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Abstract 
 
Turkey has undergone large-scale transformations over the past 30 years, changing it 
from a Kemalist Republic to a country ruled by a moderately Islamic party – the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP). I study how Islamic business associations 
(BAs) have gained political influence over dominant secular BAs in Turkey – a key 
process of these transformations.  
Existing literature treats voluntary BAs either as purely economic 
institutions, or focuses on political elites’ strategic policy and power interests in 
explaining BAs’ political influence. There is inadequate guidance on when BAs turn 
into political actors, and how they engage in mobilisation and broader intra-state 
power struggles. Especially the role of ideology and religion has been neglected, 
which is relevant for several transition countries’ business politics. This inadequacy 
can be addressed by developing a social movement framework. Following a 
grounded theory approach, I conducted a comparative analysis of secular and Islamic 
BAs’ networks structures (1993–2012), collective action frames, organisational 
structures and patterns of resource-exchange across changing institutional contexts. 
Findings are based on 51 semi-structured interviews in Gaziantep’s textile cluster in 
Turkey and additional archival material. 
I argue that Islamic BAs gained political influence because they applied 
typical social movement tactics that are adapted to the cultural and political 
environment. Conditions of politico-religious contention combined with gradual 
economic liberalisation have encouraged marginalised businesspeople to apply Islam 
in a non-contentious and market-based way. By integrating with civil society at the 
grassroots level, and gaining the support of political elites, Islamic BAs have 
complemented economic activities with resonant framing. These tactics grounded in 
Islam have increased Islamic BAs political influence by creating a new pious and 
legitimate business elite. These findings contribute to the literature by extending the 
types of institutional incentives, tactics and actors that businesspeople rely on to 
engage in contentious politics to include ideological factors.  
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Chapter I Introduction 
1. The phenomenon and its theoretical relevance 
Over the past 30 years, Turkey has experienced both economic liberalisation and 
wide-ranging political changes. A key dimension of these changes has been the 
displacement of the traditional secular Kemalist1 coalition of military leaders, top 
bureaucrats and state-nurtured holding companies by a new movement of moderate 
Islamists. This movement consists of the incumbent Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), which has formed successive majority governments since 2002; the Gülen 
community or ‘cemaat’2, one of the most influential international Islamic 
movements; and the economy-wide voluntary business associations3 linked to these 
groups, Müsiad (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) and 
Tuskon (Turkey Industrialists’ Confederation). The devout bourgeoisie organised in 
these Islamic business associations (BAs) has provided financial and human 
                                                
 
1 Turkey’s state ideology dating back to the Republican Period (1923–1946) is Kemalism, 
the basic principles of which are republicanism, secularism or laïcité, nationalism, populism, 
statism and reformism (Parla & Davison, 2004). Turkish or Kemalist conceptions of 
secularism are based on the French concept of laïcité. Kuru differentiates passive from 
assertive secularism: ‘passive secularism implies state neutrality toward various religions 
and allows the public visibility of religion. Assertive secularism, on the other hand, means 
that the state favors a secular world view in the public sphere and aims to confine religion to 
the private sphere’ (Kuru, 2006, p. 137). The French and Kemalist conceptions of secularism 
are of the assertive type where the state actively controls religion. In the following I refer to 
secular actors and institutions that signal their support for this type of assertive secularism or 
laïcité, whereas I refer to Islamic as such actors that signal their support for the restructuring 
of Turkish secularism (in moderate or extreme ways) and/or seeking greater Islamisation in 
the public, social and cultural spheres (see further point 2.3.2.b in Chapter IV). Actors in 
both groups may be privately devout Muslims. 
 
2 A ‘cemaat’ is a religious community – a flexible form of religious organisation that is 
specific for Turkey’s modernisation process. Its founder colours the discourse, and it has no 
formal entry or exit. Cemaats grows and specialise with the needs of their members; in 
modern Turkey they satisfy religious, social, economic as well as political needs (Agai, 
2004).  
 
3 Business associations are a specific type of business group: ownership or contractual ties as 
in conglomerates or holdings do not link their members. Instead, BAs are voluntary ‘long-
term organizations with formal statutes regulating membership and internal decision-
making’ (Schneider, 2004, p. 23). This study focuses on voluntary business associations and 
excludes state-chartered associations. All of the BAs studied are economy-wide, i.e. 
represent members from all industries. Neither the BAs studied, nor the Chambers are 
involved in industrial relations. Instead, the voluntary BA TISK (Turkish Employers’ 
Confederation), which has a narrow policy agenda, focuses explicitly on wage bargaining. 
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resources to the AKP, and therefore their support has been essential to the AKP’s 
formation and continued victories (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009; Hale & Özbudun, 2009; 
Jang, 2005). The AKP’s 2002, and the following 2007 and 2011 landslide electoral 
victories mark a significant turning point in Turkish history: It is for the first time 
since the formation of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 that a political party 
with roots in political Islam, ultimately challenging Turkey’s Kemalist institutions, 
has formed a majority government and reached such widespread popularity. After a 
long period during which Islam was controlled and delegitimised in the public realm, 
and a dominant state4 distanced itself from Muslim masses in the periphery,5 the 
empowerment of moderately Islamic BAs and political parties marks the 
‘resurfacing’ of Islamic political, societal and economic groups (Turam, 2007; 
Yavuz, 2003). 
Islamic business associations (BAs) that represent the pious middle class in 
the new industrial districts in central- and south-eastern Anatolia have played a 
crucial role in this large-scale political transformation. A key question in this 
                                                
 
4 Following Stepan (1988), I define the political as made up of three arenas: the state, the 
political society and civil society. By state I refer to the extensive and interconnected 
administrative, bureaucratic, legal and coercive system that has the authority to make rules, 
which govern a society including the government and armed forces. Political society is the 
arena in which contestations take place, and includes political parties as key actors. Civil 
society is the arena of mainly voluntary institutions and movements which are not explicitly 
political, nor involved in state activities, but which still exercise profound political 
influence. More specifically, ‘we understand 'civil society' as a sphere of social interaction 
between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the 
family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, 
and forms of public community’ (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. ix). The Gülen community and 
other Islamic sects/tarikats/brotherhoods/cemaats (religious community) often refer to 
themselves as civil society organisations, and I use this term as incorporating such 
religiously motivated civil society organisations, as well as any other collective operating in 
the civic realm, such as Rotary Clubs or NGOs. I refer to these organisations as operating in 
the civic realm and as composed of civic actors, and networks. 
 
5 Turkey’s present party configuration continues many of the characteristics of the centre-
periphery cleavage. This cleavage has deep roots in the Ottoman Empire where there were 
no intermediary institutions linking the military bureaucratic state elites and the Sultan in the 
centre of power, with the ‘ruled’ (Mardin, 1969; Hale & Özbudun, 2009). In the Republican, 
single-party era (1923–1946), this cleavage continued, and a united ‘centre’ of Kemalist 
military, bureaucratic institutions and party leaders subordinated civil and political society in 
the ‘periphery’. With the shift to multi-party politics after WWII, the new political parties 
and civil society have remained in a vulnerable position against bureaucratic and military 
elites (Özler & İnaç, 2007). With the emergence of political Islam in the Turkey in the late 
1970s, this cleavage overlaps to a large extent with the secular-Islam continuum in Turkey, 
with Kemalist or secular elites in the centre and Islamic actors in the periphery. This 
cleavage continues to shape Turkey’s political system and business politics today. 
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transformation is under which conditions and how moderately Islamic BAs, the 
AKP’s business constituency, have gained political influence over dominant secular 
business associations and holding companies. These moderately Islamic BAs have 
not only increased their membership in size and variety, becoming the most 
encompassing and dominant associations of the business community. They have also 
obtained more leadership positions in the semi-public Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), which maintains a central role in guiding the 
economy. This has been at the expense of their main competitor, Tüsiad (Turkish 
Industry and Business Association; 1971–), the oldest Turkish voluntary business 
association, which represents the first generation of state-nurtured, western-oriented, 
holding companies from the Istanbul-Marmara region (Buğra, 1998). 
This raises the larger question of how, and under which conditions, business 
gains collective political influence in the context of developing and transition 
countries. Existing literature provides inadequate guidance on when BAs turn into 
political actors and how they engage in mobilisation and broader intra-state power 
struggles vis-à-vis competing BAs. Especially the role of ideology and religion in 
business organisation and political power has not been developed, which is relevant 
for several transition countries’ business politics. 
Mainstream management literature on BAs treats them as purely rational 
economic institutions. The dominant collective action stream is grounded in rational-
choice paradigms: Olson’s seminal collective action theory (Olson, 1971) would find 
the mere existence of large, voluntary BAs puzzling given their inherent free-riding 
problems. Political activity of BAs is limited to rent-seeking,6 where it is rationally 
emerging from market conditions (Olson, 2000). Olson’s approach has been 
extended in transaction costs and new institutional economics approaches that 
analyse BAs as purely functional organisations that carry out efficiency-related 
activities where state and market institutions leave ‘voids’ to be filled (e.g. Khanna 
                                                
 
6 Rent-seeking is a term originating from such rational choice or neoclassical economics 
approaches. ‘Rent is part of the payment of the owner of resources over and above that 
which those reosurces could command in any alternative use. Rent is receipt in excess of 
opportunity cost.’ (Buchanan, 1980, p. 3). Rent-seeking is regarded as inefficient in that it 
obscures the efficiency of the efficient, free market economy. It creates social waste because 
resources are spent in order to maximise one’s share of personal wealth rather than creating 
social surplus. State interventionism in the economy is argued to increase the opportunities 
for rent-seeking.   
 
 17 
& Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005, 2007; Luo & 
Chung, 2005; Tan & Meyer, 2010).  
A central focus of political science literature of BAs concerns how they 
achieve political influence. Most past research has attributed variation in influence to 
either structural-institutional factors, or political elites’ strategic interests. Structural-
institutional variables include differences in party systems (Martin & Swank, 2012), 
or the institutionalised role of labour unions (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999), or the 
extent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the economy (Guillén, 2001). The 
political entrepreneurship stream within the political science literature regards 
business organisation and political access as an outcome of state and political actors’ 
strategic interests. Strong business organisations can provide policy input to 
vulnerable politicians whose interest to implement and design efficient policy or to 
get re-elected can induce them to give business special access to policymaking 
(Culpepper, 2011; Schneider, 2004). Such studies largely focuses on strategic 
national political and state elites and their interests in re-election, political support 
and policymaking7. Such strategic interests give incentives for business to build 
strong organisational structures to aggregate and control business interests. Power-
building strategies for BAs centre on getting access to policymaking through 
lobbying or other formal state-business channels. Some studies have recognised the 
broader role that BAs can play in complex intra-state conflicts and power struggles 
(e.g. electoral competition) (Markus, 2007; Sinha, 2005). However, the range of 
actors remains limited, with a focus on incentives provided to political and state 
actors by the historical-institutional context. The multiple ways through which BAs 
engage in political struggles and mobilisation, and the role of ideology remain 
ignored. 
This question is important because there are many settings in which 
competing business interests are allied with different political parties in deep intra-
state power struggles. These cleavages are most common where power coordination 
is less regulated and new political and market institutions vulnerable, providing civil 
                                                
 
7 Sinha’s (2005) study of the transformation of Indian BAs to developmental BAs does 
incorporate business interests into her framework to explain their origins. However, it does 
not include ideological variables and does not study BA tactics, but focuses on the 
institutional context.  
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society at large, and business in particular, a more prominent role in contests that go 
beyond providing policy input or support for politicians’ re-election. One example is 
Russia under Putin (Markus, 2007), where BAs’ access to policymaking has been 
institutionalised in order to exercise pressure on state agents. These intra-state power 
struggles can also overlap with ideological or other broad social cleavages, bringing 
ideology and cultural symbols to the fore in political and business mobilisation. This 
has been observed in an increasing number of Latin American and post-Ottoman and 
Muslim countries.8 Business associations that focus on achieving certain political 
aims, and base their mobilisation on informal cooperation and shared ideologies, 
have been observed in several Latin American countries as well as in Turkey. In 
Turkey, the displacement of secular BAs is part of a broader political struggle 
between the moderately Islamic and secular alliances consisting of political parties, 
state elites and civil society organisations, including BAs. Collaboration between 
Islamic political elites, a particular religious community and SMEs  (Small- and 
medium-sized enterprises) based in Anatolia have played an important role in the 
formation and growth of Islamic BAs and the empowerment of the AKP (Tuğal, 
2009; Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003). Informal grassroots networks at the local level 
have served as platforms for political mobilisation, the exchange of financial 
resources and the creation of legitimacy to a new pious economic elite (Buğra, 2002; 
Demir, Acar, & Toprak, 2004; Hoşgör, 2011; Özcan, 1995). Several examples have 
also been observed in Latin America: The contention surrounding Peronist ideology 
has deeply influenced business politics in Argentina, creating polarisation and 
conflict among Argentinian BAs (Schneider, 2004). The neoliberal populism and 
ideology applied by Peronist parties in Argentina shows similarities to Turkey in the 
1980s (Öniş, 2004). During the transition to democracy in the early 1980s, Mexican 
businessmen were similarly observed to become involved with ‘movements’ of like-
minded capitalists and military officials (Schneider, 2004). In Brazil the modern-day 
Pnbe (National Thought of Entrepreneurial Bases) first existed as a movement of 
young industrialists in Sao Paulo who were pro-reformism and formed a non-
                                                
 
8 Post-Ottoman countries are those territories in which were part, for a reasonable amount of 
time, of the Ottoman Empire, including countries of the Northern African Continent, 
especially modern-day Egypt and Tunisia, the Balkans, and Middle Eastern countries such 
as modern-day Syria and Iraq. The Kemalist ideology has influenced state-building in 
Muslim countries beyond the Ottoman Empire such as Iran, and Indonesia (Yavuz, 2003). 
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hierarchical BA to prevent the concentration of power at the top (Guimaraes & 
Gomes, 2004). They initially organised themselves in 1987 in competition to the 
dominant Fiesp (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo), and consisted of 
young SME owners aiming to stimulate public debates. Although their influence is 
said to be limited, it still exists today focusing on solving social and ecological 
problems. All of these collaborations go beyond the rational and interest-based 
exchanges between political elites and businessmen identified in the existing 
literature.  
These examples show that BAs can mobilise their membership base and 
engage in political competition through informal means of cooperation with various 
groups, based on shared political goals, identities and ideology. In spite of such 
examples, the question of how ideology and religion enter business organisation and 
under what conditions these serve as sources of political power has not been 
developed in the BA literature. Existing approaches limit the range of actors, power 
resources and strategies that BAs can apply to gain political influence. Such 
functional and interest-based approaches cannot explain the competition between 
BAs based on shared goals, identities and informal means of collaboration with civil 
society organisations, political elites and particular business groups in some 
countries. 
In this thesis, I argue that this inadequacy can be addressed by adopting a 
social movement perspective that combines political institutional and ideological 
variables in explaining the context, functions and consequences of BAs. I explore 
how ideology and religion have entered the strategies and success of BAs to gain 
political influence, based on an in-depth comparative case study of Turkey’s BAs. I 
study the conditions and ways in which BAs apply social movement tactics to gain 
political influence, based on a comparison of secular and Islamic inter-organisational 
networks, framing activities and resource exchanges.  
2. Theoretical framework: business associations with social 
movement characteristics 
Social movements are ‘collectivities acting with some degree of organization and 
continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of 
challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally 
based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a 
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part’ (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004, p. 11). The political process framework and its 
later extensions (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1978) 
provide a useful starting point to study when and how BAs successfully apply 
ideology to gain political influence. Sidney Tarrow (2011, p. 32) argues that 
contentious politics are translated into sustainable social movements under the 
following conditions, or ‘political opportunity structures’ (POS): when ‘threats are 
experienced and opportunities are perceived, when the existence of available allies is 
demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed’. Such changes in 
power balance trigger incentives for actors who lack the necessary resources for 
political influence to take action by applying tactics from ‘repertoires of contention’ 
(Tilly, 1978) – the means by which people engage in contentious collective action. 
Contention successfully translates into sustainable movements ‘when it taps into 
embedded social networks and connective structures and produces vivid collective 
action frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention against powerful 
opponents’ (Tarrow, 2011). Social and organisational bases are necessary to translate 
claims into movement organisations, as are constructions of identities and mobilising 
emotions through collective action frames (Tarrow, 2011, p. 13).  
Following this literature, I first analyse openings in the ‘political opportunity 
structures’ to understand when and under what conditions ideology has entered the 
political empowerment of Islamic BAs in Turkey. Secondly, my thesis analyses the 
factors contributing to the political success of moderately Islamic BAs in displacing 
secular BAs in Turkey, based on a comparative analysis of their network structures, 
collective actions frames, organisational structures and patterns of resource exchange 
across changing institutional contexts at the grassroots level. In Turkey’s 
environment of politico-religious contention, or generally where social struggles 
‘revolve around broad cleavages in society’, success in political mobilisation 
depends on ‘bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols’ (Tarrow, 
2011, p. 29). The question is therefore how ideology and religion have been 
incorporated into the social movement tactics of economic institutions – business 
associations – to provide sources of political power.  
A key element of successful social movements, in addition to an ability to 
grasp political opportunities, is whether and how they can tap into embedded 
networks with civic and political actors. Networks can fulfil various functions, 
allowing for the exchange of resources, building of solidarity and trust as well as 
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common goals (Baldassarri & Diani, 2007; Tilly, 2005), and can ‘form bridges 
laterally and over time’ between organisations (Tarrow, 2011, p. 132). As formal 
cooperation between Islamic organisation and political parties has been forbidden 
since the 1980 military coup, integration has been achieved through the overlap of 
informal membership between organisations. Network patterns based on 
membership data are, therefore, an indicator for the cooperation/competition 
between relevant business, civil society and political organisations, as well as for the 
opportunities and obstacles to the transfer of resources, political support and 
solidarity in the associated network. The chapter on social networks will study if and 
how Islamic vs secular BAs have been able to tap into local embedded networks 
with political and civil society organisations over time. More specifically, I compare 
levels of cohesion and the structure and extent of political and civic ties in the two 
subgroups9 between the pre- and post-AKP eras (from 1993–2012).  
In order to bind networks of organisations together and to motivate collective 
action, successful social movements require collective action frames that define a 
common problem, goal, identity, and tactics. Frames are ‘collections of idea 
elements tied together by a unifying concept that serve to punctuate, elaborate, and 
motivate action on a given topic’ (Snow & Benford, 1988). Effective frames that 
‘resonate’, according to the literature, fulfil all these tasks of framing and ground 
their idea elements in familiar cultural narratives and ideology. I compare the quality 
or resonance of Islamic and secular BAs’ collective action frames, which depends on 
their coherence, specificity, completeness and grounding in cultural or ideological 
narratives. I illustrate how Islamic BAs create internal solidarity and legitimacy, and 
motivate collective action through resonant framing. 
Without some degree of formal organisation, however, we can expect 
movements to fade away, i.e. interpersonal networks are not sufficient for successful 
movement activity. As part of the early political process paradigm (Tilly, 1978), the 
resource mobilisation approach (Gamson, 1975; Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 
1977) argues that organisations with more resources are essential for political 
                                                
 
9 I refer to the two ideologically based alliances of organisations as subgroups. The Islamic 
subgroup qualifies as a movement, which is the overall argument of this thesis, and therefore 
I refer this subgroup also as a movement and to the organisations as social movement 
organisations. The secular subgroup does not qualify as a movement, but only as a coalition 
of organisations. 
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mobilisation and internal control. Such resources include the availability of 
organisational venues, expertise, time, and financial assets. I finally analyse the types 
of activities and resources that BAs provide to their members and collaborating civil 
society and political organisations. What activities, or rather tactics, do Islamic as 
compared to secular BAs offer their members through their embedded networks with 
political and civic elites? And how do these resource exchanges increase the political 
influence of Islamic BAs in a competition with secular BAs? I analyse whether 
exchange patterns and tactics extend beyond providing efficiency-related services to 
companies and politicians; in other words, whether BAs play a contentious role 
beyond providing resources that market institutions do not provide, and beyond 
exchanging patronage10 resources with politicians (i.e. campaign financing, re-
election support in exchange for commercial interests and policy access). The study 
of resources and tactics extends to BAs organisational structures that either facilitate 
or hinder inter-organisational cooperation. The question is what kind of 
organisational structures Islamic BAs have built into their organisational fields11 to 
facilitate both the exchange of resources, while retaining the ability to act and speak 
with one voice, and also integrating flexible local interests. Are these different from 
the majority of BA and movement literature, which suggests that hierarchical and 
strong organisations are crucial for collective action? 
3. Summary of research design, sample and methods 
I chose Gaziantep, or short Antep, as a city case because it is one of the most 
successful growth centres of the new industrial centres of central- and south-eastern 
Anatolia (Anatolian capital). Gaziantep’s economic growth is most evident in its 
export performance, where it has gradually overtaken older industrial centres (like 
Adana) since the 2000s. This displacement extends to the political realm: Above all, 
the secular BA and political parties have increasingly lost the competition with more 
influential Islamic BAs and political parties in Gaziantep (as will be established in 
                                                
 
10 By patronage I mean the use of the state resources, e.g. appointments to office or other 
privileges, such as state tenders, in exchange for electoral or political support to individuals.  
 
11 Organisational fields are ‘a set of organisations that share overlapping constituencies and 
interests and that recognize one another’s activities as being relevant to those concerns’ 
(Cress and Snow, 2000, p. 1074). This definition is consistent with work on 
multiorganisational fields in study of social movements, and the institutional perspective on 
organisations. 
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Chapter III). The increase in political influence of Islamic BAs and businessmen is 
apparent in their positions at the Gaziantep Chamber of Industry (GSO) and the 
Union of Chambers (TOBB). Gaziantep differs from other Anatolian capital 
provinces in that it has had a stronger secular political and political elite. The 
increasing competition and gradual displacement in Gaziantep through Islamic elites 
is therefore all the more puzzling and provides an ideal study ground to analyse how 
a new and vulnerable Islamic movement gained political influence at the expense of 
an already established secular elite.  
Gaziantep has three Islamic business associations, two of which are affiliated 
with Tuskon, and one of which is a local Müsiad branch. There is one secular 
business association. This study focuses on the textile manufacturing cluster in 
Gaziantep in its selection of a network sample and interviewees. The economy-wide 
voluntary business associations in Turkey aim to mainly organise powerful industrial 
companies, and therefore non-industrial companies were excluded. The textile 
cluster is among the internationally most competitive and largest of Gaziantep’s 
industries. By selecting companies with industry activities in one specific cluster, we 
can rule out the explanation that specific production and task requirements in textiles 
shape the differential networking strategies of Islamic and secular companies. 
Although there might be slight differences between industries, the mobilisation of 
Islamic business associations takes place across all sectors, and Gaziantep’s textile 
industry reflects a valid company sample of these tactics. 
I rely on a grounded theory approach to develop a social movement 
framework of BAs. After tracing the conditions or political opportunity structures 
that have impacted upon Turkish business politics, I conduct a comparative analysis 
of secular and Islamic BAs’ networks structures (from 1993 – 2012). Findings are 
based on 51 semi-structured interviews in Gaziantep’s textile cluster in Turkey and 
additional archival material. The comparison of Islamic and secular BAs’ frames 
relies on a frame analysis; the following comparison of Islamic and secular BAs’ 
activities and resource exchanges in their organisational fields relies on a thematic 
analysis of different sections of the same source material.  
4. Summary of findings, argument and contribution 
I argue that Islamic BAs gained political influence at the expense of secular BAs 
over the 1993–2012 period because they combined a broad range of resources and 
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actors by applying typical social movement tactics that are attuned to the political 
and cultural environment. In Turkey, conditions of high politico-religious contention 
and threats, combined with gradual globalisation, have encouraged businesspeople in 
the periphery to apply Islam in a non-contentious and market-based way through 
collaboration. This non-contentious, market-based collaboration grounded in Islam is 
evident in Islamic BAs’ tactics that reinforce each other and are adapted to their 
environment. It is evident in their networks, frames and resource exchanges. By 
integrating with civil society at the grassroots level, as well as gaining the support of 
political elites, Islamic BAs have been able to provide strong economic activities 
with complementary framing. These tactics have increased Islamic BAs political 
influence by enhancing the public legitimacy of a new generation of pious economic 
elites that can compete with existing secular elites. This exchange is contentious 
insofar as it is supports wider movement interests and organisations, and paves the 
way for disruption and institutional change. 
The social network analysis shows how Islamic BAs have created strong, yet 
diverse local networks that bring together political and civic elites at the grassroots 
level. These informal networks based on co-membership have supported movement 
tactics by serving as important bases for the transfer of resources, political support 
and solidarity vis-à-vis a threatening centralised state. This is adaptive in that Islamic 
BAs have built venues for collaboration and political mobilisation where alternatives 
were closed off since the collaboration between political parties and civil society was 
limited with the 1980 military coup.  
The framing analysis shows that Islamic BAs have created a coherent and 
complete frame that develops a non-contentious capitalist Islamic value system that 
informs all aspects of that frame and of Islamic BAs’ tactics. This frame supports 
Islamic BAs’ networks by incorporating the interests of collaborating social 
movement organisations (SMOs) and by promoting solidarity by establishing shared 
identities and goals. It supports BAs’ activities by giving market-based and civic 
activities an otherworldly legitimacy. The key goal is defined as creating a 
legitimate, pious business elite. This frame is adapted to its environment insofar as it 
amplifies religion and develops a value system that is not directly disruptive to state 
elites, but based in themes of civic service, hard work, entrepreneurship and piety. 
The analysis of the resource exchange and activities of Islamic BAs shows 
again how Islamic BAs’ tactics reinforce one another by being based on a coherent 
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and non-contentious type of capitalist Islam and collaboration among SMOs. Islamic 
BAs’ activities and resource exchanges are in line with framing by adhering to the 
defined goals and tactics, and facilitated by networks across SMOs.  Islamic BAs 
receive resources of legitimacy and economic resources through their networks with 
political and civic elites, to build a new pious business elite with public legitimacy. 
Yet Islamic businessmen also return financial and political support. This inter-
organisational collaboration is facilitated by BAs’ organisational structures. These 
are characterised by hybrid structures, which are strong, resource-rich and flexible at 
the same time. Combining Müsiad’s centralisation and Tuskon’s sensitivity to local 
interests across organisations has facilitated the integration of political, civic and 
business interests across the network.  
The promoted resource exchange is indirectly contentious, promoting 
movement organisations and goals. First, economic resources are received in return 
for providing political support and financial resources toward collaborating SMOs, 
the AKP and the Gülen community, and this process creates interlocking 
dependencies and continued support. Second, this exchange creates parallel Islamic 
organisations and institutions that are aimed to supplant existing institutions. 
Thereby such seemingly non-political economic and CSR services, in the civic and 
economic realm provide sources of political power for the whole Islamic movement. 
Third, this resource exchange is indirectly contentious, as the provision of such 
resources is largely limited toward co-religionists and requires compliance with 
certain Islamic civic, business and private codes of behaviour and institutions. These 
were previously illegitimate and were aimed at restructuring Kemalist state 
institutions. 
In contrast, the secular BA’s elitism is reflected in its network, activities and 
frames, which qualify it as a ‘club’ rather than movement. I find that the association 
does not focus on economic activities, but on CSR and socialisation activities to 
create friendship and solidarity among large business owners internally, and public 
legitimacy externally. Similarly, the network analysis showed that the secular BA 
has not cooperated with a popular civil society organisation, but have forged ties 
with elitist secular clubs and the semi-public Chambers of Industry and Trade. 
Political elites of the secular coalition were more likely to be members of such elite 
clubs, rather than of the business association, showing the reduced focus on political 
integration via the secular BA. This is reflected in the fact that Islamic BAs overtook 
 26 
the secular BA in their political integration during the formative years of the new 
moderately Islamic and capitalist AKP. This has reduced members’ access to 
economic resources today, unless they become strategic and join Islamic BAs. 
Combined with their incoherent collective identity and the focus on nationalism and 
elitism in their collective action frame, this has resulted in a gradual loss of political 
ties, economic power and public legitimacy compared to Islamic BAs. 
Social movement theory particularly focuses on collective action outside 
established institutional channels, which is goal-oriented, aiming to challenge or 
defend authority (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11). When business becomes part of broader 
intra-state struggles, and traditional means of political mobilisation are cut off, BAs 
can adopt such movement characteristics as well. Both political entrepreneurship 
approaches to BAs and the political process models of social movements give 
primacy to political contexts and state actors in shaping the mobilisation tactics of 
civil society organisations. But while the former includes only state and BA actors, 
and tactics focused on strong organisations and policy support for rational 
politicians, I argue that different political contexts condition different types of tactics 
to successfully provide political support. The application of a social movement 
framework of BAs allows for the incorporation of ideological and political-
institutional variables. By studying the dynamics of religious organisational forms 
and their influences on broader processes at large, I aim to extend the BA and 
organisational literatures overall, where such processes are little understood (Tracey, 
2012).  
First, in terms of the conditions for achieving political influence, I argue that 
BA literature needs to go beyond the rational policy interests of state elites and 
structural institutional environments to include context-specific politico-ideological 
incentives and constraints. Secondly, concerning how BAs achieve political 
influence, I argue that there are variety of actors that provide a multiplicity of power 
resources at both the centre and periphery of power, and accordingly, a large range 
of tactics are applied by BA to achieve political influence. Most importantly, in line 
with social movement approaches, I argue that the boundaries of BAs have to be 
extended to include other ‘social movement organisations’ in BAs’ organisational 
fields. Civil society organisations, including religious groups, can be important 
actors in addition to political elites, providing essential economic, political and 
legitimacy-based resources. Similar to political parties and civil society 
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organisations, BAs’ strategies of power-building and power resources can include 
shared goals and beliefs.  
The political process approaches to social movement excludes collaborative, 
and indirect forms of contention that go beyond ‘symbolic and peaceful forms of 
disruption’ (Tarrow, 2011, p.102). The modern Islamic movement in Turkey 
however has combined indirect socio-economic and private forms of contention with 
disruptive aims. I show that BAs can apply collaborative, market- and civic-based 
tactics to attain goals that ultimately challenge authorities, thereby extending the 
range of ‘repertoires of contention’ to include indirectly contentious tactics. This is 
line with recent developments in social movement literature that suggest that tactics 
can range from contentious to non-contentious, and from attacking state or cultural 
authority through collaboration and/or confrontation (Bakker, Hond, King, & Weber, 
2013).  
5. Structure of the thesis 
In the following literature review (Chapter II), I will first give an overview of the 
existing literature on business associations’ political influence to situate the current 
study. I develop limitations of the existing literature, and justify why voluntary 
business associations in Turkey provide a useful case to address the lack of religion 
and ideology in explanations of business political power. I then build a social 
movement framework that analyses social networks, collective action frames and 
resource exchanges, embedded in POS, as tactics of power building for BAs. Finally, 
I briefly outline the general methodological approach and research design.  
Chapter III first presents empirical data and literature to establish the 
phenomenon or puzzle, being the increasing political influence of Islamic over 
secular BAs. Next, I justify Gaziantep as city case for studying the competition 
between secular and Islamic BAs. The second part of this chapter provides an 
analysis of the political opportunity structures (POS) and background conditions of 
Turkish business politics. This analysis traces what background conditions have 
shaped the tactics and political success of Islamic business associations.  
Chapters IV to VI are dedicated to the empirical analyses of social movement 
tactics in Gaziantep, comparing Islamic and secular BAs’ membership networks, 
collective action frames and patterns of resource exchange. Each of these empirical 
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chapters features its own introduction, methods chapter and discussion of findings at 
the end.  
Chapter IV focuses on the membership networks of BAs’ organisational 
fields, asking if and how BAs have built local coalitions with civil society and 
political organisations before and after the AKP’s inauguration (from 1993–2012). 
As formal ties between political and Islamic groups have been delegitimised at 
certain time periods, overlapping memberships have become an important way of 
connecting Islamic actors. Tapping into embedded networks is a key element of 
transforming contention into successful social movements. Variations in the 
cohesion and extent of political and civic inter-organisational ties between secular 
and Islamic BAs across time indicate differences in network-building strategies and 
access to political, civic and economic resources. Those resources will be analysed 
in more detail in the final empirical chapter.  
Chapter V compares the completeness and coherence of Islamic and secular 
BAs’ collective action frames with a special focus on their use of ideological 
variables. According to the literature, the resonance of frames crucially depends on 
how coherent, specific and complete frames are, adhering to identifying a common 
problem, identity, goal and tactics. How well the frame resonates with actors also 
depends on the fit between the ideological contents of the frame with the wider 
cultural environment. I illustrate how building resonant frames, coherent and 
attainable identities and goals, has been important to bind inter-organisational 
coalitions together, to motivate actors, and to gain public legitimacy for Islamic BAs. 
Chapter VI compares secular and Islamic BAs’ activities, the resources 
provided to members and collaborating organisations through such activities, and the 
organisational structures that facilitate this exchange. This chapter analyses the kind 
of tactics through which Islamic BAs, compared to the secular BA, achieve the goals 
set out in their collective action frames, and how these generate political influence. A 
large and rich range of resources, and strong hierarchical organisational structures 
are regarded as important facilitators of movement success. 
Chapter VII concludes with a short summary of findings, before discussing 
their contributions to the relevant literature. I then note some limitations of the 
present study. I finally present avenues for future research and comment on Turkey’s 
outlook for democratisation and economic development.  
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Chapter II Literature Review 
1. Situating the study within the literature 
Among the existing approaches, the literature of business associations intersects with 
three broad literatures on collective action: the rational choice paradigm and its 
expansion in transaction-cost and neo-institutionalist approaches, corporatism, and 
political science. Each of these streams has differing explanations for the emergence, 
functions and consequences of voluntary BAs. 
The dominant collective action literature analyses BAs as economic 
organisations that carry out efficiency-related activities aimed at maximising 
economic results for their members. Olson’s classic rational choice paradigm regards 
economy-wide, voluntary BAs as anomalies, and as causing market distortions 
through their inherent fixed interests in rent-seeking and free-riding (Olson, 1971, 
2000). Olson’s ‘logic of collective action’ (1971) follows a rational choice paradigm, 
focusing on which and how internal organisational and structural characteristics (e.g. 
group size and heterogeneity) can alleviate the inherent free-riding problems in 
collective action. Rational actors in large, heterogeneous groups face strong 
incentives for free-riding that make cooperation difficult to achieve. While small and 
homogeneous groups are likely to organise, the pure existence and persistence of 
economy-wide, encompassing BAs with voluntary membership are puzzling to this 
strand of theory, and assumed to be short-lived and weak at best (Schneider, 2004). 
That is especially true where membership is voluntary, lacking means of coercion or 
other exceptional ‘selective incentives’ for members only. Additionally, BAs are 
regarded as rent-seeking organisations only, seeking market privileges from 
entrenched state and political actors to gain monopoly rents, for example, through 
lobbying. However, multiple studies have shown that BAs can also take on more 
positive developmental functions (Doner & Schneider, 2000; Sinha, 2005), and 
participate in political activity beyond rent-seeking and lobbying. Olson assumes that 
the political activity of business solely derives from the fact that multiple markets 
and related industries segment the larger business communities; political 
participation then becomes rational in these smaller groups. However, there is poor 
empirical support and even contrary findings as there is simply ‘too much’ political 
activity among BAs (W. L. Hansen, Mitchell, & Drope, 2005). 
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An extension of Olson’s theories of collective action can be found in the 
‘new’ institutional economics (Ménard & Shirley, 2008; North, 2008) and 
transaction cost literatures (Williamson, 1981) where associations are assumed to 
form to lower several key transaction and information costs. While Olson’s theories 
regard the process of business mobilisation in non-partisan ways, neo-institutional 
accounts see associations as primarily functional entities responding to market and 
state failures (Sinha, 2005). Inefficient market institutions propel the development of 
non-market institutions such as BAs to lower transaction costs and to fill 
‘institutional voids’ that normally underpin the efficient functioning of markets, such 
as venture capitalists, financial analysts, labour market intermediaries, or even 
judicial institutions and a rigorous financial press12 (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 2000; 
Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005, 2007; Luo & Chung, 2005; Tan & 
Meyer, 2010). The key debate in this stream of literature is whether BAs are 
‘paragons or parasites’, i.e. whether or not business collective can have positive 
consequences for economic growth.13 BAs and their political activities are analysed 
as functional facilitators to get access to economic resources. Gaining political 
influence is not regarded as a goal of BAs, but as a means to achieve greater 
efficiency, disembedding political from economic dynamics. While BAs and their 
members can be assumed to be inherently interested in economic profit-
maximisation, this strand of literature neglects that BAs can serve as vehicles for 
mobilisation and be involved in the interest formation of their members and broader 
power struggles. 
The corporatist and political science literatures pay closer attention to how 
political structures and actors affect the emergence, functions and consequences of 
                                                
 
12 For example, some studies tested whether measures of capital market development and of 
the legal system, on the one hand, and the extent of risk sharing provided by business groups 
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2005) as well the extent of vertical integration and of the diversification 
premium, on the other hand, (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), are correlated. However, the authors 
admit there was no clear evidence of the institutional-void explanation for financial market 
institutions. For example, risk-sharing characteristics through loans and mutual insurances 
can only be observed in South Korea, and to a lesser extent in Thailand and Taiwan. 
 
13 These empirical studies estimating economic effects of group membership mainly focus 
on business groups with ownership ties where data are more readily available (especially 
analysing South-East Asian cases like South Korean ‘chaebol’, Japanese ‘keiretsu’ 
networks, or Chinese business groups (Chang & Hong, 2000; Keister, 1998, 2009). 
However, these are unlikely to have implications for voluntary BAs where members are 
independent of each other. 
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BAs. Bringing the state and political dynamics into the analysis is key as much 
literature suggests that the state is an important actor influencing the organisation of 
business in transition economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia (Buğra, 1994; 
Schneider, 2004; Teichman, 2001). BAs are not limited to merely economic 
organisations that provide efficiency-related functions to their members, but 
understood as political organisations contingent on their contexts.  
The corporatist literature emerged to conceptualise tripartite concertation 
agreements among labour, business and employers in social Europe (e.g. Baccaro, 
2003; Cawson, 1985; Lehmbruch, 1984; Schmitter, 1974; Streeck, 2006). Generally 
speaking, analyses in the corporatist literature are mostly historical and 
contextualised, explaining collective action by one group as related to other groups, 
political actors and institutional constraints (Schneider, 2004). A dominant approach 
to BAs from the corporatist tradition argues that their activities and outcomes are 
shaped by a large variety of factors including not just members’ interests, but more 
importantly, trade union and state structures. Such factors influence whether BAs 
orient themselves toward their members’ or state interests’, and thus their dominant 
activities and political influence at large (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). However, it 
focuses heavily on institutional variables, namely the cooperation in national-level 
policymaking between organised interest groups and governments. The European 
model with concerted agreements among peak associations and government leaders 
is not likely to be viable in developing countries or in transition countries such as 
Turkey that are in the process of economic liberalisation and democratic 
consolidation (Bianchi, 1984; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995). 
The corporatist literature and some political analyses give primacy to 
structural-institutional variables to explain BAs’ political influence (e.g. party 
systems, extent of foreign direct investment (FDI) and corporate ownership). Cross-
national variations in corporate ownership and the extent of FDI in transition 
economies have been assumed to influence the propensity and structure of collective 
action: the type of goods and investment capital governments and powerful social 
groups allow multi-national corporations (MNCs) to import, makes a difference in 
what space is available for domestic business to organise, and whether these groups 
are strongly dominated by large foreign firms (Biggart & Guillen, 1999; Guillén, 
2001). However, there are several examples, which defy this line of argument. For 
example, Mexico attracts among the largest level of FDI in Latin America, yet also 
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has strong, organised voluntary BAs (Schneider, 2002, 2004). Turkey has received 
comparatively little FDI until the 2000s, mainly in the form of joint ventures with 
large holding companies, who did not choose to exit, but many of who instead chose 
to get organised in Tüsiad. Since the mid-2000s, FDI inflow into Turkey has 
increased considerably, but so has the organisational strength of voluntary BAs.  
Concerning political institutions, a range of scholars expect that macro-
political factors such as state-led development, the structure of party systems, the 
existence of military dictatorship or democratisation will affect patterns of business 
organisation (Schneider, 2004). For example, Offe (1995) argues that generally 
interventionist states tend to promote group formation while governments inspired 
by liberal doctrines ignore organised groups or, in extreme cases, attempt to 
dismantle them. A key structural example from the political-institutional literature 
are the historical and comparative analyses by Martin and Swank (2004, 2012). The 
authors compare Denmark, Germany, the UK and Us and ask under what conditions 
business was more likely to exert policy influence toward ‘social investments’. 
Using mixed methods, they find that business was the most developmental where 
strong peak BAs were organised by politicians, whose incentives, in turn, were 
shaped by party systems. More specifically, multiple party systems in Germany and 
Denmark gave incentives to defer policymaking to private peak BAs, who 
increasingly self-regulated and promoted social investments. Dual party systems 
gave no such incentives.  
Such macro-political and structural factors are important as boundary 
conditions to set the stage for the actions of particular state and business actors. 
However, alone they cannot explain under what conditions and how BAs gain 
political influence. Much more depends on such actions within a dictatorship, for 
example, or on specific events during the process of implementing a new 
development strategy than on these macro parameters themselves, especially in 
transition economies where ‘young’ democratic and neoliberal institutions are less 
stable and more vulnerable than in mature economies (Schneider, 2004; Teichman, 
2001). For example, Schneider’s (2004) analysis shows that there are a variety of 
responses within the same structural arrangements: developmental states featured 
either personal relations bypassing associations in some countries, or preferred 
collective representation in others (e.g. in Chile and Colombia, or Brazil under 
Vargas), or favoured associations in informal consultation.  
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In line with this approach, another stream within the political science 
literature, referred to as political entrepreneurship, criticises the overly structural 
focus of the aforementioned political-institutional and of corporatist approaches. 
Instead, political entrepreneurship argues for a more actor-centred approach where 
political and state elites are regarded as initiators’ of business’ political influence 
(Culpepper, 2011; Markus, 2007; Martin, 1991, 1994; Maxfield & Schneider, 1997; 
Polsky, 2000; Schneider, 2002, 2004, 2010a; Sinha, 2005). Business organisation 
and political access is regarded as an outcome of state actors’ strategic interests. 
Organised business can help political elites in various power struggles (e.g. electoral 
competition, struggles between executive and legislature), and promote efficient 
policymaking. In this regard, Culpepper (2011) studies the variation in the influence 
of business on corporate governance reform across Germany, the Netherlands, 
France and Japan, although he does not explicitly focus on BAs. He argues overall 
that the policy influence of business originates from the rational policy interests of 
state elites to implement effective policy and to gain political support. How, and 
under what conditions, business exercises influence is shaped by the complexity of 
policy issues and their political salience.14 Policy interests of state elites and political 
support have also been analysed as key drivers of BA organisation in emerging 
economies. Schneider’s (2004) seminal study comparing the organisational strength 
of Latin American BAs (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico), traces their variation 
back to state actors’ interests in policymaking. More specifically, Schneider (2010b) 
argues that businesspeople distribute their political investments into various 
influence channels according to their returns; and these returns depend mostly on the 
opportunities offered by the political system. Where state actors prefer to deal with 
organised businessmen through encompassing BAs (rather than through personal 
networks or political parties), this gives incentives for business to invest into 
encompassing BAs that exercise political influence (Schneider, 2004). The author 
                                                
 
14 If issues are complex, like corporate governance, and do not seem very important to the 
average voter, then the influence of business is high. In such circumstances business 
influences legislators through ‘quiet tactics’ like lobbying and influencing the media and 
legislators, who rely on businesspeople’s alleged managerial expertise. The influence of 
business decreases when the salience of issues is high which increases public scrutiny of 
political elites. Institutions in general, and trade unions and corporate governance 
institutions in particular influence managers’ preferences, i.e. for share- vs stakeholder 
governance arrangements, but not managers’ superior political power at large.   
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finds that it is especially under conditions of high vulnerability, e.g. through high 
electoral volatility or after a military coup, that political elites look to business for 
mobilising political support, to acquire information for complex policymaking, and 
to facilitate effective policy implementation. In another study, he finds that business 
participation also tends to vary according to the type of policy (depending on scope, 
uncertainty, and length of implementation) (Schneider, 2010b). The aggregation of 
business interests and provision of market information through peak business 
organisations to prevent rent-seeking was also a key motivator of European 
corporatism of the 1970s (Schmitter, 1974). The provision of efficient information to 
state bureaucrats by businesses to facilitate their implementation of economic policy 
autonomously from particularistic interest-group preferences has been identified as a 
key contributor to the successful economic growth in South-East Asian countries 
such as Korea and Taiwan (Buğra, 1994; Haggard & Moon, 1990). 
The presented approaches mainly treat BAs either as purely economic 
institutions, or focus on structural institutions and rational politicians’ strategic 
interests in explaining BAs’ political influence. However, some studies of political 
entrepreneurship focus on how business can enter broader political power struggles 
and support political actors (Markus, 2007; Martin, 1991, 1994; Polsky, 2000). In 
the US, office-seekers have been found to ‘engage in a discursive exercise to 
remould business (…) interests and undertake the mobilization of these interests’ to 
support their political campaigns and ‘alter the distribution of power at the national 
level’ (Marcus, 2007, p. 280). Martin (1991, 1994) has extensively studied how 
mobilised business in the US can support activist presidents to counteract political 
opposition and to increase support for their policies. In transition economies, 
Schneider (2002) finds that in Mexico in the 1960s, the then centre-left president 
promoted business organisations to perform certain neoliberal economic policies, 
such as attracting FDI, so that the administration could focus more strongly on 
socialist policies to keep its electorate. Markus (2007), studying the new strong 
business organisations in Russia, argues that BA organisation can become a part of 
intra-executive struggles (e.g. between state bureaucracy and government) especially 
in transition economies. In Russia, the ‘shift from monetarism to market dirigisme in 
Putin’s government drove the demand of presidential state agents for cooperation 
with institutionalized business, since the latter allowed the state principals to 
increase pressure on state agents. This pressure is exerted via institutionalizing BAs’ 
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access to economic policymaking’ (Markus, 2007, p. 282). These studies have 
argued that organised business can play a more active role in complex intra-state 
conflicts and power struggles (e.g. electoral competition) (Markus, 2007; Sinha, 
2005). 
Such intra-state conflicts are not just relevant for post-Communist polities, 
but apply in general to transition economies with a legacy of strong centralised states 
disembedded from civil society. When industrialisation and nation-state building 
take place at the same time, industrial activity takes on strong political dimensions 
along partisanship lines (Buğra 1994; Siegel, 2007), and a strong state becomes an 
ultimate provider of resources and legitimacy. Some transition economies with 
strong states have a weak state capacity for implementation (Evans, 1996; 
Woolcock, 1998). Their state and political elites suffer high vulnerability due to 
transitions from authoritarian military regimes and the foreign dependence of weak 
financial systems. Under such conditions vulnerable state or political elites may turn 
to civil society, actors outside of politics proper, to generate political support in 
power struggles, and to implement and create effective policies. This is further 
facilitated by the fact that the institutional system, especially the legal system and 
bureaucracy are highly contested and unstable, as they reflect the short-term 
necessities of economic development rather than accepted norms (Buğra, 1994; 
Teichman, 2001). Businesspeople, enjoying the greatest structural power compared 
to other social groups through their control over jobs and growth, often acquire 
premium access in such conditions, especially if labour is weak. If those civic actors 
have limited options for political representation and power building, they have a high 
incentive to participate in broader power struggles. If political parties and policy 
channels do not provide the opportunity for political participation, civil society 
organisations and social movements can serve as alternatives to traditional 
institutions for businessmen, as platforms for political mobilisation, and as sources 
of legitimacy and resources (Singerman, 2004).  
Such conditions apply to some Latin American countries, for example, as 
well as Turkey and other countries that share its Ottoman legacy of a strong centre-
periphery cleavage between state and civil society. South Korea, in contrast, is often 
given as a counter-example where a strong state disembedded from civil society 
combined with a strong state capacity was able to implement effective macro-
economic policy and transition independent of business interests. In a number of 
 36 
Latin American and post-Ottoman countries, such intra-state power struggles also 
overlap with broad societal cleavages, which bring ideology and religion to the fore 
in political mobilisation. BAs that focus on achieving certain political aims, and base 
their mobilisation on informal cooperation and shared ideologies, have been 
observed in several Latin American countries. In Turkey intra-state struggles overlap 
with deep ideological cleavages. The displacement of secular BAs is part of a 
broader political struggle between the moderately Islamic movement and secular 
coalition consisting of political parties, state elites and civil society organisations, 
including BAs.  
And while the political entrepreneurship literature recognise the broader role 
that BAs can play, the range of actors remains limited to political and state actors, 
and the focus is on studying the incentives provided by the institutional context and 
on strategic state elites’ interests. There is inadequate guidance on when BAs turn 
into political actors and how they engage in mobilisation and broader intra-state 
power struggles vis-à-vis competing BAs. The multiple ways through which BAs 
may achieve political mobilisation, and the role of ideology remain ignored. This 
question is important because there are many settings in which competing business 
interests are allied with different political parties in deep intra-state power struggles 
that also overlap with other ideological or cultural cleavages. For example, in some 
countries that share an Ottoman legacy, a strong centre-periphery cleavage overlaps 
with an Islam-secularism dimension. BAs in Turkey have cooperated with political 
parties and civil society organisations to gain political influence, but there are several 
examples where BAs are not purely focused on rational business interests, but 
combine such interests with political mobilisation around shared beliefs. In other 
words, BAs can have social movement characteristics. However, research has 
neglected how BAs engage in power building and how ideology and religion 
influence the conditions under which and how business gains political influence. 
This inadequacy can be addressed by taking a social movement perspective to build 
a new framework that combines political and ideological variables in explaining the 
context, functions and consequences of BAs. I rely on a detailed case study of 
Turkey’s voluntary BAs to advance the BA literature. 
Both the political BA and social movement literatures are broadly concerned 
with collective action that is directed to achieving political influence for a 
constituency. Social movement theory particularly focuses on collective action 
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outside of established institutional channels, which is goal-oriented and aims to 
challenge or defend authority (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11). Where business becomes 
part of broader intra-state struggles, and traditional means of political mobilisation 
are cut off, BAs can adopt such movement characteristics, making a combination of 
them meaningful. Both political entrepreneurship approaches to BAs and the 
political process models of social movements give primacy to political contexts and 
state actors in shaping the mobilisation tactics of civil society organisations. But 
while the former includes only state and BA actors, and tactics focused on strong 
organisations and policy support for rational politicians, the latter posit that different 
political contexts condition different types of tactics to successfully provide political 
support. Social movement concepts can therefore provide a fruitful extension to BA 
research. 
A social movement framework extends the types of institutional incentives 
and actor-based conflicts that encourage businesspeople to engage in contentious 
politics, as well as the range of tactics that BAs apply. Tapping into embedded social 
networks with civil society, creating frames that rely on common goals and 
identities, and applying repertoires of contention – these are key established 
processes through which resource-poor social movements build a multiplicity of 
power resources at the grassroots level that can feed up to the national level.  
Concerning the conditions and context, the concept of ‘political opportunity 
structures’ (POS) from political process models allows studying the role of state 
actors and ‘other micro-political institutions in encouraging or disorganizing 
business’ (Sinha, 2005, p. 4). POS are ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious 
politics’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 32). Such perceived incentives and constraints go beyond 
the rational policy interests of state elites and structural institutional environments to 
include context-specific politico-ideological institutions. In social movement 
research, it is widely accepted that ‘especially when struggles revolve around broad 
cleaves in society, that bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols 
becomes more important for mobilisation’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29). That is, in an 
environment of politico-religious contention, successful mobilisation and 
establishing political influence requires incorporating ideological factors. Secondly, 
concerning how BAs achieve political influence, a social movement approach 
includes a variety of actors that provide a multiplicity of power resources at both the 
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centre and periphery of powers, and, accordingly, a large range of tactics applied by 
BA to achieve political influence. Those go beyond the rational policy interests that 
state elites at the national level provide through formal, institutionalised policy 
channels; they also go beyond traditional BA tactics such as lobbying through 
organisationally strong BAs at the centres of political power.  
Social movement research is traditionally differentiated from collective 
action through interest groups such as BAs by operating ‘outside of institutional or 
organizational channels’ (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11). However, it extends the 
organisational boundaries of BAs to include not just political elites but any relevant 
actors and organisational forms, including civil society organisations, in BAs’ 
organisational fields with which BAs collaborate to achieve change-oriented goals 
(Snow et al., 2004). Although an important impetus for the organisation and political 
influence of BAs originates from state actors, the conditions for and tactics of 
mobilisation can take various forms; political actors can mobilise business or labour 
unions to alleviate their vulnerability or to increase their political support and policy 
efficiency, but they can also include powerful civil society, social or religious actors 
as allies (in the following: civic actors). Social movement research not only focuses 
on actors and formal channels at the centre of power, it is concerned with how 
resource-poor groups achieve movement goals. It focuses on how important 
resources for resource-poor groups can be generated at the periphery of power then 
feed back to the centre of power. While business organisation may be promoted ‘top-
down’ from political elites, this process also triggers down to the periphery, outside 
of national power centres, where a multitude of power resources are generated that 
have an impact on the central-national level. For business politics, the ‘centre of 
power’ is also where political power is concentrated, i.e. the cities and capitals with 
the seats of government. 
2. The context: Turkey’s voluntary business associations 
Turkey provides a good case to address the inadequacy of the existing BA literature. 
Several observers argue that the competition between secular and Islamic BAs is part 
of a broader long-term intra-state power struggle between the secular coalition in the 
centre of power, and the Islamic movement in the periphery. The former was 
supported by a Kemalist developmental and étatist state since the early Republican 
era, and incorporated bureaucrats, military officials and early party elites (as well as 
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the Judiciary and Presidential offices). Since economic liberalisation in the late 
1980s, a movement of Islamic political parties, BAs and civil society organisations, 
has competed and gradually displaced the secular elite. The intersection of political 
parties, civil society organisations and BAs in an environment where religion and 
ideology come to the fore in political mobilisation makes Turkey an ideal ground to 
study the conditions and means by which ideology supports the process of BAs 
achieving political power. First, it allows studying in depth how a new actor beyond 
state and political elites, namely, civil society organisations and religious 
communities may support BAs’ political power. Second, it allows studying under 
which conditions and how politico-religious contention affects the political 
mobilisation of BAs. And third, it allows studying in depth the various types of 
means and tactics that BAs may use to compete with each other, and how ideology 
enters those. Several scholars have observed that, instead of traditional political 
channels, informal networks at the grassroots level between Anatolian SMEs, 
political and civic actors have played a key role in Islamic BAs’ empowerment. 
Others have analysed the construction of a socio-economic type of Islam in its frame 
as part of the AKP’s success and popularity. This case therefore opens the venue for 
analysing alternative tactics of political mobilisation for BAs grounded in religion. 
Several observers argue that the development of Islamic BAs is closely 
linked to the politico-religious contention in Turkey (Buğra, 1998). The Islamic 
movement since the 1980s has shifted from political Islam to a socio-economic type 
(Yavuz, 2003), encompassing Islamic BAs. While the AKP built up a cross-class 
support base, it is the incorporation of the new capitalist class in Anatolian growth 
centres that is a key ingredient of its success (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). The SMEs 
and petty traders in the previously under-developed central-and south-eastern 
Anatolian provinces have been the backbone of the Islamic movement in Turkey. 
These businessmen are mainly represented in the Islamic BAs Müsiad and Tuskon. 
Today’s Anatolian industrial districts are where moderately Islamic BAs have 
emerged, and this region continues to be the base of their economic and political 
power. Some of these provinces have emerged into new centres of economic growth 
since the economic liberalisation of the 1980s. 
While there are examples in the Turkish studies literature that have studied 
the intersection of political and business ties at the national level, the local and 
grassroots levels have been neglected. Mobilisation at the local level, however, is an 
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equally important arena where important power resources are created through 
collaboration. Also, as the examples below will show, the focus has been mainly on 
the AKP or the Gülen community, and less on Islamic BA’s political mobilisation. 
There are a few studies that have looked in more detail at the overlap 
between the AKP and Islamic BAs at the national level. Businesses organised in the 
association Müsiad were found to have provided substantial human and financial 
resources for the formation of the AKP in 2001 (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009). For 
example, the Albayrak Group, a Müsiad member company, became one of the chief 
financiers of a progressive group within the political Islamist Milli Görüş Movement  
(the so-called ‘yenilikciler’); and thereby supported their split from the Milli Görüş 
to establish a new party, the AKP. Numerous Müsiad members were found to join 
the AKP in local offices in Anatolian cities, and in the Grand National Assembly 
(e.g. 20 Müsiad members were elected as AKP MPs in 2002) (Gümüşçü & Sert, 
2009; Jang, 2005). These authors argue that the pious Anatolian capitalists who 
previously supported the political Islamist parties of the Milli Görüş have re-shuffled 
their alliances to form the backbone of the moderately Islamic AKP (Gümüşçü & 
Sert, 2009; Jang, 2005).  
The links between political elites and religious groups, generally speaking, 
are less visible. Turam (2007), for instance, argues that there is generally no 
overlapping membership between the AKP and the Gülen movement. They have 
remained organisationally independent and disconnected in their activities, and this 
independence from the state has been necessary for development of civil society. 
This is not to say that linkages have not existed, but they have been informal and 
have contributed to the religious movements’ influence. The Gülen movement’s 
economic power has been fortified through its strong connections with national and 
local politicians in Turkey. Gülen followers are known to vote for the AKP since its 
break from the Milli Görüş – a political Islamist movement that has produced many 
political parties since the late 1970s (see more details in Chapter III). Yavuz (2003) 
stresses that ‘Nurcu’15 reading or study circles, of which the Gülen community is the 
                                                
 
15 Said Nursi (1876–1969) was the founder and leader of the ‘Nur’ Movement. It is the most 
influential Islamic movement in Turkey; in the late 1990s it was estimated to have 5–6 
million followers (Yavuz, 2003). The Gülen community constitutes the largest offshoot of 
this movement and it emerged in Izmir in the 1970s where Fethullah Gülen was then 
working as a state ‘imam’ (preacher). During times of state repression, ‘Nurcu’ circles were 
 41 
biggest offshoot, were used as instruments for ‘wielding informal political power 
through unofficial ties to politicians’. Turgut Özal had been a follower of Gülen’s 
sermons since the 1960s and since his election as the PM in 1987, the Gülen 
movement was enjoying more freedoms (Agai, 2004) – among other things, the 
consequence of the ‘TIS’ (Turkish-Islam Synthesis) followed after the 1980 military 
coup. As the Gülen network widened considerably in the 1990, and the first schools 
were opened abroad, politicians started visiting those establishments both in Turkey 
and abroad. F. Gülen also met with T. Çiller of the DYP in 1994 and with PM B. 
Ecevit, with whom he supposedly had excellent relations (Agai, 2004). These 
examples, while focusing on the AKP and Gülen community show that informal 
connections between religious and political elites have played an important role in 
the empowerment of the Islamic movement at large. 
Concerning BAs it is especially Ayşe Buğra’s work that has focused on 
business-state links (Buğra, 1994; Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, 2012, 2014). It analyses 
BAs as rent-seeking organisations, which provide legitimacy to patronage networks 
between big business and political elites. These studies have analysed patronage 
relations at the national level as the key source of BAs’ political access and 
influence, and have focused on tracing the changes in the types of patronage 
resources over time.  The author argues that during private sector led import 
substituting industrialisation (1960–1980), Turkish business increasingly 
consolidated its presence in the industrial sector and in society, but particularism in 
state-business relations and strong state support and interventionism persisted 
(Buğra, 1994). With the foundation of the first voluntary, economy-wide BA, 
Tüsiad, in 1971, state-business relations changed significantly, as the corporatist 
legacy ended and voluntary BAs begin to become as or even more influential than 
the Chambers. It was mainly big business profiting from protectionist measures 
during this time period. Prominent individuals e.g. V. Koç or S. Sabancı got easy 
                                                                                                                                     
 
organised secretly and played a key role in creating a counter-elite in the face of state 
repression, and in conserving Islamic identity (Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003). The Nur 
movement stood for a move from oral to a print culture, and argued to keep politics separate 
from Islam (other than the Milli Görüş). It has focused on the private sphere, education and 
later, with Gülen, the business realm. Other important Islamic groups are the Sufi Order of 
Nakşibendi, the aforementioned political Milli Görüş (National Outlook) Movement, as well 
as the brotherhood/cemaat of the ‘Süleymancılar’. The Nakşibendi Sufi Order served as the 
‘matrix for the emergence in the 1970s of these leading contemporary Turkish Islamic 
political and social movements’ (Yavuz, 2003).  
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access to information and funds through unmediated direct contacts with ministers 
and bureaucratic elites (Buğra, 1994). Support mechanisms included the provision of 
cheaper input material to the private sector, cheap credits from state banks and 
infrastructure investments by central governments. In spite of trade and later 
financial liberalisation in the 1980s, government interventionism merely changed its 
form to support the foreign trade regime (Atan, 2004). The allocation of resources 
continued to be based on connections to political elites rather than on merit and clear 
criteria, which resulted again in uncertainty, rent-seeking activity and hostility 
between bureaucratic, political and business elites. Such clientelistic relations 
continued well into the 1990s. In this era, ‘exporters, who were supported by tax 
rebates, investors in tourism and real estate benefiting from preferential credits, and 
the bidders for public sector enterprises in privatisation deals have all appeared as 
important actors in newly emerging networks among public authorities and private 
businessmen’ (Buğra, 2003). Public tenders and privatisation deals, as well as the 
provision of cheap credit through public banks (e.g. Halk and Vakıf Bankası) 
continue to constitute an important tool to support business elites today, according to 
the authors (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). While the altering political and economic 
context modified the tools of state interventionism, these studies argue that clientelist 
exchanges have continued to dominate the state-business relationship up to this day. 
One important difference from the past is that Anatolian industrialists have 
also taken advantage of the step-wise trade and financial liberalisation since 1980, 
and relied on informal grassroots networks and a pattern of pooling private 
resources16 instead of predominantly relying on state subsidies and protectionist 
policies (Demir et al., 2004; European Stability Initiative, 2005). This is not to say 
that Anatolian SMEs did profit from the ANAP administration’s export promotion, 
providing export- and other incentives. Existing Turkish area studies have not 
studied how Islamic BAs have generated resources at the local level, and how these 
have increased their political influence. They mainly focused on either BA–AKP 
relations at the national or the Gülen community. While studying these rent-seeking 
coalitions at the national level is important, this research neglects the role of civic 
                                                
 
16 For example, a study by TMOBB (the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and 
Architects) shows that in Gaziantep 93% of companies founded their companies with the 
help of family capital (TMOBB, 1998 cited in Ayata, 2004, p. 569).   
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actors and the wide variety of resources exchanged and created at the local level, 
where such patronage networks may be one of several exchange mechanisms. This is 
all the more surprising given that Anatolian industrial districts in the periphery have 
been argued to be a key support base of centre-right parties, the Gülen community 
and of Islamic BAs. To address this inadequacy, I conduct my study of how Islamic 
BAs have gained political influence at the grassroots level in the former periphery of 
Anatolian industrial districts.  
The importance of the local level for the Islamic movement is further 
supported by the following observations in the Turkish studies literature. In the 
political realm, Çarkoğlu (2002) argues that in spite of Turkey’s highly centralised 
political system, or maybe because of it, local and regional factors have been shaping 
national election results over the past half a century. Studies of the AKP have shown 
that the AKP has merged neoliberalism with strong local organisation and 
mobilisation – a legacy of political Islam. In their in-depth study of the AKP, Hale 
and Özbudun (2009) show that the AKP fulfils one important aspect of a mass-based 
political party; the AKP is more active, and more highly motivated and elaborately 
organised at the local level than any other political party in Turkey. Local activities 
feature service provision, intra-party education and face-to-face interactions with 
potential voters. A study on the social backgrounds of AKP deputies in 2007 
confirms the trend of the AKP toward greater localism. Sayari and Hasanov (2008) 
show that the percentage of deputies born in their constituencies increased 
considerably between 1999 and 2007, and especially among the AKP, increasing the 
influence of local interests. In 2007, the AKP had the highest share of local deputies 
from the Anatolian regions (Eastern-, Central-, South-eastern-Anatolia, ranging 
between 78%–100% of deputies), and the second lowest share from the Marmara 
region (44% of AKP deputies, slightly above the nationalist MHP). 
The importance of cooperating with civil society organisations at the 
grassroots level has become even more important since many municipalities have 
been in the hands of the AKP and are allowed to contract welfare provisioning out to 
private firms (Göçmen, 2011b). With increasing decentralisation, the resources of 
local municipalities have increased and the range of activities to be subcontracted 
locally has widened from infrastructure, which continues to be an important arena 
for rent-seeking (e.g. through the agency Toki), to further social services (Göçmen, 
2011b). 
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Hale and Özbudun (2009) report how the AKP maintains close contacts with 
like-minded civil society organisations (associations, foundations, etc.) active in the 
sub-province, mainly to guide and inform voters of the various social welfare 
programmes conducted by the central government (e.g. Social Solidarity Fund), the 
metropolitan municipal government and local municipalities. Such local activism has 
also been attributed to Islamic BAs, Tuskon affiliates and Müsiad branches alike, 
that mainly serve to build up local solidarity and support, and to provide meeting 
points with AKP politicians and civil society organisations (Hale and Özbudun, 
2009). Yavuz (2003) observes that Müsiad’s economic interests overlap with 
provincial/ideological ties to create a more effective and rooted associational life. 
For instance, the majority of Müsiad members in Konya are also members of diverse 
cultural associations.!Müsiad members are thus members of overlapping networks. 
The informal characteristics of these networks, which are based on interpersonal 
trust and derived from Islamic identity, ‘help to promote work ethics and new 
channels of communication for collaborating and sharing business information’ 
(Yavuz, 2003). The author argues that the current Islamic movement in Turkey has 
conjured a successful blend of capitalism and a secular, rational Islam. Another 
consequence of Islam in business circles has been argued to be that adherents ‘situate 
themselves among the faithful devoted to just causes and beyond the realm of 
economic interests’ (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012). 
In sum, several authors argue that both the political mobilisation of the AKP 
and the rise of the confident Anatolian bourgeoisie have been maturing outside 
traditional institutional channels, party politics and deliberate forms of political 
mobilisation (Tuğal, 2009; Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003). The relevance of informal 
grassroots mobilisation for the political power of the moderately Islamic movement, 
which is based on a common Islamic identity among political parties, business elites 
and religiously motivated civil society organisations, has been noted. However, these 
processes have not been studied in depth at the grassroots level. Therefore I propose 
to compare Islamic and secular BAs’ power-building activities at the local level, 
incorporating their informal networks with local elites, their framing and resource-
generation activities, using social movement theory. The following section justifies 
such an approach and discusses social movement theory in more detail. 
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3. A social movement framework of business associations 
The political process framework of social movements and its later extensions 
(McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1978) provide a useful starting point to 
study when and how BAs successfully apply ideology to gain political influence, i.e. 
move from the periphery to the centre of political influence. Sidney Tarrow (2011, p. 
32) argues that contentious politics are translated into sustainable social movements 
under the following conditions, or political opportunity structures: when ‘threats17 
are experienced and opportunities are perceived, when the existence of available 
allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed’. Such 
perceived changes in the power balance trigger incentives for actors who lack the 
necessary resources for political influence to take action by applying tactics from 
‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1978) – the means by which people engage in 
contentious collective action. Contention successfully translates into sustainable 
movements ‘when it taps into embedded social networks and connective structures 
and produces vivid collective action frames and supportive identities able to sustain 
contention against powerful opponents’ (Tarrow, 2011). Social and organisational 
bases are necessary to translate claims into movement organisations, as are 
constructions of identities and mobilising emotions through collective action frames 
(Tarrow, 2011). Networks can fulfil various functions, building solidarity, trust as 
well as common goals, and allowing for the exchange of resources (Baldassarri & 
Diani, 2007; Tilly, 2005); they can ‘form bridges laterally and over time’ between 
organisations (Tarrow, 2011, p. 132). However, without some degree of formal 
organisation we can expect movements to fade away, i.e. interpersonal networks are 
not sufficient for successful movement activity (Tarrow, 2011, p. 124). As part of the 
early political process paradigm (Tilly, 1978), the resource mobilisation approach 
(Gamson, 1975; Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977) argues that organisations 
with more resources are essential for political mobilisation and internal control. Such 
resources include the availability of organisational venues, expertise, time, and 
financial assets. 
Following this literature, my thesis analyses the factors contributing to the 
political success of the moderately Islamic in displacing secular BAs in Turkey, 
                                                
 
17 ‘By threats, I mean those factors – repression, but, also the capacity of authorities to 
present a solid front to insurgents – that discourage contention’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 32). 
 46 
based on an analysis of their networks structures, collective actions frames, 
organisational structures and patterns of resource exchange across changing 
institutional contexts at the grassroots level. Such an analysis can answer the major 
research question of how the increasing Islamisation of politics impacts upon the 
different mobilisation tactics, and the political power of secular vs moderately 
Islamic BAs.  
I define social movements as ‘collectivities acting with some degree of 
organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the 
purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or 
culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which 
they are a part’ (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11). Sustainable social movements grasp and 
shape perceived POS at the right moment to translate contentious politics into social 
movements; by relying on embedded networks and resonant collective action frames, 
they thereby gradually create the resources (including resource-rich organisations) 
they initially lacked, to achieve their goals. Below I discuss the relevant debates 
within the social movement, social network and ethnic entrepreneurship literatures 
concerning the various tactics of BAs that inform my conceptualisations and 
methods. 
A general theme from social movement theory is that successful tactics fit 
with the political environment in that they grasp political opportunity structures and, 
within the cultural environment, build on existing feelings of identity and solidarity. 
This is in line with the general tenet of an economic sociology approach that regards 
organisations as embedded and shaped by their social ties, ideological institutions 
and political contexts, all of which shape organisations’ opportunities, constraints, 
and organisational patterns in their economic and political advancement (Beckert, 
2010; Granovetter, 1985; Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). Repertoires of contention, or 
movement tactics, after all, are ‘learned cultural creations (…) that emerge from 
struggle’ (Tilly, 1993, p. 264). Movements have lived experiences and cultural and 
ideological backgrounds that affect their tactics and how movement actors perceive 
and enact those tactics. This is how ideology and religion enter BA’s power-building 
tactics, as they need to be built on ideological bases to create solidarity and identity. 
Especially where struggles revolve around broad political and ideological cleavages 
in society, successful mobilisation requires ‘bringing people together around 
inherited cultural symbols’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29). Under conditions of high politico-
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ideological contention, we would therefore expect ideology and religion to enter the 
mobilisation tactics of movements in their networks, by including not only political 
elites, but also civic and religious actors who can provide additional power 
resources, in their frames, as well as resource-building activities. I study the 
resource-based and ideological mix of tactics in framing, network and resource-
building activities that BAs may use to create political influence. Just like social 
movements, business in the periphery can build economic, ideological and ultimately 
political power through social movement tactics. For such an analysis I rely on a 
case study on Islamic BAs in Turkey who have relied on networks and framing to 
build up a variety of resources to emerge from the periphery toward the centre of 
political power. I build tentative hypotheses regarding the conditions under which 
ideology enters into the political mobilisation of business and how it is applied in 
networks, frames and resource-building activities. 
3.1. Political opportunity structures and threats 
First, I analyse openings in the ‘political opportunity structures’ to understand when 
and under which conditions ideology has entered the political empowerment of 
Islamic BAs in Turkey (Chapter III, point 3). Social movement scholars state that 
contentious politics is produced when ‘threats are experienced and opportunities are 
perceived, when the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the 
vulnerability of opponents is exposed’ Tarrow, 2011). Perceived opportunities or 
political access, the existence of allies, shifting political alignments and the 
opportunity to exploit divisions or vulnerabilities of opponents, are key ‘political 
opportunity structures’ developed in political process theories, in addition to threats 
from the establishment (Tarrow, 2011). While threats have received less attention in 
the literature, they are key in explaining ideological variables in political 
mobilisation in late-developing countries with (semi-) authoritarian regimes. Shifts 
in political opportunities have altered the types of tactics that pay off for the 
mobilisation of political support. This analysis is presented in the following chapter. 
As will be argued in Chapter III, the specific historical conditions of a strong 
centre-periphery cleavage have created an environment in which Islamic BAs with 
social movement characteristics have emerged and displaced part of the existing 
secular establishment. In Turkey’s case the central intra-state conflict is traditionally 
between ‘the centre’, traditionally the military and bureaucratic as well as state 
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elites, and ‘the periphery’, the rest of civil society, including political parties. Most 
observers of Turkish politics agree that the centre-periphery is the key cleavage that 
produced the present-day Turkish party system and that has deep roots in the 
Ottoman Empire18 (Hale & Özbudun, 2009; Heper, 1980; Mardin, 1969, 1973). In 
modern Turkish politics, the centre-periphery largely overlaps with the secular-
religious cleavage,19 which ‘has led to a particularly deep and a potentially explosive 
division, a real dichotomy, in Turkish politics.’ (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, pp. 33–34). 
Changes in intra-state conflicts have allowed secular and Islamic actors to exploit 
various openings in political opportunity structures at different times. Shortly after 
tracing the history of Turkish business politics, I analyse whether the traditional POS 
defined in the political process literature apply, and how, and whether there are 
further boundary conditions at play. For this, I rely on secondary literature to build 
hypotheses concerning the context of politico-religious contention and its effect on 
BAs’ mobilisation tactics. 
3.2. Social networks 
Besides grasping political opportunities, another key element of successful social 
movements is whether and how they can tap into embedded networks. The chapter 
on social networks therefore studies if and how Islamic vs secular BAs have tapped 
into local embedded networks over time, comparing pre- and post-AKP eras (from 
1993–2012). Local interpersonal networks matter because successful organisations 
may begin as local networks ‘that spread through the diffusion of contention, and 
ultimately either disappear or scale upward to regional and national levels’ (Tarrow, 
2011, p. 124). A movement view of networks defines them as ‘informal interactions 
between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or 
cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity’ (Diani, 1992, p. 13). 
                                                
 
18 ‘Under the sharp dichotomy between the rulers and the ruled in the Ottoman Empire, the 
centre signiﬁed the military bureaucratic state elites headed by the Sultan, while the 
periphery referred to the rest of the society who had no role in conducting government 
affairs. The absence of powerful intermediary institutions in the Ottoman Empire made this 
cleavage much sharper than in Western Europe’ (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, pp. 33–34).  
 
19 ‘The present Turkish party conﬁguration reﬂects many of the characteristics of a centre-
periphery cleavage.’ And while ‘this cleavage is not identical with the one between Islamists 
and secularists, one should not overlook a large degree of overlap.’ The AKP is […] the 
party of the excluded or marginalised sectors of the society, imbued with religious and 
conservative social values’ (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, p. 33–34). 
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Beyond such interpersonal ties, some degree of formal organisation is usually 
necessary for social interactions to translate into sustainable social movements. I 
analyse network patterns in order to understand how Islamic BAs have been able to 
gain political influence over dominant secular BAs, building on economic 
sociology’s insight that BAs’ advancement is also shaped by their informal, social 
ties with elites. While the political science literature largely focuses on 
institutionalised state-business channels like lobbying, policy or tripartite bodies, 
informal social ties with political and civic actors can provide crucial platforms for 
solidarity building and resource exchange. 
Tracking inter-organisational networks over time can help explain the 
expansion and growing influence of a movement as the shape of networks can be 
regarded as the outcome of network-building strategies (Diani, 1995). Network 
patterns are an indicator of the (informal) cooperation/competition between various 
associations, as well as of the opportunities and obstacles to the transfer of resources, 
political support and solidarity in the associated network. In order to study the 
cooperation/competition between the various organisations at the local level, both 
the extent as well the structure of ties between BAs, political parties and civil society 
organisations are relevant. Social network analysis (SNA) is the most relevant tool to 
study relational data: the contacts, ties and connections, the group attachments and 
meetings, which relate agent or social groups to another (Scott, 2000). It allows for 
depiction of the interconnectedness, or embeddedness of groups and the exchange of 
different types of resources. 
Religious networks in general, and modern Islamic networks in particular 
have been observed to be multifunctional, escaping the traditional network 
distinction between ‘solidarity-based’ networks and instrumentally driven 
‘transaction networks’ (Baldassarri & Diani, 2007). Instead, religious networks can 
facilitate the building of ideological, spiritual and material resources (Agai, 2004; 
Harders, 2000; Loimeier, 2000). Informal networks and social movements often 
serve as alternatives to traditional political institutions, when they are discriminatory 
and exclusionary (Singerman, 2004). It is especially marginalised groups that 
organise participation-relevant resources in such informal networks (for examples in 
the Middle East, see Bayat, 1997; Singerman, 1995). Similarly, modern Turkish 
Islamic movements have been observed to be socio-economic and fulfil a variety of 
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needs (Yavuz, 2003), providing platforms for resource exchange, business contracts, 
and the generation of public legitimacy and political support.  
 
The politico-religious contention in Turkey has created BAs that relied on the 
pooling of private resources in informal networks. As political parties have been 
forbidden to enter alliances with ideological civil society organisations, such ties 
have remained informal. An important way to achieve integration has been through 
overlapping memberships. Such overlapping memberships, or so-called affiliation 
networks, are a way to track changing alliances among social movements, political 
elites and civil society organisations. The insight for studying affiliation networks 
comes from expanding Simmel’s intuition on the duality of persons and group 
(Diani, 2003). Just as ‘persons are linked by their shared memberships of social 
groups, groups are likewise connected by the members they happen to share. (…) 
The identity of persons is ultimately the result of the particular intersection of their 
group memberships, while the position of groups depends on the multiple 
memberships of their members’ (Diani, 2003, p. 301). Other studies have 
emphasised the role of overlapping memberships as channels for the circulation of 
information, resources, expertise and solidarity among organisations (Diani, 2004). 
Already in the early 1970s, individual activists were regarded as inter-organisational 
links (Curtis and Zürcher, 1973, cited in Diani, 2004). Rosenthal and colleagues’ 
study (1985; 1997) of  19th-century women reform leaders in New York State is one 
of the earliest and most systematic treatments of overlapping memberships as inter-
organisational links. Studying network patterns among local business, political and 
civic elites is thus a crucial way to understand how Islamic BAs in the periphery 
have gained political influence. 
3.2.1. Cohesion: bonding versus bridging 
In addition to the social movement scholarship, several studies in the social networks 
and ethnic entrepreneurship literatures have studied how social networks can provide 
crucial resources to resource-poor populations. A key debate across these different 
streams of literatures concerns whether more or less cohesion, i.e. connectedness, or 
rather ‘bonding’ or ‘bridging’, is more advantageous to accumulate a larger range of 
resources (Lee, 2009). I therefore first compare the levels of cohesion between 
Islamic and secular networks to analyse how they have gained political influence. 
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Bonding and bridging are among the most common concepts of social 
network analysis and incorporate various indicators such as density, tie diversity and 
tie strength, and structural holes in both ego-networks and overall networks. Density 
reveals the percentage of connectivity in a network or its potential to achieve 
saturation (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005a, pp. 30–37; Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, p. 30); tie 
diversity refers to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of ties, and just as with tie 
strength, its exact definition depends on what kind of ties are measured (tie content). 
Social movement studies have shown that extent of cohesion can have 
implications for the propensity of political mobilisation: ‘Gould (1991, 1993, 1995) 
pioneered the empirical study of the relationship between collective performance and 
network variables. The author looks at levels of resistance by different Parisian 
neighbourhoods in the commune uprising of spring 1871 and finds that the stronger 
the link between two neighbourhoods, [i.e. the stronger the cohesion], the more 
similar the levels of resistance. Both sustained mobilization and demobilization was 
significantly affected by network properties’ (cited in Diani, 2004, p. 345). 
Granovetter (1973) argued that weak ties, [i.e. less cohesion] can serve as better 
bases for mobilisation than strong ones, because strong ties are more restricted, 
leaving out potentially useful actors. However, the adequacy for mobilisation 
depends on the goals of the respective movement. ‘Consensus movements and broad 
reformist movements prospered on relative weak networks, [while] high-risks groups 
(…) depended on the extremely strong ties of family and close friends whose ties 
had been hardened’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 132). 
The literature on inter-organisational networks shows how bonding, or 
cohesive networks can foster emotional similarity and motivation during trade 
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003), and enhance the levels of inter-ﬁrm resource exchange. 
Individual actors with some element of high cohesion acquire resources and learning 
capabilities that increase innovation diffusion (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). 
Walker and colleagues (1997) showed that the psychological closeness felt among a 
close-knit network of biotechnology ﬁrms can reduce transaction costs (unfair and 
opportunistic behaviour), and increase the ﬂow of privileged information and 
resources. Bonding networks were also found to encourage moral obligations, 
intimate information sharing, and a sense of solidarity and belonging (Fukuyama, 
2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). When network actors communicate frequently 
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with each other, this creates not just internal trust and enhanced resource-sharing, but 
also reputation-building and legitimacy (Lin, 1999). 
Studies of ethnic entrepreneurs and developing countries stress the effect of 
exclusionary institutions on network structures and frames; by restricting access to 
resources to certain groups and thereby discriminating against others, strong 
cohesive pockets characterised by high in-group solidarity and thus a fragmented 
group structure overall, may emerge (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). Dense and 
cohesive networks are then usually supported by an equally homogeneous and strong 
collective identity. Such dense ego-networks tend to be more homogeneous and thus 
highly controlled and conformist (Harders, 2000). Following from the discussion of 
social movement, bonding networks and ethnic entrepreneurship literatures above, 
we would expect bonding networks characterised by high cohesion and strong ties in 
the Turkish environment. Where marginalised business groups have been relying on 
each other, and under conditions of imminent state threats, strong solidarity and trust 
are required to facilitate a rich resource exchange.  
On the other hand, economic growth requires diverse and innovative 
resources and information that extend beyond ethnic communities and the potential 
lock-in of dense local networks. In that respect, we would expect less cohesive (i.e. 
more diverse, weaker and less dense) ties in Anatolian industrial districts. Empirical 
studies on the advantages of less cohesive bridging networks stress their merits for 
economic growth. For example, Burt (2001) holds that the key source of social 
capital is a network of ties characterised by many structural holes: a sparse network 
with few strong ties and a richness of brokers, or bridges linking groups that are not 
otherwise connected. Burt and colleagues (2000) established structural hole theory 
by comparing the networks of French and American managers. The authors found 
that managers with sparse networks and disconnected ties that bridged more 
structural holes acquired more innovative information than those managers who 
relied on their cohesive ties. Early adopters of new practices are likely to be situated 
at the intersection of multiple networks, with links to diverse information sources. 
Lower cohesion facilitates not only quicker access to innovative information, but 
also allows for the flexibility necessary to adopt such new ideas, whereas cohesive 
ties can create stronger constraints for managers (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). 
Ambitious ﬁrms that seek high growth and market share across diverse geographic 
regions should therefore encourage brokerage, which was shown to enhance product 
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innovation and exploitation of new markets (Zaheer & McEvily, 1999). On a whole 
network level, the economic growth and export-oriented networks of Anatolian 
capital that require innovation and access to diverse resources and information, 
would therefore be expected to be less cohesive. Consolidating these two 
contradictory expectations from the bridging/bonding debate, I expect changes 
across time as Islamic networks increase their economic and political influence. 
Expectation for cohesion: The Islamic networks studied here originated from 
marginalised, emerging SMEs that were competing against established elites; but 
gained increased influence from the late 1990s as the Anatolian industrial districts 
experienced economic growth. They would thus be expected to be more cohesive 
(stronger bonding) than their secular counterparts during the early 1990s (1993–
1998) when they were being formed; and to grow less cohesive (stronger bridging) 
in later periods. 
3.2.2. Political and civic integration 
While most network approaches do not differentiate the content of ties (i.e. between 
political, economic and civic types of ties) to explain network effects, there are good 
reasons to do so in a study of social movements in late-developing countries. 
However, social movement scholars have incorporated links to political elites as 
determinants of mobilisation success into their analyses. For example, Snow and 
Cress (2000) find that sympathetic allies in the city council increase the success rate 
of local homeless mobilisation, among other factors. Similarly, Amenta and his 
colleagues (Amenta, 2006; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010; Amenta, Caren, 
Fetner, & Young, 2002; Amenta, Carruthers, & Zylan, 1992) argue for the presence 
of both strong organisations and a sympathetic political context: 
They propose a political mediation model, whereby successful mobilisation typically 
requires mediation by supportive actors in political institutions. In particular, they 
look at the presence of sympathetic regimes and state bureaucracies that would 
benefit from protest outcomes (in addition to the presence of strong SMOs). In the 
absence of sympathetic political actors, they argue that more aggressive tactics are 
likely to be required by SMOs in order to obtain desired outcome. (Cress & Snow, 
2000) 
Similarly, in the Turkish context, Tuğal’s (2009) ethnography stresses that 
institutional change cannot happen only in the sphere of ‘civil society’, as state 
institutions still are the most powerful source of legitimacy in the normalisation 
process of identities, habits and everyday practices. The state remains a major target 
and source for BAs in Turkey after economic liberalisation (Buğra, 1994), and the 
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continued decentralisation has increased the importance of the state-business 
relationship at the local level (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010). The extent of political ties, 
then, increases the political influence of a movement, not only by providing access to 
state resources and legitimacy, but also by providing security vis-à-vis threatening 
elites. The high vulnerability of Islamic political parties and civil society, in the 
Turkish case, makes necessary further civic ties as sources of legitimacy and as 
platforms to reach out to actors at the grassroots level. My network study therefore 
compares to what extent and how political and civic elites are integrated into Islamic 
vs secular BAs. I track affiliation networks from the formation of the first BA in 
1993 to 2012. 
Expectation for extent of civic and political integration: The heightened 
vulnerability of political parties and civil society in the Turkish case makes extensive 
civic ties particularly important for political influence. First, I expect Islamic 
networks to have fewer political ties than the secular coalition in the 1993–1998 
period when they were in the periphery of power. However, their relative share of 
political members should increase over time alongside their growing political 
influence. Second, I expect Islamic networks to make up for their lack of access to 
resources through political elites in the 1993–1998 period by relying more on 
internal resource exchange with civic elites through cohesive networks. They should 
thus exhibit a larger share of civic ties compared to the secular coalition. Third, I 
expect the extent of civic ties to be strong not just in early periods, but in all time 
periods (1993–2012), as the Gülen community has been strongly incorporated in the 
Islamic movement since its foundation. 
3.2.3. Multiplexity and effects 
Another key aspect of networks that facilitate political influence is how these three 
layers of relationships meet and intersect. A movement that approximates a bonding 
network would not only show high density, but also include strongly overlapping 
ties across the business, political and civic spheres; that is, many BA members are, at 
the same time, members of political parties and civil society organisations. Safford 
(2009) calls this type of overlap across relationship layers, embedded multiplexity. A 
movement that approximates a bridging network would feature comparatively 
independent business, political, and civic layers, where being a secular member in a 
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BA does not increase the chances of being a member in a political party and/or civil 
society organisation, for example. 
Multiplexity has been shown to have effects for political mobilisation. For 
example, Sean Safford (2009) and Padgett and Ansell (1993) analyse the emergence 
and effects of regional networks from a long-term historical perspective, and come to 
the conclusion that networks of intersecting multiplexity (with independent 
relationship layers) bring greater advantages for economic development and political 
mobilisation. While Padgett and Ansell explain the political mobilisation of the 
Medicean political party in Renaissance Florence, Safford focuses on the successful 
economic restructuring of Allentown in contrast to Youngstown (from the 18th 
century). Both studies stress the negative effects of strong, cohesive and multiplex 
ties across different layers of relationships (i.e. embedded multiplexity). According 
to Safford, the key variable in shaping the different post-industrial trajectories of 
Youngstown vs Allentown is the type of multiplexity shaping the availability of 
leadership and of focal organisations within a social structure; these can serve as 
unifying forums of interaction and engagement in critical moments of restructuring. 
Intersecting multiplexity allows for diverse information sources to solve complex 
problems, and provides a larger pool of potential leaders. This goes against the 
bonding view that holds that more overlapping ties cause a closer and holistic bond, 
in which obligations spill over from one sphere to the other. 
Social movement scholars have also studied multiplexity, but less in 
connection with the bridging or bonding debate, and more because of its 
consequence for movement expansion and coalition building. Scholars of networks 
in movements have shown how networks of individual activists can help create 
formal coalitions between organisations, and how they can create bridges between 
social movement organisations (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004; Mische, 2008). 
Including resource-rich actors and organisations into the movement can increase 
influence for resource-poor actors in the periphery, and increase its political 
influence in the long run. Studying the emergence of how the civic, business and 
political spheres have come to intersect is key in the Turkish case. Strong threats 
have made illegal formal alliances between political parties and Islamic groups. 
However, studies on the AKP have claimed that the new moderate Islamists have 
gained political influence through their grassroots mobilisation and cooperation with 
entrepreneurs and the Gülen movement. How the Islamic movement has managed to 
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increasingly mobilise both civic and conservative political elites at the grassroots 
level is puzzling. To shed light on this phenomenon, I track their organisational ties 
across the three relationship types in comparison with the secular coalition. This can 
help understand what kind of networking tactics Islamic actors have used under 
conditions of politico-religious threats. 
Expectation for multiplexity: In the Turkish case, formal alliances between 
political parties and Islamic groups are illegal. However, studies on the AKP have 
claimed that the new moderate Islamists have gained political influence through their 
grassroots mobilisation and cooperation with entrepreneurs and the Gülen 
movement. Thus, in the 1993–1998 period, I expect the Islamic movement to have a 
weaker membership overlap between civic and political elites than in the secular 
coalition. In the later time periods, I expect increasingly stronger overlapping 
memberships across the three types in the Islamic movement (i.e. ‘embedded 
multiplexity’). I track how this change from weak to strong overlapping 
memberships has been achieved over time. 
3.3. Collective action frames 
This study focuses on an in-depth study of how Islamic BAs have gained political 
influence at the expense of established secular elites by generating innovative social 
movement tactics, namely, informal grassroots networks to support resource 
exchange, and framing to bring diverse actors together in a common cause and 
identity. After studying how Islamic versus secular BAs have built informal 
grassroots networks as alternative, non-traditional platforms for the creation of 
solidarity, resource exchange and political influence, I will focus on what has 
actually ‘happened’ in these networks. Framing activities have been a key tactic 
supporting Islamic BAs’ power building. 
The creation of collective action frames is another central process of 
successful movements that has not been discussed in the existing BA literature. 
Social movement literature asserts that the ‘coordination of collective action depends 
on the trust and cooperation that are generated among participants by shared 
understandings and identities, or, on the collective action frames that justify, dignify, 
and animate collective action’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 31). Many great movements of the 
past centuries (seeking abolition of slavery, child labour, or the promotion of 
women’s suffrage movement) ‘sought major legislative changes, but were 
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unthinkable without altering people’s views, which depended upon reaching their 
hearts and minds’ (Snow, 2004, p. 390). Likewise, the moderately Islamic 
movement, and collaboration between business and other actors in the political or 
civic sphere, requires a common goal, vision, identity and thus binding mechanism. 
Collective action frames are essential to mobilise, bind together and organise or alter 
members’ views (Turner, 1983). 
Collective action frames (frames in the following) are collections of idea 
elements tied together by a unifying concept that serve to punctuate, elaborate, and 
motivate action on a given topic (Snow & Benford, 1988). ‘Frame analysis is 
explicitly about social actors’ lenses as they are deployed, particularly in the service 
of collective advocacy, mobilization, or public policy’ (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). 
Frames are collective ‘cognitive structures’ that we can access ‘through the spoken 
words of participants and written texts of social movement organisations’ (Johnston, 
1995, p. 231). What frames do is ‘render events meaningful and thereby organize 
experiences and guide action’ (Johnston & Noakes, 2005). The framing perspective 
is rooted in a symbolic interactionist and constructionist principle that regards 
meanings as not automatically attached to objects, events or experiences, but as 
arising, instead, through interactively based interpretive processes (Snow, 2003). 
Frame analysis has been suggested as a strategy not just for social movements, but 
for organisational research, too. This method offers tools to analyse the effects of 
societal and contextual issues on organisations (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002, p. 
35), and thus to unpack how culture and religion influence intra-and inter-
organisational tactics.  
Successful framing can have internal and external effects. It can bind social 
movement actors together internally, and create public legitimacy externally. 
Diagnostic and prognostic framing not only help to ‘define and bring into sharp 
focus grievances, targets of blame, targets of action, and lines of action, but, in doing 
so, may also help SMOs enhance organisational legitimacy within the organisational 
fields in which they are embedded’ (Cress & Snow, 2000). In turn, this legitimacy is 
likely to increase the prospect of securing sympathetic allies and official political 
support. In other words, effective framing creates cohesion, solidarity and trust by 
organising experiences and giving them a shared meaning, identity and goal, thereby 
promoting collective action. Public legitimacy is crucial for BAs in the Turkish 
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context where business remains dependent on state resources (Buğra, 1994) and 
where Anatolian capital and religious actors have been marginalised not just 
economically and politically, but also in the cultural sphere. Generally, private 
organisations that wish to influence public policy the need to build up legitimacy by 
formulating goals in alliance with public interests (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999).  
The quality and mobilisation potency (‘resonance’) of a frame depend on 
how coherent, specific and complete it is, and in the Turkish context, how ideology 
is applied in it: Firstly, the quality of collective action frames can be judged by 
studying the quality of three inherent framing tasks that collective action frames 
ideally adhere to. The three relevant framing tasks to be studied in this research 
follow from Gamson and Lasch’s (1983), as well as Snow and colleagues’ research 
programme (Cress & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, Rochford, 
Worden, & Benford, 1986). These consist of ‘diagnostic framing’ (problem 
identification and attribution, including collective identities), ‘prognostic framing’ 
(goal or plan formulation), and ‘motivational framing’ (rationale for engaging in 
action, articulation of motive). By pursuing these core framing tasks, movement 
actors foster both consensus and action (Klandermans, 1984). The quality of frames 
depends on how coherent, complete and specific they are. In the highly polarised 
Turkish context another key qualifier is how well the content reflects the cultural 
narratives and symbols relating to the centre-periphery cleavage – a key qualifier of 
a frame’s resonance (mobilisation potency or quality). These are the two key sets of 
quality indicators applied in this research.  
Social movement research has established that social movements need to tap 
into deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. Nationalism, ethnicity and religion 
are often used as bases for social movement organisation as they have been ‘more 
reliable bases of movement organization in the past than the categorical imperative 
of social class’ (Tarrow, 2011, p.11). This is especially true in Turkey and other late-
emerging economies where mobilisation based on social class has been punished in 
favour of classless ideologies like nationalism, Kemalism and Islam (Buğra, 1994). 
In Turkey, as Ayşe Buğra (1994) argues, the specific historical ideological legacy 
has created a business community that is deeply dependent on the state. However, 
lobbying and class interests, and profit-maximisation are not legitimate objectives in 
a society that is still today shaped by the Ottoman legacy of a ‘classless society’, 
which means that such objectives are instead replaced with nationalist and 
 59 
ideological themes. In such historical contexts, religion and ideology20 become 
major sources of solidarity and legitimacy that successful movements need to build 
upon. In environments of high politico-religious contention, successful mobilisation 
requires ‘bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols’ (Tarrow, 2011, 
p. 29).  
Therefore, the framing chapter (Chapter V) analyses and compares how 
ideologies, especially Kemalism/secularism and Islam, are used in the collective 
action frames of Islamic and secular subgroups as sources of political influence. I 
compare the quality of Islamic and secular BAs’ frames with a special focus on their 
use of ideological variables in the three framing tasks. That is, how do their problem 
and goal formulations, collective identities and proposed tactics, create cohesion 
across an alliance of organisations as well as ideological power or legitimacy? Are 
the frames coherent, specific and complete? How has the Islamic movement 
incorporated the interests and claims of political, civic and business actors to create 
cohesion and solidarity across these SMOs? How have Islamic BAs managed to tap 
into deeply felt experiences and Islamic-cultural narrations vis-à-vis a threatening 
state? And most importantly, how have Islamic BAs married seemingly 
contradictory religious and moneymaking claims to create public legitimacy? 
These questions link up with a set of processes identified in the framing 
literature: the ‘strategic efforts by social movement organizations to link their 
interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective 
resource providers’ are conceptualised as ‘frame alignment processes’ (Snow et al., 
1986). Frames are ‘developed, generated, and elaborated on not only via attending to 
the three core framing tasks, but also by way of three sets of overlapping processes 
that can be conceptualized as discursive, strategic, and contested’21 (Benford & 
Snow, 2000, p. 623). Strategic processes are the most relevant in the present context, 
                                                
 
20 Framing processes comprise the definition of collective identities, i.e. the self-ascribed 
characteristics vis-à-vis other actors. The concept of ideology is different from frames, as 
parts of different ideologies can be combined in the process of framing (Snow, 2004). 
Ideology is a ‘broad, coherent, and relatively durable set of beliefs that affect one’s 
orientation not only to politics but to everyday life more generally’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, 
p. 613). In contrast, frames are more action-oriented and fulfill a mobilisation purpose for a 
collectivity, whereby ideology can function as both a constraint and a resource, by 
influencing a frame’s resonance with cultural narratives. 
 
21 Contested processes concern how counter-frames affect a movement’s activities, a process 
which is beyond the scope of the present analysis, as are discursive processes.  
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since they are goal-directed, aimed at recruiting and bringing together SMOs to 
facilitate resource-accumulation. These are efforts by SMOs to link their frames with 
other powerful actors and potential supporters and resource providers.  
Four basic processes have been researched within these strategic processes, 
called frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame 
transformation. In my frame analysis I will explore whether and how processes of 
frame bridging, extension, amplification and transformation have been applied by 
the Islamic BAs. Frame transformation involves the re-definition or transformation 
of existing ideas to incorporate them into an existing frame. For frame 
transformation, ‘new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or 
understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or ‘misframings’ reframed’ 
(Tarrow, 1992, p. 188). ‘Frame amplification involves the idealization, 
embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs’ (Benford 
& Snow, 2000, p. 624). This process seems particularly relevant to enhance 
ideological resonance in a context of politico-religious contention: 
Given that one of the key factors affecting whether or not a proffered frame 
resonates with potential constituents has to do with the extent to which the frame 
taps into existing cultural values, beliefs, narratives, folk wisdom, and the like, it is 
not surprising to find that most movements seek to amplify extant beliefs and values. 
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624) 
And while I do not have data to study how movement frames have invigorated the 
existing values of members, I study in detail how ideologies have been incorporated 
into movement frames and build upon those pre-existing values. Frame bridging 
refers to ‘the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem’ (Benford & Snow, 
2000, p. 624). Of particular interest is here how Islamic BAs have brought together 
Islamic with neoliberal capitalist references to integrate them into a coherent frame. 
Additionally, how have the views of businessmen, the AKP and the Gülen 
community been incorporated into Islamic BAs’ views? This question links to the 
process of frame extension, which concerns the extension of the boundaries of the 
proposed frame to include views and interests of targeted groups. 
3.4. Resources, activities and organisational structures 
After analysing the emergence of the Islamic network that has contributed to the 
political influence of Islamic BAs, and the frames that supported these networks, I 
will analyse what kind of resources have been exchanged within these networks 
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today to perpetuate these ties. What activities or tactics do Islamic compared to 
secular BAs offer to their members through their embedded networks with political 
and civic elites? In other words, what kind of power is created through such 
resources: is the focus on economic growth activities for SMEs only, as some 
institutional void accounts of BAs would have it? Or do political activities go 
beyond rent seeking, as Olson (1971) conceptualises BAs, to include more collective 
activities like providing political support and policy influence? And is there an 
ideological and contentious aspect about these tactics that would qualify BAs as 
movements? Are these activities and resource exchanges in line with the tactics, 
goals, and identities constructed in their collective action frames? 
To answer such questions, I compare the resources provided by Islamic 
versus secular BAs through their various activities in the political, economic and 
civic realms. To understand the political influence of the Islamic movement, it is 
essential to study the activities of and resources exchanged among allied BAs and 
civil society organisations at the grassroots level. These constitute central sources of 
political power. Among such resources, organisational capacities’ influence on 
political mobilisation has been much studied by movement scholars (Amenta, 2006; 
Gamson, 1990). Movements require some degree of formal organisations to survive 
and exert public and political influence (Tarrow, 2011, p. 124). The key for 
movement organisers is to construct organisations that are robust enough to structure 
contention and to collaborate with other SMOs, yet flexible enough to include local 
communities and informal networks (Diani, 2009, cited in Tarrow, 2011). Resource 
mobilisation approaches (e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1977) argue that organisations with 
more resources are essential for political mobilisation and internal control. Such 
resources include the availability of organisational venues, expertise, time and 
financial assets. In this traditional view of social movements, informal as well as 
formal forms of organisation were regarded as important as they ‘offer insurgents 
sites for initial mobilization at the time opportunities present themselves and 
condition their capacity to exploit their new resources. Despite some evidence to the 
contrary (…), a large body of evidence finds organizational strength correlated with 
challengers’ ability to gain access and win concessions’ (McAdam et al., 2001). 
Gamson (1990), for example, comparing 53 American challenging groups, finds that 
strongly hierarchical and centralised organisations, among other factors, were the 
most effective at achieving policy outcomes. Equally, in the BA literature, 
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organisational capacities have been found to fulfil essential functions of political 
mobilisation: first, the ‘control’ of members to follow common goals, and second, 
the mobilisation at the local level to support those goals (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). 
This BA literature also stresses that ‘strong organisations’ are necessary to provide 
the policy and political support that political elites require during vulnerable times 
(Doner & Schneider, 2000; Schneider, 2004). However, in the Turkish literature it 
stated that Anatolian SMEs have thrived on grassroots mobilisation in combination 
with ties to the hierarchically-organised AKP (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). My analysis 
of the organisational structures of Islamic BAs thus aims to resolve this puzzle to 
analyse which combination of hybrid structures has allowed Islamic BAs to be 
flexible enough to integrate bottom-up resources interests, yet also allow top-down 
control. 
More recent social movement research has focused on hybrid forms that 
manage to combine grassroots groups with bureaucratic and centralised 
organisations – an insight that could also apply to the dominant BA literature that 
regards centralised organisations as the most effective. Tarrow (2011, p.129) 
summarises the literature on hybrid forms, which includes a range of local, regional, 
and national, centralised and decentralised membership and non-membership 
organisations. McCarthy (2005: 196, cited in Tarrow, 2011) identifies a wide variety 
of action types of social movement organisations, ranging from classical federated 
structures all the way to freestanding local groups through a variety of regional and 
networked organisations. The following section outlines the indicators of 
organisational strength developed in the BA literature that I will compare among 
secular and Islamic BAs. 
 Indicators for organisational strength 
Following major studies of BAs’ organisational structures, proxies for organisational 
strength concern associations’ material resources and internal intermediation 
mechanisms (Schneider, 2004; Schmitter & Streeck,1999). The mere existence and 
persistence of economy-wide BAs is an indicator of strength, as it shows the amount 
of money and time that prominent capitalists invest. Additionally, an estimate of 
BAs’ staff and branches reveals the material investment by its members and its key 
constituencies. The quality of internal intermediation is another important indicator 
of the organisational viability of an association’s organisational strength (Schneider 
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2004), however, Schneider (2004) does not provide clear indicators of this important 
concept. Therefore, I apply Schmitter and Streeck’s (1999) definition of ‘organised 
complexity’, which concerns the functional differentiation of tasks and interests into 
subunits (e.g. into sectoral committees), and the institutionalised coordination toward 
common goals among such subunits, (which can be achieved internally or 
externally). The level of centralisation/hierarchy, or how local-level branches and the 
national-level headquarters relate to each other, is also key in how the balance 
between controlling and attracting a heterogeneous (because economy-wide) 
membership is achieved. These latter aspects (centralisation, coordination) concern 
the internal intermediation of BAs. According to the authors, multi-level pyramids, 
such as those of the confederations Tuskon and Türkonfed, represent the highest 
forms of organisational capacity as they allow both centralised control and 
responsivity to local members’ interests. 
4. Design and methods 
The ultimate purpose of this study is to infer explanatory hypotheses, and to further 
existing explanations of how and when BAs gain political influence through a case 
study of how Islamic BAs have increasingly displaced secular ones in Turkey. 
Existing literatures rooted in political entrepreneurship and collective action cannot 
sufficiently explain when and how Islamic BA have gained political influence. I 
address this ‘inadequacy’ (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997) through a comparative 
case study at the grassroots level of secular and Islamic BAs in Turkey from 1993 to 
2012. By in-depth study of how Islamic BAs have applied ideology in networks, 
frames and resource building to generate political influence, I aim to add grassroots 
ideology-based mechanisms of power- building to the BA literature. The comparison 
with the secular BA serves as a necessary ‘control’.  
By selecting an ‘outlier’, ‘deviant’ (Lijphart, 1971), or negative case that is 
poorly explained by existing explanatory variables, we can identify unknown causes 
and mechanisms (Evera, 1997). Therefore, this kind of case study has also been 
called a ‘theory-generating’ (Evera, 1997) or  ‘explorative’ case study (Hancké, 
2009). The justification for selecting Gaziantep as a suitable city case is presented in 
the following chapter, which defines the suitable universe of cases among Anatolian 
industrial districts. 
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This study follows a grounded theory approach to theory building (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The strength of qualitative methodologies is 
precisely that it allows one to go beyond strict hypothesis testing by engaging in the 
on-going refinement of concepts, the iterated fine-tuning of hypotheses, and the use 
of specially targeted case studies that appear likely to suggest new hypotheses and 
theoretical ideas, which can then be tested (Munck, 2004). Accordingly, I adopt a 
qualitative approach to social networks that relies on the interpretation of visual 
graphs aided by network indicators. The analyses of resources, organisational 
structures and collective action frames rely on a thematic analysis, and a frame 
analysis of semi-structured interviews and further archival data. 
This section justifies the selection of manufacturing companies largely from 
the textile cluster in Gaziantep for the analyses of networks, frames and activities. As 
this sample affects all three empirical chapters, it is discussed in the present section; 
further methods will be discussed within the three respective empirical chapters 
focusing on networks, frames and activities/resources. Findings are based on 51 
interviews with 36 actors and further archival data as well as membership data for 
the network analysis; all based on Gaziantep’s textile manufacturing cluster. The 
frame and resource-exchange analysis rely on different sections of the same 
interview material (and further documents). The analysis of resources is conducted 
via a thematic analysis, while collective action frames rely on a frame analysis. 
 Selection of interviewees 
The following overview of interviewees is summarised in Table 1. Interviewees 
were chosen to represent as large a variety as possible of politico-religious views and 
affiliations. According to their affiliations and interview material, businessmen were 
placed into the following categories reflecting their politico-religious views: Islamic 
Leaders and Islamic Businessmen (differentiating between those who are active in 
organisations, and pious businessmen who are less active in organisations); Strategic 
Political Entrepreneurs (owner family/board members turned politicians – mainly 
members of conservative parties which represent business interests); Strategic 
Businessmen (who may lean in Islamic or secular directions, but who join different 
associations, depending on the incumbent government); and Secular Businessmen 
(those who do not join Islamic groups at all). These categories were merged in the 
network analysis and translated into either ‘Islamic’, ‘mixed’, or ‘secular’ codes, or 
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given no coding at all. Industry and coalition leaders were identified with the help of 
local experts from the GSO and BAs. Such leaders are the most involved in politico-
religious arrangements; ‘outsiders’ and former elites were added to the sample in 
addition to current leaders. Further snowball sampling was employed, by asking 
businesspeople for further connections from their sector. I also tried to balance the 
number of interviewees among SMEs and larger firms, but note that the sample is 
skewed toward larger industrial firms, some of which are among the top 1000 in 
Turkey. However, these are the companies mainly involved in setting the political 
agenda. 
Interviews were semi-structured and questions differed between 
businessmen, and association and civil society organisations and public institution 
representatives. Because of the sensitivity of politics and religious issues, not all 
businessmen were asked the same questions. I conducted 51 semi-structured 
interviews in total. Some of these interviews represent different roles of 
businessmen, e.g. as both a BA representative and individual member/industrialist. 
In total, 36 distinct interviewees are quoted in this research. Of these, 26 are 
businessmen (22 owner-managers/board members, 3 top-level managers, 1 lead 
engineer) and 9 are current BA leaders or representatives. Two interviewees are 
leaders of Müsiad at the national level, while all the others are leaders or 
representatives of Gaziantep’s associations. All of Gaziantep’s BAs are included, 
namely, the Islamic Tuskon affiliates Hürsiad and Gapgiad, as well as Müsiad’s 
Gaziantep branch and the secular Gagiad. All but two of the businessmen are active 
in the textile industry cluster and included in the network analysis; the other two 
businessmen have companies in other sectors and provided insightful insider 
information beyond sectoral concerns. In addition to those 26 businesspeople 
interviewed, the sample consists of 5 representatives of relevant public institutions: 
the municipality, the Kosgeb (Small and Medium Enterprises Development 
Organisation), the Development Agency, the City Council, and one teacher. All 
interviews were conducted in Turkish and subsequently transcribed verbatim. An 
approximate interview guide can be found in the appendix section 9. 
 Textile cluster sample 
The following industries were included in the textile cluster sample (following 
NACE Rev. 2 codes, see appendix 1. for further details): manufacture of textiles 
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(preparation of cotton and other fibres, weaving and finishing of textiles; 
manufacture of other textiles like knitted fabrics, technical textiles, carpets and rugs); 
manufacture of wearing apparel (e.g. underwear and work wear); manufacture of 
leather and related products especially footwear; and manufacture of rubber and 
plastic products (especially plastic shoe wear, packing goods and plastic goods and 
sacs). The textile cluster incorporates several industries along the value-chain, from 
the spinning and preparation of yarn, to the manufacturing of dyes and side products 
like plastic. Other cluster-related industries of the textile industry like dyeing, design 
services, or machinery were excluded due to fundamental differences in production 
and task requirements. The same applies to service-industries like design services or 
machinery repair workshops. Note that the production of plastic packing goods 
resembles the production of yarns as the same resource is used and several 
companies are involved in both or diversify into plastics. 
Industry- and production-specific requirements can influence inter-
organisational ties and network strategies with institutions (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 
2005), and therefore a specific industry was selected. For example, in industries that 
require a large amount of government regulation, e.g. contracting and 
telecommunications, political ties may become more important for businessmen than 
in less regulated industries. Furthermore, limiting the sample to organisations 
providing the same types of services enhances comparability and reduces extraneous 
sources of variation and measurement error (Becker & Gerhart, 1996, p. 792). By 
selecting companies from one specific cluster, we can rule out the explanation that 
specific production and task requirements in textiles shape the differential 
networking strategies of Islamic and secular companies. 
The classification as a textile firm is based on the firms’ primary activities 
(e.g. carpets, apparel, technical textiles). Diversification represents the major growth 
strategy of most Turkish firms, which is common in many emerging markets 
(Khanna & Rivkin, 2001), and most large firms are integrated to include yarn 
production, dyeing and carpet production, for example. Companies move to diversify 
into areas as they become profitable, such as currently non-woven technical textiles, 
or energy production (several interviews). While the industry code thus reflects the 
major activity, most sample firms have diversified activities, albeit mainly in textiles 
and related industries (e.g. the carpet manufacturer Merinos has moved into furniture 
production to grow in the interior designs area). Therefore, I would argue that the 
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present findings are not limited to the textile cluster, but have implications for other 
industries as well. 
Why was the textile cluster chosen over other industries? Most importantly, it 
is this rapid growth to one of Gaziantep’s largest industries, and its overtaking of 
existing industrial centres that makes the textile cluster the most relevant cluster to 
study. It is among the internationally most competitive and largest of Gaziantep’s 
industries with roots back in the 14th century. Gaziantep’s textile sector is among the 
city’s most developed in terms of technology and capacity utilisation (Söylemez, 
Arslan, Çakar, Kalaycioğlu, & Özgen, 2012). The textile industries of Gaziantep, 
especially the manufacture of carpets and related products, developed fast in the 
post-liberalisation phase from the 1980s, overtaking the traditional leading textile 
cities Istanbul, Adana, Bursa and Izmir. Rather than being deeply embedded in 
Antep’s history, the successful machine-woven carpet industry, for example, 
emerged in Gaziantep only in the 1970s and grew as result of export-drive in the 
1980s and 1990s (Oz, 2004). Companies can be considered ‘young’ overall, but due 
to Antep’s long industrial history, companies are more mature than in some 
industrial districts like Denizli that have even more recent industrial histories (Ayata, 
2004). Textile companies appear to be younger than that estimate as a more recent 
survey by the TEK for the textile, apparel and leather industries in Gaziantep finds 
that only a small percentage of companies were founded before 1980, and the large 
majority founded in the late 1990s and 2000s (Söylemez et al., 2012). Because of a 
lack of coherent data on SMEs (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, 2004), the actual figure remains somewhat unclear. 
Nevertheless, this industry incorporates some of the city’s oldest and largest 
holding companies, allowing studying leading holding companies such as Sanko or 
Merinos, and increasing the potential for studying changes across time. Not only are 
there more mature firms, but the textile cluster also incorporates a variety of younger 
firms developing in the new millennium, all of which allows studying the 
networking strategies of a large variety of firms that have emerged and grown in 
different political environments. By selecting firms within a growing cluster, this 
study attains a variety of firms with different affiliations, yet incorporates the most 
successful examples of secular and Islamic elites across time. 
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 Selection of manufacturing companies 
Only textile companies registered at the GSO were included. In Gaziantep, industrial 
firms have to register at the GSO as opposed to the Gaziantep Chamber of Trade 
(GTO). The GTO encompasses merchant and traders and non-industrial interests 
(e.g. construction sector), while the GSO encompasses industrial interests. Until 
1989, the two Chamber Bodies used to be united under one roof; companies 
registered before 1989 are therefore usually members of both. 
Bayırbağ (2010, 2011), in his in-depth study of Gaziantep’s associational 
landscape, observes that the GSO is politically and economically more powerful than 
the GTO.  The membership base of the GTO and the GSO combined constitutes 
around one third of the entrepreneurs in Gaziantep. 
The rest, composed of petty traders and artisans, i.e. the ‘esnaf’, are organised under 
a separate local union of numerous sector-based chambers, (…) which is represented 
by the TESK (The Confederation of Tradesmen and Artisans of Turkey) at the 
national level. Despite the fact that the (…) esnaf has a large membership base with 
a strong guild tradition and sense of sectoral solidarity, and that such micro-
enterprises considerably contribute to the employment in the city, esnaf remains at 
the periphery of the local political arrangements and the local policymaking scene. 
(Bayırbağ, 2011, p. 12) 
Therefore, the study sample excludes firms that operate only in trade or commerce 
(i.e. are registered at the GTO), as well as small shopkeepers, artisans and workshops 
(‘esnaf’). Naturally this manufacturing sample has a larger section of large 
companies than is typical for Turkey’s industry overall. The economy-wide 
voluntary BAs in Turkey aim to mainly organise powerful industrial companies 
(several interviews). Additionally, the growth of Anatolian industrial districts has 
been driven by the manufacturing sector. Consequently, this study focuses on 
industrial companies registered at the GSO. SMEs and family firms dominate 
Gaziantep’s economy at large as is typical for Turkey’s economy. In a 2011 study, 
53% of companies were estimated to be micro firms with 1–9 employees; 32% of 
companies were small (10–49); 5% medium (50–99); 7% large (100–250) and 3% 
very large (above 250) (Kunt & Zobu, 2011). Data on size are not available for all 
sample companies, but interviews were conducted predominantly among SMEs and 
very large firms rather than micro-enterprises. 
 
 69 
Table 1 Interviews and their characteristics 
Intervie
wee no. 
Role Dates of 
Interview 
Company Size, Age 
(GSO registration 
date) and Size 
(employees) in 2012* 
in Textile 
Organisation/Company 
category 
Network coding of company based on 
affiliations across three time periods 
(Islamic/Secular/Mixed/None); Same for 
all time periods unless indicated 
1 Hürsiad representative (Tuskon) 30/06/11 n/a Islamic Leadership I 
2 Hürsiad leadership (Tuskon) 
Owner-manager  
29/11/11 2001;  
Medium (2) 
 
Islamic Leadership 
I 
I  
3 Gapgiad representative (Tuskon) 29/6/11 n/a Islamic Leadership I 
4 Gapgiad leadership (Tuskon) 
Owner-manager  
17/11/11 1984 
Very large (4) 
 
Islamic Leadership 
I 
I (99-12); None (93-98) 
5 Gagiad representative 
  
13/6/11 
16/11/11 
n/a Secular Leadership S 
6 Gagiad leadership  23/6/11 Not in textile Secular Leadership S 
7 Müsiad Gaziantep leadership  14/6/11 Not in textile Islamic Leadership I 
8 Müsiad co-founder  June 2010 Not in textile Islamic Leadership I 
9 Müsiad HQ representative  June 2010 Not in textile Islamic Leadership I 
10 Municipality employee 2/12/11 n/a Public Institution n/a 
11 City Council representative 
Owner-manager  
8/12/11 1998 
Small or Medium 
(1 or 2) 
Strategic Political 
Entrepreneur 
(conservative) 
n/a 
S (04-12); M (93-03) (overall mixed) 
12 Kosgeb representative 29/6/11 n/a Public Institution n/a 
13 Development Agency representative  21/6/11 n/a Public Institution n/a 
Not 
quoted 
GSO/GTO representatives (ca. 4 for data, 
referrals, publications) 
16/6/11 and 
other  
n/a Public Institution n/a 
14 Academic, University in Gaziantep  23/6/11 n/a  Public Institution n/a 
15 Academic, University in Gaziantep  23/6/11 n/a Public Institution n/a 
16 Academic, University in Gaziantep  17/6/11 n/a Public Institution  n/a 
Not 
quoted 
3 Academics in Istanbul who have worked on 
Anatolian capital; and further at Zirve Uni  
May 2010 
20/6/11 
n/a Public Institution – 
Uni 
n/a 
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17 Teacher in Gaziantep 5/12/11 n/a Public Institution  n/a 
18 Owner-manager  14/6/11 1995; Large (3) Islamic Business I (99-03; 04-12), None (93-98) 
19 Owner-manager  28/11/11 1990; Large (3) Islamic Business I (04-12), None (93-03) 
20 Top-level employee 20/6/11 1992; Large (3) Islamic Business I (99-03; 04-12), None (93-98) 
21 
22 
Owner-manager 1 
Owner-managers 2 and 3  
15/6/11 
2/12/11 
2001; Medium (2) Islamic Business 
(little membership) 
I (04-12); None (99-03) 
23 Owner-manager 
 
27/6/11 1993; Medium (2) Islamic Business 
(little membership) 
None (but pious) 
24 Owner-manager 30/11/11 1985 
Very large (4) 
Strategic Political 
Entrepreneur 
(conservative) 
Mix (04-12), S (93-03) 
25 Owner-manager  21/11/11 1973 
Large (3) 
Strategic Political 
Entrepreneur 
(conservative) 
S (strategic) 
26 Owner-manager 21/6/11 1988; Large (3) Strategic Business Mix (04-12), I (93-03) 
27 Top-level manager 24/6/11 1988; Large (3) Strategic Business Mix (04-12), I (93-03) 
28 Top-level manager 7/12/11 Textile: 2003; 
Medium (2); 
Overall group: (3) 
Strategic Business I  
29 Owner-manager 23/11/11 1996; Large (3) Strategic Business Mix (04-12); I (99-03): None (93-98) 
30 Owner-manager 22/11/11 1996; Medium (2) Strategic Business None 
31 Owner-manager 25/11/11 1983; Very large 
(4) 
Strategic Business 
(tend secular) 
S (04-12), I (99-03) Mixed (93-98) 
(strategic) 
32 Owner-manager 20/11/11 1993; Medium (2) Secular Business S (strategic) 
33 Owner-manager 22/6/11 1993; Medium (2) Secular Business S (99-12); None (93-98) 
34 Owner-manager; co-founder of secular 
organisations 
13 and 22/6/11 
19/11/11 
1988; Small (1) Secular Business S  
 
35 Top-level manager outside textiles 5/12/11 Not in textile Secular-Nationalist Not in textile sample 
36 Owner-manager outside textiles 18/11/11 Not in textile Secular-Nationalist Not in textile sample 
* Classification of firm size based on number of employees; source: provided by GSO (largest companies only); interviews and company homepages: Small 
firms (1) <49 employees; Medium firms (2) 50–249 employees; Large firms (3) 250–999 employees; Very large firms (4): 1000+ employees
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Chapter III Background and Case Selection: The Political 
Influence of Anatolian Capital 
In the following, I present data and literature to establish the empirical puzzle or 
phenomenon, namely that Islamic BAs’ political influence has increased at the 
national level, and also that leadership in Chamber Bodies is an important site of 
political contestation (and therefore a valid indicator). I then show that the regional 
arena is key to understanding the political empowerment of the Islamic BAs. 
Anatolian capital is the backbone of the Turkish Islamic movement, its political 
parties and BAs that have developed into new economic growth centres and elites. 
Finally, I justify the selection of Gaziantep as a city case to study the local arena of 
political contention, and give a short overview over its industry.  
In the second part of this chapter I analyse the background conditions that 
have shaped BAs’ power-building activities and social movement tactics, which will 
be analysed in more detail in the following three empirical chapters. I trace the 
institutional changes in business politics, through the lens of ‘political opportunity 
structures’. I use the term politico-religious contention to summarise the key POS 
that have shaped the emergence, tactics and political influence of Islamic BAs.  
1. The puzzle: the political rise of the Islamic movement 
1.1. Indicators of political influence 
Controlling leadership positions in Chamber Bodies is an important source of power 
at both regional and national levels. In spite of the multiplicity of voluntary BAs, the 
Chambers maintain their role of guiding the Turkish economy through their 
participation in official, social and commercial institutions and establishments (Atan, 
2004). Membership is obligatory. At the regional level, the Chambers’ potential to 
integrate sectoral interests into a single Chamber Assembly, provides businesspeople 
with an official and influential voice to represent local economic interests more 
widely.22 The Chambers fulfil a range of bureaucratic functions that are highly 
relevant to businessmen, providing official documentation to members e.g. for export 
activities. Most importantly, they connect local businessmen with government 
                                                
 
22 Each provincial or sub-provincial Chamber of Commerce and/or Industry has ‘a single 
Chamber Assembly where all sectors are equally represented. Sector specific issues are dealt 
with initially at the level of sectoral committees, but the decision-making organ is the 
assembly’ (Bayırbağ, 2011, p. 9). 
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bodies.23 Because of such functions, leadership positions in Chambers provide ample 
opportunities to influence policymaking, to represent business interests to elites and 
to acquire easier access to information and resources from government bodies. 
In order to acquire such top-level posts, businesspeople face several elections 
from the lower to the upper-level hierarchical bodies of the Chambers.24 
Appointments into higher-level decision-making bodies such as the Chamber 
Assembly and the Board of Directors are the result of deliberate and careful 
campaigning among Chamber members (interview 34). Several observers of Turkish 
business politics regard the Chambers as an important site of political contention. 
Bayırbağ’s (2011) study of Gaziantep’s associational landscape observes that private 
BAs like Müsiad try to ‘take over’ or appropriate the semi-public Chambers 
(Bayırbağ, 2011). Ayşe Buğra also regards the Chambers as an arena for political 
contestation; in an interview she states:  
It’s not easy for governments to control the Chambers. There’s little research on this 
topic, but Chambers have always been arenas where very lively political debates 
have been fought out. Governments cannot easily influence them because the 
Chambers’ governance mechanisms are democratic, elections are taken very 
seriously; they’re strong bodies. During elections, voluntary organisations compete 
for the highest posts to take control of its administration, and build election alliances. 
We can say that Turkey’s polarization also affects the Chambers (…) but I don’t 
think as strongly as in other structures. (Özvarış, 2013) 
Consequently, leadership positions in the GSO and the national-level TOBB serve as 
indicators of political influence, both for companies and for BAs. In line with this, 
many businessmen in Gaziantep, the city case, regard the Chambers as an integrating 
                                                
 
23 Legislation states that Chambers are responsible for a range of bureaucratic and technical 
tasks (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği ile Odalar ve Borsalar Kanunu [TOBB 
Legislation], 2004), ranging from providing official government documentation as well as 
information and news on industry, trade and relevant legislations, to managing industrial 
sites, setting industry standards (e.g. in capacity usage, wastage), and to aggregate industry 
interests and inform government bodies. For businesspeople this is highly relevant when, for 
example, Chamber leadership can get into easy contact with the Energy Ministry if there are 
problems with access to electricity in parts of an industrial site. To give another example, 
official documentation from the Chambers is required for businesspeople to register a 
company, to get bank credits, buy input or other material from SOEs, etc. (interview 34). 
 
24 The lowest organs are the ‘meslek gruplari’ or professional groups, followed by Sectoral 
Committees, the Chamber Assembly, and finally the Board of Directors. Businesspeople can 
then be elected from regional into national-level Chamber Bodies (some positions become 
automatic members) (“Oda ve borsaları seçim heyecanı sardı [Chambers in Election Fever],” 
2008, Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği ile Odalar ve Borsalar Kanunu [TOBB 
Legislation], 2004). 
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body efficient at aggregating industry interests into one voice (e.g. interviews 6, 19, 
21, 31, 34). The political influence of the GSO both at the local and national level 
has also been observed by Bayırbağ’s study (2011) of Gaziantep’s BAs’ political 
contention. The weight of the GSO’s membership in Gaziantep’s economy turned it 
‘into a political agent that constantly negotiated the boundary between the local and 
non-local, exploring and introducing new agendas, thus becoming the agenda setter 
of the local corporate regime’ (Bayırbağ, 2011, p. 11). Gaziantep’s economic growth 
has also been reflected in their improved position among national-level institutions.25 
In an interview with the GSO’s secretary-general in the same study, the GSO 
representative gives some examples of this:  
While it [GSO] was being represented with one delegate in the TOBB at the 
beginning [note: from 1989], now it is represented with three delegates. Our 
President of the Chamber is on its Management Board (‘koordinasyon kurulu’) [of 
TOBB at the national level]. Our President of the [Chamber] Assembly is on the 
[TOBB’s] Industry Council. Also, since 1980, Gaziantep has sent Ministers to every 
government. (Bayırbağ, 2011, p. 15) 
Indeed, many of GSO’s and TOBB’s long-term leaders continue to enter party 
politics at the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey), e.g. Nejat Koçer, the 
GSO’s 11-year long president entered parliament in the 2011 national elections as an 
MP (Member of Parliament, ‘milletvekili’) for the AKP. In sum, leadership positions 
at the GSO constitute an important source of power for Gaziantep’s businessmen, 
both to shape the local corporate regime, yet also to reach national decision-makers. 
Therefore, such positions are used as an indicator of political influence. 
1.2. The political influence of Islamic business associations at the national 
level 
Islamic BAs have increasingly acquired important leadership positions in the semi-
public TOBB. Another important aspect of their influence is that they have increased 
their membership in size and variety, becoming the most encompassing and 
dominant associations of the business community. That is, at the expense of their 
main competitor, Tüsiad (Turkish Industry and Business Association; 1971–), the 
                                                
 
25 A number of members are elected and partly sent from each regional Body of Chamber 
into the national Body of Chambers, TOBB. From the ‘Genel Kurul’ or National Assembly, 
organized along broad sectoral lines into five Councils (‘konsey’), members can be further 
elected into the Board of Directors and other management bodies. (Türkiye Odalar ve 
Borsalar Birliği ile Odalar ve Borsalar Kanunu [TOBB Legislation], 2004). 
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oldest Turkish voluntary BA, which represents the first generation of state-nurtured, 
western-oriented, holding companies from the Istanbul-Marmara region (Buğra, 
1998). Figures are hard to come by and are limited to the BAs’ own irregular claims 
and reports and researchers’ interviews or newspaper articles.  
For example, two recent chairmen of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce 
(ITO), and TOBB vice-presidents, are at the same time influential members of the 
Islamic BA Müsiad, as well as AKP founding members.26 The Istanbul Chamber of 
Commerce is one of the largest chambers representing approximately 300,000 of 
TOBB’s total 1,6 million members (Özgentürk, 2012). Further more systematic data 
will be presented for the regional-level analysis below. 
Islamic BAs represent a wider variety of businesspeople than secular BAs do, 
and while their combined industrial output remains smaller than that of Tüsiad’s, it 
has grown considerably. In the 1990s, Müsiad ‘became the country’s largest and 
most widespread businessmen’s association (…)’ (Eligür, 2010, p. 203). Müsiad’s 
membership consisted of ca. 136 businessmen in 1991, which increased to 524 by 
1993, roughly doubled to 1000 by 1996, and stood at 1500 by 200127 at the time of 
the AKP’s formation. According to some very optimistic figures, in 1998, Müsiad 
was representing ‘nearly ten thousand enterprises, which together employed roughly 
half a million people. The member enterprises’ annual revenue in 1998 was $2.79 
billion’. After the AKP’s formation these figures grew even faster, so that the 
association reached around 2000 members in 2003 and around 3000 members in 
2009. In the 2011–2012 period, Müsiad had 3,150 senior members (and another 1750 
members in their ‘Young Müsiad’ section), representing more than 15,000 
companies, whereas Tüsiad had 600 members representing around 2,500 firms in 
                                                
 
26 This section refers to Murat Yalçıntaş, who had a background in political Islam before 
joining the AKP, and İbrahim Çağlar, both of whom went on to become vice-presidents of 
TOBB. Murat Yalçıntaş was the FP (Fazilet Parti; Virtue Party) Istanbul Regional 
Chairman’s Assistant (‘Istanbul Il başkan yardımcısı’) from 1998-2001. The FP is a political 
Islamist party that is part of the National Outlook Movement, from which the AKP split in 
2001.  
 
27 This data has been compiled from various sources: The figures concerning the 1990-2004 
years were reported by Ali Bayramoğlu in the Milliyet Newspaper of April 4th, 2004, as 
reported in Gümüşçü (2008). The 2009 data was taken from Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010; the 
2012 figures from Müsiad’s homepage (“MÜSIAD’la tanışın [Meet Müsiad],” 2012). 
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201128 (TÜSIAD, 2011). Tüsiad represents a much smaller, albeit economically 
powerful section of the business community, and reflects Tüsiad’s strategy of 
remaining a club, selecting the largest holding companies as members. According to 
the associations’ information, Tüsiad members contribute 65% of the industrial 
production and 80% of the foreign trade volume of Turkey (“Verilerle TÜSIAD 
[Tüsiad in figures],” 2011). Nevertheless, Müsiad members contributed 15% of 
Turkey's GDP and 17 billion US Dollars to Turkey's export revenue in 2012 
(“MÜSIAD’la tanışın [Meet Müsiad],” 2012).  
The confederation Tuskon, which is affiliated with the Gülen community and 
was only founded in 2005, already represented around 33,260 entrepreneurs in 2012 
(www.tuskon.org). The secular equivalent to Tuskon is the confederation Türkonfed 
(Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation), initiated by Tüsiad in 2004. 
Although both the secular Türkonfed and the Islamic Tuskon were founded almost at 
the same time, Türkonfed represents far fewer29 businessmen than Tuskon. The 
Islamic BAs also have more branches throughout Turkey and include more small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than their secular counterparts, making their 
membership base more heterogeneous.  
This development has been paralleled in the business sphere as more and 
more members of Islamic BAs have entered TOBB’s list of Turkey’s largest 1000 
manufacturing firms (according to net sales figures). Although both Müsiad and 
Tuskon represent more SMEs than Tüsiad, big holding companies have increasingly 
developed across Anatolia. In fact, 55 Müsiad member companies were among 
Turkey’s biggest 1000 companies in 2008 (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010). The figure 
remains unclear for Tuskon, although it can be expected to be much larger due to its 
larger membership base. 
In sum, it can be concluded that Islamic BAs represent a larger and more 
varied section of the business community and expanded their political influence as 
well as their economic potential, at the expense of secular elites and institutions. The 
latter have not disappeared or been completely displaced, but rather been forced to 
                                                
 
28 That is up from 484 members in 2000 (TÜSIAD, 2001), and 545 members in 2005. 
Tüsiad’s figures refer to 2011, Müsiad’s to 2012. 
 
29 In 2010, Türkonfed had 10,000 businessmen-members, organised in ten regional 
federations and 105 BAs, including Tüsiad (“TÜRKONFED History,” 2012).
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adjust and appropriate. How can we explain this political rise of Islamic BAs to the 
very centres of power at the national level? As established in the Turkish studies 
literature (see previous chapters), the local and grassroots level play a key role in this 
empowerment. The following section establishes that Anatolian capital is the 
backbone of the Turkish Islamic movement, its political parties and BAs, and that it 
has developed into new economic growth centres and elites. 
1.3. Anatolian capital: the backbone of the Islamic movement 
Turkish studies secondary literature, arguing that Anatolian capital is key in the 
Islamic movement’s empowerment, was presented in the literature review. This 
section confirms these claims with original data showing that Anatolian capital 
constitutes the power base of the moderately Islamic movement, of Islamic parties 
and of Islamic BAs. Parallel to the rise of the moderately Islamic movement. These 
formerly underdeveloped provinces in the periphery have developed into successful 
industrial districts.  
Anatolian capital is a term used to coin these industrial centres, and 
businessmen, who are a product of the new liberalised era of economic development, 
have been catching-up with the traditional industrial centres (Istanbul, Kocaeli, 
Izmir, Bursa, Ankara, Adana). These were created and supported by a secular 
developmental state during the import-substitution-industrialisation era (1960–1979). 
The traditional industrial centres, and some of their neighbouring areas that have 
developed into the second generation of industrial centres, are depicted in Figure 1 in 
red and blue, while Anatolian capital is depicted in green. Based on economic 
performance indicators of private sector based manufacturing and the timing of the 
industrialisation process, Pamuk (2012) classifies Denizli, Konya, Kayseri, 
Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya as part of Anatolian capital. These formerly 
neglected central- and south-eastern Anatolian regions have developed into new 
economic growth centres rivalling traditional industrial centres. In the last three 
decades, successful businesses in many manufacturing industries, notably in 
construction, furniture, textiles, food-processing and car-making, have tended to 
develop most in fast-growing Anatolian cities (“Silk road to riches,” 2010, p. 16). 
Anatolian industrial centres show rapid catch-up rates. In 1980, only 3.5% of the top 
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500 manufacturing companies30 had been located in these Anatolian districts 
(excluding Malatya), whereas this figure increased to 10.4% in 2008 for the top 500, 
and to 16.6% for the second top 500. This rapid catch-up is also reflected in the share 
of exports from the Anatolian region. Most notably Gaziantep and Denizli have 
moved into the top eight exporter provinces in Turkey in the 2000s. They are 
competing closely with the mature industrial centres in Izmir and Ankara (Gaziantep 
Sanayi Odası, 2012), and overtaking, for example, Adana in  terms of their annual 
value of exports. The aggregate share of Anatolian industrial districts in national 
export and GDP rates remain low when compared to the aggregate traditional 
Turkish industrial provinces. Nevertheless, compared to the traditional Turkish 
industrial provinces, the share of Anatolian provinces in manufacturing value-added 
and in total exports has increased (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012). In spite of these 
impressive growth rates, the competitiveness of many Anatolian SMEs is 
unsustainable, as productivity and technology levels remain low for SMEs in Turkey 
in general, also because access to credit and equity is limited (Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2004). The term Anatolian ‘tigers’ is 
clearly a euphemism, especially comparing the performance of Turkey with East 
Asian economies such as South Korea (Öniş & Bayram, 2008). 
  
 
Figure 1: Traditional industrial provinces in red; second generation of industrial provinces in 
blue; third generation of industrial provinces/Anatolian capital in green  
                                                
 
30 Figures based on manufacturing companies’ self-reported net sales (Istanbul Sanayi Odası, 
2013). The ISO publishes a list of Turkey’s top 1000 manufacturing companies every year, 
based on manufacturing-based sales turnover, profit and further performance indicators from 
1993 to 2012 (for top 500). 
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Islamic BAs operate in all parts of the country but, compared to secular BAs, 
a much larger section of their membership is made up of Anatolian capital. Indeed, a 
publicly announced goal of Müsiad’s formation has been ‘extending its 
organizational networks in eastern and south-eastern Turkey’ (Eligür, 2010, p. 202). 
Detailed, longitudinal membership data by region are not available, but based on the 
regional membership data presented in the secondary literature,31 the following 
estimates can be made: In 1995, about 30% of Müsiad’s member companies were 
registered in the newly emerging Anatolian districts (Denizli, Gaziantep, 
Kahramanmaraş, Konya, Malatya); circa 33% in the wider Istanbul region; and 10% 
in Ankara. In 2010, Müsiad’s membership in Anatolian districts has declined to 
represent 20% of its total membership, whereas its share of the Istanbul region has 
slightly increased to 36%.  
The importance of local activism is clearly reflected in the number of 
branches outside of Istanbul and Ankara. Compared to the secular Tüsiad’s two 
branches across Turkey, Müsiad features representational offices in 31 of Turkey’s 
provinces (2012 data). There are 12 Tuskon-affiliated BAs in the 6 Anatolian growth 
centres, each of which also hosts Müsiad branches. In contrast, Tüsiad has no 
branches outside of Istanbul and Ankara. Türkonfed, the secular confederation and 
counterpart to Tuskon, in spite of its 133 member associations, also appears weak in 
central Anatolia. It currently has no BA affiliates, neither in Kayseri, Gaziantep, nor 
in Kahramanmaraş or Malatya. Interestingly, the BA Askon (‘Anadolu Aslanları 
İşadamları Derneği’) that is close to the present-day parties of the National Outlook 
Movement, compared to the moderately Islamic BAs, draws most of its members 
from the Marmara and Black Sea region rather than central- and southeast Anatolia 
(Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010).  
The fact that Anatolian capital is the political backbone of the Islamic 
movement can be seen in regional election patterns. Below, in Figure 2 and Figure 3, 
I present the municipality voting patterns of the six Anatolian capital municipalities 
from 1989 until 2009. I compiled the data from the Turkish Statistical Institute to 
encompass the study period of 1993–2012. The next section on Gaziantep presents 
voting patterns of the ‘lowest’ possible administrative region, Anatolian capital 
                                                
 
31 Calculations are based on membership data presented in Buğra (1998), and Buğra & 
Savaşkan (2010). 
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provinces (NUTS-3 Region32), in general elections between 1991 and 2011. Local 
election data at the municipal level are assumed to reflect local dynamics more 
strongly than election data for the general elections at the national level. 
The political Islamist parties of the National Outlook Movement (or ‘Milli 
Görüş’) achieved higher voting shares in local, rather than in national elections in 
Anatolian capital, especially since 1999. This difference is even more pronounced in 
the case of centre-right parties, which show stronger local votes, especially in the 
1994, 1999 and 2004 local elections. Secular-left parties display the opposite 
trajectory. Until the turn of the millennium, secular-left vote shares were on average 
higher in Anatolian capital municipalities than in national elections. This shows that 
the centre-right and Islamist parties have a strong presence in Anatolian capital. The 
local prominence of the political Islamist Milli Görüş can be most clearly seen in the 
1999 municipality and 1995 general elections. In more than half of Anatolian growth 
regions the Milli Görüş party acquired the highest share of votes. Most importantly, 
Milli Görüş votes shares are well above the Turkish average across all time periods 
and elections. Since the AKP foundation in 2001, AKP vote shares are also well 
above the Turkish average in Anatolian capital (except for Denizli). In the new 
millennium, the regional shares for the AKP have been well above the national level, 
whereas the votes for the secular CHP party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) have been 
well below the national level (except for Denizli). Before the AKP’s existence, other 
centre-right and political Islamist parties were dominating these regions in both local 
and general elections. This prior support for the Milli Görüş in the Anatolian 
heartland shifted toward the more moderate AKP since its foundation (Gümüşçü & 
Sert, 2009). Based on these findings, it can be argued that Anatolian capital forms 
the political backdrop of the Turkish Islamic movement.  
The following section justifies the selection of Gaziantep’s prominent textile 
cluster as a case study of the displacement of the secular coalition by the Islamic 
movement. That is, firstly, by establishing that the phenomenon and puzzle exists in 
                                                
 
32 ‘NUTS’ is the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, a (1998) standard for 
referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes. The standard is developed 
and regulated by the European Union, and thus covers the member states of the EU in detail 
(“Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics,” 2014). Within the framework of the EU 
accession process, the Turkey’s Statistical Institute has adapted the EU’s statistical 
standards. 
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Gaziantep, i.e. the increasing influence of Islamic BAs over the secular BA at the 
Gaziantep Chamber of Industry (GSO); and the growth of Islamic BAs over the 
secular BA in general. Secondly, based on voting patterns compared to other 
Anatolian capital regions, I argue that Gaziantep provides an ideal study ground to 
analyse the displacement of an initially strong centre-left/secular coalition by a 
centre-right/Islamic movement. Finally, I give a short overview over Gaziantep’s 
textile cluster.  
Figure 2 Municipality election results by party group in 6 Anatolian Capital municipalities in 
the 1989, 1994 and 1999 local elections [%]; source: Tüik (“TÜIK-Turkish Statistical 
Institute,” n.d.)   
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Figure 3 Municipality election results by party group in 6 Anatolian Capital municipalities in 
the 2004 and 2009 local elections [%]; source: Tüik (“TÜIK-Turkish Statistical Institute,” 
n.d.). 
 
2. Gaziantep as city case 
This section establishes that Gaziantep is a relevant city case where the proposed 
mechanisms can be studied in depth. Showing ‘causal homogeneity’ (Munck, 2004), 
i.e. that the proposed processes are present in a case, and is a necessary part of case 
selection. I do this, first, by establishing Gaziantep’s economic growth; second, by 
comparing secular and Islamic BAs’ influence in the Chambers, and the size and 
economic influence of their membership over time; and third, by comparing electoral 
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an economic growth centre over the past 20 years, but also that the secular BA and 
political parties have increasingly lost the competition with more influential Islamic 
BAs and political parties. After justifying this choice of Gaziantep, I give a short 
overview over its industry and justify the selection of the textile cluster as an 
industry case.  
2.1. Gaziantep as economic growth centre 
Gaziantep is one of the most economically dynamic cities in the Anatolian region. 
Gaziantep, compared to other Anatolian capital regions, has among the strongest 
manufacturing sectors according to employment shares.33 Furthermore, according to 
the figures compiled by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO) every year, 
Gaziantep has a high share of top manufacturing companies. To give an example, in 
2008, Gaziantep hosted 31 of Turkey’s top 1000 manufacturing firms, whereas in 
Konya this number was 20, in Kayseri 27, in Denizli 22, and in Kahramanmaraş 11. 
According to my own compilations34 of ISO data, between 1993 and 1998, 13 
holding firms (or 10 holdings) with headquarters in Gaziantep were among the top 
1000 manufacturing firms. This number increased to 16 holdings firms between 1999 
and 2003 period, and more than doubled to 34 holding firms (24 holdings) in the 
post-AKP between 2004 and 2012.  
Additionally, Gaziantep features the highest value of manufacturing exports 
among the Anatolian capital cities, which can be seen in Figure 4 below.35 This 
graph plots the value of manufacturing exports in 1,000 USD for each year for which 
this data are available, from 1996 to 2012, comparing 18 traditional and new major 
industrial centres (NUTS–3 Region; excluding Istanbul). Istanbul is excluded to 
improve the readability because values are far outliers, e.g. manufacturing export 
values in 2012 reached ca. 74 billion USD (similar level to that before the global 
                                                
 
33 According to Regional Statistics provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute for the year 
2009, 32% of Gaziantep’s working-age population was employed in manufacturing, ca. 25% 
in agriculture, 24% in services and ca. 19% in retail. In contrast, this manufacturing 
employment share was 25% in Kayseri and 24% in Konya. Source: TÜIK (“TÜIK-Turkish 
Statistical Institute,” n.d.) 
 
34 Based on profit and/or sales turnover, both net. 
35 Exports values are the most readily available data for the longest time period by NUTS-3 
region, whereas information on value added or other performance measures is sparser. I 
compiled this data from the homepage of the Turkish Statistical Institute; the Institute 
provided additional data for earlier years. 
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economic crisis in 2008) – compared to Gaziantep’s 5.4 billion USD. Istanbul 
remains Turkey’s economic centre, however economic activity has spread from 
traditional manufacturing centres to a wider region encompassing Anatolian capital. 
Before the turn of the millennium, Gaziantep and other Anatolian capital provinces 
like Denizli or Konya’s export performances were far below those of Istanbul, 
Ankara, Izmir, Adana or Bursa. However, Gaziantep and Denizli are especially 
notable, improving their performance over traditional centres like Sakarya or Adana. 
Gaziantep, due to its strategic location toward Middle Eastern markets, shows the 
strongest export performance, gradually reaching levels similar to Ankara or even 
Izmir in the late 2000s. The fact that Gaziantep has gradually overtaken older 
industrial centres in exports since the 2000s makes Gaziantep a good choice to study 
the displacement of older industrial centres and elites.  
 
Figure 4 Annual value of manufacturing exports in USD (1000$) by year by 18 traditional 
and new industrial centres (NUTS-3 regions), excluding Istanbul; source: TÜIK (“TÜIK-
Turkish Statistical Institute,” n.d.)  
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2.2. Business association displacement in Gaziantep 
Gaziantep has three Islamic and one secular BA. Firstly, there is a local Müsiad 
branch. Then there are Gapgiad (‘Gaziantep Sharing Young Businessmen’s 
Association’), and Hürsiad (‘Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association’), which are both members of the confederation Tuskon (which is 
affiliated with the Gülen community). Finally, the bourgeois club with secular 
leanings, Gagiad (‘Gaziantep Young Businessmen’s Association’), represents the 
most elitist businesspeople of the region, and shows similarities to Turkey’s most 
prestigious and oldest voluntary BA, Tüsiad. 
The increase in political influence of Islamic BAs and businessmen is 
apparent in their positions at the GSO and TOBB. The figures of Table 2 discussed 
here refer to the study sample of business groups in Gaziantep’s textile cluster, which 
have been aggregated into three time periods by ideological affiliation.36 The 
ideological categorisation rules for business groups as Islamic, secular or mixed are 
explained in the network chapter. Most TOBB are also GSO leadership members, but 
were only included in the TOBB column to prevent doubling those business groups. 
Listing in ISO’s top 1000 manufacturing firms (based on turnover and profit figures) 
by affiliation is included in a further column.  
Overall, TOBB positions became more diversified with business groups with 
Islamic memberships (mixed and predominantly Islamic) dominating over 
predominantly secular business groups in the post-AKP era. This domination is all 
the more puzzling if we consider the domination of secular business groups in the 
early 1990s. In the 1993–1998 time period, all TOBB members (2 business groups) 
are secular BA members only (no other BA membership); there are also more secular 
than Islamic businessmen in GSO leadership positions (32% vs 23%). In the 1999–
2003 time period secular Gagiad members continue to dominate at TOBB (among 
the 4 TOBB members, 3 are in Gagiad, 1 in Tuskon plus Gagiad, none in Müsiad). 
There are no Islamic TOBB members in this time period, but two secular and one 
                                                
 
36 The TOBB and GSO provided this leadership data. As businesspeople can be members in 
multiple BAs, expressing leadership positions by BA membership is less meaningful than by 
overall ideological categorisation that takes into account all memberships. Due to the 
aggregation into time period, the 1999–2003 period appears to have fewer GSO members 
(see N=14, compared to 1993 N=22). This is due to fewer elections/fewer member changes 
among the leadership bodies in that time period, resulting in a smaller variety of business 
groups.  
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mixed business group (plus 1 non-categorisable). The pattern at the GSO is similar to 
the earlier time period (note: more members with no affiliation in this time period). 
The local GSO has had a more mixed profile than the TOBB from the early 1990s 
onward. Nevertheless, in the post-AKP time period, 43% of GSO leaders have 
predominantly Islamic affiliations, while only 9% have predominantly secular 
affiliations, illustrating Islamic dominance in the GSO. Secular business groups are 
still strong at TOBB, but competition has increased. An equal share of TOBB 
members has predominantly secular and mixed memberships now (38% of members 
each), in addition to one Islamic member (8% of members). Islamic influence is also 
reflected in the top 1000 manufacturing companies list, where for the first time 
Islamic business groups dominate over mixed and secular ones in the 2004–2012 
time period. The majority of Gaziantep’s top companies now have Islamic 
affiliations (36% Islamic vs 20% secular), while the pattern was reversed in early 
1990s (40% secular vs 30% Islamic). Mixed affiliations reach an all-time high; and 
the share of businesspeople with no affiliations reaches an all-time low, illustrating 
the advantages of membership overall.  
Table 2 Sample business groups’ leadership positions in the GSO, TOBB, and in the top 
manufacturing companies’ list compiled by the ISO, aggregated across three time periods, by 
ideological affiliation 
Business 
groups 
nr (%) 
GSO 
93–98 
(only) 
GSO 
99–03 
(only) 
GSO 
04–12 
(only) 
TOBB 
93–98 
TOBB 
99–03 
TOBB 
04–12 
ISO 
93–
98 
 
ISO 
99–
03 
ISO 
04–
12  
None 9  
41% 
8  
57% 
8  
35% 
0 1  
25% 
2  
15% 
2  
20% 
3  
25% 
5  
20% 
Islamic 5  
23% 
2  
14% 
10  
43% 
0 0 1  
8% 
3  
30% 
4  
33% 
9  
36% 
Secular 7  
32% 
3  
21% 
2  
9% 
2  
100% 
2  
50% 
5 
38% 
4 
40% 
5  
42% 
5  
20% 
Mixed 1  
5% 
1  
7% 
3  
13% 
0 1  
25% 
5  
38% 
1  
10% 
0 6  
24% 
N 22  14  23  2  4  13  10  12  25  
 
The increasing influence of Islamic over secular BAs in Gaziantep is also 
reflected in their membership figures.37 Figure 5 shows the number of members 
                                                
 
37 Overall, all BAs in Gaziantep combined represent approximately one third of the 
companies included in my textile cluster sample in the post-AKP period (2004–2012), which 
is up from around a fifth (22%) in the 1993 – 1998 time period. The number of companies 
without membership is probably over-estimated as the textile sample may include companies 
which are only registered to be active in textiles, but are in fact not operational in that area 
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(businesspeople) of all BAs across all sectors over three time periods (overlapping 
memberships possible). In 1993–1998, Gagiad had the largest number of members, 
103 businessmen, slightly more than either Hürsiad (Tuskon affiliate) at 96 and 
Müsiad at 91 members. This completely changed in the 2004–2012 period. Now 
Hürsiad (Tuskon affiliate) has the most members (476 businesspeople), followed by 
Müsiad (226 businesspeople), the secular Gagiad (209 businesspeople), and the 
second and smaller Tuskon affiliate, Gapgiad (ca. 101 businesspeople). Especially 
Hürsiad’s membership growth is notable, and although the elitist Gagiad does not 
follow an equally expansionist strategy as the other BAs, focusing only on the largest 
companies, the reversal of the pattern over time is remarkable. Across all three time 
periods, the category of membership that displays the lowest growth rate is 
businessmen who are exclusively Gagiad members (i.e. not members in any Islamic 
BA). The increase in Gagiad membership overall is smaller than the overall firm 
growth rate in Gaziantep and much smaller than the growth in exclusive 
Müsiad/Tuskon memberships (figures are not displayed here, but see appendix 
section 8).  
 
Figure 5 Number of total members (businesspeople) off Gaziantep’s four business 
associations by time period (accumulated), across all sectors 
 
Focusing only on the textile cluster sample, a similar pattern emerges. The 
sample data in Figure 6 no longer refers to businesspeople, but to companies, the unit 
of observation (number of companies in the textile cluster which have a board 
member who is a BA member). The post AKP 2004–2012 time period witnesses an 
increase in the number of companies with memberships in all three BAs. As 
memberships overlap, the figure of total company members is overestimated, and 
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rather reflects the total number of memberships.38 Having noted that, most 
importantly, in 2004 Tuskon (combination of Hürsiad and Gapgiad) slightly 
overtakes the secular Gagiad in representing the textile cluster firms of the study 
sample (152 vs 145 companies). While in the early 1990s, Tuskon only represented 
approximately half the number of firms that Gagiad represented among the textile 
cluster firms, Tuskon membership has shown a massive boost in the post-AKP 
period, reaching stages at par with Gagiad, with Müsiad not far behind. In sum, this 
section provided data to show that Islamic BAs and businessmen have increased their 
political influence vis-à-vis a dominant secular elite in Gaziantep – in terms of 
Chamber leadership and company representation in BAs, and partly economic 
performance. 
 
Figure 6 Number of sample companies with owners who are members in Gaziantep’s BAs 
and total number of sample companies by time period (accumulated) 
 
2.3. Political arena: political displacement in Gaziantep 
This notable and fast change in influence is also reflected in the political arena. 
Comparing national voting patterns to the other Anatolian industrial centres, 
Gaziantep is unique in that it has experienced a political transition in its electoral 
behaviour from voting for the centre-left parties slightly above the national average 
in the 1990s, to voting for the centre-right AKP above the national average. Local 
voting results (municipality election results) are presented above which show a 
similar pattern. Indeed, from 1989 until the local administrative elections in 2004, 
                                                
 
38 Between 1993 and 1998, of the 401 sample companies, 87 or 22% are BA members. The 
ratio remains similar between 1999 and 2003 where, of the 590 sample companies, 138 (or 
23%) are BA members. The ratio of BA relative to none-BA members increases slightly in 
the post–AKP 2004 time period where, of the 830 sample companies, 258, or 31% of 
companies are BA members. 
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charismatic mayor Celal Doğan had dominated the municipality for the centre-left 
CHP (Republican People’s Party). In 2004, the AKP took over (2004–present). Such 
a long dominance of the CHP in the municipality is unusual among other Anatolian 
capital cities; this is also reflected in general elections where the centre-left parties 
receive a larger share of the votes in Gaziantep compared to other Anatolian 
industrial districts, especially compared to Konya, Kayseri and Kahramanmaraş (but 
less so compared to Denizli). 
Generally, Figure 7 and 8 show how after the AKP’s inauguration, the party 
has become far more dominant than any other party was throughout the 1990s. The 
(political) Islamist parties of Milli Görüş have been decimated and absorbed in the 
aftermath of the AKP formation; this is in comparison to their strength in the 1995 
and 1999 general elections. Centre-left parties have become much weaker in 
Anatolian capital, and the nationalist MHP has also lost some ground (although it has 
been growing stronger again more recently).  
In spite of a stronger than average centre-left support base in general 
elections, centre-right parties received the majority of the votes in Gaziantep 
province in the 1990s. Political Islamist parties were close to the national average, 
while centre-right parties were weaker than average. However, Gaziantep develops 
from having a larger than average centre-left voting share, to having a larger than 
average AKP voting share from 2004 onward. In the 2007 and 2011 elections, the 
AKP received 12% more in Gaziantep province than the Turkish average, reaching a 
maximum of 62% of the votes in 2011. The centre-left parties combined even 
received 7% less in Gaziantep than the national average, while it had consistently 
received several percentage points above the national average in the 1990s general 
elections.  
Gaziantep, as part of Anatolian capital therefore mirrors the national-level 
transition to a dominant AKP well, and provides the most suitable study ground to 
explore how the Islamic has gained political influence vis-à-vis the dominant secular 
elite. Having a stronger centre-left and somewhat weaker right political landscape 
makes Gaziantep the least likely case among Anatolian capital to develop a very 
strong AKP support base, as observed in the late 2000s. In contrast, the strongholds 
of Islamist politics, especially Konya, have been more homogeneous in their political 
landscape and thus do not reflect this struggle and ascent as well as in Gaziantep. 
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Figure 7 General election results by party group in 6 Anatolian Capital provinces (NUTS-3 
region) and Turkey in the 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections [%]; and in the 2002–2011 general 
elections in Figure 8; source: Tüik (“TÜIK-Turkish Statistical Institute,” n.d.)
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2.4. Gaziantep’s textile cluster: a short overview 
Gaziantep’s industry is diverse with extensive complimentary relations among the 
local manufacturing industries in the food, textiles and clothing (e.g. machine-woven 
carpets, shoes), chemicals (soap and detergents), plastic products, and miscellaneous 
machinery sectors. Almost all of these are internationally competitive (Öz, 2004). 
This study focuses on the textile-manufacturing cluster in Gaziantep in its selection 
of a network sample and interviewees.  
 Extent and performance of textiles and clothing in Gaziantep  
Gaziantep’s textile cluster plays an important role in terms of manufacturing capacity 
and export performance in Turkey’s textile industry. In 2002, the year of the latest 
Census of Industry, ca. 34% of Gaziantep’s industrial companies were active in 
textiles, leather and footwear, apparel and plastics (all of which were partly included 
in the present sample); providing altogether ca. 64% of employment (TÜIK, 2002).  
Turkey has a global competitive advantage in the following subsectors of 
textiles, which also dominate Gaziantep: Machine-made carpets, yarns, tricot 
apparels, non-woven technical textiles, PP sac and big bag (Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 
2012). According to 2013 TOBB data presented by the GSO (Gaziantep Sanayi 
Odası, 2014), Gaziantep fulfills 94% of Turkey’s manufacturing capacity ratio in 
machine made carpets, 86% in PP yarns, 80% in nonwoven fabric, 77% in tuft-in 
carpet, 53%in fancy yarns, 71% in acrylic yarns, 45% in cotton yarns, a high 
percentage in plastic slippers, and ca. half in bags and sacks from PE/PP band 
(plastics); rates are also high for macaroni and semolina/bulgur production. 
Gaziantep is dominated by textiles over clothing (Kunt & Zobu, 2011). Technical 
textiles and carpets are the most concentrated sectors in Gaziantep.  
In 2013, textiles and clothing combined made up ca. 51% of Gaziantep’s 
exports; in 2003 that figure was slightly higher at ca. 64% (Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 
2014). In 2009 and 2010, the products most exported from Gaziantep, were machine-
made carpets, and among the top ten products were further clothing and textile 
subsectors (pp yarns, outerwear, woven and knitted fabrics, acrylic yarns). The 
number one export market across all sectors in 2010 was Iran (39% of exports), 
followed by Europe (21%), other Middle East Countries, Africa, USA, Turkic 
republics and Syria. (Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 2012, Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 2012). 
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It is mainly medium-sized and large companies rather than small and micro firms 
that are involved in exports (Ayata, 2004). 
 Short history of Gaziantep’s industrial district: From periphery to centre 
In modern Turkey, Anatolian capital’s competitive advantage has lain in its cheap 
labour force, as well as the lax government controls on tax and insurance payment 
(Ayata, 2004). Gaziantep’s industry and Anatolian capital at large undertook an 
extraordinary growth from underdevelopment to competing with traditional 
industrial centres increasingly since the 2000s. This is all the more astonishing in 
Gaziantep where state investments and FDI (foreign direct investment) inflows were 
particularly low, and where subcontracting among local companies has been limited; 
even when compared to other Anatolian cities like Bursa or Denizli (Ayata, 2004; 
Bademli, 1977; Özcan, 1995; Öz, 2004).  
Gaziantep’s industrial roots date back a long time. In the Ottoman Empire 
Antep had been an important trade and industry centre due to its strategic location 
toward Middle Eastern Markets, however, in Republican Turkey, it was neglected 
(Bademli, 1977; Özcan, 1995). The fact that Gaziantep industry was not developed 
by the state is a source of local pride, as was stressed by many interviewees and 
supported by other studies on Gaziantep. For example, Ayata (2004) argues that 
being on the periphery has been an advantage in that Gaziantep industry managed to 
grow autonomously and not under the control of big state or private holdings or 
international capital. Its growth impulses result form the independence from state 
control, and Gaziantep’s supply of cheap labour and a strong entrepreneurial spirit. 
Other than the usual infrastructure developments, none of the classic SOEs (state-
owned enterprises) in industry, agriculture or energy were developed in Gaziantep 
(Ayata, 2004). Bademli’s study (1977), the first systematic and detailed study of 
Gaziantep’s industry, shows that direct state involvement in factory building in 
Antep only began in the 1950s,39 and was far less than in Eskisehir and other western 
cities. In the 1970s Gaziantep was still regarded at the periphery of the mainstream 
of the Turkish industrialisation process (Bademli, 1977, p. 158). 
                                                
 
39 The first state-supported developments in Gaziantep were a ‘rakı’ and wine factory in the 
1950s, employing around 400 workers. In another cooperation with the private sector, the 
state built a cement factory for about 550 employees (Bademli, 1977) 
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With the export-promoting economic policies of the 1980s, the buyer-driven 
apparel industries in Turkey began to produce large gains. This led to a gradual 
incorporation of SMEs into global value chains through subcontracting, contracting, 
and licensing agreements (Tokatli, 2003). The growth of all Anatolian industrial 
districts is to be regarded as part of this broader global process. In line with this 
development, the export drive of textiles increased in the 1990s when 
textiles/clothing made up around 60% of Antep’s exports (Ayata, 2004). Major 
export markets for Gaziantep’s textile at that time were Middle Eastern and the new 
post-Soviet states. The city’s industry profited from not only from the Iran-Iraq war 
and its close location to those markets during and after the war, but also from the 
collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Many cheap and low quality carpets were 
exported to central Asian and post-Yugoslav countries at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Ayata, 2004). Most of my interviewees also reported that early companies were able 
to exploit the high demand in these new markets to grow quickly, which was not 
only facilitated by export incentives in the 1980s, but also by the Gülen community 
(interviews). 
During this time period, many firms became manufacturers for global brands 
(e.g. Boyner holding signing licensing agreements with Benetton Group). In the 
1990s, in spite of ‘comparatively low productivities, some domestics have evolved 
from simple assembly initially to full-package production, and then to original brand-
name manufacturing’ (Tokatli, 2003, p. 1880). Learning from this, some companies 
moved on to create their own brands, while others entered more gradually into 
franchising/licensing joint ventures (Tokatli, 2003). This process can also be partly 
observed in Gaziantep. Although there are less international brands, there are some 
successful examples that I observed during my fieldwork that show that the sector in 
Gaziantep is expanding and partly climbing up the value-added ladder. There are 
several large companies that manufacture for global labels and department stores and 
that have entered joint ventures,40 and some are developing their own brands that 
they export.41 
                                                
 
40 For example, the Islamic carpet producer Bayteks entered a joint venture with a Belgian 
carpet company in 2012; the Islamic Naksan Holding produces Pierre Cardin carpets; the 
leading Sanko holding entered its first joint venture in 1997 with Germany cement company 
Ytong and produces clothing as subcontractor for retailers like M&S, Walmart and fashion 
brand like Levi’s and Nike; Selçuk Iplik produces cloth for Dolce & Gabbana; Islamic 
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3. Politico-religious contention and the political rise of Islamic 
business associations 
The connection between SMEs in the periphery of power and the Turkish Islamic 
movement has been conditioned by various changes in Turkey’s political and 
economic institutions.42 These will be analysed below through the concept of POS 
(political opportunity structures). POS are ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious 
politics’ (Tarrow, 2011). Perceived opportunities or political access, the existence of 
allies, shifting political alignments and the opportunity to exploit divisions or 
vulnerabilities of opponents, are key POS developed in political process theories, in 
addition to threats from the establishment (Tarrow, 2011).  
3.1. Tracing political opportunity structures 
Since the establishment of multi-party politics in 1950, the centre of power, the 
military and Kemalist state officials and bureaucrats, have meddled heavily with 
political parties, closing them down through military coups. Such ‘threats’ have had 
a large impact on business politics. After coups in 1960 and 1971, the intervention in 
1980 resulted in the harshest Constitution toward associational activity and Islamic 
groups (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). Further post-modern coups in 1997 and 200843 also 
left deep marks and contributed to the moderation and reshuffling of the Islamic 
movement. By supporting more moderate over radical groups, Anatolian business 
elites, who had an economic interest not to confront the secular state, arguably 
                                                                                                                                     
 
carpet-producer Kaplan produces carpets, amongst others, for several German retailers like 
Aldi (interviews with respective owner-managers).  
41 For example, Merinos Holding has built up his own brand in carpets and furniture; Onur 
Group has built up its brand DreamOn Bridals. 
 
42 This is not to say there are also important international factors and institutions at play, like 
the EU anchor or US interests in the Middle East. However, the analysis is focused on how 
domestic actors have made used of and/or pro-created openings in the Turkish political 
opportunity structure and created a moderately Islamic and socio-economic movement. The 
origin of such opportunities is secondary compared to the primary focus of how actors made 
use of them. 
 
43 In 2008, with renewed ideological debates among the military, who feared the introduction 
of an Islamist state by the AKP, brought the case of the party’s closure to the constitutional 
courts (Karadağ, 2012). This process ultimately failed, resulting only in a fine, but gave the 
AKP further incentives to resort to resentment politics and to start courts proceedings against 
Kemalist elites (referred to as Sledgehammer/Ergenekon). 
 
 94 
contributed to the moderation of Islamist politics in Turkey (Keyman & Öniş, 2007; 
Öniş, 2006; Pamuk, 2012). After the imprisonment of several Müsiad members in 
1997, the association decided henceforth not to publicly refer to Islam in its activities 
and publications (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009). The militarisation of Turkish politics 
(Jacoby, 2005) encompassed periods of threats and incorporation from the state, 
military and bureaucracy on the one hand, to the political parties as well as civil 
society, on the other hand. This competition has created structurally weak political 
parties and led politicians to look for support outside ‘politics proper’ to business and 
social welfare organisation at the grassroots level.  
State threats were never complete (Bianchi, 1984), but instead periods of 
threats alternated with periods of encouragement for Islamic actors, providing 
important opportunities for political access – access and threats are two of the POS 
established in the political process literature. After the 1971 and 1980 military coup, 
the respective political-Islamist parties of Erbakan’s ‘Milli Görüş’ Movement were 
closed down. After the 1980 coup, the military encouraged moderately Islamic 
movements such as the Gülen community to become more visible publicly. This 
move reflects an effort that has now been called the ‘TIS’ (‘Turkish Islam 
Synthesis’), in which the military was seeking public support for its intervention, for 
tools to strengthen moderate over more radical Islamist movements, and to supplant 
class organisation by promoting the uniting force of Islam. When Turgut Özal, a 
follower of Fethullah Gülen’s sermons, and an adherent of the Nakşibendi Sufi 
Order, became Prime Minster in 1983, various ‘cemaats’ (religious community) and 
‘tarikats’ (Sufi order) were given more freedoms, paving the way for expanding 
Islamist charity and associational activity (Agai, 2004). This increasing ideological 
opening contributed to the later electoral victories of the political Islamist parties in 
the 1990s and increased their opportunity for access. 
By constraining organisational links with Islamic groups,44 and by decimating 
trade unions after the 1980 coup, BAs remained as the major legitimate 
                                                
 
44 After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Islam was to be eliminated from 
the public realm and institutionalised in the form of a state-interpreted, official version of 
Islam as an integral part of the government structure; brotherhoods, tarikats and other 
institutions were forbidden (Agai, 2004). Religious sects and educational institutions, which 
had formed an integral part of the Ottoman empire for centuries, did not simply disappear, 
but continued to exist ‘underground’, initially as a popular spiritual ethical movement 
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organisational base in a neoliberal Islamic project. As a counterpart of rigid state 
laicism, Islamism made its first formal political appearance in Turkey in 1970 when 
Necmettin Erbakan formed successive political parties mobilising political Islam. 
After the 1980 coup, party ideologies as well as parties’ organisational links with 
civil society were further constrained (Hale and Özbudun, 2009). This has led the 
political Islamist movement to rely on informal networks at the grassroots level with 
Islamic groups and charities. As a consequence of legal restrictions, inter-
organisational ties tend to be informal, based on personal networks and overlapping 
memberships rather than official organisational ties or channels. Such ties with 
Islamic civil society were further facilitated by BAs and Anatolian SMEs, which 
provided a legitimate platform. Necmettin Erbakan, the political Islamist Milli Görüş 
Movement’s leader did not only mobilise among the poor and pious, but also 
polarised Anatolian SMEs.  
The exclusion from the negotiating tables and state resources (e.g. finance for 
SMEs, infrastructure projects), has given incentives for the businessmen of Anatolian 
capital to rely on local, informal networks and on a pattern of pooling private 
resources for community and business purposes. This newly emerging middle class 
felt excluded from economic elite circles and political participation, as well as from 
platforms for identity-formation and thus looked for alternatives. Political Islamist 
parties, since the 1970s, have gradually transformed this grievance into a powerful 
impetus for collective action for upwardly mobile Anatolian businessmen. SMEs in 
general and the central- and south-eastern Anatolia have indeed been neglected in the 
state’s initial engineered economic development program, which is not unusual as 
scale economies associated with modern technology require ‘starting big’ (Buğra, 
1994). The arising political Islamist parties successfully mobilised SMEs from 
smaller business constituencies, which developed more independent and aggressive 
means of representation and associated themselves with the Islamic periphery. 
Erbakan successfully exacerbated cleavages in the business community based on 
region and size of enterprise to win political support from small manufacturers in 
Anatolia and merchants in the depressed east (Bianchi, 1984). Around the time when 
                                                                                                                                     
 
(Yavuz, 2003). This legacy of controlling Islam has continued throughout Turkey’s modern 
history. 
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he founded his first political party, N. Erbakan was elected as leader of the TOBB 
with the support of small merchants and middle-income businessmen, a position 
from which he was soon removed (Bianchi, 1984).  
In spite of repeated military interventions and because of incomplete 
oppression, Islamic actors have managed to increase their access over time, and to 
create new powerful allies. In addition to threat and access, the availability of allies 
is another key POS that has shaped Turkish business politics. The following section 
shows how this has been made possible through their efficient grassroots 
mobilisation, and new resources made available through gradual integration into 
international markets and through gradual decentralisation reforms.  
Through efficient grassroots mobilisation and organisation, the Islamists 
emerged as the leading party in the 1994 municipal elections, and in the 1995 general 
elections. The current PM Erdoğan became mayor of Istanbul as representative of the 
Milli Görüş Movement’s Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP). Most observers of 
Turkish politics attribute this electoral success to the Welfare Party’s ‘achievements 
in local government’. In an environment of high inequality, and rapid urbanisation, 
‘Islamist municipalities channeled more services to poorer districts and distributed 
free coal, food and clothes. Simply by curtailing municipal corruption, the Islamists 
achieved a notable improvement in the quality of urban services’ (Tuğal, 2007). 
Efficient hierarchical organisation down to the grassroots level (Eligür, 2010, pp. 
186–188), and patronage networks are key aspects of these achievements, legacies 
which are present in the AKP’s organisation today: 
The RP [political-Islamist Welfare Party] provided both selective material incentives 
and emotional rewards through face-to-face contacts with the electorate that 
established close, friendly relations with their constituents, especially those who 
resided in shantytowns. The fact that municipalities exist, that the Turkish state is 
organized on multiple levels of governance, created a degree of inherent “openness” 
of the system to entry by new political actors. The Islamist movement exploited this 
structural opportunity. Having gained access, the successful performance of 
municipalities under WP control gave Islamists increased credibility on the national 
level as an alternative to parties tarred by the malfunctioning state. (Eligür, 2010, p. 
213) 
 
These local networks have gradually increased their resources since the 
1980s: While business was heavily dependent on state nurturing during the ISI era 
(import-substitution-industrialisation), the deepening economic liberalisation in the 
1990s has created a new business class. The emergence of a pious middle class 
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without adequate representation at the national level has provided a new range of 
allies for the Islamic movement. PM Özal’s ANAP Party (centre-right Motherland 
Party), from 1983 onward, pursued an export-led growth strategy, providing export- 
and other incentives to the emerging pious middle classes (e.g. tax rebates to 
exporters, preferential credits and privatisation deals; Buğra, 2003), giving way to 
deepening corruption cycles in the 1980s and 1990s (Zürcher, 2004). Through such 
incentives and international trade, Anatolian industrialists have gained sufficient 
disposable income to invest into the Islamic movement and Anatolian industrial 
districts, more or less independently of the state. In sum, both economic 
liberalisation that allowed pious industrialists to apply new market tools, and 
decentralisation projects that allowed religious-conservatives to come into power in 
local administrations, increased their financial resources and autonomy from the 
centralised state –two important boundary conditions.  
Efficient local administration is an important factor contributing to the later 
electoral successes of Islamist parties and the AKP at the national level (Demir et al., 
2004). Most importantly, political Islamists’ popularity in the 1994’s local elections, 
and their leader Erbakan becoming PM for a short period in 1996, were major 
turning points in increasing the  perceived political access of Islamists. R. T. 
Erdoğan was elected mayor of Istanbul for the RP in 1994. The RP entered a 
coalition government with the centre-right Right Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, 
DYP) after the general elections in 1995, which collapsed as the Constitutional Court 
closed down the RP in 1997 (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012).  
The perceived access and new range of resources and allies managed to 
facilitate the empowerment of the AKP in the 2000s because of the electoral 
volatility and de-legitimisation of existing parties and elites. Electoral volatility or 
rather ‘shifting political alignments’, as well as divisions amongst elites, are two 
further POS that also apply in the Turkish case.  
The existing political parties and Kemalist alliance of bureaucrats, military 
and state-nurtured holdings gradually lost their legitimacy for several reasons, the 
first being, through corruption scandals, and the incurred costs of the biggest 
economic crises in modern Turkish history. The deep economic crises of 2000–2001 
and the subsequent social costs of restructuring incurred due to a new IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) package, combined with the bad management of the 
devastating 1999 earthquake, led to a broad rejection of established political 
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parties.45 The stigmatisation by the military of Islamist parties (and Kurdish parties) 
as enemies of Kemalism (Karadağ, 2012) helped the new moderately Islamic 
movement to construct itself as the only viable alternative to the dominant centre-
right parties (DYP, ANAP) of the 1980s and 1990s, as well to the secular CHP. It 
has also provided ample opportunity to Islamic actors to depict themselves as the 
unjustly oppressed, as well as to give their cause a pure and religious appeal that cuts 
across classes and is situated beyond power interests (Özcan & Turunç, 2011). It was 
also in the 1990s, that the political Islamist parties increasingly established 
themselves as the sole true anti-establishment parties, aiding a self-description as ‘the 
other and oppressed’, later to be perpetuated by the AKP. This strongly felt external 
threat has furthermore intensified out-group derogation, escalating suspicion and 
hostility toward an elite that is constructed as coherently ultra-Kemalist. The 
combination of Islamic and capitalist aspects by the moderately Islamic movement is 
regarded as an important draw of the AKP toward lower-income groups as well as 
businessmen (Özcan & Turunç, 2011).  
Second, the high electoral volatility of the 1990s increased the preference of 
politicians to mobilise and polarise heavily among civil society and BAs. During the 
changing and weak coalition governments of the 1990s (Karadağ, 2012), different 
parties have increasingly polarised different sections of the civil society, and thereby 
created deep divisions among elites. Such electoral volatility makes existing elites 
vulnerable, resulting in uncertainty among state and political actors (Tarrow, 2011, p. 
165), creating an opportunity for new actors to capture. 
It is a new party, the AKP that rises to win the sentiments of the majority by 
exploiting such divisions among elites created by previous electoral volatility, and 
economic crises. This opening in the political opportunity structure was quickly 
seized by a young and reformist wing within the Milli Görüş Movement who would 
establish the AKP. This new party with roots in political Islam, had an inherent high 
vulnerability vis-à-vis the powerful and Kemalist bureaucracy, state elites and 
                                                
 
45 The devastating earthquake in Izmit in 1999 led to about 20,000 casualties and further 
made visible the deep-seated corruption (Green, 2005). The following economic crisis seems 
to have been the last straw, which destroyed voters’ trust in the existing political parties. 
Although under the economic leadership of Kemal Derviş essential reforms were initiated by 
the then coalition government between the DSP (Democratic Left Party), the ANAP and 
MHP (Nationalist Populist Party), the fruits of these reforms which set the foundations for 
the following economic recovery, were reaped by the AKP.  
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military at the time of its inception in 2001, after repeated military coups ousting 
political Islamists. This vulnerability has increased AKP politicians’ need for the 
support of social groups outside of the state apparatus. A variety of non-
governmental organisations, such as the voluntary BAs and civil society 
organisations in the former periphery of Anatolia, have formed an important support 
base for the AKP. After several of these elites had been imprisoned repeatedly, 
including several Müsiad leaders and R.T. Erdoğan himself, this new movement has 
largely refrained from using direct Islamic references. As these new groups had a lot 
to lose from direct confrontation, they have adapted moderately Islamic frames 
presenting themselves as equivalents of European Christian conservatives and 
applying non-contentious tactics. They won international allies, by not only 
supporting IMF reforms and neoliberal reforms, but also by seriously pursuing EU 
accession, and implementing EU reforms toward democratisation (Öniş & Türem, 
2002; Uğur & Yankaya, 2008). 
3.2. Discussion  
Successful movements seize perceived POS at the relevant time and develop tactics 
within a ‘repertoire of contention’ that fit, adapting them to the cultural and political 
environments. Repertoires of contention are ‘learned cultural creations (…) that 
emerge from struggle’, including contentious action involving violence, organised 
demonstration, and creative disruption (Tilly, 1993, p. 264). Movements have 
different experiences that impact the tactics they implement. In an environment of 
politico-religious contention, successful tactics and mobilisation have to refer to 
‘inherited cultural symbols’, yet also adapt to specific political conditions. Based on 
the above analysis, I argue that changes in intra-state conflicts have allowed secular 
and Islamic actors to exploit various openings in POS at different times. Islamic 
actors have grasped emerging political opportunities by developing an effective set 
of tactics that has adapted to the political and cultural environments: a non-
contentious repertoire that is grounded in a capitalist Islam. In the face of state 
threats, Islamic actors have relied on tactics outside of state control, to increase their 
access, range of allies and resources. Market-based tactics and informal networks in 
collaboration with civic actors in the periphery have allowed Islamic political actors 
and BAs to capture the centres of political power. Such non-contentious tactics in the 
periphery constitute an effective adaptation to state threats from elites in the centre. 
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Most importantly, these tactics are grounded in the cultural environment, developing 
a socio-economic type of Islam in their framing activities. 
Social movement scholars state that contentious politics are produced when 
perceived political opportunities are grasped, when threats are experienced and 
opportunities for political access are perceived, when the existence of available allies 
is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed through 
changing political alignments or internal divisions (Tarrow, 2011). Threats are key in 
the Turkish case, yet the other POS developed in the literature are relevant as well in 
conditioning a set of non-contentious tactics that is well adapted to the Islamic 
movement’s environment. I argue that this creative adaption is key to the Islamic 
movement’s success. 
State threats were never complete (Bianchi, 1984), but instead periods of 
threats alternated with periods of encouragement for Islamic actors, providing 
important opportunities for political access. Access and threats are two of the POS 
established in the political process literature. In spite of the repeated military 
interventions and because of the incomplete nature of oppression, Islamic actors have 
managed to increase their access over time and to create new powerful allies. In 
addition to threat and access, the availability of allies is another key POS that has 
shaped Turkish business politics. This has been made possible through their efficient 
grassroots mobilisation, and Turkey’s gradual integration into international markets 
and decentralisation, which has provided new tools outside of state control. 
Economic liberalisation allowed pious industrialists to apply new market tools, and 
decentralisation projects allowed religious-conservatives to come into power in local 
administrations, both of which increased Islamic actors’ financial resources and 
autonomy from the centralised state. These are key factors contributing to the later 
electoral successes of Islamist parties and the AKP. Gradual decentralisation and 
globalisation act as important boundary conditions for the political success of Islamic 
BAs. These are similar to conditions identified in the existing literature that asks 
under what conditions developmental BAs emerge. Sinha (2005), in her study of 
developmental BAs in India, has found that competition from other BAs, and 
federalism in India, have been important boundary conditions that have shaped intra-
state conflict dynamics, and promoted the involvement of business actors. 
Additionally, Doner and Schneider (2000) found that in Latin America, the 
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availability of competitive markets was an important incentive for the emergence of 
encompassing, developmental BAs. 
The perceived access and new range of resources and allies helped the AKP 
to come to power in the 2000s because of the electoral volatility and de-
legitimisation of existing parties and elites. Electoral volatility or rather ‘shifting 
political alignments’ as well as divisions amongst elites are two further POS that also 
apply in the Turkish case. The stigmatisation by the military of Islamist parties (and 
Kurdish parties) as enemies of Kemalism (Karadağ, 2012) helped the new 
moderately Islamic movement to construct itself as the only viable alternative to the 
dominant centre-right parties (DYP, ANAP) of the 1980s and 1990s, as well to the 
secular CHP. It is a new party, the AKP that rises to win the sentiments of the 
majority by exploiting divisions among elites created by previous electoral volatility, 
and economic crises. An important factor in the ’s success is the construction of a 
socio-economic Islamic frame, combining themes of piety and purity with 
capitalism, in the face of the prevalent corruption of previous administrations. 
Relying on a strong business constituency, built up through gradual decentralisation 
and market-tools and a non-contentious frame, this group has managed to capture 
openings in the POS to emerge as the new ruling elite.  
The historical institutional context of Turkey has brought ideology to the fore 
in political mobilisation and has created a new set of social movement tactics for 
power generation. In Turkey, the centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin, 1969, 1973) 
that overlaps with the secular-Islamist and left-right continuum, is the key 
institutional change that has made the application of Islam and the informal 
cooperation with civil society organisations at the grassroots-level profitable for the 
new devout middle classes. These tactics go beyond those developed in the political 
institutional literature, that focus on providing information and policy support to 
rational political elites, through strong organisational structures that aggregate and 
control business interests. I refer to the collection of those changes as politico-
religious contention.  
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Chapter IV Network Analysis: Membership Networks 
across Time 
1. Introduction 
If and how actors tap into embedded networks is another key element of 
transforming contention into successful social movements. The present network 
analysis compares how and to what extent Islamic and secular BAs have built such 
embedded networks – local coalitions with civil society and political organisations 
before and after the AKP’s inauguration (from 1993–2012). Variations in inter-
organisational ties between secular and Islamic BAs across time would indicate 
differences in network-building strategies and access to political, civic and economic 
resources (in both type and quality). Network patterns are an indicator for the 
cooperation/competition between various associations, as well as for the 
opportunities and obstacles to the transfer of resources, political support and 
solidarity in the associated network.  
The emergence of such multifunctional inter-organisational networks at the 
local level has been conditioned by alternating threats and encouragements by 
Kemalist state structures toward Islamic actors in the periphery (see POS analysis in 
Chapter III). The modern Islamic movement in Turkey fulfils spiritual and material 
needs, as well as providing platforms for political mobilisation (Yavuz, 2003). As 
political Islamic movements were partly pushed ‘underground’ by a threatening 
state, informal ties and religious communities have gradually emerged into 
multifunctional platforms for marginalised actors. As a result of alternating threats 
and opportunities by the state, some Islamic actor began to rely on informal networks 
at the grassroots level with Islamic civil society organisations, politicians and 
business actors, in what has gradually emerged into a socio-economic type of 
moderate Islam. After the 1980 coup, party ideologies as well as parties’ 
organisational links with civil society were constrained (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). As 
formal ties between political and Islamic organisations were delegitimised or even 
illegal at various time periods, overlapping memberships have become an important 
way of connecting these actors. Therefore I study how memberships overlap among 
local civil society, business and political organisations (so-called affiliation 
networks) as an indicator for the cooperation between organisations and the inter-
organisational resource exchange among them.  
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What aspects of networks matter in influencing resource exchange and 
political mobilisation? In order to study the cooperation/competition between various 
organisations, both the extent as well the structure of membership ties among BAs, 
political parties and civil society organisations are relevant. I compare three aspects 
of these networks: the level of cohesion between the Islamic and secular subgroups;46 
the extent and structure of different types of relationships; and the ‘multiplexity’ or 
the intersection between different layers of political, economic, and civic 
relationships.  
First, I compare the level of cohesion within both the Islamic and secular 
subgroups. Several studies have shown that cohesive networks can enhance trust 
building and legitimacy and facilitate inter-organisational resource exchange 
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Fukuyama, 2001; Lin, 1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001; Walker et al., 1997). However, weaker and more 
diverse ties are required to acquire the innovative and diverse information and 
resources required for economic growth (R. Burt, 2001; R. S. Burt, Hogarth, & 
Michaud, 2000; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Koka & Prescott, 2002; Zaheer & 
McEvily, 1999).  
Expectation for cohesion: The Islamic networks studied here originated from 
marginalised, emerging SMEs that were competing against established elites, but 
gained increased influence from the late 1990s as the Anatolian industrial districts 
experienced economic growth. They would thus be expected to be more cohesive 
than their secular counterparts during the early 1990s (1993–1998) when they were 
being formed, and to grow less cohesive in later periods. 
Second, I compare the extent and structure of different types of relationships 
or memberships in Islamic and secular networks, differentiating between business, 
political, and civic layers within each subgroup. How many members does each 
subgroup have who are members of political parties and relevant civil society 
organisations and how does this civic and political integration change across the 
three time periods? Social movement studies have shown that more extensive 
                                                
 
46 I refer to the two ideologically based alliances of organisations as subgroups. The Islamic 
subgroup qualifies as a movement, which is the overall argument of this thesis, and therefore 
I refer this subgroup also as a movement and to the organisations as social movement 
organisations. The secular subgroup does not qualify as a movement, but only as a coalition 
of organisations. 
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political and civic ties in a movement can support political mobilisation (Amenta, 
2006; Amenta et al., 2010, 2002, 1992; Cress & Snow, 2000). 
Expectation for extent of civic and political integration: The heightened 
vulnerability of political parties and civil society in the Turkish case makes extensive 
civic ties particularly important for political influence. First, I expect Islamic 
networks to have fewer political ties than the secular coalition in the 1993–1998 
period when they are in the periphery of power. However, their relative share of 
political members should increase over time alongside their growing political 
influence. Second, I expect Islamic networks to make up for their lack of access to 
resources through political elites in the 1993–1998 period by relying more on 
internal resource exchange with civic elites through cohesive networks. They should 
thus exhibit a larger share of civic ties compared to the secular coalition. Third, I 
expect the extent of civic ties to be strong not just in early, but in all time periods 
(1993–2012), as the Gülen community has been strongly incorporated in the Islamic 
movement since it was founded. 
Third, I compare the intersection of different layers of political, civic and 
economic relationships, examining the structure of these relationship layers and how 
this structure has changed over time. In the network literature, this is referred to as 
‘multiplexity’, or the ‘degree that the relationship between two individuals exists on 
multiple dimensions’ (Safford, 2009, p. 137). Multiplexity can be embedded, e.g. 
when a businessperson is a member of all three types of organisations; or 
intersecting, e.g. when the relationship layers are largely independent, but connected 
at various points through only a few businesspeople who are members of several 
types of organisations.  
Expectation for multiplexity: In the Turkish case, formal alliances between 
political parties and Islamic groups are illegal. However, studies on the AKP have 
claimed that the new moderate Islamists have gained political influence through their 
grassroots mobilisation and cooperation with entrepreneurs and the Gülen 
movement. Thus, in the 1993–1998 period, I expect the Islamic movement to have a 
weaker membership overlap between civic and political elites than in the secular 
coalition. In the later time periods, I expect increasingly stronger overlapping 
memberships across the three types in the Islamic movement (i.e. ‘embedded 
multiplexity’). I track how this change from weak to strong overlapping 
memberships has been achieved over time. 
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In sum, I find that the overall level of cohesion differs only slightly between 
the Islamic and secular subgroups. While cohesion is somewhat stronger in the 
Islamic movement during the 1999–2003 period, Tuskon members appears to have 
the most diverse memberships of all BAs. It appears then that the absence of 
bonding, and some limited form of bridging, supported the export and economic 
activities of Tuskon. This also holds for the civic plane, where, contrary to 
expectations, both subgroups have similarly strong overlaps with various civil 
society organisations. In addition, the secular coalition has even stronger civic ties 
than the Islamic movement in the early time period.  
In line with expectations, the Islamic movement overtakes the secular 
coalition in the extent of its political ties in 1999–2003. However, the two become 
more similar again in the post-AKP era (2004–2012). The most important finding 
concerns the structure of relationship layers. Islamic BAs have gradually bridged the 
gap between the popular Gülen community and conservative political parties, 
facilitating their cooperation through non-contentious membership in BAs. In 
contrast, secular BAs have not cooperated with a popular civil society organisation, 
but forged strong ties with elitist secular clubs and the semi-public Chambers of 
Industry and Trade. Political elites in the secular coalition were more likely to be 
members of such elite clubs rather than of the BA. And while conservative political 
entrepreneurs of the 1990s were more often members of the elitist (secular) Gagiad 
than of the (Islamic) Müsiad or Tuskon, Islamic BAs overtook the secular BA in 
their political integration during the formative years of the new moderately Islamic 
and capitalist AKP.  
2. Methods 
In its network analysis, this study applies a largely qualitative approach that is based 
on the visual interpretation of network graphs and descriptive network indicators (as 
compared to inferential statistics for networks, which are a relatively new and 
complex field). Such an analysis is preferred over a fully quantitative statistical 
analysis because ‘visualisation creates a locus for storytelling based on an integrated 
geography of positions, roles and information’ (Fisher, 2005). Data visualisation can 
transform relationships into spatialised images, making interactions visible, while 
also representing indicators accurately. Such an analysis provides more in-depth 
information than a single indicator can, and is therefore more suitable to 
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understanding complex processes. It is not the absolute size of an effect that matters, 
but the comparison of how two structures (Islamic and secular) have changed relative 
to each other. It encompasses altering datasets, adjusting visual properties, refining 
filters and network layouts and thereby modifying the research goals and questions 
until reaching a clear picture that facilitates interpretation (D. Hansen, Shneiderman, 
& Smith, 2010). In the present case this involves recoding the network to analyse 
only the core of each subgroup to clarify patterns emerging from the organisational-
level analysis.  
Descriptive indicators serve as additional confirmations of graph 
interpretations. Interpreting network graphs entails a hermeneutic circle, moving 
from an initial understanding of parts or subgroups to the overall network and their 
relations to the political context, and then back to an improved understanding of each 
part (Klein & Myers, 1999). Network visualisations are essentially a vehicle for 
exploration and facilitate an in-depth qualitative investigation, although they cannot 
rule out alternative explanations or factors on why the Islamic movement has gained 
political influence. However, they provide potential paths that can be further 
examined relying on further data sources and methods (Diani, 2002, p. 174), and 
overall this mixed-method approach provides a complex analysis and thick 
description of the process of how and when Islamic BAs have gained political 
influence.  
2.1. Network indicators at the organisational and subgroup levels 
Networks were studied through membership data, resulting in so-called affiliation 
networks. Affiliation networks were chosen because affiliation data allow studying 
both the ties between actors and between events/affiliations (Borgatti & Everett, 
1997). In this view actors are linked to one another by their affiliation with events (or 
associations), and, at the same time, events (or associations) are linked by the actors 
who are their members (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
Affiliation or membership networks are so-called two-mode networks as they 
depend on two units of observation: structural variables are measured on two sets of 
entities or modes, a first set containing the actors (here: corporations or business 
groups), and a second set containing the events (here: business, political, and civic 
organisations) (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005b). A tie is recorded if an actor takes part 
in an event, in this case, if a business group owner is a member in (or affiliated with) 
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an organisation. The original sample therefore consists of two types of entities 
(organisations and companies), the selection of which will be justified as follows. In 
a first step, I visualised these two-mode networks to get an insight into the data. In 
order to refine my investigation, transformation of the original two-mode into one-
mode networks was necessary. Indeed, the majority of network measures requires 
one-mode data (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). There are two possibilities, both of which I applied: in a 
one-mode event-by-event network, organisations or events are regarded as related 
through their joint memberships (of business groups’ owners). This type of event-by-
event network was used to study the overlaps between organisations (organisational 
overlaps) within and between the secular and Islamic movement. The more members 
two organisations share, the larger the organisational overlap, and the more they are 
linked. In such networks, organisations are related through their joint members, and 
the analysis takes places at the organisational level. 
In one-mode actor-by-actor networks, actors or business groups are regarded 
as related to each other through their joint affiliations or memberships in 
organisations. These networks were used to analyse further indicators of cohesion 
and structure, not at the organisational, but at the larger subgroup level. The interest 
here is not in how Tuskon and Müsiad membership, for example, overlap, but in 
making generalisations about the Islamic movement or secular coalition as a whole, 
which makes an aggregation necessary. Data about membership in various 
organisations were combined to reflect affiliation with a subgroup. Depending on 
their memberships, not all members were included because only specific 
combinations of could be clearly associated with a Secular, Mixed or Islamic 
subgroup. This second transformation is the only possibility for differentiating 
between business, political and civic ties within each subgroup, combining, for 
example, membership in Müsiad, Tuskon and Gagiad into one business membership 
category to be able to compare the business layer overall between Islamic and 
secular subgroups. 
The following indicators of cohesion and structure were analysed in one-
mode networks at two different levels, the organisational-level (event-by-event 
network) and the subgroup-level (actor-by-actor network). The multiplexity and the 
extent of civic and political integration are mainly analysed at the larger subgroup 
level. The key concept of cohesion incorporates several network indicators, and I 
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compare tie strength and density (general level of cohesion) at the subgroup level, as 
well as tie diversity at the organisational level. Density is a key measure of social 
network analysis and describes the general level of cohesion (Scott, 2000). For 
binary data, density measures are interpreted as the percentage of possible ties that 
are present (sum of ties/total possible ties). ‘Density is simply the number of ties in 
the network, expressed as a proportion of the number possible’ (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005b, Chapter 7). Bridging ‘emphasizes open networks characterised by 
outward or extra-community network linkages across diverse social cleavages’ 
(Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). In other words, bridging (or low 
cohesive) networks are characterised by higher tie diversity. Furthermore, Burt 
(2001) and Granovetter (1973) argue that weak ties are commonly associated with 
the process of bridging as they are based on loose emotional tendencies, and 
maintained via infrequent communication between heterogeneous groups. ‘Overall 
density’ describes the general level of cohesion (Scott, 2000). In contrast, bonding 
(or high cohesion) refers to the ‘inward’ or ‘intra-community’ network linkages that 
help cement homogeneous (similar) horizontal ties with actors who develop moral 
and fair values (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). That is, bonding 
networks are characterised by high density, lower tie diversity and stronger ties; 
scholars generally agree that bonding entails actors who communicate frequently and 
develop similar levels of thick trust, emotional intimacy and mutual empowerment 
(Fukuyama, 2001; Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). Among those who focus on internal 
ties within a given society (e.g. Ostrom, 1994; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994), 
networks often mean the informal, face-to-face interaction or membership in civil 
society organisations or clubs.  
2.2. Network measures  
I compare tie strength, tie diversity, and density to evaluate density. For this, I first 
calculated organisational overlaps according to Bonacich’s normalised subgroup 
overlap measure (1972); a measure which is based on a formula counting the number 
of shared, (and non-shared), members among organisations, and then 
normalising/adjusting for the size of the organisations. Overlaps are recorded in both 
total numbers of companies (in brackets in tables; red figures in full network graphs) 
and a normalised subgroup overlap measure that adjusts for the membership size of 
organisations. The former serves as additional information to judge the size of the 
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effect, whereas the normalised measure is preferred for interpretation. Overlaps 
based on companies rather than holdings are chosen because this allows introducing 
a ‘weighting’ mechanism for the influence of larger business groups. After all, the 
influence or the extent of cooperation between two associations increases the bigger 
or more influential its (shared) members are. Bonacich values are presented in the 
appendix (section 2.), whereas graphs are presented below in the findings section. 
According to Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 324): 
Bonacich proposed a measure of subgroup overlap, which is also independent of the 
size of the events. His measure is analogous to the number of actors who would 
belong to both events, if all events had the same number of members and non-
members. Bonacich analyses these overlap measures by treating them as analogous 
to correlation coefficients (...).  
A value of 0.5 is equivalent to independence; the measure ranges between zero and 
one. Values larger (smaller) than 0.5 signify an association: being a member in one 
association increases (decreases) the chances of being a member in another 
association. 
Depending on the organisations included, organisational overlaps serve as 
basis for various indicators: first, overlaps of organisations with the Chambers served 
to evaluate which organisation, with a special interest in BAs, had the most members 
controlling the Gaziantep Chamber GSO, and the national Chambers TOBB and how 
that changed over time. Overlaps among various organisations served to evaluate 
cohesion: overlaps among subgroup organisations served to evaluate the level of 
cooperation within; and overlaps between subgroup organisations served to evaluate 
the level of tie diversity. For example, how many members do the Islamic BAs 
Müsiad and Tuskon share with each other, and how many with the secular BA 
Gagiad? The larger the cohesion, the larger the number of companies shared among 
Islamic (or secular) organisations. Cooperating organisations are expected to have 
higher organisational overlaps. Additionally, overlaps between BAs and political 
parties as well as civil society organisations gave a first insight into the extent of 
political and civic integration of the secular coalition and Islamic movement. To 
evaluate this at the subgroup level, transformation of network data was necessary.  
Measures and analyses that compare the Islamic and secular subgroups are 
conducted at the subgroup level to compare the overall levels of cohesion (density), 
the strength of ties (as well the structure of business, political and civic relationship 
types, see below). This focus on the subgroup means that only a subset of association 
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members who can be argued to be part of the subgroup, are included in these 
analyses (the rules of these inclusions and network recoding are further outlined 
below). The strength of ties is measured by the number of memberships across all 
organisations and types within each subgroup (i.e. if two actors are members of 
several organisations within each subgroup, they would be linked by a strong tie;47 
the more strong ties each subgroup has, the stronger the level of cohesion). ‘Isolates’ 
or rather companies without any membership (in Chambers or associations) were 
excluded because they provide no further information.  
More specifically, I calculated densities ‘by group’ (Borgatti, Everett, & 
Freeman, 2002). Standard density measures make comparisons between groups more 
difficult as they vary by network size: the smaller the network (or group), the more 
ties between actor would be expected. The measure of ‘densities by group’ is exactly 
designed to make densities comparable between subgroups (Islamic, Secular, Mixed) 
that originate from the same dataset; this makes densities for the subgroups 
comparable within each time period. Isolates or companies with no affiliation were 
excluded because they add no relevant information to the questions of how cohesive 
the subgroup is, or how the various relationship layers intersect. These densities were 
calculated for valued data (by adding up the number of memberships), and 
dichotomised at different numbers of memberships, which allowed for the 
comparison of tie strengths. Dichotomised binary data capture only whether 
membership exists (0= no membership; 1= membership), at different levels or 
numbers of membership (i.e. at level 2: 0= not 2 memberships; 1= 2 memberships). 
For binary data, density measures capture the proportion of actual observed ties 
relative to the total possible number of ties in a network. By calculating the 
proportion of observed ties for businesspeople with 1, 2, or more affiliations or 
levels, I can compare the densities at different tie strengths and conclude which 
subgroup has a higher or lower density of ‘strong’ ties. Tie strength is simply 
measured by the number of memberships. The average tie strength is measured by 
calculating the density of valued, not binary, data: then density is ‘the average of all 
values, which is to say we compute average tie strength’ (Borgatti et al., 2013, 
                                                
 
47 In order not to lose information about each business groups’ membership, ‘reflexive ties’ 
reflecting individual actors’ affiliations, were included in the analyses. 
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pp.150–151). Again, what matters is the relative comparison between Islamic and 
secular networks rather than the absolute sizes of the measures. These cohesion 
measures of the subgroup complement the broader organisational overlap measures. 
Overall, a cohesive bonding network would feature small tie diversity, i.e. a 
smaller amount of shared members with non-subgroup organisations than with 
ideologically close subgroup organisations. At the subgroup level, such a network 
would also display a higher level of density and stronger ties. A less cohesive 
bridging network would feature larger tie diversity, i.e. a similar amount of shared 
members with non-subgroup organisations to subgroup organisations. At the 
subgroup level, such a network would also display a lower level of overall density 
and weaker ties. 
As outlined above, the content of ties, differentiating the three layers of 
relationships is a further aspect to be studied to evaluate their extent within each 
subgroup and how they intersect. These analyses are based on the business group-
unit, combining firms or companies into business groups based on their ownership. 
Calculating such structural indicators at the company level would lead to their 
overestimation; density measures would also be distorted.48 
For the structural analysis, the extent of political and civic integration was 
evaluated by simply counting the numbers of business, political and civic business 
group members in each subgroup and then dividing them by the total number of 
business groups to arrive at a relative frequency. Such frequencies do not include any 
information on the tie strength, i.e. if a businessperson is a member of both Islamic 
BAs, this was counted as one Islamic BA membership (to make results easier to 
interpret as a percentage of the total subgroup of business groups). Then, for 
                                                
 
48 For example, the holding ‘Sanko’ has 19 firms in the textile cluster in the 2004 period; if it 
were a member in all three types of relations, the level of civic, business and political 
integration would be 19 times the level of a sole company with the same memberships, if 
measured at the firm-unit. This would be misleading given that the major interest is in the 
relative structure of the three relationship layers. The business-unit is also preferred for 
density measures because a similar overestimation would arise, given that the density 
measure would count the ties between those 19 companies if the group owner had one 
relevant membership. In the analyses focusing on organisations overlaps, the firm-unit is 
preferred: if ‘Sanko’ were a member of both Gagiad and Müsiad, this would result in a larger 
subgroup overlap measure than if a small company were a shared member. Sharing a larger 
business group increases the overlap measure, and thus indicates more cooperation between 
two associations to reflect the larger number of shared companies that are controlled by one 
parent company. In the latter type of analysis, the author goes back to check the largest of 
holdings like Sanko so that these extremes do not cloud the overall interpretation. 
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example, to analyse how political ties are integrated into each subgroup, I compare 
the numbers of business groups with both a political and BA affiliation vis-à-vis 
those with both a political and civic affiliation (pol+BA vs pol+civic). If politicians 
are mainly integrated into a subgroup via civic ties, the pol+civic share should be 
larger than the pol(itical)+BA share. The extent of embedded multiplexity in 
indicated by the number of companies with all three relationship types 
(BA+pol+civic) in each subgroup. Whether a BA focuses more strongly on civic or 
political integration can be judged by comparing the BA+pol with the BA+civic 
membership shares. A network with high embedded multiplexity is where 
businessmen tend to be members of political, civil society and BAs at the same time. 
A network with high intersecting multiplexity is where businesspeople tend to be 
members of either a political, civil society, or BA with only a few members featuring 
multiple affiliations who then connect the three different relationship layers.  
The multiplexity of ties, if and how the political, business and civic 
relationship layers intersect, is also evaluated via a qualitative interpretation of 
subgroup graphs. Indicators enable the analyst to make sense of the crowdedness of 
the network as it appears in the sociogram. The visualisation gives the user a sense of 
the structure and depth of the network while the statistics provide a way to both 
confirm and qualify the visual findings (D. Hansen et al., 2010). The frequency 
measure loses information on the number of memberships or strength of ties, which 
is added back in the graph visualisations where thicker lines reflect multiple 
memberships (and the outcome is visualised as well). A combination of indicators 
and graph visualisations increase the validity of the claims. All data were analysed 
with UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002), a software package for the analysis of social 
network data, and visualised in NodeXL (Smith et al., 2010), which has additional 
visualisation properties to the more quantitative UCINET programme. The measures 
are summarised in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Network measures for different constructs at two levels of one-mode networks 
 
Network constructs 
Organisational level 
(companies); event-by event 
network 
Subgroup level by relationship 
types (subgroup members’ 
business groups); actor-by-actor 
network 
Cohesion Organisational overlaps 
(normalised Bonacich values) 
and graphs to evaluate: tie 
diversity (across and within 
subgroups) 
Density (across all relationship 
types aggregated) 
 
Tie strength (across all 
relationship types aggregated) 
Extent of political 
and civic 
integration 
Indicated by overlaps between 
BAs and political parties/civil 
society organisations 
Frequencies: compare relative 
amount of memberships in 
political/civic/business layers 
Multiplexity – 
Structure of 
business, political 
and civic 
relationship layers 
 
n/a 
Frequencies (cross-memberships, 
e.g. BA+pol) 
Qualitative interpretation of 
movement graphs by relationship 
types 
 
 Outcome measures 
Leadership positions49 in the GSO and the national Chambers TOBB serve as an 
outcome measure of political influence, both for companies and for BAs. These data 
were provided by the TOBB. Another outcome measure, which is only available for 
few firms, is economic performance measured through the firm’s rank in Turkey’s 
top 1000 manufacturing firms based on production-based sales. These data are 
collected through self-report every year by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry and 
made publicly available. However, in the 2004–2012 period only about 30 firms 
from Gaziantep entered the top 1000 firms, so this indicator cannot be studied 
systematically; instead it was used to select firm-case studies and as additional 
information. Rather than production-based sales, the present study considers these 
firms’ ranking based on their period profit and sales turnover.  
The following section (2.3.1) justifies the sample of two-mode data: first, the 
companies/business groups, and second the organisations included. I explain how 
these data were aggregated to represent three time periods. I then explain how the 
                                                
 
49 In the national-level Chambers, TOBB, membership in the following bodies was 
considered as a leadership position: ‘General Assembly’ (‘Genel Kurul’); the Chairs of 
Sectoral Committees; Board of Directors (‘Yönetim Kurulu’); the Disciplinary and 
Coordination/Management Bodies (‘Disiplin Kurulu’, ‘Koordinasyon Kurulu’). In 
Gaziantep’s GSO the following two highest-level bodies were considered as leadership 
bodies: the General Assembly and the Board of Directors. 
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necessary transformations to one-mode networks at the organisational and subgroup-
levels were conducted (2.3.2), resulting in event-by-event and actor-by-actor 
networks. While the former organisational-level event-by-event network includes all 
members, the latter only includes a subset of actors that can be justified to be 
subgroup affiliates. I developed a method based on combinations of memberships to 
focus on subgroup actors, which is justified in section 2.3.2b. I then present the 
network findings, summary and discussion. 
2.3. Network samples, time periods and transformations 
2.3.1.  Original two-mode affiliation networks 
2.3.1.a  Mode 1: Sample of companies and business groups and aggregation 
into three time periods 
The sample of firms registered as operating in Gaziantep’s manufacturing textile 
cluster in 2012 was obtained from the GSO. The geographic boundaries of the 
network are limited to organisations falling within the statistical metropolitan area of 
the city of Gaziantep. The list of actors considered for inclusion are the owner-
managers of the firms in the manufacturing textile/apparel cluster registered at the 
GSO. This sample was split up into three groups representing three time periods 
based on the firm’s foundation date.  
The vast majority of firms are family-owned, and I grouped individual firms 
into business groups. The information on cross-ownership was gathered from various 
local and national newspapers and the homepages of the companies by comparing 
company addresses of branches and some expert interviews; the Gaziantep Registry 
Office did not give me access to this data.50 Therefore it may underestimate the real 
cross-ownership as such information is more readily available for larger business 
groups. The sample numbers for the different time periods are: 
- 2004–2012: n=830 companies, 646 business groups 
- 1999–2003: n= 590 companies, 470 business groups 
- 1993–1998: n= 401 companies, 334 business groups 
 
Data on the following additional node attributes were partly available: for 
almost all firms, the maturity or age (registration at GSO), and the current (2012) 
industry codes are available as reported by the GSO. The size of firm, measured in 
                                                
 
50 The relevant officials argued that ownership data are sensitive data that they feared I 
would publish and thereby create tax and other issues. 
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terms of number of employees, was collected from various sources,51 but is only 
available for a smaller selection of firms and therefore not reported at an aggregate 
level. 
This sample was split up into three groups representing three time periods 
based on each firm’s GSO registration date. Only surviving firms are included in the 
sample, as no systematic, local level record of liquidated firms is available.52 The 
time period covered by this study falls between 1993 when the first local BAs were 
built in Gaziantep and 2012 when most interviews were conducted; it covers the 
essential year 2004 when the AKP overtook the CHP in Gaziantep. 
The fundamental changes in the political, cultural and economic institutions 
in Turkey’s modern history allow for the identification of critical turning points, and 
studying the effect of such national changes on the pattern and political influence of 
BAs in Gaziantep in different time periods. Three time periods were chosen to 
investigate the changing tactics, embedded in the changing national institutional 
context, with which Islamic BAs have gradually displaced secular BAs. The relevant 
turning points identified here relate to changes in political Islam in Turkey, which are 
reflected in Gaziantep’s local elections. Gaziantep slightly lag behind national-level 
electoral developments: 1993 was set as the beginning of the first time period as it is 
the year in which all BAs except for the younger Tuskon-affiliate Gapgiad, (founded 
in 2002), were formed in Gaziantep. During this time Gaziantep remains dominated 
by secular centre-left coalitions, but political Islam gains in popularity in elections. 
The general and local elections in 1999 mark the end of the first time period from 
1993 to 1998 and the beginning of the transitional time period from 1999 to 2003. 
The twin economic crises of 2000–2001, inter alia, and the previous banning of 
parties of political Islam result in a rejection, also in Gaziantep, by the public of 
                                                
 
51 Mixture of GTO database of registered companies (“Gaziantep Ticaret Odası e-GTO 
portalı [Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce e-GTO membership portal],” 2012), some figures 
were reported by GSO to me; with additions from Capital IQ database (“Capital IQ 
[Company Screening Report - Buyers/Investors],” 2012), and ISO Top Manufacturing Firm 
lists. 
 
52 Only aggregated rates of liquidation are available: liquidation rates appear to be relatively 
small, therefore this method of splitting up current surviving firms can be justified. For 
example, a publication by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜIK, 2009, p. 91) on Gaziantep 
lists 490 companies, or only 0.1% of total companies, closed down between 2004 and2009 in 
TRC11 Gaziantep (including surroundings beyond the city of Gaziantep). 
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existing political parties, and the re-formation of the Islamic camp to create a new 
party of moderate and capitalist Islam in 2002 – the AKP. In Gaziantep, the centre-
left coalition gradually loses its popularity at the turn of the millennium, resulting in 
the election in 2004 of AKP’s Asım Güzelbey as mayor. This political turning point 
in Gaziantep in 2004 marks the beginning of the last time period from 2004–2012, in 
which the moderately Islamic movement increasingly dominates, and the affiliated 
BAs increase their political influence.  
2.3.1.b Mode 2: affiliation/membership data and aggregation into three time 
periods 
For each company in the GSO data, network data were collected on their 
affiliation/membership in eight different organisations of three different types 
(political, business, and civic) across three different time periods. Lists of each type 
of affiliation were finally compiled into three final lists showing all affiliations of 
each company in three different time periods. For the organisational-level analysis 
these data were kept to differentiate among the various organisations, whereas 
further structural analyses required an aggregation of this information into three 
different relationship layers and two subgroups. 
Three types of political parties, three BAs and two civic categories (in 
parentheses the respective labels in the organisational-level graphs) were considered: 
- Centre-left/secular parties (Pol_Left) 
- Centre-right/Islamic parties (Pol_Right) 
- Political Islamist parties53 (Pol_Islamist) 
- Müsiad (BA_Musiad) 
- Tuskon – combination of local affiliates Hürsiad and Gapgiad (BA_Tuskon) 
- Gagiad (BA_Gagiad) 
- Secular civil society organisations (Civic_Secular ) 
- Islamic civil society organisations affiliated with the Gülen community 
(Civic_Islamic) 
 
These are in addition to the outcome measures: companies’ leadership positions at 
the Turkey or Gaziantep Chambers, (Chambers_Turkey, or Chamber_Antep), and 
                                                
 
53 Parties of centre-right and political Islam were later combined to the Islamic category for 
the subgroup-level analyses, but was only included if a business group had additional 
membership in another moderately Islamic organisation. Businessmen with a sole political 
Islamist affiliation were added to the ‘none’ category. See further details below in 2.3.2.b. 
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companies’ ranking among Turkey’s top 1000 manufacturing firms (only relevant for 
actor-by-actor networks).  
Which organisations exactly were included? With respect to BAs, Müsiad 
and Tuskon affiliates represent centre-right/Islamic case studies, and Gagiad the 
secular case. Members and leadership levels alike were included, where possible, 
across the three time periods. Membership information was available for various 
years within each time period, and was extended to the full time period. As 
membership stays relatively stable (various interviews with BA representatives), and 
only a few members ever leave their respective association, the procedure of 
including members from previous into the next time periods can be regarded as valid. 
More details on all of the affiliation data sources can be found in the appendix 
(section 3). 
Access for civil society organisations was even more difficult. For all official 
civil society organisations, only leadership level data were available, rather than 
membership. Nevertheless, leadership reflects stronger engagement, and is therefore 
valid data. Concerning civil society organisations, the Gülen community has been 
widely acknowledged in the literature and in my fieldwork as the most relevant 
religious community. Belonging to the Gülen community, which has no official 
membership, is coded through the following strategies: first, if a businessperson has 
made a large contribution to a school or educational institution known to be part of 
the ‘cemaat’ (religious community), he/she was coded as affiliated with the cemaat.  
This information turned out to be very sparse as I was told that many businessmen 
preferred to keep this kind of Gülen sponsorship a secret. Additionally, therefore, I 
included two local charities that promote ‘imam hatip’54 schools or Koran courses: 
Gaimder and Sunder (Gaziantep Imam Hatip Lisesi Mezunlari Derneği; Sunguroğlu 
Liseleri Mezunlari Derneği), which were chosen because a newspaper described 
them as the most active of such education-related charities (‘imam hatip dernekleri’) 
                                                
 
54 The education system is a key topic of contention between the secular coalition and 
Islamic movement in Turkey. Imam hatip schools were opened in the late 1940s as vocation 
schools to train Imams and hatips (Muslim preachers). Their numbers particularly increased 
in the 1980s and 1990s’ (Kuru, 2006, p. 150). Under the AKP, they became regular schools, 
albeit with a heavier focus on religion, and their graduates were oriented towards all sorts of 
professions (see further in Chapter VII), which secular actors regard as a major assault on 
laïcité. Religious education is controlled by the Presidency of Religious affairs (‘Diyanet 
Işleri Başkanlığı’), and private education of Islam is prohibited, and thus there are specific 
additional public schools to teach the Koran (Kuru, 2006).  
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in Gaziantep (“İmam Hatip dernekleri ne işe yarar?,” 2010), and they also provided 
online access to their board members (“About GAIMDER,” 2012, “Sunguroğlu 
Liseleri Mezunlar Derneği,” 2012). Both charities are members of the cemaat’s 
south-eastern educational charity arm Günder (“Özel Gaziantep Güney Eğitim 
Kurumları (Günder),” 2012), which is known to be associated with the Gülen 
cemaat. The cemaat schools listed by the teacher are largely members of these 
charities as well. Again, this information was limited, and therefore I also included 
further coding by hand: Board members of the Light Insurance (Işık Sigortası) and 
Bank Asya, both of which are also affiliated with the Gülen cemaat (included in a 
specific time period). Additionally, if one (or ideally two) interviewee(s) identified a 
company owner as a cemaat member, that company was coded as such. Concerning 
secular civil society organisations, the Tennis and Equestrian Club (TEC) was 
mentioned several times by leading businessmen as a place where elite secular 
businessmen meet. Rotary clubs were included as well. Again, only leadership levels 
were considered.  
Political affiliation data are not based on party membership, but on whether a 
businessperson holds or runs for office in the Gaziantep city or province council, or 
the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This information is available for each 
election period and was gathered from various sources (including local newspapers 
for earlier time periods or the Turkish Statistical Institute). For earlier time periods, 
information at local bodies was largely limited to leadership levels. Table 4 shows 
which parties were included for each of the three time periods, which encompass 
several general and local elections (1993–1998; 1999–2003; 2004–2012): nationalist 
parties like the MHP were ignored because both secular and Islamic parties have 
nationalist factions, and nationalist parties do not easily fit into the left-right or rather 
secular-Islamist categorisations. Also, for the 2004–2012 period, I excluded the 
DP/ANAP from the centre-right/moderately Islamic spectrum, and only included the 
AKP and partly political Islamist parties. I was mainly interested in studying the 
effect of AKP affiliations, and by excluding these weaker centre-right parties I was 
able to not confuse AKP with other centre-right parties’ effects. The classification of 
parties into a left-right or rather secular-Islam continuum is derived from various 
political scientists’ observations and analyses of the Turkish party system and voting 
preferences. These authors argue that religiosity has been dominant in determining 
party choice since the 1980s in Turkey (Çarkoğlu, 2004, 2007, 2008; Hale & 
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Özbudun, 2009) and that importance of the conflict between the values of the centre 
versus the values of the periphery continues to be signified by religiosity 
(Kalaycioğlu, 1994). 
Table 4: Political parties included in each time period  
 1993–1998 (91 and 
95 general elections; 
89 and 94 local 
elections) 
1999–2003 (99, 02 
general elections; 99 
local elections) 
2004–2012 (07,11 
general elections; 04 and 
09 local elections) 
Centre-right/ 
Islamic  
DYP, ANAP 
 
DYP, ANAP, AKP 
 
(DYP/DP, ANAP – 
excluded, minor), AKP 
Political Islam 
(National Outlook 
Movement) 
RP, FP SP, BTP (n/a) HAS (merged in 2012 
with AKP) 
SP, BTP 
Centre-left/ 
Secular 
SHP, DSP, CHP DSP, CHP, YTP 
(n/a), ÖDP 
DSP, CHP, ÖDP 
Ultranationalist 
(excluded)  
MHP, BBP (na) MHP, BBP and GP 
(n/a) 
MHP, BBP and GP 
(n/a) 
(n/a: where no members were found in Gaziantep) 
 
Leadership positions in the GSO and the TOBB serve as an outcome measure 
of political influence both for companies and for BAs. These data were provided by 
TOBB and are available for each election period since 1989.  
After gather this membership data for various time periods, it had to be cross-
referenced with the GSO’s textile company list to filter out those members who are 
also owners of a company in Gaziantep’s textile cluster. The resulting lists for the 
three time periods are so-called ‘incidence matrices’ with rows of business groups 
and columns of affiliations/memberships, which can then be read into the social 
network programme UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). The procedure of cross-
referencing is explained in more detail in the appendix (see section 4). 
2.3.2. One-mode networks: transformations to organisational- and subgroup-level 
networks 
2.3.2.a Matrix transformations in UCINET  
The lists resulting from the matching or cross-referencing procedure, which were 
uploaded into UCINET, are binary incidence matrices – the two-mode affiliation 
networks described above. They are depicted as a rectangular data array of business 
groups by affiliations and characteristics (size, foundation date, ISO rank and further 
economic performance data available for few firms). The affiliations make up one-
mode and the business groups the second. As described above this two-mode data 
had to be transformed into one-mode data: the affiliations or memberships are turned 
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into ties connecting affiliations by shared members, and business groups by shared 
membership in affiliations. As a first step, I visualised two-mode datasets illustrating 
business groups and their memberships in eight affiliations to get a first overview of 
the network. Following from this, I proceeded to transform this two-mode data into 
one-mode data55 in UCINET.  
In order to calculate and analyse organisational overlaps, I first had to 
transform these two-mode data into a one-mode data set where associations are 
connected through shared members (organisation-level analysis of event-by-event 
networks). Secondly, I transformed them one-mode data sets where actors (business 
groups) are connected through shared memberships (subgroup-level analysis of 
actor-by-actor networks). For the latter, organisational membership data had to be 
transformed to reflect Islamic and secular business, political and civic ties rather than 
memberships in different organisations. I limited the number of business groups to 
those who could be argued to be members and supporters of the business part of the 
subgroup. I developed a set of rules to determine, based on their memberships, which 
business groups should be included in either an Islamic, Secular, or Mixed network. 
These rules naturally result in a network with stronger overlaps (than one without 
any exclusions) as companies with singular affiliations could not easily be assigned 
to either subgroup as sympathisers. These rules are described in more detail below; 
further information on how this new categorical membership/affiliation data were 
first created, and then transformed into ties between actors can be found in the 
Appendix section 5 (see 5.1.b for the creation of actor-by-actor networks, and 5.2. 
for transformations into actor-by-actor networks).  
The first step after this transformation was to export the matrix to the 
program NodeXL (Smith et al., 2010), which offers more possibilities of 
visualisation than UCINET. After a first graph interpretation, I calculated basic 
frequencies by hand to support graph interpretations. In order to calculate densities 
within each subgroup, the ties across the three relationship layers (business, civic, 
political) had to be aggregated (see section 5.2. in the appendix).  
                                                
 
55 This was done via the ‘data>affiliations’ procedure in UCINET, turning attributes into ties.  
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2.3.2.b One-mode subgroup-level networks: Islamic, Secular and Mixed 
categories 
As argued above, in order to analyse the differences in the mobilisation strategies 
between the secular and Islamic subgroups, affiliation data were recoded to describe 
Secular, Islamic, Mixed kind, (or none), and within these categories were further 
allocated among political, business or civic ties, resulting in nine levels. Depending 
on the combination of affiliations/memberships of each company in these eight 
organisations, the company was coded as either Secular, Islamic, both (Mixed), or 
none, and within each category, whether the affiliation is of a business, political 
and/or civic kind.  
I define as Islamic those groups who aim to redefine Turkey’s assertive 
secularism or laïcité (see further footnote 1, Chapter I), either directly by attacking 
the state (as Islamist parties did until 1997), or indirectly by aiming at 
transformations in the cultural sphere (following Tuğal, 2009). The latter includes, 
for example, if the association or actors expresses opinions supportive of relaxing the 
headscarf ban or generally to increasing religious freedoms (which in reality mostly 
means Sunni Muslim freedoms), aims to increase the number of imam hatip schools 
or Koran courses, and to extend brotherhoods, cemaats and tarikats, generally 
increasing conservatism and religiosity in society. Secular are those actors and 
institutions that largely seek to uphold the status quo. Both subgroups may contain 
liberal actors, who seek to support a more liberal notion of secularism, but this is a 
small and negligible faction, and the ‘Mixed’ category allows for the inclusion of 
ambiguous cases. Actors in both groups may be privately devout Muslims, but 
secular actors restrict religiosity to the private sphere, whereas Islamic actors seek a 
more visible role of Islam to inform the cultural, social, economic or political 
spheres. The crucial aspect for the following categorisation is that the perception of 
the affiliation is what matters as each affiliation signals an ideological closeness, 
which in turn shapes the opportunities for information- and resource exchange 
available to companies. I tried to validate this procedure by checking my coding for 
individual firms against interviewees’ judgements of these firms.56 Note also that this 
                                                
 
56 For example, the categorisation works well for bigger companies like Canan, or Gulsan; 
for Kocer 2004 with three BAs, civic-secular and centre-right affiliations; or MB holdings 
with Gagiad and Tuskon memberships. 
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is a rating concerning several company board members at the company level, 
therefore the coding aims to establish the major tendency overall. If there is no 
majority of Islamic or secular affiliations, then the company is coded as Mixed 
(both).  
 Rules for assigning ‘ideological score’ and subgroup 
Membership data were used to assign a company to either category. I did two rounds 
of coding where the second version was a stricter version that required more than one 
membership for non-BA affiliations for a clear categorisation. This naturally resulted 
in a network with more overlaps than in the first round of coding as companies with 
sole political or civic affiliations are coded as ‘none’ and therefore excluded from the 
analyses. I made sure to apply rules in parallel to the secular and Islamic subgroups 
to ensure that results are comparable (and differences in findings do not result from 
differences in the rules applied). I arrived at those rules by going back and forth 
between example cases where I had good additional information through interview 
data and making sure that the rules categorise these companies similar to 
interviewees’ judgements.  
Different rules were applied for sole and multiple affiliations, because sole 
affiliations are less clear (especially for centre-right parties and civil society 
organisations in general), whereas in combinations an ‘average’ or general tendency 
can be established more easily. Therefore sole civic and political affiliations were 
excluded;57 single BA memberships were coded as Islamic for Müsiad and Tuskon 
affiliates and as secular for Gagiad. Sole BA membership was included because this 
is a study of BAs’ political influence. Gagiad is perceived by local businessmen to be 
rather secular, whereas Müsiad/and Tuskon are clearly known to be closely affiliated 
to the AKP and the Gülen movement, respectively, and therefore are perceived to 
                                                
 
57 While this means a loss of data for the already sparse coding of civic-Islamic Gülen 
cemaat members, it had to be applied as some civil society organisations like Rotary clubs 
cannot clearly be categorised. And while centre-left parties can clearly be categorised as 
secular, the case is harder for centre-right parties, which are made up of different coalitions, 
which change according to changes in leadership. For example, in AKP’s early period many 
liberals joined the party (Onar, 2007), but it also had a large political Islamist wing (Hale & 
Özbudun, 2009). The ANAP and DYP similarly have consisted of various coalitions and in 
the study period of the 1990s leaned more strongly toward promoting a (neo-)Kemalist 
agenda (Arat, 1998; Ayata, 1996; Çavuşoğlu, 2010). In order to keep the rules parallel for 
both subgroups, all sole centre-right, centre-left and political Islamist affiliations were 
therefore excluded (categorised as ‘none’).  
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also have a transformational agenda. This argument is further supported in the 
following chapter that analyses the activities of BAs.  
I developed a points-based system where different points were assigned in 
mixed combinations to each BA/pol/civic membership, and categorised as either 
I/S/M or none depending on whether a differentiating threshold of Islamic vs secular 
affiliations was crossed. Political ties received the most points, followed by BA and 
civic ties (2 points for political ties, 1 point for BAs, and 0.5 points for civic ties). 
Political Islamist and centre-left party membership earned 2 points for their clarity, 
whereas centre-right party membership received no points due to its ambivalence, 
making it neutral and necessary to establish a general tendency through further ties. 
However, political Islamist parties were only included, if an additional, moderately 
Islamic membership was present in order to include only members of the moderately 
Islamic movement. Each Islamic and each secular affiliation received points, which 
were then added up for an aggregate ‘ideology score’; the more memberships, the 
larger the size of the necessary differential for an I/S categorisation.58 If the threshold 
was not crossed, the company was either coded as Mixed or None if there was not 
enough information for a coding to be assigned (e.g. only civic or only political 
affiliations). Further details can be found in the Appendix (section 5.1.a). 
Because of the strict coding scheme, this mostly and automatically resulted in 
subgroup organisations that are ideologically close being considered in each 
subgroup (i.e. businesses in the secular coalition with a civic affiliation are all of the 
civic-secular type).59 The focus of this analysis is on the extent and structure of ties 
rather than actual shared organisational memberships between individual actors in 
                                                
 
58 For affiliations up to 2.5 or 4 points, the threshold has to be larger than 1 (e.g. through one 
Islamic BA membership); for affiliations with more than 3 or 4.5 points, the threshold 
increases to 1.5. The second larger threshold applies to businesses with political-left or 
political Islamist affiliations that receive 2 points, whereas centre-right and no political 
affiliations receive 0 points in that category, reducing the overall amount.  
 
59 There are only a few exceptions to this rule: in 1993, all civic and political ties in the 
Islamic movement match with Islamic civil society organisations and centre-right parties; all 
memberships in the secular coalition automatically match with secular civil society 
organisations and political_left or centre-right parties. Additionally in 1999, all civic ties in 
the Islamic movement match with Islamic civil society organisations; only 4 BA 
memberships are additional secular BA affiliations (on top of Islamic BA affiliations). By 
leaving centre-right parties ambiguous, this way of coding resulted in including AKP 
members in the secular coalition in 2004. In sum, it adds some secular BA membership to 
Islamic networks, and some AKP membership to secular networks. 
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any case. The numbers of business groups for each category after this recoding are 
summarised in Table 5. The present table shows the numbers for each subgroup, 
whereas further tables in the appendix show the numbers for each relationship layer, 
differentiated by the amount of memberships (see appendix section 6). 
Table 5: Number of business groups per subgroup in each time period after recoding  
 1993–
1998 
1999–
2003 
2004–
2012 
Islamic 23 41 84 
Secular 17 23 35 
Mixed 4 5 14 
All categorised 44 69 133 
None 290 401 513 
Total N holdings 334 470  646  
 
3. Network findings  
3.1.  Graph visualisation information 
For better readability throughout all graphs I adopted the following colour scheme:  
different colours represent different types of relationships where the secular coalition 
is depicted in lighter, and the Islamic movement in darker shades. Blue tones are 
selected for BAs and BA affiliations; red/brown tones for political and green tones 
for civil society organisations and affiliations. In the graphs of organisational 
overlaps, Chambers and their affiliations are shown in shades of grey. 
 Visualisation information for one-mode graphs of organisational overlaps 
(event-by-event networks) 
I visualised organisational overlaps for the full network of organisations for each 
time period (see Figure 10, Figure 12, and Figure 14). The circles represent the 
various organisational memberships or affiliations. The size of the circle represents 
the size of the sample membership of the respective affiliation; the number of 
member companies is added at the end of the label as well (e.g. 
Chambers_Turkey_10). The thickness of the line reflects Bonacich’s subgroup 
overlap measure: the thicker the line, the higher the value, and thus the overlap. Cut-
off points were chosen to reflect different ranges of the measure (see below). The 
figures on the lines are the total number of companies shared by two affiliations. All 
Bonacich values and shared company figures can be found in the appendix (section 
2.) 
For a clearer visualisation of the strongest overlaps of each BA, I also created 
graphs of organisational overlaps which are ‘one-step’ graphs (Figure 9, Figure 11, 
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and Figure 13): these focus on BAs as the ‘ego’ and show only overlaps of this ego 
with all other associations (‘alters’). All overlaps of the ego are included, not just the 
strongest ones as in the full network. Ties among alters are excluded to focus on each 
BA and its integration. In these graphs, the lines again represent organisational 
overlaps ordered from strongest (left) to weakest (right). The figures on the lines are 
the respective Bonacich values. 
In the full organisational-level network graphs, all organisations are included, 
and so are the strongest overlaps between them (weaker overlaps were excluded to 
reduce clutter). Bonacich values, in general, are high due to the small number of 
organisations; most values, especially in later time periods are larger than 0.5, (which 
signifies independence), and range between 0.5 and 1. The few cases smaller than 
0.5, which signify a negative relationship are discussed individually. In the 1993 and 
1999 time periods, overlaps ≤ 0.6 were removed60 while in 2004 this threshold due to 
the very high overlaps rose to ≤ 0.75. Exploring graphs to clarify patterns is a 
common interpretation tool for qualitative network interpretation and I tried several 
versions to arrive at a threshold with little loss of information that at the same time 
maximised clarity (D. Hansen et al., 2010). The resulting exclusions of overlaps in 
the graphs are explained in more detail in the Appendix (see section 7). 
 Graph information for subgroup-level graphs (actor-by-actor network) 
The last type of graphs compares how the different relationship layers intersect 
between the Islamic vs Secular subgroups (see Figure 15–Figure 21). Business 
groups with several companies are capitalised; single companies are not. Thicker 
lines reflect multiple memberships – information lost in the frequencies measure, but 
reflected here. In the Islamic movement, I additionally filtered out stronger ties, 
usually members with more than two affiliations (of any kind), to get a clearer 
picture of the core structure (see Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 18).  
The coloured circles around the companies’ names reflect that business 
group’s memberships (reflexive ties); the black and white discs or circles associated 
with the label show additional characteristics: companies that are listed among the 
                                                
 
60 The exclusions for the 1993–1998 period are: Gagiad-Tuskon .61; Gagiad-Civic Islamic 
.52; Gagiad-Musiad .39; Musiad- Civic Secular .5; Tuskon-Civic Secular .60; Civic Secular-
Civic Islamic .47; Civic Islamic- Pol_Centre-Right .60. The exclusions for the 1999 time 
period are: Tuskon-Civic Secular .58; Musiad-Chamber Antep .59; Civic Islamic-Chamber 
Antep 0.52. 
 126 
top 1000 firms in that time period have a disc (full black circle). The size of circle 
reflects membership in the Chambers: the standard small size means no affiliation; 
medium reflects Gaziantep Chamber membership and the largest circles reflect 
national Chambers membership. 
3.2. Outcome: domination of Chambers across time 
Table 6 below shows how the number of leadership positions is distributed among 
the Islamic and secular subgroups as well as the mixed and non-categorised business 
groups. Note that TOBB (Chambers_Turkey) members are usually also Gaziantep 
Chamber, i.e. GSO (Chamber_Gaziantep) members, but that the Gaziantep Chamber 
column excludes those TOBB members (to remove duplicates). The ISO columns 
refer to the number of business groups ranked in Istanbul Chamber of Industry 
(ISO)’s list of top 1000 manufacturing companies based on turnover and profit-based 
sales. Companies of the Islamic movement gradually increase their amount of 
leadership positions, but do not fully displace secular companies, which, in 
Gaziantep or Antep, still keep a strong presence especially in the national Chambers. 
The Islamic movement’s influence is especially obvious in the GSO, where Islamic 
business groups have doubled their presence between 1993 and 2012, whereas 
secular business groups only control 25% of the seats in post-AKP period that they 
had controlled in the 1993–1998 time period. In the national Chambers, Islamic 
business groups remain less dominant than their secular counterparts. However, this 
body has become more diversified with the same number of mixed and secular 
business groups in the 2004–2012 period. In the pre-AKP period secular business 
groups had fully dominated the TOBB. The economic growth of the Islamic 
movement is also reflected in the increasing number of Islamic business groups that 
have entered ISO’s (Istanbul Chamber of Industry) list of top manufacturing 
companies. While the number of secular business groups from Gaziantep in the top 
1000 has stayed relatively stable at about 5 business groups, Islamic business groups 
have tripled their placement from 1993 to 2012 to 9 business groups. Similar, 
previously absent mixed business groups have increased their presence to six 
business groups. In Gaziantep, Islamic business groups have increasingly dominated 
the Gaziantep Chamber and top 1000-company list over secular counterparts and the 
national Chambers have become more diversified. This increasing domination is also 
reflected in the organisational overlaps of secular vs Islamic organisations with the 
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Chambers, presented below. Table 6 provides more detail on which organisations 
control the Chambers. 
Table 6: The number of business groups across subgroups with leadership positions across 
three time periods  
 Gaziantep Chamber  of 
Industry (GSO) only 
National Chambers 
(TOBB) 
Business Groups in Top 
1000 (ISO data) 
 
 
93–98 99–03 04-12 93–98 99–03 04–12 93–
98 
99–03 04–12 
None 9 8 8 0 1 2 2 3 5 
Islamic 5 2 10 0 0 1 3 4 9 
Secular 8 3 2 2 2 5 4 5 5 
Mixed 1 1 3 0 1 5 1 0 6 
N 22  14  23  2 (2 in 
GSO) 
4 (3 in 
GSO) 
13 (10 
GSO) 
10  12  25 
 
 
 1993–1998 
The major notable feature of the full network graph of organisational overlaps (graph 
4) is the domination of the secular coalition in the Gaziantep and national-level 
Chambers: this is reflected in the thick lines, i.e. large membership overlaps between 
the affiliations Gagiad, Civic secular, Chamber Antep and Chambers Turkey. Indeed, 
secular BA and club members take up all leadership positions at the national 
Chambers (the normalised overlap score between Gagiad and national Chambers is a 
perfect 1). The subgroup overlap measures of the Gaziantep Chamber are also much 
stronger with secular civil society organisations and Gagiad (at 0.94 and 0.85, 
respectively) than with the Islamic BAs Müsiad, Tuskon or Islamic civil society 
organisations (all between 0.63 – 0.67). Islamic BAs and civil society organisations 
have only minor Chamber Antep integration, and none with the national Chambers.  
It also becomes apparent that in spite of the domination of the political centre-left 
CHP in the local council, the party’s influence in the manufacturing business circles 
is much smaller than that of the neoliberal centre-right parties ANAP and DYP. For 
example, the Antep Chamber shares 13 firms with centre-right parties, compared to 
only 1 firm with centre-left secular parties.  
 1999–2003 
Gagiad, the secular BA, and secular civil society organisations still share the 
strongest overlaps with both the Gaziantep and national Chambers (national 
Chambers share their largest overlap with secular civil society organisations at 0.94, 
and Gagiad at 0.93; and Gaziantep Chamber shares its largest overlap with secular 
civil society organisations at 0.90 and Gagiad at 0.80). However, Tuskon which was 
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not represented in national Chambers positions in 1993–1998, now has six firm 
members represented at the national-level Chambers (increase in overlap measure 
from 0 in 1993 to 0.64 in 1999), and continue to have a similar amount of Gaziantep 
Chamber members as in 1993. Interestingly, the centre-right parties share less direct 
overlaps with the Gaziantep Chamber in this time period at 0.63, and now seem more 
indirectly integrated in to the Chambers via Islamic BAs (note that the integration of 
centre-left parties with Gaziantep Chamber increases in this time period, but is only 
carried by one company). This is mainly because of the fact that the major groups of 
Sanko and Yetkinsekerci withdraw their former political alliances from the centre-
right parties, and move up into national Chambers positions at the same time. 
 2004–2012 
The integration of the Islamic movement into the Chambers’ leadership has been 
achieved as an outcome of their earlier network strategies; and the organisational 
patterns reflect the subgroup-pattern presented above in Table 6. While the strongest 
overlap of the national Chambers is still secular civil society organisations at ca. 
0.90, the Islamic civil society organisations now have an overlap of 0.78 as well (up 
from 0 in 1993). Additionally, Müsiad and Tuskon together share 56 firms with 
national Chambers, compared to Gagiad’s 44 (translates into normalised values of 
0.89 for Gagiad vs 0.73–0.77 for Tuskon and Müsiad). The national Chambers have 
become more diversified, but secular business groups are still strong in their 
leadership bodies.  
Islamic domination is most evident in the Gaziantep Chamber: while the 
secular civil society organisations share the largest overlap with the Gaziantep 
Chamber leadership, Islamic civil society organisations have reached a very similar 
level (normalised overlaps at 0.875 for secular vs 0.826 for Islamic; company 
numbers at 50 vs 40). Most importantly, Tuskon and Müsiad together share 127 
companies with the Gaziantep Chamber leadership compared to only 75 for Gagiad 
(normalised values: 0.775 for Tuskon; 0.809 for Müsiad and 0.829 for Gagiad).  
The AKP61 dominates the Gaziantep Chamber over their political left 
counterparts (0.8 vs 0.73 normalised values; left parties’ integration is overestimated 
because of two massive holdings’, Sanko and Merinos’s, diversified strategies). The 
                                                
 
61 Only AKP members are included in the 2004–2012 time period. 
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AKP now has several shared businesspeople with both the Gaziantep and national 
Chambers, even without mediation by BAs, showing their increased influence. After 
establishing this growing influence of Islamic over secular organisations, the 
following section focuses on comparing various network indicators of cohesion and 
structure across time. 
3.3. Cohesion: densities and tie strengths across all time periods 
Table 7 shows the densities for the Islamic, Secular and Mixed categories across 
time, first for valued (density measures average tie strength), then for dichotomised 
datasets (density measures proportion of actual relative to possible ties). Comparing 
the densities between the secular and Islamic subgroups reveals slightly higher 
values overall, and stronger ties for the Islamic movement in all time periods. The 
difference is most pronounced in the middle time period. The Mixed business groups 
are those who are the most strongly connected with memberships on both sides. We 
would expect higher density values for this mixed subgroup because their coding, but 
also because smaller subgroups with fewer actors are usually more connected than 
larger subgroups with more actors. 
In 1993–1998, the difference between the subgroups in cohesion is small: the 
difference in average tie strength is only about 0.19, and the binary densities at 
different tie strengths are largely similar. For example, 58% of possible ties with two 
or more memberships (≥2) are present in the secular coalition vs 52% in the Islamic 
movement. The Islamic movement has a slighter higher range of strong ties (above 
≥3). 
The share of strong ties and the density differential between the subgroups is 
the most pronounced in the 1999–2003 time period: average tie strength of the 
Islamic movement is about 54% stronger than that of the secular coalition, and the 
percentage of possible ties across stronger ties is also larger in the Islamic 
movement. This difference declines in the 2004–2012 post-AKP period where the 
subgroups are more similar again. While the secular coalition has a slightly higher 
ration of ties with two or more memberships, the Islamic movement has again a 
slightly higher ratio of ties across very strong levels (≥ 5 and upward). Average tie 
strengths differ by about only 0.5. Based on density data, differences in cohesion are 
not very large between the subgroups. The following section analyses organisational 
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overlaps to identify the level of diversity within each subgroup and the strength of 
integration with inter- and intra-subgroup organisations.  
Table 7: Densities by subgroups across three time periods for valued and binary data 
(dichotomised at various tie strengths) 
Densities 
within 
groups 
93–98 
Islamic 
N=44; 
n=23 
93–98 
Secular 
N=44; 
n=17 
93–
98 
Mix 
N=44 
n=4 
99–03 
Islamic 
N=69; 
n=41 
99–03 
Secular 
N=69; 
n=23 
99–
03 
Mix 
N=69 
n=5 
04–12 
Islamic 
N=133; 
n=84 
04–12 
Secular 
N=133; 
n=35 
04–12 
Mix 
N=133 
n=14 
Density 
(valued) 2.185 1.993 3.125 2.402 1.563 2.880 2.818 2.293 3.880 
Density 
Binary 
(≥2) 
0.516 0.581 1.000 0.544 0.438 1.000 0.587 0.705 1.000 
Density 
Binary 
(≥3) 
0.214 0.201 0.750 0.342 0.063 0.640 0.388 0.271 0.587 
Density 
Binary 
(≥4) 
0.153 
 0.125 0.250 0.173 0.063 0.160 0.265 0.209 0.311 
Density 
Binary 
(≥5) 
0.106 0.038 0 na na na 0.119 0.049 0.265 
Density 
Binary 
(≥6) 
0.045 0.038 0 0.083 0 0 0.104 0.049 0.173 
Density 
Binary 
(≥8); for 
93: ≥10 
0.025 0 0 0.046 0 0 0.074 0.003 0.051 
Density 
Binary 
(≥12) for 
93: ≥15 
0.006 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.032 0.000 0.020 
 
3.4. Cohesion: organisational overlaps within and between coalitions (tie 
diversity) 
3.4.1.  Intra- and inter-subgroup overlaps (tie diversity): business associations and 
full networks 
 1993–1998 
First, I focus on BAs’ ego-networks and their integration with various organisations 
within and between subgroups. Figure 9 illustrates that the strongest overlaps of each 
organisation are in line with their respective subgroup, suggesting that two subgroups 
of organisations can be differentiated via overlaps. 
Müsiad and Tuskon’s overlaps with each other are among their strongest 
overlaps at a normalised score of 0.8 each. Müsiad shares about half of its 
membership companies in the sample with Tuskon. Müsiad as well as Tuskon 
dominate the Islamic civil society organisations on overlaps ranging between 0.7 and 
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0.75. There is only one businessman who is a member of the political Islamist party 
in this time period, and he is integrated into the Islamic BA Tuskon only (resulting in 
a perfect overlap measure of 1). Gagiad and civic-Islamic memberships are 
independent of each other (overlap measure of 0.52), and being a Gagiad member 
even decreases the likelihood of being a Müsiad member (overlap measure of 0.39). 
Similarly, civic-secular and Müsiad, as well as civic-Islamic memberships are 
independent of each other at a value of about 0.5 each. Müsiad and Islamic civil 
society organisations are clearly differentiated from secular organisations in the types 
of members they attract.  
 
BA Islamic: Tuskon 1993–1998 
 
BA Islamic: Müsiad 1993–1998 
 
BA Secular: Gagiad 1993–1998 
 
Figure 9: 1993–1998 Organisational overlaps of each BA (One-step ego-networks), ordered 
by strength of Bonacich normalised subgroup overlap measure (see line labels) 
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The secular Gagiad shares most of his members with the Chambers and with 
secular clubs. Unexpectedly, Gagiad’s integration with secular clubs or civil society 
organisations is stronger than that of internal overlaps in the Islamic movement (the 
Gagiad civic-secular overlap is 0.94 vs Islamic BAs’ overlap with civic-Islamic is in 
the range of 0.7–0.75). However, BAs are not completely disconnected: Tuskon and 
Gagiad memberships share a slight overlap of 0.6. Müsiad only shares one company 
member with Gagiad, who is additionally in Tuskon, whereas Tuskon and Gagiad 
share eight company members overall.
 
Figure 10: 1993–1998 Full network organisational overlaps (event-by-event network) based 
on largest Bonacich subgroup overlap measures 
 
Figure 10 above additionally allows a closer study of the integration of 
political parties; interestingly, the secular Gagiad shares the largest overlap with 
centre-right political parties with a strong measure of 0.81 (14 companies- see line 
labels), whereas Tuskon shares no members with centre-right parties, and Müsiad 
only 2 companies (0.64). Similarly, it is secular rather than Islamic civil society 
organisations that are integrated with political right parties (measures of 0.86 versus 
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0.60). Powerful business groups such as Sanko and Yetkinsekerci largely drive this 
integration of secular organisations into political right parties. And while these 
business groups slightly overestimate Gagiad’s political integration, they illustrate 
the strong influence of the secular BA, which manages to attract powerful political 
entrepreneurs. The political left shares no members with any BA and is only 
indirectly integrated into business circles via overlapping memberships with secular 
civil society organisations or clubs. This shows the strong integration of centre-right 
parties with secular organisations and Chambers in this time period.  
Two subgroups that are only slightly integrated can therefore be 
differentiated: Tuskon, Müsiad, Civic-Islamic, and Political Islamist form axis 1, 
versus Gagiad, Civic-Secular, Political Right and the Chambers, which form axis 2. 
The two axes, and the stronger internal integration in the secular coalition within and 
with the Chambers can be seen in the full network graph.  
 1999–2003 
Figure 11 shows that compared to the earlier time period, Islamic BAs are more 
strongly integrated with the secular BA Gagiad: Müsiad’s previously negative 
relationship with Gagiad increases to 0.62, and Tuskon’s to a medium 0.7. Gagiad’s 
membership is slightly more strongly integrated with Islamic civil society 
organisations as well (from near independence in 1993 to a weak to medium positive 
relationship at 0.66).  
 
BA Islamic: Tuskon 1999–2003 
 
BA Islamic: Müsiad 1999–2003 
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BA Secular: Gagiad 1999–2003
 
Figure 11: 1999–2003 Organisational overlaps of each BA (one-step ego-networks), 
ordered by strength of Bonacich normalised subgroup overlap measure (see line labels) 
 
In spite of increasing diversity and inter-subgroup overlaps, BAs’ strongest 
overlaps are still shared with their respective subgroup organisations. However, 
Gagiad’s strongest overlaps remain the Chambers and the secular civil society 
organisations (Gagiad’s integration into secular clubs is nearly perfect at 0.93). 
Islamic organisations actually increase their intra-subgroup overlaps compared to 
1993. This can be seen clearly in Figure 12, where the thickness of lines representing 
Bonacich values is more similar within the subgroup than it was in 1993–1998. More 
specifically, Müsiad, Tuskon and Islamic civil society organisations still exhibit a 
strong overlap (0.74 between Müsiad and Tuskon, which is slightly lower than in 
1993). In fact Islamic BAs have increased their integration of Islamic civil society 
organisations (overlap between 0.78–0.85), which is now more similar to Gagiad’s 
civic-secular integration (at 0.93). Tuskon’s strongest membership overlaps are with 
other movement organisations, which now include the political right (ANAP, DYP 
and the new AKP), Islamic civil society organisations, the political Islamist party and 
Müsiad. There is near independence between Tuskon and civic-secular membership 
at 0.58. Similarly, Müsiad shares the largest part of its membership base with Islamic 
civil society organisations (13 companies at 0.85), the political right and Tuskon. 
Müsiad still shares about half of its member companies with Tuskon, and half with 
Islamic civil society organisations.  
Differences between Müsiad and Gagiad’s homogeneous and Tuskon’s 
diverse strategy become apparent in their civic and BA linkages: Tuskon, is similarly 
strongly integrated with Gagiad, as it is with Müsiad (at 0.70 vs 0.74) and has a more 
diversified integration into civil society organisations than Müsiad: while Müsiad 
shares no members with secular clubs, Tuskon shares a few (albeit at 0.58); Tuskon’s 
integration into Islamic charities is also weaker than either Müsiad or Gagiad’s 
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integration into their respective civil society organisations. Gagiad similarly 
increases its diversity through a larger shared membership with Tuskon and Islamic 
civil society organisations than in 1993, but at the same time remains much more 
strongly connected to secular civil society organisations and the Chambers. 
Another key development is the changing integration of centre-right parties 
(this is further analysed in the section on the extent of political integration below): in 
the previous time period the centre-right parties were integrated with the secular 
subgroup, and political Islamist parties with the Islamic movement. Now, Tuskon 
shares its strongest overlap with centre-right parties with nine companies, Müsiad 
with five and Gagiad with four companies. Indeed, with a measure of 0.83, centre-
right parties are the strongest overlapping organisations of Tuskon. 
 
 
Figure 12: 1999–2003 Full network organisational overlaps (event-by-event network) based 
on largest Bonacich subgroup overlap measures  
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In sum, there is both increasing internal and external integration with the 
latter being mainly driven by Tuskon. The political centre-right becomes more 
integrated with Islamic organisations in this time period. An Islamic BA member 
between 1999 and 2003 is still much more likely to be a member of the political 
right, and the Gülen community than of secular civil society organisations (and to a 
lesser extent, of Gagiad). It therefore makes sense to regard Islamic BAs, sections of 
the political right and the cemaat as cooperating social movement organisations.  
 2004 – 2012 
The most notable feature of the 2004–2012 affiliation-by-affiliation graph is the 
large extent and similarity of overlaps across all groups. All BAs have become 
increasingly diverse in the post-AKP period with stronger inter-subgroup 
integrations. Consequently, the two subgroups have become harder to differentiate in 
this time period, as can be seen in the full network graph Figure 14.  
This diversification is indicated by the fact that the differences in overlap 
measures between the strongest and weakest overlap have become much smaller (see 
Figure 13): at Tuskon, the difference between the weakest overlap (political Islamist 
party) and the strongest overlap (BA_Musiad) has shrunk to only 0.15 in the post-
AKP period, from a span of 0.4 in 1993. Similarly at Gagiad the differential between 
the strongest and weakest overlap was the largest in 1993 at 0.6, and now has shrunk 
to about 0.2.  
While Tuskon’s integration with Gagiad remains similar to before, Müsiad 
now has also increased its Gagiad integration (to 0.74). However, Müsiad has the 
lowest variance in the span of normalised overlap measures across the three time 
periods. It is the most homogeneous of all three BAs. The inter-subgroup integration 
appears to be mainly driven by Tuskon and Gagiad in previous time periods; in the 
post-AKP period, Müsiad diversifies further into secular organisations, however to a 
lesser extent than Tuskon had. In spite of such integration, in absolute terms, the two 
Islamic BAs share well over half of their respective membership (82 companies in 
2004). Most importantly, all BAs still share the largest normalised overlap measures 
with close subgroup organisations (see Figure 13). In fact, Müsiad becomes 
Tuskon’s largest overlap for the first time (at 0.83), and Tuskon constitutes Gagiad’s 
smallest overlap. Civic-Islamic and political right parties remain the strongest 
overlapping organisations of Islamic BAs, followed by the Chambers.  
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BA Islamic: Tuskon 2004–2012 
 
BA Islamic: Müsiad 2004–2012 
 
BA Secular: Gagiad 2004–2012 
 
Figure 13: 2004–2012 Organisational overlaps of each BA (one-step ego-networks), ordered 
by strength of Bonacich normalised subgroup overlap measure (see line labels) 
 
The large integration of the political left into the Islamic movement 
(especially into the Islamic civil society organisations and Islamic BAs at about 0.7) 
is exaggerated as it is carried mainly by two large holdings’ affiliations: Sanko and 
Merinos. This is also true for the political left’s integration into the Chambers. 
This integration and diversification can be seen in the inter-subgroup overlaps 
in Figure 14: the integration between Gagiad and Islamic BAs has become even 
stronger, and especially increased with Müsiad (up from 0.39 in 1993 to 0.61 in 1999 
and to 0.74 in 2004). Civic-secular clubs shared no members with Müsiad in 1999 
and only one in the early 1990s; the overlap measure has increased from 
independence in 1993 to a relatively strong 0.75 in the post-AKP period. Civic-
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secular elite clubs used to be mainly integrated with Gagiad with near-perfect 
overlap measures and 0 or independence from Islamic BAs. In the post-AKP period, 
secular organisations have become much more diversified and integrated with 
Islamic organisations. This suggests that Islamic elites now increasingly join elitist 
secular associations. Indeed, political entrepreneurs of the AKP appear similarly 
likely to join Islamic BAs and the secular BA Gagiad (overlap measures of AKP 
with Tuskon at 0.80, with Müsiad at 0.83 and with Gagiad at 0.72). To further 
support this statement I have calculated the growth of the sample membership for 
each BA and BA combination relative to firm growth (see appendix section 8); the 
share of companies who are members of the secular BA Gagiad only is less than firm 
growth over the study period, whereas the growth of Tuskon and Müsiad-only 
memberships increases faster than firm growth. The category that increases the most 
is companies with membership in all three BAs, indicating that the increase in 
Gagiad membership is driven by mixed membership, namely, Islamic BA members 
entering Gagiad. 
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Figure 14: 2004–2012 Full network organisational overlaps (event-by-event network) based 
on largest Bonacich subgroup overlap measures 
3.4.2. Structure: extent of political and civic integration  
3.4.2.a  Organisational overlaps and frequencies 1993–1998 
Organisational overlaps showed that in 1993, Gagiad dominates centre-right parties, 
and has both stronger civic and political integration than the Islamic movement 
overall. Tuskon has only one political party member of the otherwise isolated 
political Islamists party. Frequencies at the business group level (see Table 8), which 
make up for any bias of group size, confirm the finding that the secular coalition is 
more strongly integrated into centre-right parties and civil society organisations in 
the 1990s than Islamic BAs: 12% of secular business groups have political 
membership compared to 9% of Islamic business groups. While this difference is 
smaller than in overlaps, the fact that the secular BA had integrated these influential 
political entrepreneurs shows their influential political integration.  
 
Table 8: Frequencies of three relationship layers and their combinations compared between 
Secular and Islamic subgroups  
 1993–1998 1999–2003 2004–2012 
Percentages (total 
business groups) Secular Islamic Secular Islamic Secular Islamic 
Business 
Association only 65% (11) 78% (18) 74% (17) 71% (29) 54% (19) 
69% 
(58) 
Civic total 
 35% (6) 13% (3) 22% (5) 20% (8) 26% (9) 
20% 
(17) 
Political total 
 12% (2) 9% (2) 4% (1) 10% (4) 29% (10) 
14% 
(12) 
BA + Civic only 
 24% (4) 13% (3) 17% (4) 20% (8) 17% (6) 
16% 
(13) 
BA + Political 
only 
 
0 9% (2) (0) 10% (4) 20% (7) 10% (8) 
Civic + Political 
only 
 
6% (1) (0) 4% (1) (0) 4% (1) (0) 
BA + Civic + 
Political 6% (1) (0) (0) (0) 6% (2) 5% (4) 
Total Business 
Groups 17 23 23 41 35 84 
 
As for civic integration, Gagiad’s three strongest overlaps are shared with the 
Chambers and the secular civil society organisations of Gaziantep. In the early 
1990s, civic integration in Gagiad (0.94) appears much higher than in Tuskon or 
Müsiad (0.69 for Tuskon and 0.75 at Müsiad). Frequencies (see Table 8) confirm 
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overlap findings showing that the level of civic integration in the secular coalition is 
much stronger in the early 1990s (35% vs 13% in the Islamic movement). The 
Islamic movement catches up in its level of civic integration in the following time 
period (2% difference). The two subgroups remain similar in the post-AKP era (6% 
in 2004–2012); it is actually the secular coalition that has slightly more civic ties in 
the post AKP era, not the Islamic movement.  
3.4.2.b Organisational overlaps and frequencies 1999–2003 
In this time period, it is especially Tuskon that strengthens and diversifies its 
membership base, gaining the strongest influence in the centre-right parties. Most 
importantly, Gagiad’s overlap with the centre-right parties reduces to 0.62 (from 0.8 
in 1993), whereas Tuskon’s increases to 0.828 from 0. Both Tuskon and Müsiad 
have the political right as their strongest overlap. This shows the gradual shift in 
centre-right parties from secular to more Islamic groups in this time period. Gagiad, 
which has 88 members in the textile industry in this time period, shares only four 
companies with any political party, whereas Tuskon and Müsiad combined have 15 
centre-right party members (among their 90 firm members in the textile cluster). This 
is also reflected in frequencies based on coalition data, which only includes 
ideologically close members; the extent of political ties is now larger in the Islamic 
movement (4% vs 10%).  
However, it is not only the extent, but also the influence and ideological 
closeness of the company that matters. Gagiad’s overlap with centre-right political 
parties is now only mediated through ideologically less close firms like the Islamic 
firm Eruslu, and the mixed Prosep (a former ANAP politician). These companies, 
while being Gagiad members, are in fact members of the Islamic movement and 
mixed categories, not the secular coalition (and are therefore not reflected in 
subgroup frequencies presented above). The secular coalition only features one 
ideologically close political member in this time period, namely, ‘boyasboya’ 
(political left member). In contrast, Islamic BAs’ centre-right integration is direct 
and incorporates four ideologically close Islamic companies62 (see Figure 16). 
                                                
 
62 This refers to the following business groups. The business group ‘Gurteks’, a DYP and 
Müsiad-only member in the previous time period, now additionally joins Tuskon. The 
business ‘uzer tekstil’, a political Islamist party and Tuskon member in the previous time 
period, now additionally joins a centre-right party. ‘uzer tekstil’ also becomes a leader at 
Müsiad and the AKP in the 2004–2012 period. The group ‘Ozsever’, a Tuskon and 
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Interestingly, the centre-right parties share fewer direct overlaps (0.63) with the 
Gaziantep Chamber in this time period; they now seem more indirectly integrated 
into the Chambers via Islamic BAs, which additionally underscores Islamic BAs’ 
increasing influence. 
Importantly, the Islamic movement also catches up in the amount of civic 
integration in this time period, which is confirmed by both frequencies at the 
subgroup level and organisational overlaps. The percentage of total civic ties is at 
20% in the Islamic movement in the 1999–2003 time period, versus the secular 
coalition’s 22%. In the early 1990s, the secular coalition has more than double the 
Islamic movement’s civic integration. Overlaps showed that Gagiad’s strongest 
overlap is with secular civil society organisations in this time period again, rather 
than with political parties. This shows the secular BA’s focus on civic integration; 
Gagiad’s overlap at 0.93 with secular clubs is much larger than Tuskon’s 0.75 with 
the Gülen cemaat (Müsiad has a stronger civic integration than Tuskon at 0.85).  
One example of an Islamic company entering leadership positions in this time 
period is the civic-Islamic member ‘Akteks’, which in this period also takes the 
leadership of the Tuskon-affiliate Gapgiad and moves into a Gaziantep Chamber 
position. Bigger and more diversified firms such as Merinos, one of the largest carpet 
producers in Turkey, add more Islamic affiliations. 
3.4.2.c Organisational overlaps and frequencies 2004–2012 
In this time period, the AKP shares the largest part of its membership with Tuskon 
and Müsiad (0.802 and 0.829 respectively). The AKP’s integration with Gagiad has 
also increased considerably from 0.62 in 1999 to 0.72 in 2004. Although Gagiad now 
has increased again its integration into the AKP, many of those shared members are 
also members of Islamic BAs. Again, this can be interpreted as the moderately 
Islamic movement increasingly entering Gagiad and thus changing the nature of this 
secular association. This pattern is reflected in the frequencies at the subgroup level 
where 29% the secular coalition’s ties are political versus the 14% on the part of the 
Islamic movement. Approximately half of the secular coalition’s political ties are 
AKP members. The extent of political ties is less than expected in the Islamic 
                                                                                                                                     
 
Gaziantep Chamber leadership member in the previous time period, now also joins a centre-
right party. The business group ‘Eruslu’, which is a member of all BAs, and a centre-right 
party. 
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movement, as AKP members have similarly entered the secular BA (and due to the 
nature of the coding, combined AKP and Gagiad members were ranked as secular vs 
combined AKP and Islamic BA members as Islamic). 
The extent of civic ties is still slightly higher in Gagiad at this time than in the 
Islamic BAs. The ranking of organisational overlaps showed that Gagiad’s largest 
overlaps are still with civil society organisations and the Chambers rather than 
political parties (rank 4), whereas Müsiad’s second strongest overlap is with the 
AKP, for example. This is also reflected in the frequencies where the extent of civic 
ties is 26% in the secular and 20% in the Islamic movement. 
3.4.3. Structure: multiplexity and structure of three relationship layers 
To analyse how political ties are integrated into each subgroup, I compare the 
numbers of business groups with both a political and BA affiliation vis-à-vis with 
both a political and civic affiliation (pol+BA vs pol+civic). If politicians are mainly 
integrated into a subgroup via civic ties, the pol+civic share should be larger than the 
pol+BA share. The extent of embedded multiplexity in indicated by the number of 
companies with all three relationship types (BA+pol+civic) in each subgroup. 
Whether a BA focuses more strongly on civic or political integration can be judged 
by comparing the BA+pol with the BA+civic membership shares. The multiplexity 
of ties, if and how the political, business and civic relationship layers intersect, is 
also evaluated via a qualitative interpretation of subgroup graphs. 
 1993–1998 
The secular BA has a stronger overlap with civil society than with political groups, 
while the opposite is true for the Islamic movement. The secular coalition has a 
larger share of political centre-right ties, and these are to a lesser extent affiliated 
with the BA Gagiad than with secular civil society organisations. Core Gagiad 
members are closer to secular civil society organisations than to the centre-right 
parties (the BA+civic share is 24%, while the BA+political share is 0). Although the 
core of the Islamic movement is less integrated into centre-right parties in the early 
time period, this integration is achieved via Islamic BAs to a larger extent than in the 
secular coalition (the BA+civic share is 13% in the Islamic movement, while the 
BA+pol share is 9%, compared to the secular’s 0). From the start, it appears that 
Islamic BAs focus more on political integration than the secular BA. Of the two 
political members in the Islamic movement, both are also affiliated with Islamic 
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BAs, and none with the Gülen community, while of the two political members in the 
secular coalition, both are also affiliated with secular civil society organisations, and 
one additionally with Gagiad (Sanko Holding). This trend is to intensify in the 
following time periods and is supported by further indicators.  
Note that no shared members exist in the Islamic movement between political 
parties and the Gülen cemaat – a structural hole that is to be effectively filled by 
Islamic BAs in the following time period. Compare the Islamic network in Figure 15 
with the secular network in Figure 19: the political red/brown ties in the Islamic 
movement are only connected to Gülen community members (green) via BA 
membership (blue). In the secular coalition, both political members (boyasboya and 
Sanko; red circles) are members of secular civil society organisations. In the Islamic 
movement, civic membership also partly overlaps with stronger BA ties (thicker blue 
lines), while political membership does not (thinner blue lines). In other words, 
political entrepreneurs are not part of the strongly connected core. 
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Full Network Strongest Ties (membership ≥ 2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: 1993–1998 Islamic company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number 
of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)   
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Full Network Strongest ties (membership ≥ 2) 
 
 
Figure 16: 1999–2003 Islamic company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number 
of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists) 
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Figure 17: 2004–2012 Islamic company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number 
of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists 
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Figure 18: 2004–2012 Islamic company-by-company (business group) network for actors 
with more than two affiliations, based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: 
political), and Outcome Measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists) 
 
 
Figure 19: 1993–1998 Secular company-by-company (business group) network based on 
relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line 
thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists) 
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Figure 20: 1999–2003 Secular company-by-company (business group) network based on 
relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line 
thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists) 
 
 
Figure 21: 2004–2012 Secular company-by-company (business group) network based on 
relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line 
thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)  
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 1999–2003 
Concerning the structure of relationships, the 1993 trend continues and clarifies in 
this time period: in the Islamic movement, there are still no shared political and civic 
members. Instead, strong BA ties bridge those relationship layers. In the secular 
coalition, the only politician is a secular club rather than s Gagiad member. This 
shows again the Islamic movement’s focus on business mobilisation, combining 
centre-right with Islamic BA membership, whereas secular politicians lack this focus 
on BAs and are more likely to be members of elitist clubs. This is also reflected in 
the frequencies: 10% of Islamic companies are members of a centre-right party as 
well as Tuskon and/or Müsiad, while the Political+BA membership combination 
does not exist in the secular coalition. Indeed, political party and BA integration does 
not exist at all until the post-AKP 2004 period in the secular core, whereas it has 
been a focus in the Islamic movement from 1993 onward. Instead, the secular 
coalition’s politician is a member of a secular civil society organisation. That civic-
political combination, in turn, does not exist in the Islamic movement.  
Figure 16, especially the network graph on the right that filters out only the 
strongest ties, shows this pattern: Islamic BAs play an important role in bringing 
together the Gülen community and centre-right politicians through informal common 
membership ties (a bridge that remains taboo otherwise). It is mainly strong BA ties 
that bridge that civic-political ‘structural hole’. In the 1999 secular coalition, 
illustrated in Figure 20, the company ‘boyasboya’ is the only company with a 
political membership. The company has an additional civic membership, yet not BA 
membership; the same was true in the previous time period (see red ring around 
company). In 2004–2012 the various relationship overlaps become much more 
similar between the two subgroups, showing the blurring of the two.  
 2004–2012 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 illustrate the large 2004–2012 Islamic networks, whereas 
Figure 21 illustrates the secular network. The percentage of civic ties is again slightly 
larger in the secular coalition in this time period, and so is the percentage of political 
ties. Most importantly, for the first time with the AKP’s strengthening, combined 
political and Gagiad membership exists in the secular coalition (see Figure 21). This 
illustrates the AKP’s, but not previous centre-right parties’ focus on business 
mobilisation. Five of the ten business groups with political affiliations in the secular 
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coalition are AKP members and five are CHP members.63 It is also the first time that 
the multiplex combination of all three relationship layers becomes more common in 
both subgroups equally.  
Equally important is that the political and civic layers in the Islamic 
movement are now directly connected; namely through some of the core companies 
of the previous periods with the strongest ties (including the business 
groups/companies ‘Gurteks’, ‘Eruslu’, ‘uzer tekstil’, ‘Kaplan 1’; see in Figure 18 the 
group of four business groups with all ties in middle part of graph of strong ties). 
Strong BA ties have been key to linking the civic and political planes in the Islamic 
movement; this is evident in the company group with the strongest ties and all three 
types of ties.  
Overlaps of centre-right political and civic-Islamic membership have also 
been absent in the category of business groups with mixed affiliations until 2004. In 
the 2004 period, it is the leading Sanko holding with mixed affiliations that combines 
almost all types of memberships; it is the only business groups with overlapping 
AKP and Gülen community affiliations within this category. These large companies 
with multiple affiliations have not been depicted here to focus on the Islamic and 
Secular subgroups. The number of mixed companies has especially grown in the 
2004 time period where subgroups are harder to differentiate. In 1993 there were 
only four and in 1999 only five business groups coded as Mixed, while there were 14 
in the 2004 time period.  
The following business groups/companies in the network of the Islamic 
movement have moved up to leadership positions: For example, ‘Kaplan’ has moved 
to the centre, from previously being a Müsiad and civic-Islamic member in the 
1990s, to additionally joining Tuskon, the AKP and finally the Gaziantep Chamber 
in the 2004–2012 period. The ‘Akteks’ group continues its previous Gaziantep 
Chamber leadership position and so does the AKP member ‘Eruslu’ group. Islamic 
groups have also increasingly joined the secular Gagiad.  
                                                
 
63 Five AKP (of which four: Gagiad plus AKP; one with additional civic membership), five 
CHP members (‘Merinos’ with all three memberships; ‘boyasboya’: pol+civic; three: CHP 
plus Gagiad) 
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 Observations on companies and outcomes 
Throughout all time periods, we can see a trend that the largest, top 1000 firms are 
also those with the most connections, and the best connected are also often national 
Chambers members, although this appears less clearly. That means that the best 
connected, most central companies accrue the most benefits in terms of resources (in 
network terms – companies with higher ‘degree centrality’), and not those that 
bridge/connect layers. This is especially true for the Islamic movement: only 
companies with at least two types of ties are economically successful, while in the 
secular coalition companies with only Gagiad membership are also among Turkey’s 
top 1000. ‘Boyasboya’ of the secular coalition appears to be a rare case of company 
that appears in Gaziantep Chamber leadership without any BA affiliation in 1993. 
BA membership has increasingly become a necessity for economic growth. In 2004, 
‘tekerekoglu tekstil’ is the only company in the Islamic movement, which is among 
Turkey’s top 1000, yet it is only a BA member; all other top companies have 
additional strong ties.  
Concerning Chambers’ leadership, in 1999 the two Gaziantep Chamber 
leaders64 in the Islamic movement are among the companies with the strongest ties 
(Eruslu, Akteks). In comparison, part of Gagiad’s Chambers’ leadership has only 
Gagiad ties (Yildirim_Sanko; Yetkinsekerci). It appears then that the strong ties that 
have gradually bridged the civic and political layers in the Islamic movement are the 
companies with the strongest benefits and political influence. 
Some of Gaziantep’s most influential holding groups like ‘Sanko’ or ‘Kocer’, 
(a Gagiad co-founder, who controlled the Gaziantep Chamber for over a decade and 
is now an AKP MP), increasingly diversify their ties over time. The Kocer group is 
in the Mixed category in all three time periods. It appears that for long-term political 
influence an extensive diversity of strong ties is required to become less dependent 
on a certain social and/or political group. In the 2004–2012 time period, Sanko has 
come to a position where it has ties to all BAs, civil society organisations and 
political parties (except political Islamist ones). It therefore appears that the 
politically influential firms increasingly diversify their ties, in spite of showing a 
clear allegiance at one time period.  
                                                
 
64 There are fewer GSO and TOBB members in the 1999–2003 period than in the other two 
periods. 
 152 
4. Summary of findings  
Several indicators and graphs were prepared to compare cohesion (organisational 
overlaps, densities, tie strength), and the structure and extent (frequencies and 
graphs) of the three relationship layers between the Islamic movement and secular 
coalition. In terms of cohesion, I first analysed density and tie strengths. There are 
few differences between the subgroups in these measures in the early 1990s (1993–
1998) and post-AKP (2004–2012) time periods. The share of strong ties and density 
differential between the subgroups is the most pronounced in the 1999–2003 time 
period, but even here differences remain negligible; the average tie strength of the 
Islamic movement is about 54% stronger than that of the secular coalition, and the 
ratio of possible ties across stronger ties is also larger in the Islamic movement. 
When analysing organisational overlaps, the early secular coalition actually appears 
to share more members within the network, i.e. shows a stronger cohesion, than the 
Islamic movement. Unexpectedly, Gagiad’s integration with secular civil society 
organisations is stronger than that of the internal overlaps in the Islamic movement. 
Two subgroups of organisations can be differentiated that show stronger 
organisational overlaps within than between them (i.e. low tie diversity). In other 
words, each subgroup shows stronger overlaps with ideologically close organisations 
of the same subgroup than with ideologically distant organisations of the opposing 
subgroup. Islamic and secular BAs are weakly integrated and not completely 
disconnected. For example, Tuskon and Gagiad memberships share a slight overlap.  
In the 1999 to 2003 time period, both cohesion and diversity increase in the 
Islamic movement. In this time period, the overall strength of network ties and 
density increases the most within the Islamic movement relative to the secular 
coalition. At the same time, the two subgroups become more integrated with each 
other, i.e. more diverse, compared to 1993. This diversification is mainly driven by 
Tuskon in the Islamic movement, which is more diverse than both the secular BA 
Gagiad and the Islamic BA Müsiad. Overall, there is both increasing internal and 
external integration. The two subgroups become clearly differentiated in this time 
period, but the strengths of overlaps increase within the Islamic movement and catch 
up with the secular coalition, resulting in two more similar looking subgroups.  
The most notable feature of the 2004–2012 affiliation-by-affiliation graph is 
the large extent and similarity of overlaps across all groups. Consequently, the two 
subgroups have become harder to differentiate in this time period. Two subgroups 
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with stronger internal overlaps can hardly be made out, especially as Müsiad 
increases its diversification as well. Overall, all BAs have become increasingly 
diverse and less cohesive in the post-AKP period with stronger inter-subgroup 
integrations.  
Concerning network structures, there are important differences between the 
Islamic movement and secular coalition. In 1993, the secular coalition has more civic 
and more influential political ties than the Islamic movement. The stronger 
integration of civic ties into the secular coalition in the 1993–1998 period is contrary 
to expectations, whereas the somewhat stronger integration of political ties in the 
same period was expected. However, in the following time period, Islamic BAs 
overtake the secular BAs in the extent of their political ties, and catch up in the 
amount of civic ties. At the same time, Islamic BAs increase their political influence 
in the Chambers in the 1999 to 2003 time period.  
This growth in political integration was expected during the time period when 
Islamic BAs experienced growing political influence. However, the integration was 
not as strong as expected. In the post-AKP era (2004–2012) in Gaziantep, AKP 
members were similarly likely to be members of secular and Islamic BAs. Civic 
integration remains slightly stronger in the secular coalition in the post-AKP period, 
but relatively similar between the subgroups overall. 
Most importantly, the subgroups differ in the structure and in the types of ties 
that connect businessmen with political parties and civil society organisations. 
Political elites of the secular coalition are more likely to be members of such elite 
clubs rather than of the secular BAs. It is civic members that tend to be politicians, 
and not BA members. Overlapping BA and political membership (exclusively) do 
not exist until 2004. In contrast, in the Islamic movement, this category has existed 
since 1993 and has become as frequent as overlapping political and civic 
membership in 2004.  
In the Islamic movement, there is a very clear pattern in the scarcity of 
combined political-civic ties, which reflects the state’s hostility toward civil society. 
Between 1993 and 1998, Islamic civil society and political organisations do not share 
any members (intersecting multiplexity), while in the secular coalition they are 
directly connected (embedded multiplexity). This is in line with the multiplexity 
expectations. Instead, Islamic BAs connect Islamic civil society organisations with 
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centre-right parties. Combined political and civic memberships without any BA 
membership have become possible for the first time in the post-AKP era.  
The companies that connect the two layers are those with the strongest ties 
(i.e. multiple memberships) of previous time periods. It appears also that the business 
groups with the strongest ties in the Islamic movement gain the most economic and 
political benefits (as reflected in their position in top 1000 company list and 
Chambers’ leadership positions).   
As with the political integration, the extent of overlapping ties across all three 
types is not much different between the secular and Islamic subgroups in the post-
AKP period. Originally, I had expected much stronger embedded multiplexity in the 
Islamic movement. However, the difference between the two subgroups remains 
small, which is due to the increasing overlap between them. This again suggests that 
this is an AKP legacy stretching to both subgroups, whereby Islamic actors 
increasingly enter and transform secular organisations.  
5. Discussion 
First, I interpret findings on cohesion: based on density figures, it cannot be said that 
the Islamic network is considerably more cohesive than the secular network at any 
time period. Contrary to expectations, the early secular network (1993–1998) 
actually appears more cohesive than the Islamic network. In the following time 
period, rather than decreasing or increasing cohesion, there is a more complex 
pattern where stronger (rather than weaker) and more diverse ties are built in the 
Islamic movement. Finally, in the post-AKP time period (2004–2012), all BAs have 
become increasingly diverse and less cohesive with stronger bridging. Analysing 
membership patterns more closely, it can be argued that in the post-AKP period, 
secular organisations have become much more diversified and integrated with 
Islamic organisations. I therefore interpret the increased integration as Islamic BAs 
increasing their influence in secular elite clubs and BAs. Overall, there is both 
increasing internal and external integration, i.e. bonding and bridging in the Islamic 
movement. 
Second, I interpret findings on network structures; contrary to expectations 
civic integration has been slightly stronger in the secular coalition throughout all 
time periods, and especially in the early 1990s. Most importantly, Islamic BAs 
overtake the secular BA in political integration and catch up in Chambers’ leadership 
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positions. Based on these findings, I argue that the increasing political influence in 
the 1999–2003 time period of Islamic BAs is a consequence of the Islamic BAs’ 
stronger diversification and political integration in the same time period. In the post-
AKP period the pattern of political integration somewhat mirrors the finding of 
increased diversification of the secular BA. Together with the stronger diversity of 
secular civil society organisations and BAs, this suggests that both Islamic business 
and political elites have increasingly entered secular elite organisations and increased 
their influence in them. The political integration of AKP elites extends beyond 
Islamic BAs to the secular BA. 
The most important finding concerns how relationship types have been 
connected in the Islamic movement (i.e. multiplexity). The Islamic movement has 
gradually strengthened its internal cohesion and bridging, as well as its civic and 
political ties vis-à-vis the secular coalition. But its key advantage lies in how it 
brought these layers together: secular BAs have not cooperated with a popular civil 
society organisation, but forged strong ties with elitist secular clubs and the semi-
public Chambers of Industry and Trade. Centre-right parties of the 1990s focused 
less strongly on grassroots business mobilisation; rather, these political elites 
mingled in elitist secular-civic circles. Joining Islamic charities was a bigger taboo 
for centre-right politicians; those with stronger Islamic leanings joined Islamic BAs 
instead. Gradually, Islamic BAs have bridged the gap between the popular Gülen 
community and conservative political parties and facilitated their cooperation 
through non-contentious membership in BAs. It is through core Islamic BA members 
that eventually the way was paved for direct civic-politics links. Based on this 
finding I argue that in the Islamic movement, BAs have served as platforms for 
political mobilisation. Islamic BAs have provided a crucial platform for political 
mobilisation and resource exchange among social movement organisations, making 
overlapping political, BA and civic membership possible for the first time in the 
post-AKP era.  
These findings have implications for debates on how cohesion relates to 
political influence. It appears that bridging and diversification (i.e. low cohesion) 
have been more advantageous for the growing political influence of the Islamic 
movement. The observed structure is not one of cohesive and cutoff cliques, as some 
ethnic entrepreneurship literature has observed for excluded ethnic communities in 
the periphery (Aldrich & Waldinger, 1990; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; 
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Waldinger, 1995). The Islamic network exhibits a strong level of cohesion; however, 
this cohesion is not just inward oriented, but crucially extends to extra-community 
linkages with secular organisations. Tuskon has been more diverse in its membership 
than the secular Gagiad and the Islamic Müsiad. This strategy may have contributed 
to supporting Tuskon’s export promotion and economic growth activities by 
facilitating access to a wide, diverse range of actors and resources. Müsiad’s stronger 
homogeneity, in turn, may have supported the internal trust building required for the 
thick exchange of high-quality resources as argued in the bonding literature. On the 
company level, within the Islamic movement, I find that it is companies with 
multiple memberships that also accrue the most benefits, rather than those that 
‘bridge’ several layers. This supports the interpretation that strong bonding ties, i.e. 
the ‘core’ members with multiple memberships, facilitate multifunctional resource 
exchange. However, bridging brings advantages, too, as some of the most influential 
companies of Gaziantep increasingly diversify their ties to build up strong 
connections to both subgroups. This, combined with the finding that the Islamic 
movement does facilitate diversity also supports the interpretation that bridging has 
facilitated political influence. The combination of Tuskon’s diversity and Müsiad’s 
stronger homogeneity may have supported both Islamic BAs members’ economic 
growth and internal solidarity, combining the positive consequences of bridging and 
bonding discussed in the network literature. The observed network structure is based 
on a ‘cemaat’ structure with a strong, coherent, core and diverse edges with weaker 
ties.  
The observed network structure is similar to what Agai (2004) has observed 
in the Gülen community’s educational network, and seems to be typical of modern 
socio-economic Islamic movements in Turkey (Yavuz, 2003). Gülen’s educational 
network is also characterised by a multitude of relationship with differing qualities, 
strengths and densities rather than just coherent, strong networks. Gülen does not 
officially appear as owner of any of the multiple organisations associated with his 
movement, and he has an institutionalised link to only one civil society organisation. 
The author finds that the ‘founders and sponsors of the various organisations 
associated with Gülen report that they were “inspired” by his ideas, whereas people 
working at the lower levels might not even know about the connections’ (Agai, 
2004), especially outside of Turkey. The linkages are less visible as it is an informal 
network which connects the organisations to Gülen: The cemaat, consisting of partial 
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networks itself, builds the core of the network in which relationships are especially 
strong. Agai (2004) finds that the cemaat overlaps with the formal hierarchies in 
educational organisations. That is, members of the cemaat often had jobs in the 
higher levels of the educational institutions associated with Gülen. 
The route to political influence has been to catch up and overtake secular 
actors in cohesion, diversity, civic integration, and especially in political integration, 
as political mediation models suggest. Most importantly, Islamic BAs have managed 
to bring together these different types of relationship layers and actors. According to 
the network literature, such networks can provide important platforms for resource 
exchange, political mobilisation and solidarity building – what is going in these 
networks is the topic of Chapter VI.  
I hold that it is not the network structure per se that has provided advantages, 
but rather the inventive adjustment to the political and cultural context, relying on 
informal co-membership networks at the grassroots level where traditional forums 
for political and economic mobilisation were closed off. The political context had 
forbidden cooperation between political elites and civil society, and thus conditioned 
a ‘structural hole’ that Islamic BAs have gradually captured. Threats from the state 
increased the incentives for and advantages of building strong collaborative 
grassroots networks among Islamic actors in the political, civic and business realms; 
these serve as alternative platforms for the building of solidarity, political 
mobilisation and resource exchange. The resources built up in and through these 
informal collaborative networks were the only option left to Islamic actors in the 
periphery. 
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Chapter V Collective Action Frames 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I showed that Islamic and secular BAs’ networks have 
distinctive characteristics – Islamic BAs were shown to rely on both bridging and 
bonding, and to integrate previously disconnected political and civic actors. 
However, this raises the question of what actually goes on in these networks; the 
structure and content of relationships only tell part of the story of how Islamic BAs 
were able to build political power. It is important to understand how BAs build 
power through distinctive tactics, how they use networked relationships and mobilise 
support. In this chapter, I use frame analysis to examine the framing tactics, based on 
51 interviews with 36 people, and further archival material.  
I use frame analysis because my focus is on how Islamic BAs have generated 
political power at the expense of secular BAs. My central argument is that Islamic 
BAs were able to gain power through social movement tactics grounded in Islam. 
The frame analysis is used for analysing how SMOs mobilise support for collective 
action, how they build the internal trust and solidarity necessary to motivate action, 
and how they establish public legitimacy to support their movement goals and 
tactics. An important question is how ideology65 and religion enter the collective 
identities and goals of frames. This is especially important in the Turkish case where 
Islamic groups have been delegitimised in the public sphere and linking political 
with Islamic aims has been forbidden for civil society since the 1980 military coup. 
In the task of frame creation, ideologies based on nationalism, ethnicity and religion 
become even more important when struggles are based on such ideological cleavages 
in society. In the Turkish context, the Kemalist-Islamist dimension has come to the 
fore, as class-based activism has been discouraged in favour of unitising classless 
ideologies. However, beyond Turkey, social movement research has shown that 
ideologies based on ethnicity, religion and nationalism in general have been used ‘as 
                                                
 
65 The concept of ideology is different from frames, but parts of different ideologies can be 
combined in the process of framing (Snow, 2004). Ideology is a ‘broad, coherent, and 
relatively durable set beliefs that affect one’s orientation not only to politics but to everyday 
life more generally’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 200). In contrast, collective action frames 
are more action-oriented; they fulfil a mobilisation purpose for a collectivity, whereby 
ideology can function as both a constraint and a resource by influencing a frame’s resonance 
with cultural narratives. 
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more reliable bases of movement organization in the past than the categorical 
imperative of social class’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 11). The quality of frames therefore 
crucially depends on how such cultural symbols and ideologies are incorporated into 
Islamic versus secular BAs’ frames.  
Frame analysis focuses on speech and ‘the signifying work that is intended to 
mobilise supporters and to demobilise antagonists’ (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). 
Frames matter because they bind actors into common identities, goals and event 
interpretations, forging the trust and solidarity necessary to reach people’s hearts and 
minds and to animate collective action. Effective frames render events meaningful 
and thereby organise experiences and guide the actions of individuals in line with 
collective frames (Johnston, 1995). Bonding networks and trust have also been found 
to facilitate resource exchange. For private actors to influence public policy, 
formulating goals in the public interest is key to creating public legitimacy, 
especially when they have been marginalised and partially threatened. This is all the 
more crucial in bringing a subgroup of formally independent SMOs to act together.  
Framing is a key movement mobilisation tactic through which ideology and 
religion enter the power building efforts of Islamic BAs. It supports collaboration 
and resource exchange among marginalised actors at the grassroots level, and 
provides public legitimacy. Such ideological sources of political power have been 
neglected in the literature on BAs’ political influence. This Chapter aims to 
demonstrate that framing processes have provided essential support for the 
collaborative resource exchange among SMO networks that, in turn, have allowed 
them to make political claims. This occurs in two ways. First, ideological framing 
provides a coherent, legitimate goal and identity based on supposedly pure, non-
contentious Islamic goals. These goals are then merged with capitalist aims, which 
serve and bind together all parties involved. This is the key process analysed here. 
Second, the framing process facilitates the mobilisation tactics that are analysed in 
the other chapters, through binding a diverse network of independent actors together 
into a common identity and goal (supporting the networking studied in Chapter IV). 
This forges the trust and solidarity that is necessary to improve resource exchange 
(supporting the resource exchange studied in Chapter VI), and to motivate to 
collective action at large. Framing activities therefore indirectly support the 
economic growth of a legitimate pious business elite – which, in itself, has been 
defined as a key goal of Islamic BAs.  
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This chapter compares the resonance of Islamic and secular BAs collective 
action frames with a special focus on their use of ideological variables. The 
resonance of frames critically depends on how coherent, specific and complete the 
three framing tasks (diagnosis, prognosis and motivation to action) are adhered to. 
How well the frame resonates with actors also depends on the fit between the 
ideological contents of the frame and the wider cultural environment. This concerns 
further strategic processes, namely how different groups and their interests have been 
incorporated into the frame, and how well existing beliefs and values have been built 
upon (processes of frame extension, bridging and amplification). Frame 
amplification denotes the ‘clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that 
bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events’ (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469), 
including the fortification of ideology. Frame extension adds issues to a frame that 
were irrelevant previously, in order to be more attractive to targeted groups. Such an 
extension may be achieved through frame bridging, i.e. adding ideologically 
congruent but unconnected frames, or frame transformation, i.e. changing the 
meanings of incongruent frames to make them congruent. More specifically, how 
have the interests and beliefs of political, business and civic actors been incorporated 
into a common Islamic frame vis-à-vis an established secular elite? In the following, 
I first discuss the three framing tasks, and their quality indicators and other 
methodological concerns further. Then, I study these framing processes and quality 
indicators of each framing task, comparing secular and Islamic BAs’ frames.  
The three framing tasks include the definition of a problem and a collective 
identity (diagnostic framing) as well the formulation of goals and tactics (prognostic 
framing), and motivations for action (motivational framing). Actors have to believe 
that goals are worthy and attainable if they are to engage in potentially risky 
collective action. Appeals to principles and ideology can be powerful methods of 
persuasion in environments where political struggles are ideologically based. By 
defining what the problem is, and attributing blame to a target, diagnostic framing 
essentially encompasses the construction of collective identities, differentiating 
between doer and receptor and a string of events connecting the two. By collective 
identity, I mean a common conceptualisation of who ‘we’ are compared to ‘the 
others’, the ‘self-definition of the contending group’ (Tuğal, 2009, p. 425). Several 
studies have shown that collective action framing processes constitute one central 
mechanism facilitating the linkage of collective and personal identities, thereby 
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facilitating collective action (Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994, p. 185; Snow & 
McAdam, 2000). 
I find that Islamic BAs have created a coherent and complete frame, based on 
a non-contentious capitalist Islamic value system that informs all aspects of that 
frame. Most importantly, the frame is extended effectively to combine the interests 
and beliefs of the SMOs involved. Feelings of exclusion based on religious beliefs 
and practices enter and amplify the Islamic frame’s problem identification, collective 
identity, goal, strategies and motivational framing. Such an incorporation of largely 
non-contentious ideology is also highly embedded in cultural narratives and 
threatening political contexts. A capitalist version of Islam and the feeling of 
exclusion in the economic, political and civic realm are topics that are highly 
relevant to and incorporate all business, political and business actors (adhering to 
frame extension, bridging, and transformation). By amplifying such religious 
sentiments and concerns, Islamic BAs have created a frame that resonates well with 
cultural experiences and beliefs of actors (frame amplification) and is embedded in 
them. This provides a source of legitimacy based in religious reliefs and a 
collaborative binding mechanism that facilitates collective action and increases the 
Islamic frame’s resonance. 
In contrast, I find that the secular BA has not defined a common problem and 
only developed a rather diverse collective identity. Its frame remains incomplete and 
fairly incoherent, based predominantly on an elitist discourse of nationalist 
development. In addition, its members and leadership have not successfully argued 
against the Islamic frame’s identification of secular elitism with corruption. Together 
these aspects of its framing activities appear to have hindered the secular BA’s 
ability to reach the ‘hearts and minds’ of the public in the same way as the Islamic 
BAs. Rather secular frames have rather been accommodating and adjusting to 
Islamic frames. In sum, I find that the Islamic frame relying on religion and 
exclusion creates a more resonant frame than the secular Gagiad’s elitism. I argue 
that these differences help to explain why secular frames have lost legitimacy vis-à-
vis Islamic frames.  
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2. Methods 
2.1. Three framing tasks and frame resonance indicators 
The three framing tasks to be studied in this research include 1) ‘diagnostic framing’ 
(problem identification and attribution of blame and causality, including the 
definition of collective identity); 2) ‘prognostic framing’ (definition of goal and 
strategies); and 3) ‘motivational framing’ (rationale for engaging in action, 
articulation of motive). These are based on categories developed by Gamson and 
Lasch (1983), as well as Snow and colleagues (Cress & Snow, 2000; Snow & 
Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 1986). By pursuing these core-framing tasks, movement 
actors foster both agreement and action, or in other words, attend to the core tasks of 
‘consensus’ and ‘action mobilisation’ (Klandermans, 1984). For example, in the 
Vietnam War, the US attributed causality to the military attack by the Soviets against 
a US ally and independent country, while appealing to principles such as the defence 
of the weak and innocent against unprovoked aggression, the honouring of one’s 
word, and commitment to friends as a rationale for intervention (Gamson & Lasch, 
1983).  
I study two sets of factors that determine the resonance of a frame developed 
by Snow and Benford (1988). These factors are summarised in Table 9. The first set 
of factors concerns the completeness, specificity and coherence of the three framing 
tasks. The more the three tasks are attended to (completeness), the more specific, 
richly developed (e.g., use of clear targets) and interconnected they are (coherence), 
the more successful the mobilisation effort. Cress and Snow argue that articulate and 
coherent frames ‘clearly specify what is problematic and in need of amelioration and 
identify the culpable agents or institutions. Articulate prognostic frames specify what 
needs to be done in order to remedy the diagnosed problem’ (2000, p. 1078).  
Coherence in frames concerns how problem identification, remedy suggestion 
and call for action are interconnected. There can be overall agreement on the 
problem (e.g., lack of political representation of Anatolian SMEs), but not what the 
underlying factors are (e.g. political, economic, regional, ideological), potentially 
resulting in different factions proposing different types of action. Coherence also 
concerns whether the proposed solution and strategies (in prognostic framing) flow 
from problem identification/causal attribution in diagnostic framing (e.g. political 
solutions stressed if regarded mainly as a political problem).  
 163 
The second set factors determining the resonance of frames concerns the use 
of ideology. The higher the cultural and religious embedding and relevance of how 
events and issues are framed the higher the frame’s resonance. Another aspect is how 
competing frames are argued against. This set of factors relates to strategic framing 
processes, like frame extension, bridging and amplification: most importantly, how 
have the various interests and beliefs of SMOs been integrated into an Islamic 
frame? How have ideological beliefs been amplified in business interests? Cultural 
beliefs, dominant ideologies and values can constrain the resonance of frames and 
serve as a resource.  
 
Table 9 Two sets of factors studied that affect the resonance of collective action frames 
Factors  Subcategories 
1. Completeness, 
Coherence and 
Specificity of the three 
framing tasks 
 
 
Diagnostic frames: 
- Identification of a problem 
-Attribution of blame to a target, includes construction of 
collective identity, us vs them 
- Attribution of causality 
Prognostic frames: 
- Goal-setting 
- Solution: strategies, tactics 
Motivational frames: 
- Rationale for engaging 
- ‘Call to arms’ 
2. Ideological Factors - Linkage between cultural narratives and the way in which 
events or issues are framed, and their relevance to lives of actors  
- Strategic framing processes: frame amplification (amplify 
existing values, beliefs and interpretations at large), frame 
extension, bridging and transformation (extending frames to 
include target groups and their interests by bridging congruent 
beliefs or transforming incongruent ones) 
- Way in which competing frames are argued against  
 
2.2. Sampling, procedure and quality criteria 
Overall, frame analysis allows putting forward the ‘ideological underpinnings of 
frames’, i.e. the normative political positions and ideologies involved (Gamson & 
Lasch, 1983). Similar to the thematic analysis (of the following chapter), the analysis 
of frames first involves a rough coding, then a more refined second coding. By 
giving provisional labels grounded in the text, the researcher can uncover the 
motivations, interests and perspectives of various interviewees. The analysis then has 
to take into account who speaks in which context, as different idea elements can take 
on different meanings in different contexts (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). 
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Shapes and contents of frames vary according to interviewees’ roles and 
situational contexts. However, it makes sense to aggregate individual frames for 
subgroups within social movements that share general cognitive orientations towards 
events (Johnston, 1995). Due to the difficulty of researching questions of politics and 
religion in the business realm, this research cannot differentiate between frames of 
leaders, activists or movement bystanders, for example. Instead, I will present two 
aggregated frames for the subgroups of Islamic and secular businessmen and BAs, 
which largely rely on leaders’ and leading members’ frames. 
Frame analysis requires sampling of relevant texts. It has to be justified why a 
particular text is taken as representative. The texts have to express coherent views on 
conflictual issues (Johnston, 1995), and comprise ‘packages of integrated idea 
elements held together by some unifying central concept’ (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). 
In this research, text sections mainly come from my interviews with BA leaders and 
members, and partly from BAs’ brochures and homepages (e.g. relating to BAs’ 
official statements on contentious issues where available), as well as published 
interviews with further BA leaders. This analysis relies on different sections of same 
interview material also used for the thematic analysis in the following chapter. 
Information on the selection of interviewees can be found in the literature review’s 
methods section. Beyond such text passages, information on the organisational and 
personal context was consulted. Views on contentious issues and personal contexts 
are best acquired through loosely structured interviews (Johnston, 1995), which this 
research employed.  
The selection of texts and interviewees aimed at capturing the variety of 
views along the secular-Islamic continuum range from Islamic leaders and 
businessmen, to pious businessmen (with few affiliations), conservative political 
entrepreneurs (strong political ties), strategic businessmen (with multiple mixed 
affiliations), and finally secular-left businessmen (see also Methods section, Chapter 
II). Views of actors from different points of view increase the validity of the analysis 
(Cress & Snow, 2000). Other quality criteria concern how richly the analysis 
captures the frames and how deeply it peels away the different layers. Novelty is a 
further quality criterion of frame analysis. I also attempted to be as aware as possible 
of my own preferences and reflexive positions that can colour the analysis by trying 
to remain critical of and balanced towards all positions (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). 
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Religion and politics are very sensitive topics to businessmen that could only 
be discussed with a few businessmen. Two strategies make up for this: first, the 
incorporation of earlier newspaper interviews with BA leaders. Second, other than in 
traditional frame analysis, I did not only ask for interviewees’ opinions on 
contentious issues directly, but also asked indirect questions to capture opinions and 
self-conceptualisations in relation to contentious issues. Questions that elicit recall 
and traditional storytelling, and are best suited to get at representations of events and 
underlying ideologies (Johnston, 1995). The material was coded with NVivo 9 
(NVivo9 Qualitative Data Analysis Software, 2010) – a software package to conduct 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis by facilitating the arrangement and 
classification of information.  
3. Findings: comparing the resonance of Islamic and secular frames 
3.1. Diagnostic frames: problem identification and collective identities 
3.1.1.a Problem identification 
Diagnostic framing encompasses the identification of a collective problem and the 
attribution of blame to a target. The construction of a collective identity is an 
essential part of these tasks and a key criterion for social movements.  
Secular businesspeople, but not the leadership, accuse the current regime of 
profiteering and they complain about feeling excluded when it comes to getting 
economic stimuli or relevant information, because they are less close to the AKP 
(e.g. interviews 33, 34, 36): 
Since the AKP came to power, there have been good and bad developments. On the 
positive side, infrastructure has improved, and municipalities have more resources 
and thus provide more services. But, I haven’t been able to take advantage of any of 
these resources, I tried, but I don’t seem to have the right connections. (interview 34) 
A secular businesswoman also complains in length about how the current 
government increasingly supports financial markets rather than the real economy 
(interview 33), or about problems with customs in exports (e.g. interviews 33, 31). 
These complaints are not strongly or coherently attributed to ideology: no secular 
leader clearly states that they feel excluded because of their vision of secularism; 
ideology is not included in problem identification and in the attribution of causality. 
While there might be individual exceptions to this rule, secular leadership has not 
developed as a public topic of contention, or even of exclusion. Such complaints 
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therefore lack a coherent, specific problem identification and causal attribution to a 
target. 
Compared to Gaziantep’s Gagiad, confident Tüsiad leadership can, at times, 
be more contentious and openly criticise the government. For example, Koç Holding, 
one of Tüsiad’s biggest members, and the current head of Tüsiad Muharrem Yılmaz, 
positively evaluated the recent Gezi protests as pro-democratic (Levent & Cengiz, 
2013). Tüsiad leadership was quoted to have said in the Turkish daily ‘Hürriyet’:  
We have seen that democracy in our country has gone bad. There is a public that 
wants democratic standards to improve. Turkey should not miss the opportunity 
provided by the Gezi protests to translate its new economic weight into democracy. 
(Levent & Cengiz, 2013) 
Yılmaz calls for a new constitution, and Tüsiad representatives are part of a civil 
society consultation platform for the creation of one that will replace the 1982 
version put in place by a military junta. Nevertheless, this type of open criticism is 
usually limited to leadership and has created internal conflicts between the rank-and-
file and leadership in the past (Buğra, 1994). Being a publicly less visible 
association, Gagiad appears not to have the same clout as Tüsiad to voice such 
political criticism. 
Instead, secular leadership partly complained about the exclusion of 
Gaziantep as a city from the state development programme at large. The blame is 
shifted to a regional level with nationalist undertones. However, blame is not 
attributed to a specific target, and no specific explanations are given; it remains a 
complaint. Only one businessman (interview 34) argues that this might be due to the 
fact that Gaziantep voted for a mayor from the secular CHP from 1989–2004 and 
was perhaps punished for that by conservative parties in government, and the AKP 
after 2002. Secular leadership does not publicly include such targets. For example, in 
2004 the then head of Gagiad complains that ‘Gaziantep’s entrepreneurs and 
industrialists were punished’ by their exclusion in the economic stimuli programme, 
although they had been promised to be included (“Gagiad,” n.d.). 
The rule of moderate Islamists has almost become an accepted truth, which 
secular-leaning businesspeople have adapted to by increasingly joining Islamic BAs, 
or which they expect to disappear over time. In a defeatist fashion, some argue such 
patronage has been a feature of business politics throughout Turkish history; those 
closer to government have always been able to profit more: ‘This has been the case 
since Atatürk, always those close to the regime receive news faster and make more 
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money’ (interview 34). So, instead of developing a frame to blame the perceived 
hypocrisy of the moderate Islamists, secular actors regard patronage as a normal way 
of doing business in Turkey and adjust to the party in power. 
A key ‘diagnosis’ of the Islamic frame is the active exclusion of Anatolian 
SMEs by secular elites from negotiating tables and economic resources due to 
ideological reasons and company size. Erol Yarar, the confident co-founder of 
Müsiad describes the association’s history in a contentious way. He used to be very 
prominent in the 1990s and his framing is highly indicative of Müsiad’s goals; his 
contentious way of framing is no longer representative of the Müsiad leadership’s 
framing. He argues that Müsiad became necessary as an organisation because pious 
Anatolian SMEs were not accepted into Tüsiad, which is too elitist and discriminated 
against Islamic businessmen. He uses the terms ‘Black Turk vs. White Turk’. It 
juxtaposes Anatolian or ‘Black Turks’, depicting them as dark-skinned with Arab 
origins, as well as Islamic and backward with ‘White Turks’, depicting the urban 
Republican elite as a group with a fair and Western skin-tone. This statement, while 
not very specific, amplifies a sharp distinction between institutions regarded as 
Kemalist and urban-elitist, and a pious group of rural underdogs. The statement also 
essentially combines Islam with business issues. Müsiad’s organisation is aimed at 
increasing the social mobility and influence of pious Anatolian elites: 
Müsiad gathered the Anatolian SMEs under its roof and opened them to the world. 
We developed a bourgeois class with Anatolian tigers. My father was among the 
founders of Tüsiad, my mother was in the same class as the Ecevits at Robert 
College.66 I graduated from Işık Lisesi, but I saw in my family that we could unite 
religion and worldly affairs. But in society these two sides were strangers to each 
other. So much that when we organized Müsiad’s first congress in a five-star hotel, 
our friends said ‘what business do we have here?!’ They had forgotten that they were 
the foundation, they had accepted their marginalisation, and they felt like they had 
become Turkey’s Blacks. (…) They didn’t expect it [referring to the foundation of 
Müsiad]; they had control mechanisms that are similar to those used in a zoo. In 
Turkey, religion has always been kept under control; the situation resembles a river 
that is held back by a dam and only let free occasionally to get at a desired amount. 
(Şahin, 2009) 
In Gaziantep, less confident and present-day Tuskon leadership frames this exclusion 
in much more neutral terms: 
                                                
 
66 Refers to PM Bülent Ecevit, PM for the centre-left CHP in the 1970s and from 1999 to 
2002 for the secular-left DSP; Robert College is an elite private school in Istanbul, originally 
founded by US-American missionaries. 
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There used to be [the secular BA] Gagiad. But their membership is limited, they 
don’t take that many members, and just joining costs about 4000 dollars! There are, 
however, many businessmen who don’t want to spend that much money, but who are 
still dedicated Antep businessmen. These are the people whom we targeted when 
founding this association. (interview 4) 
 
The exclusion of Anatolian SMEs is a topic that secular or mixed-strategic 
elites often subscribe to, although Islamic frames add religious content to it. It shows 
how secular and strategic elites do not formulate a strong counter-argument, but 
rather build a more accommodating stance. This accommodation is well expressed in 
the following statement that builds upon a common regional bond of solidarity. It 
illustrates how secular BAs have not managed to overcome such regional or 
company size divisions, limiting the popularity of a nation-wide and encompassing 
secular movement. In this statement ‘Sanko’ Holding stresses the exclusion of 
Anatolian SMEs from the elitist BA Tüsiad, but without linking it to religious issues. 
In a newspaper interview (Kadak, 2010), the Konukoğlu family is described as ‘real 
Anatolian’ who is still loyal to Antep despite global joint ventures. In response to the 
question why he has not become a Tüsiad member, the owner says:  
‘I won’t ever join things like that. In the past they didn’t use to take our region, then 
they offered, but I didn’t join. Their goal changed, they wanted to give the 
impression of welcoming the southeast, of wanting to be all together. We didn’t give 
them the chance to do so.’ The industrialist agrees to the following statement by PM 
Erdoğan’s recited by the journalist: ‘Istanbul capital excludes Anatolian capital. But 
there are big names in Anatolia: In Antep, there’s the Konukoğlus, in Kayseri there’s 
the Boydaks and in Manisa, there’s the Zorlus.’ A. Konukoğlu answers: ‘Yes, this 
used to be the case, but now Anatolian businessmen don’t want to join. In the past, 
Tüsiad appeared to be appropriate for Istanbul capital only. (…) Anatolian 
businessmen didn’t use to become members because they were small- and medium-
sized. (…) Now they keep inviting us, but we don’t want to join anymore.’ 
Nevertheless, he admits that he does business with the then Tüsiad head, Ümit 
Boyner and other Tüsiad member companies: ‘Of course, we do business; we’ve 
been acquainted for a long time. But membership is not a matter of persuasion; it’s a 
matter of principle. And I won’t change my principles.’ (Kadak, 2010) 
 
Another issue stressed by the Islamic frame, especially by the Gülen 
community’s followers, is education – the ban of headscarves in public schooling 
(and administration in general), and the perceived discrimination through a secular 
system. This framing by Islamic BAs, especially of Tuskon, is clearly strategic in 
that it incorporates the civil society organisations’ interests. The majority of problem 
formulations remain non-contentious. Education is a key debate on secularism in 
Turkey, although moderately Islamic frames depoliticise it in their public speech. In 
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a newspaper article given to me by the Tuskon-affiliate Hürsiad (that is also 
published on their homepage), an economist from Gaziantep’s Zirve University 
explains: 
A further important factor [in the rise of Anatolian capital] was education, Dede 
added. While the old secular business elite used to send its children to excellent 
universities, often abroad, religious Anatolians had long been hesitant because they 
feared negative influences on their children. (Finke, 2011) 
Islamic owner–managers who are involved in the Gülen community state that:  
The path of education is very important, and Turkey’s educational sector is broken. 
Now we provide scholarships, open study centres and cram schools [‘dershane’]. 
These activities don’t go against the state, the state can take them, our ‘hoca’ 
[referring to the cleric Fethullah Gülen] even wants this because education is 
actually a state responsibility. (interview 22) 
Creating an alternative, yet state-supported education system is regarded as an 
important step towards improving the influence of pious actors (a strategy which will 
be further explored in prognostic framing): 
But the establishment of schools and universities in Turkey, which combined a good 
education with a conservative religious framework, overcame these reservations and 
hence helped create a reservoir of well-trained conservative Anatolian managers, 
engineers and politicians. (Finke, 2011) 
Who exactly is being blamed for this exclusion? Again, the targeting is not very 
specific, but ideology-based. Mature industrial elites nurtured during the ISI period 
are regarded as corrupt and feeding on state resources, and the political elites 
supporting them as undemocratic, or even fascist Kemalists supporting economic 
statism. This depiction of secular elites is further discussed in the following section 
on collective identities. For now, it suffices to say that the Islamic frame mainly 
blames parties of the political left as well as coalition governments of the 1990s in 
general, which are blamed for decisions leading to political and macro-economic 
instabilities. The military is not specifically mentioned. A strategic businessman who 
currently joined a Tuskon-affiliate (interview 29) stresses that the economy hasn’t 
ever been as stable as it is now in Turkey, equating AKP governance with economic 
growth. Similarly, a pious businessman argues: 
Past governments caused a lot of damage. There was Menderes for a while; during 
Atatürk’s time there were also many despotic issues [referring to Adnan Menderes, 
who was the first publicly elected PM from 1950-1960, and leader of the centre-right 
Democratic Party]. The transition to democracy isn’t easy; you should hang on to a 
good man if you’ve come across one [referring to PM Erdoğan]. The CHP isn’t like 
that, and the 1990s have been completely lost in Turkey, but currently there are big 
gains, we can see the material gains in our immediate environment. You know those 
10 years in the 1990s went completely for nothing; in 2002, Turkey went completely 
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bankrupt again; all that corruption. (…) People vote for the AKP because they can 
see that and because the economy is going so well. When the government changes, 
this system will change as well. (…) We are businessmen, we look at profit-and-loss, 
and choose the option that generates less loss, there’s simply nothing else available 
on the market. And the other option; well, they [referring to the CHP] would cause 
too much harm to our homeland. (interview 21) 
Not just the CHP, also the conservative DYP (True Path Party) and other parties 
involved in various coalition governments in the volatile 1990s are held responsible 
for the economic troubles of the 1990s. This rule excludes Turgut Özal’s67 leadership 
in the ANAP throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Turgut Özal has been hailed for 
beginning the Islamic capitalist restructuring of Turkey and is regarded as a model 
leader by AKP elites. 
Erol Yarar directs his blame directly at the Western capitalist system, to 
which Müsiad then claimed to offer an alternative Islamic modernity. This quote 
underscores the amplification of Islam in the frame. 
The capitalist system is a model that adversely affects the world economy and 
people. It needs to change. In our culture and religion are dynamics that can change 
it. Müsiad was founded with the belief that such an idea can only grow through 
institutional structures (…). (Şahin, 2009) 
Since the ‘soft’ military intervention of 1997, the moderately Islamic movement 
rarely applies such direct Islamic references publicly. This Islamic alternative and its 
strategies are explained in more detail in one of Müsiad’s key publications, ‘homo 
Islamicus’ (Müsiad, 1994), which will analysed in the section on prognostic framing. 
3.1.1.b Collective identity  
The combination of Islam and capitalism is obvious and amplified in Islamic frames’ 
collective identities. They describe themselves as a new breed of Islamic capitalists: 
democratic, hard-working and ‘truly’ capitalist, yet pious and discriminated against. 
This self-depiction combines ideas of democracy, capitalist production, Islam and 
modernity and extends to civic, business and political elites. The comparative use of 
ideology in collective identities is discussed in more detail in the following section. 
Beyond businesspeople, the collaborating politicians of today’s AKP are all 
regarded as pious, hard-working, modern, democratic and economic liberalisers 
                                                
 
67 The Motherland Party’s (ANAP) Turgut Özal, was Prime Minister from 1983-89, and 
President from 1989 to 1993. Özal is also widely regarded as the PM to allow greater 
freedom to Islamic movements, orchestrating, for example, the entry of Islamic banks into 
Turkey (Buğra, 1998), promoting the Gülen community (Agai, 2004) and Anatolian 
industrialists (Turam, 2007).   
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supporting free markets in the face of suppression. AKP elites and Anatolian 
businessmen like to depict themselves as hard-working vis-à-vis a lazy secular elite 
that only grew through state support (interviews 2, 7, and 8). Political elites of the 
AKP and business elites of Müsiad are constructed as ‘true democrats’ that have 
been systematically discriminated against. For example, the then head of Müsiad 
accuses state elites in a newspaper interview of banning Islamic political parties in 
the past, and for trying to ban the AKP in 2008. This topic has not been addressed by 
secular business elites, and illustrates the efficiency of Islamic frame’s counter-
framing where secular frames remain silent and thus lose credibility:   
No political parties have been banned in Europe during the same period. It is the 
case not only in the West but also in the East. For instance, neither in Pakistan nor 
even in Thailand, no political parties have been banned in spite of the long-term 
political chaos. We believe that political parties should not be banned in democratic 
republics if they are not involved in violence or terror. Especially, we consider it as 
an unfortunate issue that the ruling party, which won 47 percent of the votes is 
targeted to be banned just after 85 percent of the will of the public was reflected in 
Parliament, and just seven and a half months after the general election. When we 
look at the accusations on which the case against the ruling party is based, we see 
that most of them consist of newspaper clippings and are extremely controversial. 
Those events have hurt the conscience of most people in our country regardless of 
which party they support. It is not possible for the ones who have common sense to 
be pleased with this, except for those ones who defy democracy. (Öylek, 2008) 
 
AKP elites are also perceived as providing economic and political stability, 
invigorating the Turkish market economy; businessmen in Islamic leadership 
positions give a positive evaluation of the AKP because ‘they have invigorated the 
economy, provided a stable environment which is good for investment’ (interview 
4). ‘What we’re pleased the most is that the AKP takes the constitutional reform 
seriously, and secondly their economic reforms’ (interview 1). Secular critics 
(interview 36) argue that to keep their business voters, the AKP constantly stresses 
the political and macro-economic stability they have generated after the lost decade 
of the 1990s. A pious businessman explains why he votes for the AKP: 
Right now I vote for the AKP, not because of their Islamic views, but because they 
are hard working. The CHP isn’t like that (…). They [referring to AKP] have 
brought democracy to a certain stage. The others are much worse. This way 
democracy gets stronger; we get stronger. If there were an alternative, I would give 
them my vote, too, but they’d have to be hard working. (interview 21) 
 
The negative identity of ‘the other’ is fortified in the Islamic frame with a 
strong differentiation. Anatolian capital and Islamic leadership depict themselves as 
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the true capitalists and secular big business as state-dependent. The ‘other’ is harshly 
defined and differentiated as Western Republican elites, as corrupt and somewhat 
fake industrialists feeding on state resources, and as undemocratic or even fascist. 
This is coherent with the problem identification where the same supposedly elitist 
Kemalist group is regarded as the culprit. The new entrepreneurs from Anatolia are 
juxtaposed against the ‘old secular Turkish business elites’ whose ‘conglomerates 
concentrated on established markets in the West’ (Finke, 2011). 
We are different from Tüsiad because we don’t exploit the state. (…) Müsiad has 
more members; Tüsiad has more money. They have 40 years worth of capital, but 
the difference has become much smaller. Tüsiad is the past; Müsiad is the future. 
(Şahin, 2009) 
The then Müsiad head argues that ‘Anatolian capital represents the entrepreneurial 
spirit of Turkey, motor power and the picture of a developing Turkey’ (Öylek, 2008). 
An Islamic BA leader explains how Müsiad promotes ‘real’ exports, comparing that 
to the practice of ‘fake exports’ where exports are only documented to get access to 
the state’s export promotion stimuli programmes in the 1980s: 
That’s what the imposter producers of the 1990s used to do, everybody was afraid of 
exporters back then, but now since the 2000s, since the paradigm has changed, this 
fake production is over, export is now gaining in prestige. Many industrialists who 
exported between 1990 and 2000 are imposters. (interview 9) 
 
The co-founder of Müsiad tries to establish Anatolian capital as the ‘true 
bourgeoisie’, constructing Müsiad’s heritage from the Ottoman Empire: 
The interviewee asks: ‘In Turkey, capital developed through the state. Anatolian 
capital, on the other hand, developed naturally like in the West. Can we therefore, at 
least conceptually say that this is new capital is Turkey’s true bourgeoisie?’ To this 
Erol Yarar answers: ‘Definitely. Because these are the children of the families who 
gave their lives on the battle fronts. When the Janissary was abolished [note: elite 
infantry units of Ottoman sultans, mostly non-Muslim, abolished in early C19], 
soldiers increasingly came from the Turkish people, and trade domination was taken 
over by the non-Muslim communities. The 19th century was a century of wars, the 
Ottomans went to war for about 35 years; this was followed by the Balkan and 
World Wars, and our dynasty ended in Çanakkale. There was nobody left to do 
trade. Orphans were first forced to become farmers, the in the 50, when population 
increased, they became workers. In the 1980s Özal introduced a bit to trade, and in 
the 1990s Müsiad opened them up to the world.’ (Şahin, 2009) 
 
Vis-à-vis elitist big business centred in Istanbul and Ankara, Islamic 
businessmen stress their nature as excluded SMEs from rural Anatolia (although they 
also have larger businesses and many companies in Istanbul and Ankara). All Islamic 
BAs stress their regional (Anatolian) and business size (SMEs) differentiation. They 
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do not just represent big business like secular BAs, but also SME interests, and focus 
on morality in comparison to their secular counterparts:  
Müsiad looks for moral quality. Financial size isn’t important for us. We have many 
small business members. But we also have very large ones, who employ up to 
20,000 people, and those who employ 20 or 2 people. But we don’t take ‘esnaf’. 
(interview 8) 
Another Islamic BA leader says that ‘We take all the SMEs and industrialists 
emerging in Anatolia as members’ (interview 9), and in 2008, the then head of 
Müsiad stated in a newspaper interview that ‘two-thirds of our members are located 
in Anatolia and we are frequently in touch with the business enterprises in those 
regions.’ (Öylek, 2008) 
Just as noted above in problem identification, in collective identities there is 
also an internal differentiation between Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates or rather the 
Gülen community. While some Müsiad members more openly stress their Islamic 
goals and identities, Gülen community members like to appear more modest by 
stressing their non-contentious nature and belief in equality for all religions, as 
reflected in their education efforts. The two groups do not publicly speak out against 
each other, instead focusing on their common ‘enemies’ and goals rather than their 
internal differentiation. This achieves frame extension – the inclusion of Gülen 
community followers.  
Müsiad’s co-founder Erol Yarar’s newspaper quote on how he wants to create 
an Islamic bourgeoisie to rival the secular elite has become famous in Turkey; it is 
certainly more contentious Gülen members’ discourse, which instead stresses their 
modesty and classless nature. Tuskon and Müsiad cultivate friendly relations because 
they shared the goal of displacing secular elites, however they are still separate 
organs, which increasingly have become more diverse as they have managed to gain 
a larger section of the pie. Erol Yarar depicts Anatolian capital as the true 
bourgeoisie, the Muslim upper class, vis-à-vis the Republican bourgeoisie. This is 
part of the movement’s aspiration to define a capitalist version that moves away from 
introspection and mysticism towards entrepreneurship, rationalism and the written 
word [as popularised by the Nur movement, from which the Gülen community is an 
offshoot]. In one example, he states:  
(…) I don’t belief in the philosophy of one mouthful and one coat [‘hırka’; referring 
to modesty in Islamic principles]. That’s a pill we were forced to swallow! God likes 
to see the blessings he sends on us mortals. Ottoman sultans don’t dress like 
Karacaoğlan [folk poet]. If the benchmark is to wear the minimum how do we 
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explain how Imam Azam [Islamic scholar] got dressed? His house was the most 
beautiful among all in Baghdad. If you give alms [‘zekat’], then nobody in Islam has 
the right to ask you why you do this or that. God’s Messenger does not allow you to 
give away all your belongings. People seem to think that as soon as they get rich 
they have to live like the poor. This is not the case. (Şahin, 2009) 
Some pious businessmen regard this class focus with suspicion, and Müsiad 
members or the clubs like the new Islamic Equestrian club in Antep, as a different 
category of upper class Muslims (interview 21). In spite of this internal 
differentiation, these SMOs have defined a common target or enemy, which 
facilitates their cooperation.  
A key difference is that secular BA elites more confidently depict themselves 
as business elites, whereas some Müsiad leadership aims to achieve a bourgeois 
status and Tuskon shies away from class-related terms altogether. The secular BAs 
self-depiction does indeed stress its elitist and nationalist character. A secular 
businessmen in leadership positions says:  
We, our members represent 80–85% of Gaziantep’s economy. (…) Gagiad was 
founded in 1993 by 44 businessmen. It consists of top-level firms and managers. 
That means our members come from certain firms, from the top levels, that is from 
the company boards. (…) Our working principles and membership portfolios are 
different from Müsiad and Tuskon. Of course we also have common members, but 
we were the first organisation. (interview 6) 
The second and third generations from most of Antep’s leading business families 
continue to be members in Gagiad. (interview 31) 
 
As with the rest of diagnostic framing, identities also aim more at integration 
rather than opposition to Islamic BAs. Leadership only stresses those aspects 
publicly that are shared with Islamic identities. Both parties’ leadership depict 
Anatolian industrialists as generally neglected by state development as argued above. 
Most secular business leaders in Gaziantep, like their Islamic counterparts, stress 
their growth through capitalist means independent of the state (e.g. interviews 6 and 
31). While some (e.g. interviews 34 and 36) businessmen are more self-critical and 
see a general pattern of political corruption in Turkish business, most do not talk 
about this subject. This means avoiding the criticism directed at secular elites’ rent-
seeking coalitions with political elites in the 1970s or 1990s. For example, several 
secular businessmen in Gaziantep seem to have profited from closer relations to PM 
Demirel’s administration in the 1970s. In addition, present-day patronage networks 
of Islamic and strategic businesspeople are not criticised by the secular coalition, as 
they largely aim to enter, rather than criticise such exchanges. The lack of a counter-
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argument by secular leaders weakens the secular frame. This accommodation shows 
that the secular BA’s collective identity is generally less coherent and more diverse 
than that of the Islamic BAs.  
Gagiad and Tüsiad’s membership is quite diverse, as it is based on elitism 
rather than a clearly amplified ideology. The ‘other’ is less strongly differentiated by 
secular leaders, their negative identity less amplified. Gagiad includes many Islamic 
businessmen, which makes the association’s identity diverse. For example, the 
2012/13 head of Gagiad states on the homepage that he is ‘looking forward to greater 
regular information exchange with Hürsiad, the Islamic Tuskon-affiliate, following a 
meeting of their leadership: 
Both Hürsiad and Gagiad were founded a long time ago. They have important 
members and therefore common values, and by sharing our views we can support 
Gaziantep’s development. (“Gagiad,” n.d.) 
This integration is illustrated in the following statement: 
If it were 10 years ago, back then it was hard for firms from the religious 
community, but in the present environment, even if you don’t have any relations 
with them, you’d like to appear as being involved with them. (…) The owners of this 
business group have relations with the religious community. They are involved with 
them, but their views aren’t really like that, they have adapted to a reality. (interview 
28) 
This yet again shows the diversity of the secular coalition. And because of this 
overlap and diversity that has increased since the AKP’s domination, Gagiad 
leadership does not publicly disparage Islamic leadership. As the network analysis 
shows, this diversification within Gagiad and the GSO increased at the turn at the 
millennium and, in the last decade, it has become harder to differentiate between 
secular and Islamic associations altogether.  
Secular businessmen, not leaders, do strongly define themselves against the 
‘others’, but also do not clearly define a collective identity. Reference to nationalism, 
development and secularism can be found but are not strongly amplified compared to 
the use of Islam in Islamic identities – a point further analysed in the next section. 
Just like the secular-Republican elite by Islamic BA, the new Islamic businesses are 
regarded as being fed by the corruption of state resources by some secular 
businessmen (interview 36). Some secular businessmen accuse the AKP, Müsiad and 
Gülen community of trying to establish an Islamic state and thus reversing Atatürk’s 
Westernisation project (interview 33). Islamic businesspeople are thought to display 
a fake and purely strategic piousness to attract naïve and poor followers, which is in 
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stark contrast to their own claims of being pure and honest. Secular businessmen 
attribute the popularity of the AKP and the Gülen cemaat as an outcome of low 
education and development levels that leaves people vulnerable to ‘think with their 
stomachs, not their heads’ (interview 34). The moderate Islamic movement is 
depicted as a group that actively tries to exploit the naïve and poor: 
You know what this is? In non-developed societies they keep people together by 
deceiving people and promising them they will enter paradise in the afterlife if they 
cooperate and contribute. Am I making this clear? (interview 25) 
‘Dinci’ is a person who mainly cares about how people in his environment evaluate 
him, who is a bit fake; ‘dindar’ is a person who truly and fully believes in God. A 
dindar or true believer will not turn his religion into a public display; as it says in the 
Koran, if you pray, do so in secret. Dinci are those people who put this display first. 
You only realise this difference gradually as you get to know people. For example, a 
person who will dutifully do his prayers but then give you a cheque that bounces is a 
dinci. (interview 34) 
This contention of some secular businesspeople, however, is not translated into a 
collective secular frame by leadership. There appears to be a more specific and 
coherent depiction of ‘them’ than there is of ‘us’ in the secular coalition. 
3.2.  Prognostic frames and goal definition  
Defining a goal and strategies is the task of prognostic framing. How Islam is 
amplified in the justification and motivation for these goals, compared to the role of 
Kemalism in secular frames, is further discussed in the next section.  
Secular BAs regard collective representation of their members’ interests as an 
important goal of the organisation, but the goal is mainly to exert pressure in favour 
of the elite’s public policy interests and to provide a platform for socialisation and 
civic activities. One of the secular Gagiad’s founders says:  
Gagiad’s mission and the reason for its foundation is to be able to be together, to act 
in unison and provide collective representation of its members vis-à-vis the state. 
(…) This way we are more powerful. It means we can have our voice heard. It’s 
impossible for one person to have their voice heard (…) Gagiad, since its foundation 
has brought together the city’s elite. Those elites, the families that burden themselves 
with industrial production, that make up the city’s industry, form one big family. 
Therefore we can have a stronger voice and express ourselves better towards the 
state. (…) If you go as Gagiad, we believed that this community of families would 
be treated with greater care. (interview 34) 
The biggest goals of secular business leaders are improved representation vis-à-vis 
the state and contributing to Gaziantep’s development through corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) projects. These promote business within Gaziantep, while also 
providing an integration of big business into civil society and much-needed 
legitimacy. Gagiad leaders also like to stress their non-political nature (e.g. interview 
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31), and their contributions to national and regional development. Formulating such 
goals, which are in the interest of the wider public, is important for BAs’ public 
legitimacy if they want to achieve political influence. Ideology, however, remains 
less amplified in secular than in Islamic frames. Gagiad achieves its goals by 
organising multiple activities for socialisation and civic projects (cf. in Chapter VI): 
Yes, of course, members join Gagiad and come together because they want to gain 
some kind of advantage. Our goal is that Gagiad’s young entrepreneurs get to know 
each other and maybe enter business with each other and together, to become more 
social and cultural beings. Of course, trade brings profit. And those social and 
developmental activities bring people together. And why shouldn’t people enter for 
these advantages? Not everything in the world is due to economic profit. (interview 
34)  
Secular business elites, however, do not formulate contentious or challenging goals 
vis-à-vis Islamic elites. Again, such a lack of argument against competing frames 
weakens the frames’ resonance among secular businessmen and further potential 
followers. 
The collective organisation of Islamic BAs has an additional goal compared 
to the secular BA: The fact that this organisation intends to create an alternative 
Islamic economic elite to compete with secular elites is most clearly voiced by Erol 
Yarar in the news:  
Müsiad opened Anatolian SMEs to the world by organising them. With Anatolian 
tigers we have achieved to create a healthy and beautiful bourgeoisie. (…) In the 
1990s Anatolian businessmen mainly hadn’t been abroad and regarded themselves as 
enemies of Europe, America and Russia. They believed in the philosophy of ‘one 
mouthful and one coat’ [referring to modesty]. They gave away their belongings 
with their blessing and asked for little, as long as their son would take over the 
business, and didn’t encourage their daughters to study – those views are wrong. 
And to change them, I started to organize certain events. (…) This was a nationalist 
religious mission. Turkey’s economy has too much potential as to leave it over to 3 
or 5 families and we had to create a level playing field, to bring them down. This 
country had to make peace with its culture. (Şahin, 2009) 
The following comparison of Müsiad to elitist clubs reveals this BA leader’s 
bourgeois ambitions, which it aims to combine with its Islamic credentials:  
We became a club. When you say that you’re a MÜSIAD member, people will stop 
and go ‘wow’. Just like Rotary and Lion’s Clubs are businessmen’s clubs. All of 
them have a certain level of members, Rotary is a bit above the Lions, it’s harder to 
get in there. Likewise it’s become a privilege to be a MÜSIAD member. (interview 
8) 
The goal to organise Anatolian SME’s as competition to secular elites is a direct 
consequence of Islamic businessmen’s diagnostic frame identifying their exclusion 
as a key problem. In the face of such exclusion Tuskon and Müsiad leaders decided 
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to create their own organisations to represent their Anatolian members, a strategy 
that coherently follows from their problem identification. Islamic BAs thus aimed to 
organise Anatolian SMEs who, in general, could not or did not want to join elitist 
secular BAs like Gagiad in Gaziantep, or Tüsiad in Turkey both of which they 
regarded as elitist and exclusionary. Islamic BAs also regard collective 
representation as key to voicing their interest to the state, creating a new economic 
elite and gaining access to political elites (various interviews). 
As shown in the quote by Erol Yarar above, the organisation of Anatolian 
SMEs has contentious goals – displacing a secular elite and creating a new elite that 
is nationalist and Islamic through trade activities, which are to be supported by a 
redefined form of Islam that does not believe in modesty, but supports money-
making. Most other members of Islamic leadership, less contentiously, depict 
trade/export support and political representation for Anatolian SMEs as their key 
goal, which is more similar to Gagiad’s non-political self-representation. These 
strategies closely conform to the strong economic activities and efforts put into 
political representation by Islamic BAs, as analysed in Chapter VI. This fit and 
coherence between the largely non-contentious framing and activities increases the 
resonance of the Islamic frame. As a Müsiad leader puts it: 
Tuskon represents more members who are part of the religious community, they 
focus more on foreign trade, international trips, whereas Müsiad has a focus on 
research and with publications we want to be a pressure groups, we want to exert 
pressure. (interview 9) 
Tuskon leadership, in an even more technical and non-contentious way, stresses it is 
the promotion of exports as one of its key missions:  
The advancement of the Anatolian people, their introduction and opening to the 
world and its markets, their coming out of their shells – these are the reasons for our 
hard work and investment. (…) Our key differentiating factor from Gagiad and 
Müsiad are our international representation and the counselling/guidance that comes 
with it. (interview 1) 
 
To achieve the goal of creating a new economic elite, Tuskon focuses more 
strongly on exports than Müsiad. Müsiad leaders publicly detail a wide range of 
activities to increase inter-firm trade, business education and competitiveness for 
SMEs; they do so, for example, by organising trade fairs, improving the provision of 
information to and education of family business owners, and promoting their 
cooperation (e.g. Öylek, 2008). Such tactics are analysed in detail in Chapter VI. 
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Beyond such strategies in the Islamic movement, there is the additional goal 
of creating new markets in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, which is regarded as 
contentious by some. This is mainly driven forward by Tuskon, and supported by the 
AKP government’s new ‘zero-problems’ foreign policy. For businessmen this is a 
more economic and strategic interest. AKP and other elites incorporate this aspect 
into their ideological system by presenting greater integration with the Middle East 
and Muslim countries as a kind of neo-Ottoman and Islamic unification.  
Beyond such economic tactics and goals, the educational realm is also 
stressed, integrating and extending Islamic frames to include Gülen community 
actors. These strategies are still coherent with the publicly identified problems 
because they encompass a broader range of economic, political, educational and 
ideological topics. As argued above, fixing the education system has been defined as 
another key issue in the Islamic movement, and supporting activities have mainly 
been carried out by the Gülen community. As an academic from Zirve University, 
the community’s recently opened university in Gaziantep, notes: 
The establishment of schools and universities in Turkey, which combined a good 
education with a conservative religious framework, overcame these reservations and 
hence helped create a reservoir of well-trained conservative Anatolian managers, 
engineers and politicians. (Finke, 2011) 
An important tool to improve the chances of Anatolian capital in the future, is the 
establishment of schools for the pious, i.e. imam hatip schools, which is reflected in 
the Gülen community’s focus on cram schools (‘dershane’), dormitories, and 
schools. Dershanes are ‘special evening and weekend schools that prepare students 
for college entrance exams. These schools constitute one of the Gülen community’s 
major sources of influence and recruitment’ (Tuğal, 2013). Increasing human capital 
levels and improving the level of the education system is not only a key goal for 
Islamic BAs (interview 9), but also one for the secular Gagiad (interview 6); 
however, the reasoning differs between the movements. Their motives for doing so, 
which reflect different value systems are further discussed below. 
3.3. Comparison of use of ideology in diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational framing 
The following discussion of how ideology enters Islamic and secular frames is 
relevant for all three framing tasks. These values are the major ‘motives’ given by 
the BAs as ‘calls to arms’, as motivations to engage in collective action. 
Motivational framing remains at that ideological level, complementing the tactics 
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defined in prognostic frames that are applied as repertoires of contention. As the 
focus is on non-contentious tactics, their definition and grounding in ideology do 
serve as motivational framing. There are no calls to boycott or protest against 
supposed Kemalist domination, but rather calls to contribute to an alternative Islamic 
system. Islam and capitalism are combined and redefined in Islamic frame’s 
collective identities as well as their goals and strategies. Appeals to Islamic 
principles also serve as a major motivator for action by justifying tactics as worthy. 
The discussion therefore also relates to motivational framing. 
Islam enters the explanation of why hard work and entrepreneurship are 
important qualities. Islamic leaders construct hard work as an Islamic necessity, 
secular businesspeople refer more frequently to Atatürk quotes like the student oath: 
‘I am Turkish, honest and hardworking’ [‘Türküm, doğruyum, çalışkanım’] 
(interview 33). The strategic, yet secular-leaning Merinos group, for example, lists 
several values on its homepage, among which is also ‘hard work’. The Islamic 
Müsiad’s leader stresses the role of Islam in the BA: 
Müsiad is an ideological association. Am I making myself clear? Müsiad is an 
ideological association; it has a clear ideology. It’s not an association that was just 
founded to make money. We have a mission and a vision, but no borders or 
affiliations. That’s why our organisation is the largest. Our key strategy is promote 
an Islamic identity and to translate that into business life. We don’t take members 
who are not Muslims. Secondly, they have to have key Islamic principles like 
honesty, fairness and integrity and should have proven that in the market economy. 
This principle is expressed in our motto: High morality, high technology. Our key 
characteristic is that we are conservative (‘muhafazakar’), the English term 
conservative is something a bit different, but we could call it high morality, and we 
need to internalise moral values to produce high technology. Müsiad members are 
those who have adopted this philosophy and this is our collective value. (interview 
8) 
 
In the association’s68 1994 publication ‘homo Islamicus’ (Müsiad, 1994), this 
vision of a supposedly Islamic free market economy is further specified. This 
publication illustrates the amplification of Islam in BA activity; by transforming the 
meaning of capitalist production and giving it a religious meaning, the frame changes 
the meanings of capitalist production by giving it additional holy qualities beyond 
economic interests. While this vision in the early 1990s was more in line with the 
                                                
 
68 The report was edited by Islamic academic Hüner Şencan (each chapter has a separate 
author), under the leadership of Müsiad’s Research Committee; Erol Yarar wrote the 
foreword. 
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then political Islamist movement’s anti-Western rhetoric, it already defined free-
market, if not secular, mechanisms as tactics for collective action. Such tactics are 
non-contentious insofar as they are based in the market-sphere rather than directly 
attacking state structures. They have important consequences for the economic and 
political power of Islamic BAs and businessmen. 
The publication ‘homo economicus’ is split into different parts, the first of 
which focuses on the ‘Muslim psychology’, and the second on Islamic business 
practices. It identifies as the culprit the rational profit maximising and secular ‘homo 
economicus’ that is at odds with the value judgements and human beings of the 
Muslim world. The ‘Western’ view is equated with positivism, a ‘Western secular 
understanding of science and knowledge that is cut off from values and religion’ 
(Müsiad, 1994). It states that instead of ‘universal laws’ there is a need to develop 
‘laws with divine origins’ rooted in Islam for Muslim countries and companies. It 
provides a justification for Islamic capitalism as rooted in the Koran, and based on 
cooperation and morality rather than competition and rationality. An Islamic 
businessman operates within a free-market economy, but does not just work for 
profit, but for the good of the community and according to moral values. The homo 
Islamicus claims to go beyond ‘attaching small Islamic motives to (…) a Western 
system’.  
Alternative business and organisational mechanisms are developed and the 
East Asian model is hailed as a superior model. Each chapter focuses on a different 
area: for example, there is a chapter on employee relations, which argues for 
cooperative, paternalist and informal relations with employees, and is anti-unionist at 
large. Instead, where necessary, Müsiad promotes the yellow, Islamic union Hak-Iş. 
Philanthropy and patriarchal labour relations are favoured over traditional tax, 
welfare and industrial relations systems.  
Another chapter aims to provide a new definition of efficiency by redefining 
the idea of profit-maximisation and providing a complicated mathematical model to 
calculate an alternative, supposedly Islamic type of equilibrium. It is also argued that 
instead of focusing on self-interested profit-maximisations, Muslims need to 
maximise ‘felâh’– salvation and happiness in the present and afterlife. Therefore 
paying alms, for example, should not be regarded as interrupting economic 
efficiency but as an investment into their afterlife in paradise. Zekat should be 
gathered annually and requires special management.  
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The publication also stresses that ‘Allah permitted trade, but forbade interest 
(‘riba’)’, promoting Islamic banking and interest-free forms of investment and 
capitalisation (Müsiad, 1994, p. 168). A prominent example this is ‘green capital’ 
(‘yeşil sermaye’) – a form of capitalisation based on the direct investment of small 
savings. Such a model initially relied predominantly on the remittances of Turkish 
guest workers across Europe (Özcan & Çokgezen, 2003). These multi-ownership 
companies were mainly formed in the 1990s and based in Konya, but largely 
collapsed during the economic crisis of 2000. Müsiad and political Islamic parties, 
(and major Arab Islamic institutions), were the key champions of green capital ‘by 
providing their networks, political protection and business information’ (Özcan & 
Çokgezen, 2003, p. 2073). Green capital ‘followed the Islamic finance principle of 
profit-and-loss sharing or partnership finance through selling issued bonds of 
companies and investors to individuals, families and businesses’ (Özcan & 
Çokgezen, 2003, p. 2070). These principle also apply to Islamic banking (Hoşgör, 
2011; Kuran, 2011). It appears this type of ‘green capital’ is rare in Gaziantep, but a 
pious interviewee remembers two multi-ownership Islamic companies that collected 
remittances from abroad, but then collapsed (interview 21).  
The principle of profit-and-loss sharing in business is constructed as Islamic 
as compared to interest-based investment strategies and ownership structures. 
However, these are essentially integrated into a global free-market system and are in 
line with neo-liberal policies by favouring reductions of the welfare state and state 
involvement in general. While the state provides the necessary infrastructure for a 
free-market economy, moral businessmen provide ‘zekat’ or alms to care for the 
poor. Welfare states are unnecessary in this vision as families, philanthropic 
businessmen and religious communities provide social care and cooperation. What 
this vision of homo Islamic does is to transform the meaning of capitalism to be 
more in line with Islam – the process of frame transformation. This vision can 
therefore mainly be regarded as complementing Islamic BAs’ economic activities 
(analysed in Chapter VI) by bridging Islam and business practices. 
As the following discussion will show, Islam is not just consistently amplified 
throughout the frame, and combined with capitalist production, but also extended to 
the private and civic realms. The focus on education in civil society engagement 
incorporates the interests of the Gülen community – an extension coherently carried 
through all framing tasks. Hard work, entrepreneurship and practices of the ‘homo 
 183 
Islamicus’ are constructed as callings by the Prophet, but so are civic engagement 
(beyond zekat) and a pious, modest lifestyle. This kind of incorporation of Islam into 
the frame has important consequences. First, creating strong trust and solidarity 
within the Islamic movement, which motivates collective action and supports 
resource exchange. Second, it has important political effects, facilitating indirect 
institutional change by establishing Islamic tactics in the non-contentious civic, 
private and business realms. These processes further become obvious is the below 
discussion comparing secular and Islamic BAs’ membership selection processes, 
including their understandings of morality, and their motives for educational/CSR 
engagement.  
The membership selection process of all of Gaziantep’s BAs requires two 
references by current members, and further checks into the creditworthiness and 
business activities in general, as well as into the private and social lives of potential 
members. In Islamic BAs, additional checks are made into their ideological 
orientation: for example, Gapgiad’s membership form (“Gapgiad Üye Başvuru 
Formu [membership application form],” n.d., “Hürsiad üye müracaat formu 
[membership application form],” n.d.) includes questions on political orientations, 
and which charities and religious leaders are being followed. As business people’s 
families are expected to socialise, the private lives of businesspeople are also 
investigated. In Islamic BAs, these checks include investigations into their pious 
private behaviours (various interviews). Islamic and secular BAs and members alike 
describe themselves as ‘conservative’, and as seeking morality (‘ahlak’) in their 
members. While Islamic BAs explain conservatism and morality with the help of the 
Koran and expect to see a range of behaviours, the secular BA sticks to conservative 
values in business and family life, and restrict their religiosity to the private realm. In 
Islamic membership selection, what matters most and thus is a key part of their 
collective identity is to evaluate ‘ahlak’ or morality, as BA leaders explain (interview 
1 and 4).  
Internally, common membership can forge trust and solidarity among 
businesspeople. This applies to all BAs that apply stringent membership selection 
processes to increase inter-firm trust by reducing fraudulent activities (interview 4). 
Multiple network studies have shown that trust as social capital can increase the 
quality and quantity of resource exchange, and several businessmen confirm such 
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beneficial effects on business exchanges. Such a process has been reported for all 
BAs alike. Members state the following: 
If most members mainly work in Gaziantep’s industrial zones, it is advantageous for 
them to get to know each other, and that’s why new entrants also profit from joining 
our association. It’s a way of entering those circles, getting to know others in your 
sector. From this closeness, also through social activities, trust emerges gradually. 
(interview 3) 
Business associations are important as bridges, to secure your work, because, yes, 
members get close to each other. (interview 23) 
 
Strategic and secular businesses have a similar view of the importance of 
morality in business and private life, which are regarded as intertwined. Being moral 
to these actors means ‘being true in business life, keeping to your word and honour 
contracts, to not lie’ (interview 6), and accepting one’s social responsibility as a 
business owner. The common definition by all types of businessmen focuses on 
keeping one’s word in business agreements, independent of religion or race (e.g., 
interviews 21 and 31), and keeping an orderly family life. Ideology is not amplified. 
Our mission is to internalise virtuousness and morality as a way of life; to develop a 
firm culture that is aware of its social responsibility. (…) This is not just related to 
trade or business, this is a way of life. When we internalise these value, when we act 
right, then this will also affect our trade. It’s got to do with your character. (interview 
29) 
A secular businessman in a leadership position describes the selection process of 
Gagiad and their checks on a member’s morality (‘ahlak’), which is similar to the 
above Islamic BA quotes: 
We have various steps that an applicant has to pass. We don’t accept every 
application. Within these criteria, we always choose people whose business is moral, 
that is, who have an orderly private life, who have a good record of settling their 
accounts, who do proper production within the legal boundaries, generally honest 
businessmen. We also check family lives, because we want our members to become 
friends, and they will meet each other together with their families, and therefore we 
have to check it. (interview 6) 
 
Some Islamic businessmen and leaders go beyond that by referring to the 
Koran as their inspiration for morality and Islam as an aspect of their associations’ 
self-definition: 
All of these business associations are similar, but their understandings are quite 
different: Müsiad, for example, is religious, it accepts moral people as members; for 
example, Müsiad members won’t drink alcohol, so they have a different world view 
from Gagiad, and it’s people with similar views that will want to get together. 
(interview 23) 
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A second requirement to enter Müsiad is you have to be moral. This is part of our 
religion anyway; our religion is moral. Thirdly, you have to stick to your word; your 
word has to be more reliable than your cheques. (interview 7) 
There are therefore differences in the ideological content of collective identities. The 
secular BA creates trust and solidarity by creating friendship ties among elitist 
business families through social and civic activities. Islamic BAs, in contrast, 
additionally create such trust and solidarity through common beliefs in Islam and a 
strong collective identity. The latter can serve as a stronger and more effective 
binding mechanism in the parochial environments of Anatolian urban hinterlands. A 
secular businessman describes the emergence of multifunctional religious 
community ties in the periphery and how they can gradually translate into trade ties: 
Now, the most important thing when it comes to the cemaat, is to imagine a 
neighbourhood, a family. Imagine within a family, one or two people believe in 
something and convince their neighbours of this. Once a sense of community has 
emerged, the leader will say: ‘Now, come my brothers, why don’t you also join this 
other group [referring to Islamic BAs], there are benefits attached to it, trade 
benefits, you can increase your profits by joining.’ Once that first sense of 
community has been established, tradesmen and businessmen are directed to these 
business associations. (interview 34) 
 
The different ideological contents of collective identities influence the 
strength of solidarity among members. The stronger solidarity created in Islamic BAs 
through shared religious beliefs across different spheres of lives can be hypothesised 
to serve as a stronger binding mechanisms that supports resource exchange to a 
larger extent than in secular BAs. 
Secular businessmen may also refer to religion, be it strategic or not, as part 
of their philosophy, but they regard it as part of a person’s character and private life 
rather than trying to define economic and business practices according to it. A 
secular businessman, for example, says that he prays regularly and fasts, but he keeps 
this separate from his business life – religion is a private matter (interview 34). 
Merinos Group, a strategic, yet secular-leaning business group also refers to Islam on 
its homepage as part of its philosophy; this may be regarded as strategic in terms of 
its adjustment to the current climate.  
If we respect ourselves, we also have to respect our creator; and if we respect our 
creator, then we should also respect all things he created (alive and inanimate). No 
company, property or commodity belongs to persons; it belongs to our sovereign 
God/Allah. (“Merinos misyon ve vizyon [mission and vision],” n.d.) 
This is where [owner name] is different. He is not one of those Anatolian tigers who 
combine the Islamic piety with the joy of expensive cars. He lives like a Dervish. 
(…) He can play cards with a previous postal services worker and a guard in Bursa 
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Orhangazi, he strolls around in the slums of İstanbul. (“First a dervish, then a boss,” 
2011) 
 
The Islamic all-encompassing vision of economic success requires 
businessmen to follow Islamic practices in the civic, business and private realms. 
Justification for pious behaviour in the private realm as a prerequisite for economic 
success is given in the following excerpt: 
Even if there’s a differentiation in Turkey, this is actually an inseparable part of 
us…A ‘dindar’, a truly religious person is a loving person. I am a person who loves 
his religion. I won’t ever lie (…). You are also a part of me; you are my sibling and 
that is why I am helping you (…). Doesn’t alcohol make people drunk? It does. How 
would a foolish person be helpful? When you drink alcohol, you lose your good 
judgement; you would show wrong behaviours towards me, right? It makes people 
uncomfortable. And it makes people unproductive. (…) If a person lives according 
to the right principles, then he’ll find peace. If I went to a bar and my wife would 
wait for me at home, would she still love me? But if I were to spend that energy that 
I wasted, this beauty, on my home, we would be happy. Everything is connected. 
(…) Religion is the language of love, of beauty, if you have it, then you are 
beautiful, if you don’t have it, there’s nothing. (…) Isn’t that part of our culture? It 
is, but only few people live it. I don’t need alcohol; when I look around me, when I 
look at a tree, I feel drunk. I feel drunk all the time because I see Allah everywhere. 
(interview 23)  
A conservative, pious family lifestyle similar to that of PM Erdoğan is regarded as 
essential for economic success at large: 
For your work to prosper, peace and morality are very important, that’s true for 
politics as well, you need a moral family life, and for example, you can see that in 
Erdoğan whose success has been made possible through his conservative lifestyle. 
For example a politician like Sarkozy who rather spreads his attention among 
women and other things, he can never be successful, with this kind of lifestyle you 
won’t make it because your mind will become scattered and you won’t be able to 
concentrate. (interview 21; see interview 22 for a similar view) 
This citation also shows how many conservative businessmen identify themselves 
with Erdoğan, the self-made man from a poor background, and the ‘clean’ image 
projected by pious Islamists leading a simple devout life. The perceived control of 
and discrimination against Islam are highly central issues to Islamic businessmen, 
which give the Islamic frame further resonance. 
Islamic BAs and members construct Islamic business, economic, civic and 
private behaviours as part of worship, a religious duty. This extends to incorporate 
the Gülen community’s focus on educational activities. Comparing the rationales 
between Islamic and secular BAs for engaging in CSR activities provides further 
insights into different underlying value systems. If questioned why they contribute to 
large-scale educational and civic projects, Islamic businessmen give reasons such as 
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religious duty, and national development – the promotion of welfare where the state 
has failed:  
We do this to fulfil God’s will. Everything turns good for a good person; you will 
also do your work well. The path of education is very important and Turkey’s 
education system is broken. (…) These activities are not against the state, we want 
the state to take possession of them. Our hoca [referring to cleric Fethullah Gülen] 
even wants it this way, because education is actually the state’s responsibility. Apart 
from education, we provide social help to the poor. We go to poor neighbourhoods 
and distribute food every day to almost 1000 people, to the needy, the ill, we directly 
go to their homes. These social activities don’t bring us any advantages, everybody 
can come, this is not an economic activity. It doesn’t bring any profit for companies 
[heavy protest]! This is voluntary work (…). (interview 22) 
The education system is regarded as key for national development: 
The religious community currently fills a void and the state can fill this later on by 
itself, but for that a social welfare system has to develop. (…) I don’t like it 
particularly, but it’s like this because the state doesn’t seem to have the necessary 
reach, and therefore the normal public education system falls behind. (…) Only if 
people get a proper education, they are able to build proper systems, education is 
key. (interview 21; see also interview 30) 
Islamic BA leadership also stresses the importance of increasing the educational 
levels of the general population as well as businessmen in particular:  
Currently we are in a catch-up process, Turkey is gradually developing, and the 
monetary funds by the EU, and our projects to support children’s education through 
SODES funds help. We give education to unemployed youth (…), for example. 
(interview 1) 
Fethullah Gülen develops this religious value of education that his business followers 
take up in his numerous publications. The following example is taken from his 
English homepage: 
Gülen believes that education plays the primary role in achieving the values that 
make a person a real human being. (…). Gülen says that non-educated people will 
never find the meaning of their existence, why they are created, where they come 
from, and where exactly they are going. (…) Therefore, according to him, a public 
education campaign should be done everywhere. (…) According to Gülen, science 
should lead the person to the understanding of the meaning of his/her entity. In other 
words, it should lead the person to the knowledge of the Supreme Creator, his 
position before Him and to fulfilling his liabilities to Him. Gülen also believes that 
education gives the opportunity that people with different religions, languages, 
cultures and nations can live in peace with each other. (…). He says that religion and 
science can never be separated from each other and that no contradiction exists 
between them. On the contrary, they have a very close relationship. (…) Gülen also 
believes that education can save one’s life in here and in the hereafter. (“Fehullah 
Gülen,” n.d.) 
While the secular BA looks for justification in Atatürk’s vision where education is 
regarded as key to catching up with Western modernity, Islamic BAs are more likely 
to look for justification in the writings of Islamic clerics like Fethullah Gülen. 
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Gülen’s official vision of Islam is in sync with science, rationalism, capitalism and 
harmony with the state: He believes in the ‘necessities of establishing a positive 
direction in education, in cooperation with the state’ (“Fehullah Gülen,” n.d.). In 
order to achieve those goals, Gülen asks of his followers to fully commit to the 
community’s activities, which requires a large investment of time and, if available, 
of financial capital (Agai, 2004). Those activities include private and business-
related areas, as will be shown in the following Chapter: attending meetings several 
times a week, donating alms, following a pious lifestyle (e.g. attending prayers 
regularly, fasting) and business practices. This vision of Islam put forward is 
nationalist in that these strategies and goals are also promoted as supporting the 
development of Turkey or Anatolia, where the state has failed. 
Secular frames take their main inspiration from the founder of the modern 
Turkish Republic, from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s modernisation project dating back 
to the Republican Period (1923–1946). The major principles of this so-called 
Kemalism included Republicanism, secularism, nationalism and statism (Parla & 
Davison, 2004). It also regarded a secular, Western-style education as a major 
necessity in the catch-up process. Grounded in this state ideology, the secular BA 
and its members regard their CSR activities as contributions to the fatherland’s 
development and modernisation. While secular businessmen also regard themselves 
as religious and adhering to Islamic values, they do not aim to transform the state’s 
secular institutions and try to keep their faith in the private realm.  
Secular and strategic businessmen have a similar view of the necessity of 
increasing human capital and education for development and critical thought. The 
rationale is more similar to Atatürk’s vision than the Koran. The orientation towards 
‘Western’ development, nationalism and the importance of human capital is 
elaborated in the following quotes: 
Education is always good, no matter how it’s being given. An educated person is one 
who can think, judge and discern right from wrong. (interview 25) 
When we look to mature economies, like America, or in Europe, to Germany or 
France, or to Japan, they always do one thing. They first increase a nation’s 
education standards, and then benefit from people with higher educational levels to 
increase their production standards. Only this way can there be further development. 
(interview 31) 
We have come to a stage where we impose that all our activities have to promote 
Gaziantep’s and Turkey’s development. Our priority is that our projects support the 
city and country. We make sure that rather than providing economic advantage to an 
individual, we support Gaziantep. That’s how Gaziantep has come to this level, has 
supported Turkey’s export, that now even five industrial zones have become 
 189 
insufficient to hold our entrepreneurs. Our members, who make these kinds of 
investments, don’t need money anymore. (interview 6) 
This is different from, for example, Erol Yarar’s statement, which regards Müsiad’s 
mission as one a nationalist religious movement with Islamic goals. This is another 
excerpt from the current head of Müsiad’s response to the Gezi protests:  
Let’s not forget that the path ahead is long. Our education, and justice systems have 
become much more comfortable. We have to grow, to develop, and to gain more. 
(…) Our Prophet is not just referring to economic and financial development. 
Goodness and help, both to the environment and to us, have to be equal goals. 
(“MÜSİAD Genel Başkanı Nail OLPAK, Gezi Parkı tartışmalarını ve büyüme 
rakamlarını yorumladı,” 2013) 
 
Beyond nationalism, Atatürk references are much more muted than the 
Islamic BAs’ references to the Koran. Gagiad mainly displays these in their 
membership material and some of their cultural projects. Present Gagiad leadership 
did not refer to Kemalist ideals beyond nationalism in my interview material. 
Kemalism also does not enter the goal definition of the secular BA. To give 
examples of Gagiad’s use of Kemalism, I translated the following vision of the 
secular BA from its membership booklet: 
Within the guidelines of our association’s constitution, we as Gaziantep’s 
industrialists and businessmen, aim to, following in the light of Atatürk’s principles, 
aim to promote the social and cultural development of Turkey within a democratic 
and planned order, and to contribute to socio-economic development through our 
members by assisting their challenges and cultivating a spirit of solidarity among 
young industrialists and businessmen. (GAGIAD, 1995, GAGIAD, 2010a) 
In the cultural realm, Gagiad organised a photo exhibition with previously unseen 
photographs of Atatürk in 2005, commemorating Atatürk 67 years after his death 
(“Gagiad,” n.d.). The association also regularly put out special statements to its 
members on public holidays related to Atatürk, while the Islamic BAs more often 
does that for Islamic holidays. Generally, civic contributions are justified through 
their promotion of Turkey’s development, continuing Atatürk’s modernisation 
project. The first page of the association’s booklet (GAGIAD, 1995, GAGIAD, 
2010a) is dominated by the Declaration to Turkish Youth by Atatürk from 1927 
(Atatürk'ün Gençliğe Hitabesi, 20/10/1927).69 
 
                                                
 
69 This good translation was found online (“Atatürk’s declaration to the Turkish youth,” 
n.d.).  
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Oh, Turkish Youth! 
Your first duty is forever to preserve and to defend the Turkish Independence and 
the Turkish Republic. 
This is the very foundation of your existence and your future. This foundation is 
your most precious treasure. In the future, too, there may be malevolent people at 
home and abroad who will wish to deprive you of this treasure. If some day you are 
compelled to defend your independence and your Republic, you must not tarry to 
weigh the possibilities and circumstances of the situation before taking up your duty. 
These possibilities and circumstances may turn out to be extremely unfavourable. 
The enemies conspiring against your independence and your Republic may have 
behind them a victory unprecedented in the annals of the world. It may be that, by 
violence and ruse, all the fortresses of your beloved fatherland may be captured, all 
its shipyards occupied, all its armies dispersed and every part of the country invaded. 
And sadder and graver than all these circumstances, those who hold power within 
the country may be in error misguided and may even be traitors. Furthermore, they 
may identify their personal interests with the political designs of the invaders. The 
country may be impoverished, ruined and exhausted. 
Youth of Turkey's future, 
Even in such circumstances it is your duty to save the Turkish Independence and 
Republic. 
You will find the strength you need in your noble blood. 
Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
The secular BA seeks legitimacy for their projects more often in Atatürk’s 
modernisation project to which they want to contribute through their own civic 
projects than in the Koran. Secularism in the Kemalist sense of ‘laiklik’ thus 
becomes part of their collective identity. Their activities and identities, however, 
remain diverse as discussed above. This contrasts with the amplified, yet non-
contentious use of Islamic ideals in the Islamic movement. There are no referrals to 
Atatürk in Hürsiad or Müsiad’s Homo Islamicus, for example, but only to the Koran. 
4. Summary of findings 
The comparison above examined two framing processes: diagnostic and prognostic. 
First, diagnostic framing encompasses the identification of a collective problem and 
the attribution of blame to a target. The construction of a collective identity is an 
essential part of diagnostic framing tasks. Second, defining collective goals and 
strategies to achieve them are key tasks of prognostic framing. Motivational framing 
is carried out through appeals to ideology and Islam and therefore analysed as part of 
the use of ideology throughout the other two framing tasks. 
While the Islamic frame clearly identifies a target and attributes blame to it, 
secular businesspeople do little but complain in general about economic policy, their 
disadvantage in accessing state resources and their exclusion from rent-seeking 
coalitions. Problem definition remains a complaint of a specific interest group 
 191 
lacking the identification of a common political problem around a distinctive 
collective identity. This qualifies the secular frame not just as incoherent, but also as 
incomplete. Leadership is unwilling to define a common issue publicly, but instead 
seeks to adjust to moderate Islam. There is a hopeless and defeatist tone in secular 
framing, and the leadership is not willing to publicly speak out. Leadership, at best, 
attributes economic exclusion to Gaziantep’s exclusion, creating a bond based on 
hailing from the same place (‘hemşehrilik’). Such a bond is inclusive in that Islamic 
actors are not clearly distinguished. Blame is shifted to a broad regional level with 
nationalist undertones. Secular businessmen, but not leadership, may also bring 
secular identity into this equation, but without clearly developing a target or 
explanation, and with a muted application of ideology.   
In contrast, in the moderately Islamic frame, blame is clearly attributed to 
Kemalist state elites, secular-left parties and former centre-right parties of the 1990s. 
Although this blame attribution is clear and strongly argues against secular elites, it 
remains unspecific. Islamic businessmen and BAs characterise Anatolian capital as a 
group of pious actors excluded systematically by a centrist state because they are 
devout SMEs from Anatolia rather than big businesses in Istanbul. These state and 
political elites are not only blamed for the active exclusion of Anatolian SMEs from 
negotiating tables and economic resources, but also from the education system 
because of ideological reasons and company size. This control and discrimination 
against pious Islamists has allegedly contributed to political and macro-economic 
instabilities in Turkey’s past by favouring corrupt secular business groups that feed 
on state resources over pious, hard-working Anatolian SMEs. 
This reference to Islam has changed over time. During the early 1990s, before 
the overthrow of political Islamists by the military, Islamic actors more openly used 
Islam as a reference and proposed an alternative to Western integration. After the 
turn of the millennium, as Islamic elites of the moderate coalition largely agreed to 
abstain from direct Islamic references, this has become much more muted and 
indirectly contentious. The amplification is carried less through attacks on Kemalist 
state elites, and more through collaborative non-contentious strategies. As an 
example of an earlier, more contentious way of framing the problem, a confident co-
founder of Müsiad publicly blames the Western capitalist system for Turkey’s boom-
and-bust cycles and the control of religion by a Kemalist regime; current BA elites 
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are less contentious. Similarly, the current Gülen community focuses on the 
education system in a non-contentious manner. 
Control of and discrimination against Islamic groups is not merely a private 
spiritual matter, but extends to the economic, polity and education system. Blame 
extends from economic mismanagement, political instability, and corruption to the 
control of Islam by the state in general. This ‘diagnosis’ is rather unspecific overall. 
However, the key is that the role of religion and Islam is amplified in the explanation 
of their ‘exclusion’, and it combines business and political interests as well as the 
Gülen community’s interests. Such frame extension to business, political, civic and 
private realms, and the amplification of Islam in this frame increases its resonance 
over secular frames. 
Islamic BAs’ collective identity continues to amplify the use of Islam. 
Coherently following from the problem identification, secular Istanbul-based elites 
are strongly differentiated from pious Anatolian SMEs. This differentiation is based 
on religion, a regional dimension and partly company size (where businesses regard 
themselves as representing large, moral Anatolian holdings, but are also upwardly 
mobile SMEs). By portraying a negative identity of ‘the other’ that is coherent with 
the group to which blame is attributed, the collective identity of Islamic BAs 
becomes fortified (Gamson, 1992). Islamic frames amplify Islam by combining and 
changing the meanings of capitalism, democracy and piousness. In their collective 
identities, they describe themselves as a new breed of Islamic capitalists vis-à-vis 
undemocratic, corrupt secular elites. Islamic BAs define themselves and their allies 
as democratic, hard-working, and true capitalists, yet pious and discriminated 
against. 
In contrast, secular collective identity shows greater diversity and less internal 
coherence. In line with their status as leading businessmen, these actors regard 
themselves as the elite of the nation: nationalist, conservative and devout, yet 
secular. While this could be a true alternative, the secular and Kemalist aspects 
remain rather muted. As with the rest of diagnostic framing, identities aim more at 
integration than opposition with Islamic BAs. Leadership only stresses those aspects 
publicly that are shared with Islamic identities (regional exclusion). Some secular 
businesspeople, although not the leadership, clearly differentiate themselves from 
what is a derogatory view of pious, naïve and fake Islamic actors. However, this is 
hardly expressed publicly as in the Islamic case. Even these businesspeople focus 
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more on the other than defining a coherent notion of ‘us’. Furthermore, frame 
amplification of secularism and Kemalism is nonexistent in the leadership framing of 
identities. 
A second framing process examined in this analysis is prognostic framing. 
Defining collective goals and strategies to achieve them are key tasks of prognostic 
framing. The secular Gagiad provides little political goal definition beyond 
promoting the association’s political representation and promoting national and 
regional development. This makes the secular frame even more incomplete. Ideology 
is not amplified and no goals vis-à-vis Islamic elites are formulated. This lack of 
ideological amplification and resistance weakens the secular frame’s resonance. 
In general, moderate Islamists, and especially businessmen, remain cautious 
about directly stating their goal as transforming Turkey’s secular political and market 
institutions. The non-contentiousness of Islamic goals is a key aspect of the 
moderately Islamic frames, which instead construct tactics in the business, 
educational and private realms that gradually aim at institutional change. Islam 
remains amplified coherently by transforming and bridging ideals of capitalism, 
human capital and education, and Islam. The definition of common goals and 
strategies complete the three framing tasks coherently. Motivational framing is 
achieved by appeals to Islamic principles consistent with non-contentious goals and 
strategies. Importantly, this non-contentiousness and extension towards different 
realms allows the movement to bring together different interest groups. Only 
exceptionally confident leaders of Islamic BAs state their contentious goals 
explicitly, illustrating that Islamic goals and strategies are indirectly contentious. 
Other actors and the Gülen community largely phrase their goals as non-contentious 
and a-political, a characteristics that differentiate the Turkish Islamic social 
movements from others.  
The Islamic frame defines as its key goal the economic promotion and 
political representation of excluded, pious Anatolian SMEs. Furthermore, it aims to 
develop new markets and Islamic economic alternatives, which are ultimately not 
replacing Western capitalist production, but adding Islamic meanings and 
mechanisms to it (mainly Müsiad). Gülen community followers less contentiously 
frame their goals as fixing the discriminatory and inefficient education and welfare 
system (mainly the Gülen community). Major strategies are firstly to collectively 
organise pious Anatolian SMEs, and promote their cooperation, access to resources 
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and information, and export capacity. The second set of strategies in the 
civic/educational realm is to develop an alternative system of schools that is in line 
with state regulation and thus appears non-contentious, but which is aimed at pious 
businesspeople and thus increases the human capital of this group. Beyond such 
organisational and human capital aims, the Islamic strategies importantly extend 
more widely to the business, market, and private realms. Islamic BAs and members 
construct Islamic business, economic, civic and private behaviours as part of 
worship, a religious duty, and essential to for eternal peace and worldly economic 
success alike. 
Comparing the use of ideology in the secular and Islamic frames more 
closely, I find the following differences affect the subgroups’ frame qualities: the key 
topics of the secular frame are national development and elitism. Their strategies and 
rationales of action are informed partly by a Western style of modernity embracing 
secularism-Kemalism, and partly by their elite status as socially-conscious 
benefactors to the nation’s welfare and development – a moral duty that comes with 
elite status and is part of the developmental project begun by Atatürk. In line with 
their status as big businesses, these actors regard themselves as the elite of the 
nation: nationalist, conservative and devout, yet secular. While this could be a true 
alternative, the secular aspect remains muted. The key difference is thus that secular 
frames are not only less coherent and incomplete, but also less ideological; 
businessmen refer to nationalism and secularism, and partly Kemalism as a value 
system, but this is not specified beyond CSR activities and not consistently apparent 
throughout the frame. A secular vision of Islam and Kemalism are not stressed in the 
BA’s collective identity, which aims more at integration rather than opposition with 
Islamic BAs. Frame amplification of secularism and Kemalism is non-existent. There 
appears to be no frame extension to attract further groups, either.  
In contrast, what makes the Islamic frame so resonant is its coherent 
amplification of Islam: the construction of an ideological belief system grounded in 
the Koran, a rational and capitalist type of Islam that intertwines economic, religious, 
civic and private lives. By transforming the meanings of business, everyday and civic 
practices, this value system essentially combines the interests of the AKP, the Gülen 
community and BAs. Müsiad’s ‘homo economicus’ and Fethullah Gülen’s vision 
outline an economic, business, welfare and private system that incorporates Islam. In 
the business realm, for example, this occurs by promoting the payment of zekat 
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(competing with tax and welfare systems), or interest-free banking and profit-and-
loss sharing mechanisms. Gülen’s frame additionally constructs extensive religious 
service and contributions to educational and civic activities as the path to salvation. 
Going on pilgrimages (‘ümre’), praying five times, abstinence, going to cemaat 
meetings and contributing actively, are constructed as necessities for economic 
success and finding salvation. Only a good Muslim, who devotes his financial and 
human resources to God’s cause and follows Islamic business practices, which in the 
definition of the Gülen community includes donations to educational activities, can 
become a successful businessman.  
5. Discussion 
In this chapter, I have used frame analysis to compare the frames used by secular and 
Islamic BAs. My objective has been to identify key differences in these frames, 
based on three major framing processes; diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. 
The broader purpose of conducting this analysis has been to examine the extent to 
which this tactic of framing, argued in the social movement literature to be a key 
source of power, differs significantly between these organisations. Frames that are 
resonant are viewed as a significant source of power in this literature. I studied 
frames’ resonance by analysing how complete, coherent and specific the three major 
framing processes are, and how well they are adapted to their political and cultural-
ideological environment as well as to people’s everyday lives. Findings from my 
analysis show that the Islamic frame exhibits many of these characteristics – while 
the secular frame does not. These findings further contribute to my argument that to 
explain the growing political influence of Islamic BAs we need to conceptualise 
them as social movements. In transition environments where struggles revolve 
around broad cleavages, encompassing ideologies and cultural narratives based on 
religion, ethnicity, nationalism, etc., become important in mobilisation, especially 
when class-based mobilisation is not possible. Framing processes grounded in 
ideology are key for marginalised and resource-poor actors: in the face of state 
threats, bringing together marginalised actors’ networks and uniting them in a 
common cause that is worthy and relevant becomes crucial for mobilisation. Islamic 
BAs have integrated ideology in a way that is non-contentious to authority, but 
reaches actors’ hearts and provides legitimacy for marginalised actors. This 
adjustment to the threatening political environment, through integrating religion, is a 
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key strength of Islamic BAs’ frames. Forming a collective identity and common 
goals are key criteria for organisations to qualify as SMOs. Although these goals are 
not contentious in the traditional sense, they are indirectly disruptive to secular elites 
and state institutions. These behaviours normalise parallel Islamic norms, institutions 
and behaviours in non-contentious realms, with ultimately disruptive goals to the 
secular establishment. The combination of exclusion with a non-contentious Islam is 
particularly powerful in the face of violent military and state threats. I argue that this 
efficient framing of the Islamic BAs has created a ‘resonant’ frame that has created 
internal trust and solidarity and increased the movement’s public legitimacy and 
mobilisation potency at large. The ineffective framing of the secular group is 
assumed to have contributed to their loss of legitimacy in the public sphere. 
The role of framing and ideology in BAs’ activities has been neglected in the 
existing literature. I find that ideology has entered Islamic BAs’ non-contentious 
tactics in a complementary fashion; in their frames (through use of Islam, see present 
chapter); networks (through cooperation with Islamic civil society organisations, see 
Chapter IV); and activities (by promoting a new pious business elite and Islamic 
norms and behaviours, see Chapter VI). In the present chapter, I showed that 
resonant framing can facilitate collective action by increasing solidarity to hold 
together networks, and by giving meaning and legitimacy to BA activities or tactics, 
thereby supporting Islamic BAs’ economic and political empowerment. Legitimacy 
and solidarity are two important ways through which ideology or religion in framing 
can improve the power-generation tactics of BAs.  
Concerning the resonance of frames the following key differences emerged: 
first, the Islamic frame is more complete as it adheres to all three framing tasks, 
whereas the secular frame is weak in its problem identification and identity-creation 
aspects. The Islamic frame is also more coherent, yet rather unspecific. In the 
Islamic frame, there is a problem-, goal- and collective identity- identification, 
motivating supporters to collective action by appealing to worthy, Islamic principles. 
The secular frame lacks the identification of a shared problem, yet formulates 
strategies for business socialisation and CSR activities. These differences in frame 
coherence and completeness increase the Islamic frame’s resonance vis-à-vis the 
secular frame. Second, the frames differ in how they incorporate ideology: the usage 
of secularism or Kemalism in the secular frame is muted and does not extend far 
beyond references in BA material and values based on (regional) nationalism. The 
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Islamic frame successfully constructs a non-contentious capitalist Islamic value 
system that informs all aspects of that frame and is amplified throughout. Third, 
Islamic frames raise topics that are relevant to participants and utilise familiar 
cultural narratives grounded in Islam. The Islamic frame has been very effective at 
delegitimising what they regard as one unified Kemalist elite. The secular frame has 
not been able to argue against this alternate frame and thus remains regarded as an 
elitist, Kemalist and exclusionary elite. Such elitism does not attract as many pious 
Anatolian businessmen who feel discriminated against by secular state elites and 
businessmen, and to whom the topics of exclusion and piety are more relevant. In 
addition to the quality of the three framing tasks, relevance and grounding in familiar 
cultural themes also affects frame resonance. Another key difference emerging from 
the material is that the frames differ in their range of topics: in the Islamic frame, the 
problem areas, goals and strategies identified have a wide range and involve a large 
group of supporting organisations (frame extension). The range of issues covered by 
the Islamic movement is relatively large, and includes educational, political and 
economic issues because of the non-contentious tactics involved. However, as the 
three framing tasks adhere to these issues coherently and in all three parts, this is to 
the movement’s advantage rather than disadvantage. In the framing literature, 
covering too many issues is discussed as potentially resulting in ‘over-stretching’, 
but in the current case the blurring of private and public issues is what makes the 
Islamic frame powerful. Only through this non-contentiousness and focus on the 
educational and private realm, did it manage to survive and adapt to a socio-
economic form of Islam. Additionally, through its large range of issues, there are 
many issues covered that are highly salient to collaborating SMOs, thereby 
facilitating cooperation. 
I illustrated how such differences in resonance influence the public legitimacy 
and internal solidarity of movement actors – two important processes of power-
generation for resource-poor business actors in the periphery that can be reinforced 
or undermined by and with other movement tactics. First, resonant Islamic framing 
has increased internal trust and solidarity among diverse SMOs; resonant frames 
bind together the diverse Islamic network of civil society, political and business 
organisations into a common goal and identity. Islamic BA’s framing therefore 
complements the grassroots networks of business, civic and political actors. Second, 
by building frames based on Islam and public issues, Islamic BAs build up 
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legitimacy. Frames have to create appropriate, worthy ‘repertoires of contention’ to 
gain support. The perception of what is appropriate and worthy is based in the 
movement’s cultural background (Ennis, 1987; Swindler, 1987), and also determined 
by the political context.  
The incorporation of Islam into BAs’ power-generation has helped them to 
attract powererful allies and to create legitimacy by ‘situating themselves among the 
faithful, devoted to just causes and beyond the realm of economic interests’ (Buğra 
& Savaşkan, 2011). By appearing non-contentious through contributions to welfare 
and education, these activities achieve a high level of public legitimacy, and 
widespread popularity in a conservative country. This non-violent resistance allows 
them to depict themselves vis-à-vis a violent state and military as peaceful 
community workers who sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the Turkish people, 
not wanting to cause disruption or open political protest as political Islamists or 
fascist Kemalists would. This is supposedly in line with the Islamic doctrine of 
meeting evil with good behaviour.  
Islamic BAs’ goals are change-oriented and have political consequences 
nevertheless – another criterion of SMOs. The movement changes institutions more 
indirectly through collaborative (rather than competitive) civic, private and market-
based tactics. By fostering a new parallel economic elite and creating public 
legitimacy, the Islamic movement aims to gain economic and political power at the 
national level. Beyond that, the business, private and civic strategies defined in 
Islamic frames, and carried out through Islamic BAs’ activities gradually normalise 
Islamic norms, behaviours and institutions and create a parallel system. Islamic 
frames are not ‘laik’, secular in a Kemalist definition, because this understanding 
does envision a restructuring of institutions in the business (e.g. through interest-free 
profit-and-loss sharing mechanisms; private and informal employment relations), 
private and civic realms at large (e.g. through promoting Islamic alms as parallel to 
welfare and tax institutions).  
In the educational realm, for example, Gülen schools are recognised by the 
state and administer the secular state curriculum; its promoters regard these CSR 
activities as promoting development and public goods. Criticis argue they promote 
conservative and Islamic values in children’s behaviours at large and gradually 
reform Turkey’s secular education sector. I argue that Islamic BAs tactics have 
contributed to the increasing legitimacy and normalisation of Islamic practices. Such 
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social movement tactics of the Islamic movement have paved the ground for real 
institutional changes (see further in Chapter VII).  
According to the social movement literature, this resonant framing constitutes 
a significant source of power. However, beyond successful framing, and tapping into 
embedded networks, there is another key social movement tactic that can provide 
important sources of political power. The frame analysis established that creating a 
new, legitimate pious business elite to displace secular elites is a key non-contentious 
goal of the Islamic frame. In the next chapter, I examine the activities through which 
this goal is achieved, in other words Islamic BA’s ‘repertoire of contention’, and to 
what extent these activities fit the defined frames. 
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Chapter VI Resources, Activities, and Organisational 
Structures 
1. Introduction 
Islamic movements have, in line with political process frameworks, translated 
contention into sustainable and successful collective action by grasping political 
opportunities at the right time (see POS analysis in Chapter III). I have shown how 
Islamic BAs have gained political influence because they have built bridges between 
centre-right parties and religiously motivated civil society organisations over time, 
and have thereby acquired not only political support, but also civic integration (see 
Network analysis in Chapter IV). Furthermore, Islamic BAs have created effective, 
resonant, yet largely non-contentious collective action frames around themes of 
religion and discrimination, in a way that is compatible with a polarised environment 
(see Frame analysis in Chapter V). Building embedded networks and creating 
resonant frames rooted in religious ideology are key social movement tactics. 
Finally, this chapter analyses through which kind of tactics Islamic BAs achieve the 
goals set out in their collective action frames and facilitated by diverse, yet strong 
local networks. It compares secular and Islamic BAs’ activities, and the resources 
provided to members and collaborating organisations. This concerns the question of 
if and how religious contention enters BAs’ activities: Are BAs’ activities and 
resource exchanges ‘contentious’ in any way, i.e. are they means to engage in 
contentious collective action? And if so, what kind of tactics do BAs employ in an 
environment of politico-religious contention to acquire resources and to achieve 
political influence?  
These tactics and goals, in contrast to the political process framework, are 
expected to be largely market-based and non-contentious, and focus on the growth of 
a new pious business elite, and indirect institutional change by establishing Islamic 
capitalist practices in the private, economic and educational spheres. Tuğal’s (2009) 
ethnographic approach has argued that the Islamic movement, adapting to state 
threats, has developed a set of tactics that focuses on the socio-economic and private 
realms while aiming at long-term institutional change. Building on this work, gradual 
normalisation of Islamic frames and practices paves the way for later direct state 
attacks, as does the creation of a strong support base, consisting of a pious Anatolian 
business elite with public legitimacy. The frame analysis has shown that the creation 
of such a business elite is a key goal of Islamic BAs, a goal that is market-based, 
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seemingly non-contentious, relying on collaboration with political and civic elites 
rather than in confrontation toward state elites. This chapter focuses on what exactly 
such a set of collaborative, seemingly non-contentious tactics looks like and how it 
promotes bottom-up political influence. Since such social movement tactics for BAs 
have not been established before, this part of the study is largely exploratory.  
In the following, I will present empirical material that compares Islamic and 
secular BAs’ activities and cooperating partners in the economic, political and civic 
spheres and their differential effects on BAs’ political influence. Finally, I discuss 
the costs of affiliation and their consequences on gradually promoting institutional 
change.  
The collective action literature has largely focused on how BAs provide 
services to members to fill institutional voids or support the efficiency of businesses 
in general. Following the collective action literature, the question is whether in the 
economic realm, Islamic BAs go beyond mere ‘service-provision’, and if there are 
contentious and religious aspects to their business-related functions. Since one way 
in which BAs’ economic activities go beyond efficiency-related activities is that 
Islamic BAs’ activities promote a goal in collaboration with a religiously motivated 
civil society organisations: I firstly analyse how Islamic BAs achieve their goal of 
promoting a business elite through a range of mainly export-focused activities 
(3.1.1), and how this compares to the secular BA’s activities (3.1.2). 
In the existing political science literature, BAs’ activities to gain political 
influence focus on information and policy-provision by organised BAs for rational 
political elites at the national level, in addition to lobbying and campaign financing 
for political elites. Ayşe Buğra (Buğra, 1994; Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, 2014) has 
found that Turkish state-business relations are mainly characterised by rent-seeking 
and patronage, where BAs exist purely as a legitimate platform for such personal 
networks between political and business elites. The question is whether the exchange 
between political and BA elites at the local level goes beyond such established 
mechanisms to include further goal-oriented, religious and contentious aspects. If so, 
how does the Islamic movement promote the growth of a new legitimate, yet pious 
business elite? What kinds of resources are provided through the Islamic 
movement’s organisational network spanning BAs, civic and political elites to 
businessmen achieve this? And how do political BA activities promote the political 
influence of the Islamic movement in a non-contentious way? These questions will 
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be analysed in section 3.2, with a comparison between the political activities of 
Islamic and secular BAs. First, the access routes of secular and Islamic BAs will be 
compared (3.2.1); and then there will be a more detailed investigation of what kind 
of resources Islamic businessmen receive from their political ties (3.2.2), and of what 
kind of power resources they provide in return (3.2.3). 
The network analysis (presented in Chapter IV) showed that Islamic BAs 
have increased their collaboration with civil society organisations over time, and 
therefore that BA activities go beyond business-state relationships. The section on 
the civic sphere compares what kind of civic activities BAs and their members 
conduct, and how they collaborate with different kinds of organisations (new and old 
public organisations, religious or secular civil society organisations) (3.3.1 and 
3.3.2). If and how this collaboration goes beyond non-contentious corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) activities in the Islamic movement is a question to be answered 
in the analysis of civic sphere of BAs. I will therefore discuss in more detail how the 
collaborating Islamic Gülen community provides important resources to further the 
growth of a new pious business elite (3.3.3.), and what political elites gain from 
promoting the Gülen community (3.3.4).  
The analysis of how a new legitimate, pious business elite is created through 
various channels does not, however, explain why this remains contentious. The 
tactics are subtle. First, creating a business elite is regarded as a process of creating 
new powerful partisan institutions and organisations that can compete with existing 
secular institutions and organisations (see section 3.4 and throughout). Secondly, the 
analysis shows how the resources provided by Islamic and political elites are 
essential for SMEs, which creates a pressure to join. By joining and gaining access to 
resources, businesspeople are expected to provide resources in return: Islamic 
businesspeople are expected to support movement SMOs by providing financial and 
political support to collaborating organisations (the AKP and Gülen community) in 
return. This aspect is analysed at the end of each section, since it provides indirect 
political influence by increasing the resources and legitimacy of other SMOs. 
Further, the costs and expected personal and business behaviour of membership, 
through which Islamic businessmen indirectly promote institutional change, are 
analysed in detail in section 3.5 (as they concern all three realms). 
An important condition of providing political support is the development of 
organisational structure of BAs (3.6). Most organisational literature in the resource-
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mobilisation tradition finds that centralised and hierarchical organisations are 
essential for successful collective action; similarly BA literature stresses the 
importance of resource-rich organisations for political influence. As Islamic BAs and 
parties have been reported to combine centralised control with grassroots 
mobilisation, I study what kind of organisational structures have supported such 
flexible integration of political, business and civic elites. Key indicators in the BA 
literature are the material resources of BAs (e.g. staff, number of branches) as well as 
internal intermediation structures, the level of centralisation and coordination 
between subunits that mediate between centralised control and local interests.  
2. Methods  
The comparison of secular and Islamic associations’ resources and activities relies on 
interviews conducted in 2010 and 2011, and on additional archival data – the 
brochures and homepages of BAs and companies, as well as newspaper and 
magazine interviews with businessmen and BA leaders. Businessmen were selected 
from Gaziantep’s clothing and textile manufacturing sector organised at the GSO. I 
conducted 51 semi-structured interviews with 36 people and relied on additional 
archival material. A summary of the selection of interviewees can be found in the 
literature review’s method section. 
Archival data served partly as confirmation of interview data, but mainly to 
provide additional points of view to increase the range of interviews. The material 
was again coded with NVivo 9 (NVivo9 Qualitative Data Analysis Software, 2010). I 
conducted a thematic analysis to study the different kinds of resources, activities and 
organisational structures for the present chapter. Different sections of the same 
interview material and additional archival data were used to conduct a collective 
action frame analysis to study secular and Islamic BAs’ frames in the previous 
chapter.  
The study of resources and organisational structures followed a ‘hybrid 
approach’ to thematic analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). Thematic analysis70 is a ‘research method for the subjective interpretation of 
the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and 
identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The present research 
                                                
 
70 These authors describe ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’, yet this could perfectly describe 
thematic analysis as well. 
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applied a so-called hybrid approach in that themes were not only created from the 
bottom-up inductively, generalising from codes to more global themes. Additionally, 
codes were created deductively from theoretical concepts of BAs and social 
movements. Such concepts concerned, for example, organisational structures, such 
as internal intermediation structures; and whether or how BAs operate as ‘firms’, 
providing economic services that the institutional environment lacks; as ‘rent-
seeking’ coalitions; as ‘clubs’; or as ‘movements’ as basis of their political influence. 
A short interview guide can be found in the appendix (section 9). Starting from such 
global themes, these were used as initial coding categories and further refined and 
adapted to the research context, while at the same time, new codes and themes were 
allowed to emerge from raw data in relation to pre-defined theoretical concepts or as 
altogether new codes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This approach allowed conducting a 
more directed thematic analysis, or ‘directed qualitative content analysis’, as Hsieh 
and Shannon (2005) refer to it, essential for extending existing concepts and theories. 
3. Findings 
3.1. Economic activities 
3.1.1.  Islamic business associations: export-promotion and inter-firm trade 
This section analyses what kind of economic services BAs provide to their members 
and asks if and how Islamic BAs promote the growth of a legitimate Islamic business 
elite. One of the key themes coming out of the interviews is the strong promotion of 
international trade supported by the Islamic BAs, especially by the mature Tuskon 
affiliate Hürsiad, but also by the younger Tuskon affiliate Gapgiad. BA 
representatives and members as well as non-members alike regard the facilitation of 
exports as Tuskon’s key draw, especially for SMEs in deprived Anatolian regions. 
Müsiad membership was also described as an important resource to foster 
international trade, but less so than membership in Tuskon. Müsiad leadership 
compares itself to the Islamic confederation Tuskon: 
Tuskon represents members who are part of the religious community, they focus 
more on foreign trade, exports, international trips, whereas Müsiad has a focus on 
research and with publications we want to be a pressure group, we want to exert 
pressure. (…) They have had a positive effect in creating an international network 
for international trade, to open those Anatolian towns to the world. (interviews 8 and 
9) 
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In contrast, secular Gagiad members do not look to their association for such 
direct economic support. Gagiad members are partly regarded as international 
players who no longer require BA support on these matters; however, there are also 
smaller company members. The secular Gagiad and its confederation Tügik (The 
Young Businessmen Confederation of Turkey) do not organise their own exclusive 
trade fairs to facilitate exports, but support their members’ attendance at trade fairs in 
general. And while they also organise international trips, Gagiad has no international 
branches or collaborations, limiting its services in export promotion, which is not a 
key activity of the secular association. In contrast, Islamic BAs promote exports by 
providing essential services to SMEs in the periphery in terms of infrastructure, 
information, contact points and even financial capital. Islamic BAs provide an 
international network of branches, contact points and pro-create an ethno-religious 
market; they organise large international trade fairs and international trips supported 
by political elites; they provide a professional technological e-service for members; 
and they indirectly serve as a mediator in unstable markets. 
3.1.1.a International branches 
Tuskon affiliates strongly rely on Tuskon’s international network of branches all 
over the world, but especially in the emerging economies of Central Asia and Africa. 
This does not just include BAs affiliated with Tuskon, but also the Gülen 
community’s network of schools. As a religiously motivated civil society 
organisation, the Gülen community provides important economic resources for the 
Islamic movement. Islamic BAs’ international activities range from simple services 
(e.g. booking flights and hotels), to organising relevant business meetings (e.g. 
finding relevant carpet wholesalers), or providing information on those markets. 
Representatives of the Islamic Tuskon say: 
Our greatest differentiating factor from Gagiad and Müsiad are our representative 
offices abroad and the guidance and counselling that comes with those. Let a Müsiad 
member go abroad, let him find those contacts, he won’t be able to do it, but a 
Hürsiad member will get guidance, and he will meet businessmen, and he will also 
have arranged his hotel room and car. We will even accompany him to his return 
flight, so it’s as if he went from here to Urfa [note: refers to the close-by city of 
Şanlıurfa]. That’s our biggest advantage, our international representatives, and our 
guidance in business endeavours. (interview 1) 
 
The number of Tuskon’s international contact points can be assumed to be 
much larger than the five branches publicised on their official homepage (Istanbul, 
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Brussels, Washington DC, Moscow, and Beijing). This is because the network of 
Gülen schools abroad also serves as indirect business branches, not just in emerging, 
but also in mature economies. As even the number of these schools remains a secret, 
data on how they facilitate trade is even more elusive. In the short-term, as some 
critics argue, these schools benefit trade directly by buying supplies predominantly 
from firms affiliated with the Gülen community. For example, Kaynak Holding, a 
company formed to supply Gülen schools, is now Turkey’s largest supplier of 
educational materials (Rodeheffer, 2013). Two current outsiders, yet former secular 
elites confirm that the cemaat has a big purchasing power, providing an international 
religious market: 
The religious community needs to buy goods for its big network of followers who 
run firms, hospitals, media outlets, newspapers, TV and radio stations, and 
supermarket chains; that is in addition to the school network. The cemaat’s 
economic power allows it to buy from member companies ‘above the market rate’, if 
it chooses to support a certain member; and it provides a large market. (interviews 34 
and 36) 
More importantly, these schools can partly take over functions of BA branches. A 
carpet producer describes these advantages in the following way: 
Look, one of my partners is in the midst of these movement activities (…). There are 
a lot of schools world-wide, I think they maybe have 600 or so schools, and of 
course they have relations with these schools, they go and stay there, at least when 
they travel abroad they have somebody whom they know (….). There is definitely an 
advantage to that, because the owner of the school lives there, (…) and he deals with 
visitors and does pass on contacts and information. This is useful for firms who can’t 
get the information on who the biggest wholesalers are and cannot contact them by 
themselves. (interview 21) 
Indeed, two men from Afghanistan joined us during my visit to this company. They 
had met the owners at a Gülen school in Afghanistan and now came to buy their 
carpets (interview 21). A former elite secular businessman gives further details this 
external trade process:  
The cemaat definitely has such advantages. For example, the directors of the 
German Gülen schools have multiple local contacts and relations and via the cemaat, 
which is currently the number one channel, you can get into touch with those 
markets. The owner of a Turkish supermarket chain in Germany might say, for 
example, ‘I need plastic bags’, and his cemaat friends may then act as mediators and 
transfer trust onto his business credentials. Likewise, on the Turkish side, the cemaat 
connection confers trustworthiness onto a specific businessman; then this trade starts 
to roll, and plastic bags are exported to that supermarket chain from here. (interview 
34) 
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Beyond direct services promoting exports and trade in general, Islamic BAs 
function as mediators and facilitators, providing essential services to SMEs for 
international business cooperation. Selective membership procedures provide a sense 
of security for international collaborations as members can rely on associations’ 
background checks and company valuations. Finding customers and business 
partners who are trustworthy, i.e. who are law-abiding and honour contracts, and 
acquiring information about new marketplaces in general, are important resources for 
businesspeople looking to create trade relations in foreign markets, especially in 
countries with political instabilities and/or where market institutions are inefficient 
(multiple interviews). Tuskon therefore fills an ‘institutional void’ in the sense that it 
operates as a mediator in unstable international markets and creates ethnic and/or 
religious markets. This need was especially high for exports to post-war Middle 
Eastern markets or post-Soviet states where market institutions and bank systems 
were not developed (e.g. interview 34). BA ties can facilitate trade by simply 
providing a platform for businessmen to meet (interviews 30 and 32). Such religious 
ties, mediated through BAs, can result in important business relations. Members who 
trust each other may even found multi-ownership companies. At the Islamic Hürsiad, 
board members established a multi-ownership export company; I was told, however, 
that it ‘didn’t work properly’ (interview 1). At Müsiad Gaziantep, members are in the 
process of forming a cooperative energy company to share cheaper energy rates 
among members (interview 6). A Müsiad leader states:  
Of course, our members do business among each other, they offer cheaper rates to 
each other, for example, if a member needs a certain agricultural product, he will 
usually get it from within, and members can obtain cheaper petroleum from one of 
our members as well, or discounts on cargo rates. (interview 7) 
In the previous chapter I have shown that that Islamic BAs have a more coherent and 
stronger collective identity based on Islam, across three SMOs. This creates a 
stronger bond among Islamic businesspeople, supporting inter-firm exchange to a 
larger extent than in the secular coalition.   
3.1.1.b Trade conferences, international trips, and e-services 
In addition to international branches, Islamic BAs invest heavily into trade fairs71 and 
international trips, both of which provide contact points to meet potential 
                                                
 
71 There are also international trade fairs for which no business association affiliation is 
required. These appear to be narrower and more specialist, e.g. concerning machine-
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international collaborators, subcontractors or customers; to catch-up on current 
trends; to understand national markets; and to present businessmen’s product range 
to a wide international audience. Most members indeed regard such services as 
crucial to forge contacts in new markets. Both Islamic BAs organise trade fairs 
exclusively for their members (Tuskon’s version is called ‘Trade Bridges’, Müsiad’s 
versions are called ‘International Trade Fair; International Business Forum - IBF’). 
Tuskon’s ‘trade bridges’ are supported by the Turkish Ministry of Economy and by 
the public TIM (Turkish Exporters’ Assembly, the semi-public Union of Exporters).  
Tuskon started the organisation of its trade bridges in 2006, and currently 
three are organised each year at the sectoral level. According to Tuskon’s figures, a 
turnover of 25 billion US dollars has been generated at trade fairs between 2006 and 
2011 (“Our members returned from the 2011 Tuskon Trade Bridge program,” 2011; 
interview 4). These conferences may focus on a specific region, like the recent 
Africa trade bridge, for example (interview 1). At the 2011 trade bridge, there were 
ca. 3000 participants; 26 Tuskon members from Gaziantep participated with their 
own stands, and ca. 20 face-to-face business meetings were arranged. According to 
Tuskon’s figures, a turnover of 25 billion US dollars has been generated at trade fairs 
between 2006 and 2011 (“Our members returned from the 2011 Tuskon Trade 
Bridge program,” 2011; interview 4). For example, Gapgiad participated with 15 
large firms at Tuskon’s trade bridge in 2010. Following this fair, 15 businessmen 
from the Philippines visited multiple production plants and trade organisations in 
Gaziantep, which ultimately led to further investments and business deals (Gapgiad, 
2010). 
Concerning international business trips, Hürsiad organises up to five each 
year. Most recently, the association went to Morocco with 17 businessmen from 
Gaziantep to visit a Moroccan Tuskon affiliate (interview 1). On these occasions, 
visits to industrial and business zones are organised as well as one-to-one meetings, 
and visits to consulates and public officials. As a result of such activities 
businessmen often find new customers, partners, or wholesalers (interview 3).  
                                                                                                                                     
 
manufactured carpets only, and are more important to keep up with international 
developments in a sub-sector, such as new design trends or new machinery (interviews 21 
and 31). 
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Müsiad organises its own conferences and international trips. Müsiad’s 
representative in Istanbul reports about their planned trip to the USA with 70 
businessmen, meeting ministers, BAs, Turks, and universities. The results usually 
range from simple networking, to starting a joint venture or buying a trademark 
(interviews 8 and 9). To give a high-level example: 300 Müsiad and Tuskon 
members joined Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Minister of Economy on their 
January 2013 trip to Nigeria, Senegal, and Gabon. Generally, Tuskon and Müsiad’s 
news sections on their homepages are filled with numerous examples of prestigious 
international trips. 
Both Islamic BAs have also created e-services to promote trade and 
cooperation among members nationally and internationally and offer an ethnic 
religious market. Tuskon has a professional e-service (“Tuskontrade,” 2012) that 
operates internationally, transferring calls for bids among their members across the 
globe. These result in serious business profits for members (interview 1). Müsiad 
offers a similar service for their members. 
Gagiad offers no such deliberate inter-firm trade services. However, in its 
early years, 74 members formed a multi-ownership company in garment production 
(Gagiad, 1995). The company (Giateks A.Ş.) no longer seems to exist, but it shows 
that the secular BA may have had a stronger focus on trade promotion in the early 
1990s when its member companies were still smaller. Gagiad/Tügik neither organise 
their own trade conferences, nor do they have international alliances or branches, nor 
do they offer an online networking platform (interviews 5 and 6). The secular BA 
does support their members’ attendance at general trade conferences. Although 
Gagiad also organises international trips, none of these activities reach the same 
extent and level of organisation that Islamic BAs offer (the same applies to the 
national-level, secular Tüsiad). Gagiad leadership confidently says they don’t regard 
it as their task to give information on international markets or to provide contacts, 
because many of their members are big international players already. However, 
sometimes requests arrive at Gagiad for certain goods, through previously forged 
contacts. For example, Gagiad recently visited Syria, meeting the Syrian trade 
attaché, the consulate, and an influential BA. During this visit, Gagiad set up one-on-
one meetings and various company deals emerged from that (interview 6).  
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3.1.2. Secular business associations as clubs: social activities and class 
Schmitter and Streeck (1999) categorise BAs as clubs if they focus mainly on their 
membership rather than mediating with political or other outside actors, and on 
social activities that centre on solidarity goods and identity-related activities. In 
practice, club-like BAs often focus on a small number of large capitalists (Schneider, 
2004), representing a certain elitist class (Buğra, 1994).  
From the interviewees’ point of view, it is the secular BAs, Gagiad and the 
famous Tüsiad, that fit this categorisation of BAs as clubs for ‘big bosses’ best. One 
of Gaziantep’s two Tüsiad members describes it as a ‘patrons’ club’ that is in the 
‘hands of three to five business groups’ (interview 30). Comparing membership 
profiles, Gagiad, on average, has the biggest, oldest and most influential firms.72 In 
spite of a lack of systematic data, it can be said that Islamic BAs have a more mixed 
membership with a larger share of SMEs than Gagiad (interviews 1, 3, 4, and 8). 
Gagiad’s membership fees are also much higher than Islamic BAs’ fees, and Gagiad 
membership is limited to companies with profits above a certain threshold, whereas 
Islamic BAs do not have profit-related criteria.  
Analysing in detail Gagiad membership lists, it appears that BA membership 
is passed down to the next generation, which reinforces the association’s club and 
elitist character. Gagiad’s leadership compares the BA to a school, preparing 
businessmen to take up leadership positions in the Chambers and politics (interview 
6). 
Beyond membership profiles, social activities, such as dinners and trips, are 
regarded by all BAs as important in creating trust and familiarity among their 
members, which can facilitate business. Local businessmen describe Gagiad as an 
association that is occupied mainly with social and civic activities (interview 23). It 
serves to establish social connections (interview 29) to bring Gaziantep’s leading 
businesspeople together (interviews 25 and 26). Such ties can also translate into trade 
advantages among the established businesses of Gagiad, as a member explains: 
Gagiad represents businesses that are already established and if Gaziantep had 100 
successful businesses, these businessmen’s children would go to Gagiad. So how 
does this work? Let’s say a particular young businessman manufactures carpets, and 
he has a friend whose family produces yarns. So he might go up to his friend and 
say: ‘Come, brother [‘ağabey’], why don’t you buy your yarns from us?’, and it’s 
                                                
 
72 Business associations interviewed did not have readily available information about 
business association members’ firm characteristics such as size or foundation dates. 
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likely he will do so. I myself may call up other Gagiad members and ask why they 
wouldn’t buy from me, given we are Gagiad friends. And in these cases, they might 
answer: ‘Okay, if you give me a good price, I’ll buy from you. Currently I buy for 30 
TL, and if you can give me product for the same price, I’ll switch to you.’ In return, I 
might have to reduce my prices so that I can go into business with my Gagiad friend. 
So there are advantages that members and friends can give to each other, based on 
prices, delivery, or quality. (…) Family and friendship come into play in business. 
(interview 34) 
 
To support these activities, Gagiad has long had a so-called women’s council, 
which consists of the wives of Gagiad board members. The Islamic Hürsiad has more 
recently started such a council as well, but it wasn’t active at the time of 
interviewing. Gagiad’s women’s council is very active in organising both social and 
civic activities (the latter is analysed in more detail in 3.3):  
We support our members’ getting to know each other through our social activities, 
and the civic activities the women’s council organises. Our members’ wives can 
meet there and get closer. For example, we organise a ball once a year combined 
with an award ceremony, we organise meals with our wives. (…) We organise trips 
in Turkey and abroad, and there, of course, friendships get forged during such trips. 
That’s exactly why we do these activities. (interview 6)  
 
That is not to say that Islamic BAs do not organise such social activities to 
increase familiarity, e.g. breakfasts or dinners for the whole families of members. To 
give another example, Hürsiad recently organised a Bosphorus tour for their young 
members, together with a Tuskon association in Istanbul. However, they regard them 
as supporting trade activities among members (interview 3).  
3.2. Political activities 
This part of the study analyses if and how AKP elites provide Islamic BAs and 
businesspeople with relevant resources to create an alternative, legitimate, pious 
business elite, and how this exchange compares to the secular BA’s access. It then 
asks what kind of support AKP elites expect in return from Islamic businessmen and 
BAs. 
3.2.1. Comparing political access routes  
Business collective action fulfils the crucial function of representing the business 
community to the polity, and providing a bridge to local and national-level political 
and bureaucratic elites. In Gaziantep, the Chambers used to be the sole organisation 
fulfilling this purpose for decades. Ever since 1993 the private BAs Tuskon and 
Müsiad have been competing with and trying to control these semi-public institutions 
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(Bayırbağ, 2011). Through these BAs, pious businessmen have been able to get 
better access by bypassing, and later increasingly taking over the Chambers.  
From the different channels of political access emerging from the interviews 
it is clear that: BAs can collaborate with the Chambers to bring pressure to bear at 
the national level – this is the secular Gagiad’s preferred route; local BAs also have 
access to local politicians such as the mayor, or the provincial administrator (‘vali’), 
and Gaziantep’s MPs, who provide an important bridge to Parliament and national 
political elites.  
Gagiad members argue that the Chambers are most effective in pushing for 
certain industrial policy collectively, for example, to argue for or against receiving 
economic stimuli in a certain sector (interviews 6 and 34). The Chambers have an 
official identity as a semi-public institution that it puts forward in such cases, and it 
also represents a bigger section of the business community. According to a secular 
businessman, ‘a major holding owner can also go to the government himself, but it 
wouldn’t have the same clout. In such a situation Gagiad’s most influential members 
would bring their case to Gaziantep’s Chambers, who would then represent them and 
pass on their requests to the upper decision-making levels’ (interview 34). 
Good relations with political elites are also considered to be crucial for access 
by secular businessmen: ‘An MP is more effective at presenting your case to the 
government because he is closer to it. If you have good relations with a Minister or 
MP, he or she can argue your corner in Ankara.’ However, Gagiad was less able to 
meet national and international top politicians, such as the Prime Minister on its own 
behalf; that was only possible with better on-going relations (interview 34). 
Therefore, as an organisation, Gagiad has less direct access to national or 
international political elites. Although Gagiad is also a member of the nation-wide 
federation Tügik, this federation lacks the kind of clout that Tüsiad, Müsiad or 
Tuskon possess. Although collective access by the secular BA is not good, large 
business owners successfully forge personal ties with political elites, irrespective of 
their membership.  
By contrast, Müsiad and Tuskon do have good relations with the AKP, and 
therefore collectively get easier access to top-level politicians and institutions, be it 
with or without the Chambers (interview 34). While the Chambers are still regarded 
as an important institution, access for Islamic Anatolian SMEs has improved through 
private Islamic BAs: 
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 There has been an important change in Turkey’s civil society organisations 
[referring to the Gülen community and Islamic BAs] and public institutions, they are 
more flexible and operate more efficiently and work harder than they used to. Our 
access has much improved and we can’t complain. (interview 19) 
The importance of collective political representation is reflected in Islamic BAs’ 
activities who regularly invite and visit, for example, the mayor, the provincial 
administrator (‘vali’), MP candidates and current MPs, ambassadors, representatives 
of the Turkish National Police (‘Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü’) or the Ministry of 
Economy: 
For our Gapgiad members getting to know state and government representatives and 
to have good relations with them is important, and therefore we organise many such 
meetings. If there are visitors to Gaziantep from the government, we try and arrange 
meetings with our association (...). (interview 3) 
The Hürsiad representative explains that they have no difficulties getting access to 
political elites, who are eager to hear their opinions. The AKP mayor Asım Güzelbey 
and the AKP MP and Family Affairs Minister Fatma Şahin (until 2013) are 
important in that respect. Tuskon headquarters’ intervention is not required to meet 
such political elites associated with Gaziantep, as relations are so close. Hürsiad 
leadership also likes to recount how the Prime Minister on his last visit spared one 
hour of his time to meet association members (interview 1). Similarly, the Islamic 
Gapgiad’s head says that they can easily voice their concerns to MPs, who are key 
contact points in reaching higher-level decision-makers:  
Of course, we regularly meet Antep’s MPs. When we visit Ankara, we meet them 
there, too, or they come and visit our association. They are permanently with us and 
we are permanently with them in different situations. We can meet them easily when 
we wish to. Our voice is always heard. (…) We have no complaints when it comes to 
our mayor, the provincial administrator or the MPs. (…) We don’t need Tuskon for 
these relations, because at the provincial level, we can easily meet whom we desire 
to meet. (interview 4) 
 
Islamic BA representatives mention that their access to other national and 
international elites, is facilitated by Müsiad’s headquarter in Müsiad’s case, and the 
federation Tuskon’s headquarter, in Hürsiad and Gapgiad’s cases (interviews 1, 2, 4). 
Müsiad leadership in Gaziantep actually regards their representation and cooperation 
with the incumbent government as Müsiad’s main activity: ‘Our cooperation with the 
government has produced a ‘magnetism’ that pulls everybody in’ (interview 7). 
Gaziantep’s leadership did not go into any further detail. Members do not mention 
any institutionalised or official type of policy-exchange, rather visits to and from the 
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associations, as well as meetings at social and civic events. In spite of these close 
relationships, not all members feel that their interests are heard by the administration 
(e.g. interview 18). While access to patronage resources is facilitated, real collective 
policy influence appears more limited to the largest of Islamic business groups, even 
for Anatolian capital. Good relations between AKP elites and Islamic BAs rather 
result in economic advantages for pious Anatolian SMEs through the various ways 
discussed below. 
3.2.2. Political ties and advantages 
3.2.2.a Access to information and bureaucracies 
Good relations with AKP elites can provide essential information to BAs 
collectively. Islamic BAs are more active in providing market-relevant information 
than the secular BA, which they acquire through their better AKP relations. Islamic 
Tuskon affiliates and Müsiad regularly organise seminars and talks to inform their 
members about the state of the economy, public stimuli programs (e.g. from the EU 
or the Development Agency), organisational strategy, or foreign markets, whereas 
the secular Gagiad has less such activities. Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates also 
organise more talks by bureaucrats (e.g. from Kosgeb or Tübitak), academics and 
other experts on general issues such as generational change within family firms, etc. 
(interviews 1 and 8).  
AKP bureaucrats or politicians cannot simply confer financial resources onto 
their favourites, as official procedures still have to be followed. This process is more 
indirect, as preferential information on support schemes is exchanged with BA 
leaders during ‘dini sohbet’ meetings (religious conversations), BA or other club 
dinners: 
No, they can’t simply ‘give’ away such advantages. But how would this work? (...) 
They generate a certain support, for example cheaper credits for SMEs, and then 
those companies who fulfil the stated conditions can apply (…). But the important 
thing is to be among the first to know about this opportunity. (…) Or even if you 
have a friend in banking who can tell you about good investments or macro-
economic conditions, that’s helpful, too. It’s not just getting the information, but also 
having your application or paperwork processed faster. For example, I tried to get 
support from Kosgeb and began to despair for a sum of eight billion TL (‘8 milyar 
TL’). But then I hear that others got that money within a few hours! But you can’t 
blame the employees at Kosgeb, this is an affair that comes from the top. (…) So 
everybody can apply to these things, and it’s not like only those with cemaat or AKP 
connections can get the deals. But if you have the right connections, everything turns 
faster, you don’t have to wait in the line and jump through all the hoops. (interview 
36) 
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Preferential treatment of movement-affiliates through AKP ties results in 
indirect economic assets by providing tailor-made and faster relevant information 
and bureaucratic processing to Islamic businesspeople, for example, during public 
tenders and economic stimuli programs. Acquiring information on future economic 
and foreign policy, or rather forward guidance, is a further key information resource 
provided through political ties. Changes in economic stimuli packages, foreign 
policy (e.g. the abolishment of visas to and from Syria), or macro-economic policy 
(e.g. interest-rates adjustments), can create major problems or advantages for 
businesses. Such political connections are even more important during periods of 
macro-economic instabilities. 
The macro-economic instability and high inflation of the 1990s made 
companies reluctant to undertake investment (interview 29). Political stability is 
regarded as key to macro-economic stability and the ability to plan ahead; most 
interviewees favourably judged the AKP on providing political and macro-economic 
stability (e.g. interview 29). Such uncertainty is also at its height during election 
periods, when investment decisions are usually put off (e.g. interview 23; Çakan, 
2007). There are still many difficulties for exporting textile companies arising from 
fluctuating dollar exchange rates and financial speculation affecting petrol and/or 
cotton prices (interviews 34 and 36). Under such high dependence on global 
financial markets and uncertainties, the largest companies especially require political 
and civic connections to get access to favourable loans and other support (interview 
36). 
To give another information-related example, many businessmen complained 
about the economic stimuli package to the neighbouring city of Kahramanmaraş, 
supposedly causing troubles for many Gaziantep textile companies due to an 
artificial and price-based competition (interview 34; “Koçer siyaset sahnesinde,” 
2011). Company owners who are aware of this decision ahead of time could open a 
production plant in Kahramanmaraş to profit from the stimuli package; or diversify 
into another profitable sector, like energy, or into production of higher value-added 
materials (e.g. technical textiles). As in other walks of life, being aware of the 
government’s plans can allow you to make the right strategic decisions which will 
translate into profits (interview 34).  
The same can be argued about changes in foreign policy, which are also 
crucial for companies with a high export share such as Gaziantep’s textiles. For 
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example, a large carpet manufacturer explains how the company initially had many 
difficulties, trying to set up their production plant in Russia concerning, freight, 
customs and other documentation, at a time when the Turkish government’s relations 
with Russia ‘were bad’. The final decision and investment was only made after the 
manufacturer was assured that the relations would move towards ‘zero problems 
with neighbours’ (interview 31). Especially at the start, teething problems require 
bureaucratic support, e.g. when freight and customs issues arose (interview 31); such 
relations, are more readily available to those with personal connections, facilitated by 
Islamic BAs. Some authors have argued that the new Islamic BAs have influenced 
Turkey’s foreign policy (Özcan & Turunç, 2011; Özvarış, 2013). Although not 
directly mentioned by my interviewees, the interests if the cemaat, conservative 
businessmen in Gaziantep and the AKP are aligned in foreign policy where the AKP 
aims at ‘zero problems with neighbours’, creating friendly relations with Middle 
Eastern and Turkic neighbours– areas where the Gülen community is also very active 
and Tuskon has focused its export promotion (beside the African continent). A 
national Müsiad representative mentioned their support for the direction taken (and 
indeed this might be more relevant at headquarters at the national level):  
We need to develop a foreign policy where we don’t just orient ourselves toward the 
West, but have to provide funds to the development and control of the East, 
especially the Caucasus, and Central Asia and Africa. The broadening of our foreign 
policy implies the expansion of our foreign trade with those countries, and Müsiad, 
Tuskon and Tüsiad as well as other civil society organisations promote this 
development by providing support and educational projects to their members. 
(interview 7) 
3.2.2.b Patronage networks: benefits for businesspeople 
The facilitated access to bureaucracies and market-relevant information 
described above can result in considerable advantages for Islamic businesses. New, 
more flexible public institutions operating at the local level were arguably founded 
by the AKP to support this patronage exchange, like the City Councils, Development 
Agencies or the infamous TOKI (‘Toplu Konut Idaresi’, Housing Development 
Administration). The resources of local administrations and the privatisations of 
public services were also stepped up, increasing the availability of local public rents 
(Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, 2012; Göçmen, 2011b; Özcan, 2006). Political ties 
generate economic growth for groups close to the government, either through BAs, 
who pass such information on to their members, or through personal networks 
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facilitated by BAs. Interviewees mentioned several advantages created through 
patronage networks that go beyond information provision. 
An insider interviewee describes how some of Gaziantep’s big businesses 
have the PM on their phones’ ‘speed-dial (interview 30). These direct relations 
provide ample opportunities for certain business interests to be actualised in 
policymaking, public tenders or privatisation deals. This top-level manager has 
worked at various big business groups in Gaziantep, and at one company was 
responsible for political relations. He describes his job as encompassing lobbying, 
keeping good relations with different public institutions, following developments in 
stimuli packages, and making strategies about how best to acquire and make use of 
them. This example illustrates how large business groups can profit from political 
ties by directly influencing policy-making in their favour:  
When I was working there, there was a clause in tax legislation that companies can 
profit from tax reductions, large offsets from corporate tax, when they found other 
companies, for which they cover the construction costs and a certain start-up capital. 
(…) The same goes for those entire corporate social responsibility projects that can 
also be offset from the corporate tax, if it’s an official school, for example. But this 
is not the easiest way of tax evasion. (interview 28) 
When this piece of legislation was about to come to an end in 2002, the employee 
claims that the holding owner  
called the PM and had it extended. He definitely has the power to change legislation 
pieces or to remove or introduce them. I don’t know if this type of support still exists 
in the legislation today. But this kind of thing is not just relevant for today, it has 
always happened in Turkey. (…) This reminds of George Orwell’s quote ‘All 
animals are equal, but some are more equal than others’. (interview 28)  
Such connections importantly extend to land dealings, and infrastructure projects 
through public tenders (interview 25). And while local infrastructure public tenders 
may not be relevant to textile operations, many big business groups are diversified to 
operate across sectors. Income from such big public tenders can be diverted to 
support investments in the textile branch. Acquiring building plots at a regional price 
in general is relevant to all expanding companies and requires political ties 
(interview 34). Therefore these processes are relevant for all sectors. For example, 
locals argue that Gaziantep’s leading holding has acquired many preferential deals, 
such as winning the privatisation deal of a public cement firm, or buying building 
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plots at a very good price73 (interview, 35). One of this holding’s board members, 
whom I interviewed, is also an MP candidate for the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP). He complained at length about the previous centre-left administration’s 
(CHP, 1989-2004) supposedly anti-business policy in Gaziantep, not providing the 
holding with a suitable building plot, which resulted in the partial move of the 
holding’s business operations to another city (interview 24). This illustrates how 
even for large business groups good relations with political elites at the local level 
can create serious (dis-) advantages. 
Another major Islamic holding in Gaziantep, while appearing to largely 
operate in plastics, has been said to make huge profit from infrastructure speculation 
due to its connections with the Gülen community and the Prime Minister. This 
observation is supported by the fact that they are involved in major building projects 
throughout Gaziantep with the TOKI. They are said to be able to buy land below the 
market rate, and then massively drive up prices through obtaining government or 
‘cemaat’ support in their building contracts, and then selling on such real estate for 
inflated prices (interviews 36 and 34). This can be achieved by, for example, 
changing the status of a piece of land from industrial use to be declared suitable for 
development and dwelling (interview 36). In the most recent wave of ‘corruption 
scandal’ arrests in Turkey, it was especially the ‘winners of corrupt, neoliberal 
urbanization’ and mass housing projects through TOKI and other mechanisms that 
were targeted (Tugal, 2013). Since the corruption scandal, there has been growing 
evidence that the government ‘has been manipulating public tenders for private gain’ 
(Rodeheffer, 2013). 
In sum, patronage networks generate economic growth for Anatolian capital 
collectively or individual businessmen individually through the following ways: 
preferential treatment during public tenders, privatisation deals, and economic 
stimuli programs (e.g. taking advantage of lower VAT or other tax rate programs or 
better loan conditions for SMEs from Kosgeb or the Development Agency); 
acquiring building plots and permits required to diversify into more regulated 
industries such as energy; pressuring political elites into business-friendly corporate 
and economic policy.  
                                                
 
73 For example, a small park in Gaziantep’s centre was said to have been sold for a low price 
to an influential business group to build a shopping centre there. 
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3.2.3. Patronage networks: benefits for AKP elites  
The consequence of such political capital is the generation of economic rents for 
Anatolian capital, which are then re-distributed to AKP elites and the Gülen 
community. AKP elites additionally gain crucial political support through patronage 
networks created by the Gülen community and Islamic BAs. 
In Gaziantep, several businessmen observe patronage networks where 
businessmen provide political and financial support in exchange for preferential 
access to policy-making and economic stimuli programs, (interviews 36, 34 and 25). 
MPs use businessmen’s help in the social realm, e.g. by creating jobs, to create 
electoral support:  
Before the elections, that’s always a big topic; the politicians will then start talking 
about social help, and promise some of them gold, some of them ‘lahmacun’ 
(Turkish pizza), others will get carpets or washing machines, and yet others are 
promised jobs. Everybody is looking for work, and then the MPs will call us and say: 
‘Look, why don’t you find him some job in your firm.’ I have my own workers, but I 
can’t say no to an MP, and so you’ll agree and hire some people until a little while 
after the elections, and then fire them again. But during that time period those 
employees will feel like they should give that MP their vote, because he gave them a 
job after all. (interview 34) 
This mechanism of social welfare provision is even more prevalent in the 
cooperation with the religious communities, which will be outlined further below. 
‘TOKI and urban development projects were not only created for new urban 
capitalists, but also provided transitory housing solutions and false hopes to lower 
income sectors, thereby expanding the party’s electoral base’ (Tuğal, 2013).  
Additionally, political and state elites require influential industrialists’ 
support for re-election or re-appointment to a post. For example, the provincial 
administrator  (‘vali’) may request businessmen’s contribution to build schools in 
return for access to the central government or other favours. In order to secure re-
appointment, good relations with business elites are important (interview 34). 
Companies profiting from movement assets will vote for the AKP to continue this 
system of exchanges, and may also persuade their employees to do so. This process 
has allegedly been witnessed by the interviewee at two big companies in Gaziantep 
(interview 36).  
A third way in that politicians profit from businessmen is through their 
campaign financing. Some go as far as to argue that companies have to make 
campaign contributions to their local AKP MPs because ‘they had to secure their 
futures’ (interview 36): 
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Businessmen try and get close to the government through different ways; becoming 
a cemaat member is one of the most effective ways. They become party members 
and work for certain politicians’ campaigns. (…) There’s serious money spent on 
these election campaigns and they need substantial sums for that (…). And this 
financial support is provided through those networks. Isn’t it the same in the US? 
(interview 28) 
During my visit after the 2011 general election, on two occasions, two different 
businessmen were called up by a peer and asked whom they voted for. Both 
businessmen had voted for the secular-left CHP, but pretended to be enthusiastic 
AKP supporters on the phone (interviews 34 and 36). This implies the existence of 
pressure and control mechanism in electoral processes. 
3.3. Civic activities  
This analysis goes beyond BAs’ activities to include businessmen’s activities with 
Gaziantep’s most important civil society organisations, including the Gülen 
community, and further clubs where secular or neutral businessmen meet, like the 
Rotary clubs. Also highly active in the social and welfare realm are ‘new’ public 
institutions like the City Council (‘Kent Konseyi’), run by the municipality, and the 
new Development Agency (‘Kalkınma Ajansı’) set up by the central government. I 
compare the types of activities companies and BAs engage in, and identify the 
institutions they cooperate with, and the advantages that such civic society projects 
can generate for owner-managers. The present investigation analyses how, through 
cooperation with the Gülen community, a religiously motivated civil society 
organisations may promote the growth of a legitimate pious business elite, and what 
resources are provided in exchange. It also shows how the simple activity of 
supporting Gaziantep’s education sector can be highly contested and how CSR 
provides a source of economic and political power (by displacing public institutions 
in the welfare/public realm, providing legitimacy, and indirectly economic rents by 
facilitating access to political elites and Gülen community).  
3.3.1. Islamic business associations and the Gülen community 
All BAs make donations to leading charities or the government when major natural 
disasters occur. Islamic BAs are also very active at distributing food and other 
products to the poor during religious holidays. Islamic BAs support mainly charities 
that are affiliates of different Islamic sects, such as the Gülen community’s ‘Kimse 
Yok Mu’, or to ‘Deniz Feneri’. Gagiad, on the other hand, does not provide any 
major funds to external charities linked with movements or parties.  
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Islamic BAs stress their educational contributions. Most importantly, Islamic 
BAs encourage or even require their members to donate to religiously motivated civil 
society organisations. Müsiad leadership says that most of their members are already 
very active in the CSR realm with ‘vakıfs’74, so that the association needs to provide 
little CSR activity (interview 9). Tuskon affiliates, but not the secular Gagiad, even 
evaluate civic engagement in their membership application form.  
Islamic BAs run a range of business-related and civic educational activities to 
support their membership and the Gülen cemaat. By contributing to such public 
welfare goods, they fill an ‘institutional void’ where human capital development is 
low and an urgent problem (several interviews), yet also make public institutions’ 
activities redundant. The Tuskon member Gapgiad outlines the importance of the 
Social Support Programme (‘Sosyal Destek Programı’, Sodes) projects for their 
members, provided through funds from the central government. Within this scheme, 
courses for members are organised to train, e.g., administrative personnel, give 
computer courses, train secretaries, graphic designers, all of which are all very 
popular and book up quickly. One businessman confirms that he took part in the 
course to train his secretaries and notes that the company could not have achieved 
this easily otherwise (interview 2). Hürsiad, the second Tuskon affiliate, even has its 
own classroom in its branch to support some its educational programmes: There are 
further courses offered to the general public, with additional funds from the EU that 
focus on youth unemployment (interview 1). The Hürsiad representative also states 
that they are active in the City Council’s education committee and the other local 
                                                
 
74 Islamic law sets vakıf institutions’ standards. They were the main institutions delivering 
social services in the Ottoman Empire until the 19th century and played an important role in 
the social, cultural and economic life. They relied on a combination of public and private 
funds. Secular vakıfs with the involvement of party members were founded during the inter-
war étatist period, while Islamic vakıfs were abolished. With the gradual re-emergence of 
Islam in Turkey’s political sphere after economic liberalisation in the 1980s, Islamic vakıfs 
have begun to make a comeback both in the private and public spheres. In the public sphere, 
the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund of 1986 was the first step by the Central 
Government to build institutions modeled on Ottoman vakıfs to provide social services to 
those not covered by social security systems; currently there are over 900 State vakıfs. 
Alongside these, private vakıfs or civil society organisations and social assistance through 
municipal governments also began to mushroom (Göçmen, 2011a, pp. 3–7). The Sodes 
Program is one of those State vakıfs operating at the regional and local levels since 2008. It 
was formed with the aim to promoting the development of southeastern Turkey to reduce 
regional and social disparities (as part of the well-known GAP program). This program relies 
on local dynamics and projects are mostly supported and implemented by collaborations of 
public, private sector and civil society organisations (Kurtipek, 2012). 
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vakıfs. Hürsiad also provides scholarships, supporting the Gülen cemaat’s core 
activity (interview 1).  
3.3.2. Secular business association and secular clubs 
Just like the Islamic BAs above, Gagiad also provides donations during natural 
catastrophes, however these are limited to Turkey and publicised in a neutral, non-
contentious way (interview 6). Nor does Gagiad offer activities and donations related 
to religious holidays or to religious charities when questioned about civic projects; 
whereas Müsiad leadership stressed the association’s contribution to Islamic art, 
helping the poor during Ramadan, etc. (interviews 6 and 8). 
Analysing Gagiad’s homepage and brochures (GAGIAD, 1994, p. e.g. , 
GAGIAD, 2007, GAGIAD, 2010a, GAGIAD, 2010b, GAGIAD, 2011), Gagiad has 
initiated a large range of activities: Building pre-schools, improving teaching in 
technology and in pre-schools, building a library for the hearing- and reading-
impaired, planting trees or even increasing female labour market participation 
(interview 5). For example, Gagiad built about 70-75 such pre-school classrooms and 
were also involved with the university in trying to improve the pedagogical 
education of teachers by providing insights into the pre-school education and 
informing them also about the private school sector and its pedagogical 
requirements. Each of these classrooms is estimated to cost on average about 3,000 
TL (interview 6). 
These activities are run in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the 
vali, and the public Gaziantep University, but financed by the association itself and 
given over to the authorities, once finished. For example, the library is a project 
coordinated with the municipality and the Chamber of Industry (interview 6). 
Compared to Islamic BAs’ activities, neither further civil society organisations, nor 
the cemaat are involved, nor is there direct state support75 (compared to Tuskon’s 
quasi-public functions receiving state funds to implement training courses). A 
Gagiad representative also takes part in the City Council meetings together with 
various Gagiad members, besides their involvement in the Ministry of Education 
committee on education. This again shows the secular BA’s involvement with 
                                                
 
75 An exception to this rule is Gagiad’s recent technology project where they were awarded 
funds from Sodes as well (“Gagiad,” n.d.). 
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bureaucratic and older public institutions rather than private and religiously 
motivated civil society organisations. Gagiad is the only non-governmental 
organisation invited to participate in this committee that deals with educational 
issues together with the Chambers, the provincial administration, the provincial 
treasury and other bureaucratic organisations (interview 5).  
Rotary and Lions clubs are very active in Gaziantep, too, and their activities 
and self-descriptions provide a good comparison with the Gülen community. The 
Rotary club member stresses that compared to the Gülen cemaat, the club is not 
interested in promoting inter-firm trade among its members. It criticizes educational 
activities by the cemaat and its affiliated vakıfs (e.g. the Ipek Vakif)76 for only 
serving their followers and Islamic goals (interview 27). They also do projects 
beyond education, as their goal was not to create a ‘league of followers’: 
When we give out scholarships, we give them equally to girls with and without 
headscarves. They [referring to Gülen cemaat] aren’t like that. During my term as 
head of the club, we left the selection of students to an external vakıf. (interview 27) 
 
Rotary’s scholarships in Turkey are on a much smaller scale than those of the 
Gülen community; the interviewee estimates that the cemaat may support half a 
million students with scholarships.77 Some regard Rotary and Lions Clubs as direct 
competitors to Islamic civil society organisations: ‘What does the government do to 
react to these clubs? It builds its own system to profit from it; it builds a system for 
pious citizens’ (interview 34). The Rotary, and Tennis and Equestrian clubs as well, 
are regarded as staunchly secular institutions that are oriented toward or even 
controlled by a nebulous group of Western and US powers. In opposition to these, 
Islamic actors create social alternatives such as a new Islamic Equestrian Club or 
religious meeting groups. This again illustrates the political competition among even 
civil society organisations and social clubs. 
                                                
 
76 Naksan’s vakıf is called the Ipek Vakıf. The holding is said to be the Gülen cemaat’s 
unofficial Gaziantep leader. 
 
77 Of course, the club also contributes to international projects that Rotary worldwide 
organises where a larger budget comes from all clubs. 
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3.3.3. Benefits from corporate social responsibility 
3.3.3.a Public legitimacy, access to network resources and human capital 
Many businessmen in Gaziantep conduct individual CSR activities. They gain major 
legitimacy by promoting themselves as alleged providers of public goods (e.g. 
education) by sponsoring highly visible institutions and naming schools, hospitals, 
and mosques after themselves (interview 10). A current employee at the 
municipality, who has had insights into local budgets also through a previous 
position, describes businessmen’s motivation for CSR: 
The provincial administration together with the Ministry of Education deals with 
building schools. The municipality does only have a legal role in the maintenance of 
those schools. (…) Businessmen can make donations to the Ministry, or they can 
themselves buy land, build a school and then donate it, usually under the condition 
that the school carries his name. But only when they see a monetary advantage, 
when they can put their name on the school, will they donate. Another way for the 
provincial administration to have a school built is to contract out the construction 
through public tenders (interview 10).  
‘Last year approximately ‘25 trillion TL’ was spent to build schools’ (interview 11), 
illustrating the huge cost involved. Most importantly, Islamic BAs and businessmen 
make such donations to get access to the Gülen community’s socio-economic 
network, and to political capital. Only companies selected by the local bureaucracies 
are ‘allowed’ to donate and name schools after themselves, a process that requires 
political connections (interview 10). In return, making these donations with and 
through the Gülen community provides the cemaat with capital to fund its network 
and with public legitimacy. These advantages are reflected in the large amount of 
CSR conducted by Gaziantep’s firms: In Gaziantep many insider firms openly or 
secretly donate funds or whole educational institutions such as dorms, cram schools 
(‘dershanes’), or schools to the movement. A businessman with cemaat connections 
argues that most of the schools built by businessmen in Gaziantep are done for and 
with the cemaat (interview 21), such as those built by Gapgiad and Hürsiad 
leadership (interviews 4 and 2). Many of these projects actually stay hidden because 
members may not want to openly show their affiliation in public (Interview 19). The 
most influential firms also build their own independent schools, like the private 
Sanko School or Merinos’s schools, and run their private vakıfs for such large 
projects (interviews 21 and 31). The most active holding in the corporate social 
responsibility realm in Gaziantep is Sanko Holding. Many interviewees’ children go 
to the private Sanko School and the current mayor used to work at the Sanko 
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Hospital. Leading, large business groups are sımply expected to make large 
donations for legitimacy reasons, because they set an example (interview 34). A 
pious businessman points out that those businesses spend about 5-10 million YTL on 
constructing a mosque or school (interview 23). There are numerous examples of 
large contributions by Islamic businessmen to the Gülen community. The unofficial 
Gülen movement representative in Gaziantep has made large contributions by 
building a university, Zirve University, and so has the Kalyoncu group by building 
the Gazikent university and the private Erdem schools (which are known as cemaat 
schools; interview 17). The Islamic Gapgiad’s leadership, who is also the owner of a 
large business group, donated three schools named after their family in 1995 
(interview 4). Hürsiad’s leadership tells me of its multiple school donations (e.g. 
building 2 dorms) and its scholarships offered to the Gülen-affiliated Ipek Vakıf 
(interview 2). 
Besides fully sponsoring schools, Islamic businessmen also pay ‘zekat’ or 
alms (1/40th of budget) to religious communities, a major pillar of Islam and 
financial resource for the Gülen community. As part of their religious service, the co-
owners of a medium-sized carpet manufacturer (interview 22), give zekat, organise 
pilgrimages (‘ümres’) and donate scholarships to the cemaat. They say they do this 
to gain God’s approval and because the ‘hoca’ asks them to contribute to Turkey’s 
education sector. Further such justifications and conceptualisations of charity and 
business activity as fulfilling Allah’s calling were discussed in Chapter V.  
The AKP plays an important role in legitimising and supporting private and 
religiously motivated civil society organisations’ contributions to public goods. The 
‘cemaat’ is inherently more dependent on political elites to legitimise its active 
pursuit of Islamic interests. And while the secular Gagiad also requires legitimacy 
for its money-making, the once outlawed Islamic elites have a larger vulnerability. 
One key advantage of collaboration is therefore the acquisition of public legitimacy 
through public support and friendly/supportive policies toward Gülen schools. The 
fact that the Ministry of Education accepts Gülen schools is a support mechanisms 
between the community and the AKP, ultimately legitimising its educational 
projects. A second legitimising process is Tuskon affiliates’ quasi-public function in 
running education-related projects in its branches with funds allocated by the central 
government’s SODES Program (Social Support Programme). And so are the tax 
advantages provided to companies who give donations to Islamic vakıfs and specific 
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charities in Turkey and abroad. Companies donating schools accepted by the 
Ministry of Education can be offset from corporate tax (interview 10). Tax 
legislation thereby indirectly supports the cemaat’s educational activities. Of course, 
these kinds of mechanisms exist worldwide and it is not just movement members that 
can profit from such tax reductions. The areas of tax reduction have shifted over time 
to include, e.g. mosques or health centres, depending on the government’s welfare 
needs (interview 10).  
Finally, Islamic BA members who support Gülen’s educational activities may 
be able to employ graduates of these schools, and therefore find suitable employees 
more easily. This can help ‘to create a different kind of team spirit, they become a 
group’ (interview 25). Indeed, owner-managers constantly complain about not being 
able to find good mid-level managers and apprentices, and about the low level of 
human capital in Gaziantep province in general (interviews 33, 30, 21, 20, 18). A 
local teacher explains that the cemaat is very interested in tracking the best students. 
They do detailed family checks on the family and expect you to ‘fit in with their 
philosophy’, arguing that in her experience access depends on religiosity. Ipek 
Göçmen (Göçmen, 2011b, 2014) in her in-depth study of various religiously 
motivated welfare organisations in Turkey, supports this point of view. Of course, 
that does not prevent students from being independent after graduating from a Gülen 
school (interview 17). Less gifted but devout children are sometimes later placed in 
companies in Turkey and the Middle East as workers (interview 17), providing 
human capital to Islamic businesses. Gülen schools abroad are often high-quality 
schools that often train the children of national elites and help developing close 
relations with political elites (Rodeheffer, 2013). 
3.3.3.b Further financial resources provided by Gülen community and 
political ties 
So far I have shown that CSR provides access to network resources and public 
legitimacy. Beyond the economic resources offered by Islamic BAs directly, this 
section focuses on further resources that the Gülen community and AKP elites 
provide to build a pious business elite.  
Both Tuskon and Müsiad can offer financial resources via access to top 
bureaucrats and politicians. Müsiad leadership, for example, explains that it does not 
directly provide financial help to its members, but will liaise with financial 
institutions if a member is in financial distress. Müsiad cannot pay a member’s debts, 
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but it will bring its members in touch with the right people and thus provide 
opportunities to protect them (interview 8). Müsiad elites can get preferential deals 
from public banks or the Gülen community’s Bank Asya. Bank Asya, has grown to 
be among Turkey’s largest banks with the support of AKP elites (Rodeheffer, 2013). 
Hürsiad, via the Bank Asya, offers ‘financial help if a company is in distress’ 
(interview 1), and certain legal services for free. Members can acquire loans more 
easily and faster when key political elites and/or shareholders vouch for a 
businessman’s creditworthiness. Through such ties, loan conditions can be improved 
too, providing lower interest rates, or longer repayment periods to members.  
 
In contrast, the secular Gagiad’s leaders and members state that there are no 
such financial opportunities offered (interview 6). Nevertheless, big business groups 
may enjoy similar possibilities through personal contacts to top politicians. The key 
difference is that through the Islamic Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates such possibilities 
are now available to a broader base of businesses across the country, on the condition 
that members have proven to be trustworthy and sympathetic to the BAs’ goals 
through supportive activities and long-term membership.  
The following example of a large textile group’s current financial troubles 
illustrates how the religious community can build up an entire business group. The 
current owner-manager of this company is in a leadership position at a Tuskon 
affiliate and has sponsored multiple schools to the Gülen community. A current 
outsider, yet former elite businessman, details this example. This businessman is at 
the same time a remote relative of the textile group owners in question, and his 
family also features prominent secular-left politicians:  
They [the Gülen community] are a big power. Imagine that if one of them is about to 
go bust, if a big firm is about to go bankrupt, the cemaat has its own bank, so they 
steer it to them; they give them cheques. They get all sorts of assistance, be it 
economically, during the sales process; they’re a very big power/force. When they 
founded a company, they didn’t have any background in the industry, nothing in 
their past, no money; imagine that! Even right now, [the owner] (…) is completely 
broke. After its foundation, it wobbled once, in 2007/2008; Bank Asya took care of 
that. (…) It’s one of the easiest things in the world to ruin a company, especially a 
large one. (interview 36) 
A businessman whose partners are involved in the cemaat confirms this story as it is 
widely known in Gaziantep that this textile group had to almost close down due to 
bankruptcy. But it has managed to survive due to its bank connections. According to 
this interviewee, the company’s financial troubles have been caused by: the on-going 
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civil war in Syria that stopped production at its plant over the border; the trade union 
DISK strikes; and the general difficulty of generational change from father to son 
(interview 21).  
Some older and secular businesses, who do not vote for the AKP or join the 
cemaat, attribute their current financial struggles to their deteriorating political 
capital. Interviewee 36 inherited a plastics and a yarn firm; his father was among the 
founders of the free trade zone, and he himself was a founder of leading secular 
organisations. He explains that his family company did suffer from internal family 
problems that eventually led to a split-up of the family business in the 1980s. But the 
loss of connections is regarded as key reason for deteriorating business: 
Of course, what does the cemaat do: It gives its firms financial help, for example 
interest-free loans. Our firm was one of the first in Gaziantep to produce nylon 
plastic bags, I mean we weren’t the first, but we were among the first two to three 
companies doing this business in Gaziantep. Another firm that opened at the same 
time as us closed down; but most came later. Naksan [note: owner is said to be the 
local Gülen cemaat leader] only started two years before us. Originally they didn’t 
do printed bags – that’s what we did back then – but then they got their own 
machinery for printing. Of course, their development has been very different from 
ours, they grew very fast, and you know the reasons for that. Because we couldn’t 
profit from the same things, they grew very fast. (interview 34) 
3.3.4. Patronage networks: creating political support for AKP elites 
The support of the cemaat and of Islamic BAs is regarded as crucial for the AKP’s 
continued electoral victories, both through their social and welfare programs and 
their financial and electoral support. This is the key incentive for AKP’s 
collaboration in this resource exchange. Several businessmen describe how the 
financial and social help by the cemaat to the very poor, and their endorsement for 
the AKP, has created electoral support among the low income sectors:  
Remember that many Turks are still illiterate or have never been to school; and they 
don’t have any bread (…). Those people are easily controlled through their 
stomachs. Then somebody comes who promises them a job and income, and makes 
some political propaganda. And then he’ll ask: ‘Do you believe in Allah, in the 
Koran?’ Of course the poor devil will say: ‘Yes, I believe. I swear by the Holy 
Scripture.’ In the same breath, he’ll be asked to vote for the AKP, and get in return a 
table, chair and some money. He’ll let him eat and then collect his vote. Of course, 
such people are not just naïve, but also poor and hungry. (interview, 34) 
They keep saying they’re independent, but they’re not. They showed their true 
colours during the election, they all worked for the AKP, and they said that openly 
during their religious meetings/reading-groups (‘dini sohbetler’). The supporters of 
the cemaat, especially the lower classes, are often very naïve people, who do this to 
fulfil Allah’s will, to win his grace, these are people with very good intentions. Many 
cemaat workers are like this. (interview 36) 
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Engagement in civil society and rent seeking can go hand in hand. For 
example, when businessmen take over public functions by investing into 
infrastructure projects in return for access to and influence in policy-making:  
Of course, the vali is often involved in these development projects; he tries to gather 
enough money and therefore he will try and have good relations with the Chambers 
and businessmen. People will also want to meet him because of his position. The vali 
could decide that there should be a school built on a certain plot of land according to 
the province’s development plan, and he might refer that responsibility to the owner 
of Sanko holding, who will then do it. This exchange creates positive externalities 
for both parties involved. Actually this benefit is based on profit. The vali needs the 
support of the population and influential leaders for the party to be voted back into 
power and to keep his position. The businessman, on the other hand, will, of course, 
in return request favours from the vali, often it’s a problem that involves the central 
government. Many mosques and schools were built in this way in Gaziantep. 
(interview 34) 
 
Some businessmen argue that the Gülen cemaat with its millions of followers 
and its spiritual sway has so much power that it can significantly influence the 
outcome of elections.78 
It does currently look as if the AKP’s electoral victories do depend on the cemaat’s 
support. But this trajectory can change at any time. The cemaat can at any time 
withdraw its support for the AKP, at the end of the day, whether they cooperate or 
not depends on how the battle of profit is played out. (interview 28)  
Others argue that the cemaat doesn’t contribute much to the AKP’s electoral 
victories (interview 21). The current corruption scandal and mud-slinging between 
the AKP and Gülen movement has shown that the cemaat can at least shape public 
opinion and politicians’ careers through controlling a large media network, and 
access to its followers in the judicial and police forces.  
3.4. Politico-religious contention in business organisation 
BAs’ activities analysed above are contentious, because, as the frame analysis 
(Chapter V) has shown, the Islamic movement aims to promote a legitimate, pious 
business elite and support base through Islamic BAs. BAs are organised along 
                                                
 
78 The most recent 2014 local elections seem to show that the cemaat cannot easily direct its 
followers to not vote for the AKP. In spite of the conflict between AKP and Fethullah Gülen, 
the AKP actually increased its votes in comparison to the 2009 local elections. Why the 
conflict has not resulted in a loss of votes for the AKP remains unclear: It might be that the 
patronage networks have become so strong and self-reinforcing that their profiteers do not 
wish to exit them in spite of leadership’s disagreements. Or else, the new pious middle and 
lower income sectors supported by such networks do not find there is a good alternative to 
the AKP. At present it is too early to judge the effects of these conflicts.  
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politico-religious lines and nurture only their own memberships, where access 
depends on providing support and religiosity. Business organisation is regarded as an 
arena of political contention by businesspeople. Several businessmen point out the 
importance of collective organisation for businessmen to create public legitimacy, 
representing collective rather than individual interests. They also indicate that 
political and bureaucratic elites prefer to deal with larger organised groups. 
Gaziantep’s BAs do more than ‘window-dressing’, in spite of any personal 
exchanges. They are essential bodies for legitimate collective action for 
businessmen. Leadership from Hürsiad, explains: 
I don’t have any complaints, if I require I can easily get an appointment at the 
financial administration. But there’s a difference, as a civil society organisation you 
represent civil society. Hürsiad has more than 400 members in Gaziantep. It’s 
completely different to pick up the phone and make a call as the leader of Hürsiad or 
as the producer [interviewee name removed]. I’m not just representing myself 
anymore, but a group. Your counterpart will perceive and judge you very differently. 
They express their problems, you express yours and by organising you can meet 
under one roof and get the chance to express those to relevant parties. (interview 2) 
Even the owner of one of the largest carpet manufacturing firms worldwide, who 
may be expected to rely on personal networks only, argues that ‘organising always 
brings advantages. To have your voice heard, to express your force/power’ 
(interview 31). 
Beyond such legitimate representation, BAs are perceived to be part of 
broader political power struggles, i.e. as political rather than just efficiency-related 
organisations. They represent different factions based on politico-ideological views 
along the left-right spectrum. A businessman asked about the key difference between 
Gaziantep’s BAs, comes up with the following underlying distinction: 
There are many groups, but there are two key factors here: The first system is a 
system that mixes politics with religion; the second is a system that regards politics 
and religion as separate. These two different world views are reflected in the 
associational landscape, they give rise to different groups, now there are extreme 
ends of this continuum, and more moderate groups (…) and these split up into 
different factions. (…) There are also groups like Hamas here, but we as 
industrialists are very distant from them, I wouldn’t know anything about them. 
(interview 34) 
It is not just secular, but also Islamic businessmen who regard religion as a key 
differentiating factor between Gaziantep’s BAs: 
They have many resemblances, only their understandings are different; one of them 
relies on religion, on morality; that is Müsiad, whose members don’t drink alcohol. 
So they have different understandings; and it is people with similar views who will 
get together. (interview 23) 
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There is a specific group of people that would go to these associations, and another 
group would go to another type of association (…). The Chambers are independent. 
(interview 21) 
 
The contention and polarisation between these factions is illustrated in the 
next statement. This pious businessman regards BAs in Turkey as different factions 
and class-based organisations that he does not want to be a part of. In a heated 
discussion about the secular-Islamic polarisation he complains about how this has 
created tensions with his business partners, who contribute to the Gülen community, 
which he does not like (interview 21). He continues: 
We argue a lot about this here. They are so against the AKP, they find Erdoğan 
fascist. It’s because members of the military have been put into prison increasingly, 
and their trials haven’t been worked on – it’s not right, I agree (…). But there aren’t 
any common points to agree on, they are so against us, they are against the 
publicisation of the Dersim massacres, they are against bringing up old problems, 
they are like dinosaurs, and they still get around 30% of the vote! (interview 21) 
A large carpet producer puts this polarisation in more moderate terms: 
All civil society organisations are positive as long as they don’t have a political 
identity or are connected to a specific group (…). (…). It’s most dangerous when 
different factions emerge to represent people’s different skin colours, languages, 
religions, ethnicities or religious views. We’ve seen many examples of this across 
the world, and this continues to be one of Turkey’s most pressing issues. (interview 
31) 
Islamic BAs’ collective action is regarded as a political process that challenges state 
authority – a key aspect of social movements:  
It’s matter of balance. It’s harder to destroy people when they’re organised, but it’s 
very easy to destroy them one by one. In order to put pressure on the 
government…it’s not possible to do that as an individual. One person cannot be 
more powerful than the government. (…) But a large group can create fear in the 
government, and they [referring to Islamic BAs] are aware of it. (interview 36) 
Islamic BAs promote production and trade, information-exchange and provide other 
seeming non-contentious services. However, these services are limited to each 
association’s own membership (interview 4), aimed at promoting a limited business 
class:  
 All of these business associations have their own goals, they are business 
associations, but our [referring to City Council] goals are different, we only want to 
promote Antep’s development. (...) We don’t just represent a certain section of the 
population; (…) the other associations operate in their own interest and for 
themselves. (interview 11) 
And although knowledge and information can easily flow to all businessmen because 
they can be members of multiple associations, core advantages and activities are only 
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conferred to key members who have shown their convictions repeatedly with 
multiple projects. This is also reinforced by the rigorous membership selection 
process, which is also based on religiosity (see Chapter V). While Tuskon’s 
extensive trade conferences are very helpful, it is only the most active, who are 
chosen to participate, and there are long waiting lists (interview 19). This can be 
interpreted as an effort to create a distinct business elite along politico-ideological 
lines.  
3.5. Costs and consequences: indirect institutional change 
This resource exchange is not only contentious because it promotes the movement’s 
political influence through the creation of a legitimate, pious business elite, but also 
because it indirectly promotes institutional change. As well as providing political and 
financial support to SMOs in return for access to essential resources, Islamic 
businessmen are expected to conform to certain business and private codes of 
behaviour. 
Businessmen acknowledge that these political exchanges are similar to the 
pre-AKP era. While the types of groups involved have changed as well as the 
benefits themselves, the mechanisms are largely the same. Business groups close to 
the governments were always able to profit more, be it under Atatürk, the PMs 
Menderes, Özal or now Erdoğan (interviews 21, 36, and 34). 
This cooperation is built upon profit. Each period has its pasha. The rich of the Özal 
period are different from those of the Ecevit or Demirel periods. Demirel’s family 
members got very rich during his terms, but as soon as the government changed, it 
completely destroyed them. (interview 36) 
However, one key difference to earlier periods of business politics is the types of 
pressures and costs associated with membership in BAs. Since the AKP took over 
the local administration in Gaziantep in 2004, neighbourhood pressure has increased 
and many businessmen feel forced to exhibit their religious piety in an ‘AKP-
appropriate’ way: 
The AKP has introduced this Islamic weight, that’s why people who wouldn’t have 
prayed or fasted during religious holidays before, now suddenly show off how they 
supposedly don’t drink, pray five times a day and have their wives and daughters 
covered, just so the others see him and say: Look, he’s an AKP supporter. (…) They 
check everything, where did you go to school, who are your friends, where did you 
go, they will know if you went to a restaurant and had a drink. (…) They note if 
you’ve been to the Friday prayer or not. (…). But I believe what’s in the soul is 
important, and it doesn’t matter if you drink or not, as long you don’t hurt anybody. I 
believe in Allah, but I vote for the CHP. (interview 34) 
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Some businessmen who are not already so inclined or practice privately, feel they 
now have to signal their alliance by exhibiting behaviour in their private lives that 
match the AKP’s and the cemaat’s views of a pious (Sunni) Islamic capitalist. 
Businessmen who are not directly involved with these groups also feel the pressure 
to display certain codes of behaviour. This extends to businessmen’s families, 
because BAs check the family backgrounds of their members (e.g. interview 29). 
The same applies to applicants of training programmes or scholarships from Islamic 
BAs. Beside building schools for the movement and joining certain clubs and 
associations and not others, daily life in the factory is also affected: For example, it is 
obligatory to provide a prayer room for employees, to go the mosque during Friday 
prayer, to organise and participate in pilgrimage tours, and not to offer any alcohol to 
employees or to drink themselves (e.g. interview 23). Islamic businessmen also feel 
obliged to buy the Gülen community’s newspapers and put them on display (e.g. 
Zaman newspaper), to pay ‘zekat’ (donating 1/40th of company’s profit to a vakıf or 
the cemaat), or to conduct interest-free banking (through the Gülen community’s 
bank Bank Asya or other Islamic banks), beside contributing to the cemaat’s 
educational efforts and taking part several times a week in religious meetings 
(interviews 34 and 21). Islamic BAs promote such business practices and institutions 
more or less directly. For example, Tuskon leaders state that their members are 
conservative anyway, and that therefore there would be no alcohol during trips, 
dinners or meetings (interviews 1 and 4). However, the following quotes indicate that 
businessmen perceive such Islamic practices and behaviours more as forced upon 
them and controlling, resulting in a loss of freedom. I ask a businessman who is very 
pious, but secular, why he personally does not like to become a member of an 
Islamic BA or the cemaat. He says he often fights with his business partners about 
this issue because they are cemaat and Islamic BA members, but he thinks it’s 
wrong: 
A normal, independent man who knows his job doesn’t need this, his work could 
actually get worse, because they can rob you of your independence. By getting into 
these circles, a set of dependencies emerges. (…) Why should I have my worldview 
registered? I only want to be known by my work, not by my political or religious 
views, because in business there should be no such thing. (…) I don’t like being 
imposed with a certain view. (…) Of course this is not secular (‘laik’). (…) It’s 
difficult, and there’s only so many times you can say no, for example, I declined 
being a part of their ‘Turkish Olympics’ recently, so at least, yes, you have to buy 
and display their [referring to the cemaat] newspaper. (interview 21) 
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This view is strikingly similar to the view by one of Gaziantep’s older secular elites 
who argues that joining results in loss of independence in business decisions: 
They [referring to cemaat] don’t leave you alone, but tell you: ‘Now it’s your turn to 
go and help Ali, for example’. Once the company has grown, (…) they direct you. 
(…) Right now I am my company’s dictator, what I say is the truth. But once you 
join them you lose your independence, you become dependent upon them. (interview 
34) 
Both the secular-left and pious businessmen quoted above are against involving 
religion in business affairs (interviews 21 and 34). 
Look, we do pray and read the Koran, but our faith is our own, it’s nothing you can 
force somebody to do. Faith is not something where 2 and 2 equals 4, it’s not 
something that can or should be part of a group that checks individuals’ strength of 
faith. It’s not mathematics, it’s a very deep topic, there shouldn’t be the need for a 
reference or whatever confirming your faith. (interview 21) 
 
While not all-encompassing, the importance of signalling the right types of 
behaviours and affiliations has created a strong pressure for those who are not strong 
insiders, and can significantly impact upon a company’s reputation. That does not 
mean that all businessmen suddenly follow these codes of behaviour. Within big 
companies, it is often the case that one or two of the owners who are already so 
inclined do strengthen their efforts in the Islamic direction, whereas other owners 
may join or stay with the secular business elite. But large business groups feel the 
pressure, too. A very large carpet producers got a bad reputation for allegedly not 
allowing its employees to fulfil their religious duties of prayer and not praying 
themselves; a prayer room (‘mescit’) was then provided (interview 21) and the 
Friday prayer is even advertised on the company’s homepage now. Its owner-
manager gets angry about this issue in the interview and says:  
There is absolutely no way we would forbid Friday prayer, this is completely wrong! 
We even have a bus service to make sure all our working friends can fulfil their 
religious practices. (…) This rumour was spread as part of a smear campaign by one 
of our competitors. (interview 31) 
 
Interviewees provide mixed messages as to what extent the cemaat can 
actually force business decisions such as which subcontractor to select, on its 
members. While some argue that this is the case, other interviewees point out that the 
system works more subtly through referrals. Once a company has reached a certain 
size it has to go beyond the religious cemaat market and therefore can no longer 
make business decisions based on partisanship and religion. However, as illustrated 
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above, large business groups’ dependence on the movement is magnified through 
their larger financial vulnerability and needs. The type and extent of the cemaat’s 
business influence therefore depends on firm size and also on the extent of a 
company’s involvement in the movement: 
[The cemaat] can’t directly tell you this is correct, this is wrong. But because they 
have control over these people, as they are the reason the company even got to a 
certain stage, they can say: ‘You should enter the energy market’, and if the owner 
does not have the necessary skills for this business, they will find a cooperating 
partner for him. (…)  (…) But a lot of money goes to the Gülen cemaat’s schools, 
where they indirectly nurture trade by educating students in the Turkish language 
and Islamic culture so that they might later enter trade relations with Turkey. And 
then they can say, because they might have a spiritual sway over a person or might 
have given them a scholarship: ‘Come, why don’t you buy your chocolate biscuits 
from Ülker [originally Islamic business group].’ (interview 34) 
On the other hand, that does not mean that subcontractors, customers, and providers 
of input materials, are only selected among the movement’s membership because this 
would hurt its economic survival in the long run, especially for big firms expanding 
internationally: 
That doesn’t mean they [referring to Müsiad and Tuskon members] will ALWAYS 
sell their products to outsiders at a higher rate. It also doesn’t mean that you will 
always accept another member’s order just because you are in the same association, 
it can be up to the firm to decide if the opposite side looks trustworthy to you (...) 
They don’t exclusively sell products to other members, because the number one 
concern is the company’s profit and survival. If there is a serious potential customer 
who looks good to them, no matter of what colour, the company’s first goal is profit. 
(interview 34)  
You can’t survive by just selling your products to cemaat members; you have to sell 
to anybody. (interview 25) 
The cemaat can no longer dictate to Naksan what to do every step of the way; 
they’ve become too big. (interview 36) 
But as argued above, BAs or the cemaat can function as important bridges and 
mediators between businessmen, creating trust and closeness based on similarity, and 
thereby promote business through referrals:  
If a firm is looking for plastic bags and knows a plastic producer because, say, 
they’re both Müsiad members and they like each other, why should that firm go to 
another producer who is a stranger, outside of that association? Another member can 
give you a price reduction, whereas an outsider will pay the full price. (interview 34) 
They can’t always tell you to work with a certain other company because that might 
create serious losses for the company, and therefore also for the cemaat. But 
providing referrals through the system is important way of doing this. (…) For 
example, I bring my good friend to my business association, and they run a business 
background check on that person. Has he paid his cheques, ever committed any 
fraud? Does he share the associations’ convictions? And if so, he will join and then 
also join religious meetings where people get even closer, meeting several times a 
week, meeting certain decision-makers (…). (interview 36) 
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3.6. Organisational structures  
This section analyses the organisational structures of the three local BAs in 
Gaziantep and their national affiliations, where it applies. Tüsiad, the oldest of 
Turkey’s BAs that represents mainly the large holdings from the Istanbul-Marmara 
region is partly included as a point of references; I interviewed two Tüsiad members 
in Gaziantep. The results are compared in Table 10. Organisations with strong 
structures have rich resources (in terms of staff, membership fees/available budget) 
and effective internal intermediation; that is organisational structures that allow 
mediating between central/leadership and local/members’ interests, between control 
and interest aggregation. In other words, strong organisational structures effectively 
represent members’ interests to external actors (if that is part of a BA’s activities) 
and allow for the integration of a variety of local interests. 
The Islamic Tuskon affiliate Hürsiad and the secular Gagiad show the highest 
level of internal intermediation. Tuskon’s pyramidal confederation structure allows 
for both control and aggregation of interests (cf. Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). This 
type of organisational structure supports mobilisation of local interests and their 
combination into shared goals. The secular Gagiad is also a member of a national-
level confederation called Tügik. However, none of Gagiad’s members in describing 
its activities ever mentioned that confederation, other than for occasional social trips 
and visits to other member BAs. Tügik does not appear to be involved in the interest 
formation to the same extent as Tuskon is for its BA members. While Gagiad’s 
internal intermediation is high, that of its confederation appears to be low, therefore 
it overall receives a lower rating in internal intermediation compared to the Tuskon 
affiliates. 
The flexible integration of local interests, and centralised control at Tuskon, 
is indicated in the following way: Tuskon affiliates and the secular Gagiad, but not 
Müsiad, make decisions within their Gaziantep branches, and decide upon their 
programs, activities and membership selection themselves, rather than following 
orders from central headquarters (interviews 1, 3, and 6). Both Tuskon affiliates were 
to some extent independent before joining Tuskon, which also shows that the Gülen 
community appropriated existing structures rather than creating new ones in its effort 
to create political influence. That does not mean that the local associations can 
pursue whatever activity they desire, they still have to be within Tuskon’s framework 
if they aim to remain members. Gapgiad’s representative, for example, says that the 
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association cannot pursue activities without Tuskon’s prior knowledge (interview 3). 
Tuskon’s high importance for export activities gives the federation important 
leverage and the ability to gather local associations behind the central organisation. 
Sending staff from headquarters to local associations additionally achieves the 
control of local interests. At the same time, there is local flexibility, as Tuskon 
affiliates decide themselves whom to admit as members and on details of activities 
(interview 1). Similarly, the secular Gagiad’s leadership remarks that they decide 
themselves on details of activities and members but have similar politics/interest as 
their confederation (interview 6). Additionally, Gaziantep’s BAs are not fully 
dependent on their confederations as they actually partially fund them (interviews 6 
and 1). The secular Gagiad and Islamic Hürsiad are arguably the most powerful BAs 
within their regional federations Giaf and Günsiaf; BA leaders point out that they 
were heavily involved in the formation of their regional federations (interviews 6 and 
1). Tuskon affiliates and the secular Gagiad financially support their confederations 
and federations, rather than the other way around: 
All that we need from Tuskon is the ‘trade bridges’ and international representative 
offices, other than that we don’t get financial support, actually it’s us who send 
money to Tuskon to organise these trade bridges. Other than that the member 
associations can set their own activities, budgets or fees. (interview 1) 
 
Müsiad is strongly centralised, all local decisions have to be approved by the 
central headquarters (interview 7). All Müsiad branches across the country are 
organised in the same manner (interview 8). This allows for little local input and 
shows the association’s focus on control rather than aggregation of businessmen’s 
interests.  
Beside central-local relations, internal sub-structures and the coordination 
between them affect the quality of internal intermediation. I have little information 
on this other than their formal presence, which also indicates the BAs’ different 
activity focus. Like in any other Müsiad branch in Turkey, Müsiad Gaziantep has 
sectoral committees (e.g. in textile, agriculture,), which shows their focus on industry 
and trade activities. Note that Tuskon affiliates also have such sectoral committees, 
but not the secular Gagiad. The secular BA mainly organises social activities that 
serve to create closeness and trust among members, and serves as a platform to 
network with local and national political elites. Gagiad’s focus on CSR and social 
activities to bring elites closer is reflected in its organisational structures. It has 
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separate staff, a committee on civic projects (women’s council and separate project 
coordinator), and spends its budget primarily on organising relevant projects and big 
receptions. It has no committees organised according to civic projects and trade in 
general, namely the EU relations committee, the women’s council and the 
trade/industry committee (interview 6).  
Gagiad is the most elitist of Gaziantep’s BAs and has the strongest 
organisational structures in terms of organisational resources, but does not translate 
this into collective political power. Gagiad appears to have the largest budget based 
on membership dues, and it has an active membership, which is reflected in the 
frequency of its boards’ and committees’ meetings.  
Müsiad appears to have the least staff and worst offices of Gaziantep’s BAs. 
Instead, most resources seem to be invested into the national headquarters. Müsiad 
Gaziantep is the least transparent and most opaque of the organisations, with little 
professionally organised activity in either the civic or economic realm. Compared to 
the secular Gagiad, Müsiad Gaziantep runs no public civic activities; and compared 
to Tuskon affiliates there is no professional staff trained in and keen on publicity. 
Instead, Müsiad headquarters provides the major export and trade activities. 
Hürsiad’s real budget remains unclear because the association also receives 
large sums through ‘donations’ (interview 1). Hürsiad’s representative claims that to 
build new branches for Gapgiad and Hürsiad their 2011 budget amounted to one 
trillion TL. Overall, the number of staff and budget available are high at Hürsiad. 
The fact that Tuskon affiliates implement public projects suggests professionalism. 
Association members frequently meet within their board or committees, showing that 
members are not just prepared to spend membership fees, but also valuable time and 
effort at their organisations. Tuskon affiliates’ professionalism has come through 
their joining the confederation in 2005. In fact, the Hürsiad representative 
interviewed was sent by the Tuskon headquarters and has clearly been trained in 
public relations and in running an association (interview 1). This can also be seen in 
the fact that Tuskon affiliates have independent and rather detailed homepages and 
brochures that are publicly available, whereas Müsiad Gaziantep has no internet 
platform independent of Müsiad central.  
The combination of Müsiad’s closeness to AKP political elites, and Tuskon’s 
export network as well as organisational structures makes this subgroup very 
efficient at mobilisation and acquiring political and economic capital. Tüsiad, the 
 239 
oldest BA of Turkey, in contrast, has only two branches across Turkey, in Istanbul 
and Ankara, and only two members in Gaziantep. Their effort at local mobilisation is 
addressed through their confederation Türkonfed (Turkish Enterprise and Business 
Confederation) – to this point there is no affiliate in Gaziantep, and generally their 
alliances in central- and south-eastern Anatolia are weak; not even Gagiad is a 
member. The weakness of non-Islamic BAs to mobilise a business constituency at 
the grassroots is reflected in the absence of a strong confederation vis-à-vis Tuskon.  
In sum, I have argued that the effective combination of Müsiad and Tuskon 
affiliates’ organisational structures and activities has supported the movement’s 
mobilisation efforts and the integration of their interests and activities. The strength 
and flexibility of Tuskon’s decentralised structure has enabled both grassroots 
mobilisation and cooperation across political, business and civil society 
organisations. Müsiad’s centralised structure complements the former by facilitating 
access to national elites and the control of business membership.  
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Table 10 Comparing the organisational strength of Turkey and Gaziantep’s most important voluntary, economy-wide secular and Islamic business associations 
Associations* Members: Numbers and Profiles (Businesspeople) 
Branches Staff  Dues/Budget Meeting 
Frequency  
Internal Intermediation  
Tüsiad (1971–) 
Secular BA 
Turkey: 600 members 
representing 2500 
companies 
 
Gaziantep: 2 members  
 
(interviews) 
2 in Turkey: 
Istanbul and 
Ankara; 
5 
international 
None in 
Gaziantep 
 Across Turkey: 
- 4/5 big meetings 
per year 
- Sectoral 
committees meet 
monthly 
(interview) 
Expected to be Medium 
(not analysed directly) 
Gagiad (1993–) 
Tügik (2002–) 
Secular BAs 
Confederation Tügik: 
ca. 7000 members;  
Gaziantep Gagiad: 209 
members 
 
- Largest industrial 
companies; profit has to be 
above a certain threshold 
(represent ca. 80% of 
Gaziantep’s economy)  
-Up to 45 years of age, then 
honorary member 
(all from interviews) 
Tügik: 8 
regional 
federations; 
55 BAs  
Gagiad:  
5 members 
of staff 
(interview) 
Gagiad: 
- Entry: 5.500 TL;  
- 90 TL monthly dues 
- Dues make up 
budget; few donations, 
which are project-
based 
(all interviews) 
Gagiad: 
- Committees 
meet every 15 
days; women’s 
council and board 
of members meet 
every week 
(all interviews) 
High for Gagiad 
- Member of federation 
Giaf and confederation 
Tügik  
- Committees: EU; industry 
and trade  
- Board and women’s 
council (concerned with 
running CSR projects with 
project coordinator) 
- Decision-making in 
Gaziantep 
(all interview) 
Müsiad (1990–) 
 
 
 
 
Müsiad Gaziantep 
(1993–) 
Islamic BAs 
Turkey: 3150 senior 
members, 1750 ‘young’ 
members (18-30 years); 
representing 15.000 
companies 
Gaziantep: 226 members 
(incl. Young Müsiad) 
- Mix of SMEs and big 
industrial companies; 
professionals (interview) 
31 in Turkey; 
‘94 contact 
points in 44 
countries’ 
n/a n/a n/a Medium 
- Decision-making by 
centre (interview) 
- Sectoral committes at 
local level; additional 
working groups at HQ 
(international relations, 
education, etc.) 
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Türkonfed (2004– 
 
Secular federation 
10.000 members (2010 
figures) in Turkey; 
 
No affiliate in Gaziantep 
 
16 regional 
and sectoral 
federations; 
total 133 
member 
associations 
   Expected to be High 
- Pyramidal organisational 
structure 
Tuskon (2005–)  
 
Gaziantep 
affiliates: 
Hürsiad (1993–) 
Gapgiad (2002–) 
 
Islamic Federation 
and Associations 
33260 members  
 
Hürsiad: 
- 476 members 
- 95% of members are 
SMEs; 5% big industrial 
companies and 
professionals (interview) 
- Young Hürsiad (18-30 
years) 
 
Gapgiad: 
- 101 members 
-Big manufacturing 
companies; professionals 
(interview) 
- Up to 45 years of age, 
then honorary member 
(interview) 
7 regional 
federations; 
160 member 
associations 
(all 
provinces); 
5 
international 
centres and 
more 
unofficial 
(‘partner 
organisations 
in 140 
countries’) 
Hürsiad: 
n/a 
 
 
 
 
Gapgiad: 3 
members of 
staff 
(interview) 
Hürsiad: 
- Entry 1000 YTL 
- Annual fee: 540 YTL 
- Annual budget from 
dues about 300-
350.000 TL in 2011; 
with donations up to 1 
trilyon in 2011 
 
Gapgiad: 
- Entry: 500 Dollar; 
- Annual fee: 600 TL 
-Annual budget is 120-
150 milyar TL (excl. 
public funds); few 
donations 
(all interviews) 
Hürsiad: 
- Board meets 
every 15 days; 
committees once 
a month 
(interview) 
Very high for Hürsiad 
Hürsiad 
- Board and new women’s 
council 
- 5 sectoral committees 
(textile/shoes; construction; 
agriculture; services; 
chemicals and machinery) 
(all interviews) 
 
- Gapgiad appears to have 
no committees 
- Both Gapgiad and 
Hürsiad members of 
federation Günsiaf and 
confederation Tuskon 
- Decision-making in 
Gaziantep (interview) 
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4. Summary of findings  
The analysis has shown how Islamic BAs have gained economic and legitimacy 
resources through their activities in the economic, political and civic realms. They 
have a very strong focus on economic activities, the resources and possibilities for 
which they acquire from their ties to political elites and their access to the Gülen 
community’s international network of branches, schools, banks, insurance companies 
and media companies.  
Gagiad can be regarded as a club due to its focus on civic and social activities 
for bigger companies, which are also intended to increase inter-firm trade, albeit 
indirectly. Trade promotion dominates at Islamic BAs, whereas social and civic 
activities dominate at the secular BA.  
In the political realm, the AKP has supported the growth of an Islamic 
business elite and their legitimacy through various ways (legal and bureaucratic; 
access to state information and resources; patronage networks). AKP and business 
elites regard collective organisation as essential to organise and legitimise political 
access to a group of businessmen rather than to individuals. Islamic BAs are crucial 
vehicles to organise pious Anatolian SMEs excluded from existing vehicles of 
collective action, such as secular BAs or Chambers, and increasingly to compete 
with these for political access. Islamic, but not secular BAs, are important vehicles 
for politicians to create political support, granting them several economic 
advantages. 
Through new private organisational BA channels, and personal networks, 
Islamic BAs have acquired wider access to political elites mediating between the 
local and national levels; and thus more channels through which economic rents and 
legitimacy resources can flow. Secular businessmen try to achieve access either 
individually, or collectively by mobilising the Chambers, but not their BAs. Close 
ties to AKP mean that Islamic BAs have better access to information and state 
resources that are then distributed to its members (3.2.2.a); and that BAs provide a 
legitimate platform to facilitate personal patronage networks between political elites 
and Islamic or strategic big business (3.2.2.b). Through these mechanisms business 
groups and associations close to the incumbent government have made bigger profits 
and increased their legitimacy relative to secular outsider SMEs. However, this is an 
exchange system: In return this new pious business elite provides financial resources, 
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political support (campaign financing, providing jobs and infrastructure 
developments; and electoral behaviour) to AKP elites. I find little evidence for 
policy- and information input from Gaziantep’s business side into AKP’s policy; the 
focus appears to be more on creating a parallel, legitimate pious business elite. There 
are considerable social and business pressures associated with this inter-
organisational resource exchange, and these promote institutional change. This 
contentious aspect and the involvement of religiously motivated civil society 
organisations makes this exchange different from the political support outlined in the 
existing literature that focuses on rational politicians’ interests in re-election and 
policy-making at the national level.  
In the civic realm, Islamic BAs and businessmen are very active with CSR 
activities in line with the movement’s goals and in cooperation with the cemaat and 
other religiously-motivated civil society organisations: Leaders and key members of 
the Islamic BAs donate schools, dorms and mosques via the Gülen movement or 
cemaat (religious community). Gagiad is also very active in the civic realm to 
acquire legitimacy, but mainly conducts its civic activities in cooperation and in line 
with ‘older’ (pre-AKP) public institutions and no private bodies or civil society 
organisations. Such CSR activities increase not only public legitimacy, but provide 
access to network resources. Again, it is through this cooperation that Islamic BAs 
get access to additional economic resources that the secular BA has little access to as 
an organisation. For example, in addition to directly providing an international trade 
network, the Gülen community’s wider socio-economic network can also improve 
members’ financial assets and human capital. Such activities are also key to gaining 
public legitimacy for the cemaat’s activities. The AKP government supports Tuskon 
and the Gülen community’s educational efforts in direct and indirect ways, allowing 
their member not just access to public funds and political elites, but also to increase 
their public legitimacy. First, SMOs take over quasi-public functions. Second, the 
AKP has arguably also put in place ‘friendly’ legislation to support the Gülen 
community’s civic and educational engagement. As other scholars also point out, 
supporting the Gülen community has generated a further supporter base among the 
pious in Turkey’s shantytowns.  
Islamic BAs were the first to organise conservative Anatolian business elites 
at the grassroots level and have generated strong, yet flexible inter-organisational 
structures to facilitate this mobilisation and political representation. It is a hybrid and 
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flexible structure, combining Müsiad’s centralisation and Tuskon’s strength at 
incorporating local interests that facilitates Islamic BA’s political influence. 
Although Gagiad also has strong organisational structures, it lacks the collective 
political access and centralised control that Müsiad provides to the Islamic 
movement.  
5. Discussion  
Islamic BAs have gained political influence by receiving rich economic resources 
and legitimacy through their ties with the AKP and the Gülen community at the local 
level. This chapter shows that a combination of economic activities provided through 
Gülen community ties and AKP ties facilitated by flexible organisational structures, 
has promoted the growth of a legitimate Islamic business elite. Previous chapters 
have shown that resonant frames based on Islam have complemented this exchange 
based on strong Islamic networks between business, civic and political elites.  
In line with some collective action literatures, Islamic BAs engage in rent-
seeking (Olson, 1971) and provide economic resources to fill institutional voids in 
deprived Anatolian regions (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; 
Khanna & Yafeh, 2005, 2007; Luo & Chung, 2005; Tan & Meyer, 2010). In the 
political realm, Islamic state-business relations are characterised by patronage 
(Buğra, 1994; Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, 2014). Islamic BAs also seem to provide 
some limited policy input (e.g. into foreign policy), and political support through 
voting behaviour and campaign financing, as argued in some political institutional 
literatures (e.g. Culpepper, 2011; Martin, 1991, 1994; Markus, 2007; Schneider, 
2004).  
This resource exchange goes beyond providing policy support to rational 
political elites at the national level and/or economic services to members. Islamic 
BAs’ activities encompass inter-organisational collaboration, a collective goal and 
indirect contention that qualify them as movement tactics, rather than as economic 
services to members or political services for rational politicians. While the incentive 
for the creation of flexible, yet strong BA organisations do originate from political 
elites as some BA literature has it, my analysis shows that essential power resources 
can also be created at the grassroots level; it also shows that religiously motivated 
civil society organisations can be important local providers of resources, not just 
state and political elites at the national levels.  
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This inter-organisational cooperation extends to networks, frames and 
activities, and also to organisational structures. Islamic BAs’ structures are 
characterised by a hybrid structure that is strong, resource-rich and flexible at the 
same time. Combining Müsiad’s centralisation and Tuskon’s sensitivity of local 
interests across organisations has facilitated the integration of political, civic and 
business interests. This is contrary to most BA literature that argues that resource-
rich organisations are key, and contrary to some classic resource-mobilisation 
literature that argues that centralised and hierarchical organisations are key to 
gaining political influence.  
But how does a new, legitimate, pious business elite increase political 
influence and how is that contentious? I argue that the grassroots level inter-
organisational exchange through movement tactics has paved the way for 
institutional change by providing the legitimacy, resources and normalisation of 
Islamic practices essential to attack powerful actors in the centre. First, this 
collaborative resource exchange has created a new confident, compliant business 
elite that serves as a powerful support base, providing both financial and political 
support to the AKP and the Gülen community. In the business realm, a parallel pious 
elite has been created that can compete with existing elites in the centre, together 
with a new set of private and public institutions: the new powerful Islamic BAs 
compete with secular BAs, and their quasi-public functions in exports,79 state-
business relations, and welfare compete with existing public institutions (Buğra & 
Savaşkan, 2010). For example, private BAs compete with Chambers; institutions for 
SMEs and foreign relations, DEIK and Kosgeb; new, flexible local public 
institutions compete with old, centralised ones, e.g. TOKI, City Council, 
Development Agencies; Gülen community Islamic BAs’ welfare activities compete 
with existing education and welfare systems. The availability of resource-rich and 
confident allies paves the way for direct confrontation with former actors in the 
periphery.  
Second, by providing essential resources, yet making access to them 
dependent on providing support and following certain Islamic capitalist practices, 
this exchange normalises types of behaviour and practices that were previously 
                                                
 
79 Tuskon’s trade bridges are supported by the Turkish Ministry of Economy and by the 
public TIM (Turkish Exporters’ Assembly, the semi-public Union of Exporters). 
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illegitimate. Islamic BAs and businessmen have gradually normalised a new set of 
Islamic codes of behaviours, norms and institutions to facilitate institutional change 
in the long run. For example, by promoting the Gülen community, it has provided the 
ground for changes in the educational realm (increasing number and legitimisation of 
imam hatip schools and headscarves). Additionally, Islamic BAs foster business 
practices and private behaviours expected of members (e.g. Islamic banking, zekat vs 
tax system) (see for a similar argument concerning Islamic welfare and education 
organisations: Agai, 2004; Göçmen, 2014; Tuğal, 2002, 2009). These are non-
traditional movements insofar as they do not directly attack the state through 
contentious tactics, but rather apply non-contentious tactics in the economic and CSR 
fields through collaboration (Bakker et al., 2013). Due to multiple threats by the 
Kemalist establishment, Islamic movements in Turkey have transformed to apply 
economic and civic tactics to gradually transform the society from the bottom up, 
paving the way for direct state attacks and institutional change.  
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Chapter VII Conclusion 
I start the Conclusion with short summary of findings, before discussing their 
contributions to the relevant literature. I then note some limitations of the present 
study. I finally present avenues for future research and comment on Turkey’s outlook 
for democratisation and economic development.  
This thesis set out to explain under what conditions and in what manner 
Islamic BAs in Turkey have gained political influence at the expense of secular BAs. 
Such a study has broader implications for business collective action and political 
power in the context of developing and transition countries. Chapters I and II 
established that existing literature provides inadequate guidance on when BAs turn 
into political actors, and how they engage in mobilisation and broader intra-state 
power struggles vis-à-vis competing BAs. The literature is especially inadequate 
regarding the role of ideology and religion in business organisation and political 
power. Mainstream management literature on BAs treats them as purely rational 
economic institutions or rent-seeking coalitions. When accounting for BAs’ political 
influence, most explanations focus either on structural-institutional factors, or on 
political elites’ strategic policy, election and power interests. The multiple ways 
through which BAs may achieve political mobilisation, and the role of ideology 
remain ignored. This question is important because there are many settings in which 
competing business interests are allied with different political parties in deep intra-
state power struggles. In an increasing number of Latin American and post-Ottoman 
countries, such intra-state power struggles also overlap with ideological cleavages. A 
few examples of BAs that focus on achieving certain political aims, and base their 
mobilisation on informal cooperation and shared ideologies, have been observed in 
several Latin American countries as well as in Turkey. Functional and interest-based 
approaches cannot explain how BAs become active agents in mobilisation and intra-
state power struggles in some countries, collaborating with civil society 
organisations, political elites and particular business groups based on shared goals 
and identities; instead of on narrow input into policymaking and electoral support in 
return for patronage resources.  
This inadequacy was addressed by developing a social movement perspective 
of BAs, combining political institutional and ideological variables in explaining the 
context, functions and consequences of BAs. Social movement theory provides a 
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useful extension by widening the range of actors, power resources and strategies that 
BAs can apply to gain political influence. I explored how ideology and religion have 
entered the strategies and success of BAs to gain political influence, based on an in-
depth comparative case study of Turkey’s BAs. By studying the dynamics of 
religious organisational forms and their influences on broader processes at large, I 
aim to extend the BA and organisational literatures overall, where such processes are 
little understood (Tracey, 2012).  
Based on social movement literature, I first analysed the political opportunity 
structures and institutional environment of Turkish BAs (Chapter III, part 2). I then 
compared secular and Islamic BAs’ informal inter-organisational networks among 
business, civic and political elites (Chapter IV), their framing activities (Chapter V), 
and their resource exchanges to achieve political power (Chapter VI). This analysis 
was based on a case study of Gaziantep, a new pious industrial centre in the former 
periphery of central- and south-eastern Anatolia.  
1. Summary of findings and argument 
The analysis in Chapter III showed that state threats have played a key role in 
shaping BAs’ mobilisation tactics, but all POS developed in the movement literature 
are relevant. State threats were never complete (Bianchi, 1984), but instead periods 
of threats alternated with periods of encouragement for Islamic actors, providing 
important opportunities for political access – access and threats being two of the 
POS established in the political process literature. In spite of the repeated military 
interventions and because of the incomplete nature of oppression, Islamic actors have 
managed to increase their access over time and to create new powerful allies (a third 
key POS). This has been made possible through their efficient grassroots 
mobilisation, and Turkey’s gradual integration into international markets and 
decentralisation, both of which have provided new tools outside of state control. The 
perceived access and new range of resources and allies enabled them to come to 
power in the 2000s because of the electoral volatility and de-legitimisation of 
existing parties and elites. Electoral volatility, or rather ‘shifting political 
alignments’, as well as divisions amongst elites, are two further POS that also apply 
in the Turkish case 
The network analysis of Chapter IV compared whether, and how, Islamic and 
secular BAs have created cohesive networks with political and civic elites at the 
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local level. The analysis shows that Islamic BAs have gradually created strong, yet 
diverse local networks that bring together political and civic elites at the grassroots 
level. The route to political influence has been to catch up with the secular BA in the 
extent of cohesion and civic ties, and to overtake them in diversity, as well as in the 
extent of political integration. Above all, Islamic BAs have managed to bring 
together these different types of relationship layers and actors.  
Chapter V showed important differences between secular and Islamic BAs’ 
collective action frames. I studied frames’ resonance or mobilisation quality by 
analysing how complete, coherent and specific they are, and how well they are 
adapted to their cultural-ideological environment. I find that, first, the Islamic frame 
is more complete than the secular frame, since it adheres to all three framing tasks. 
The Islamic frame is also more coherent, although it is not very specific. In the 
Islamic frame, there is a problem-, goal- and collective identity- identification, 
motivating supporters to collective action by appealing to worthy, Islamic principles. 
The secular frame lacks the identification of a shared problem, yet formulates 
strategies for business socialisation and civic activities. These differences, in frame 
coherence and completeness, increase the Islamic frame’s resonance vis-à-vis the 
secular frame. Most importantly, the frames differ in they ways in which they 
incorporate ideology. The usage of secularism or Kemalism in the secular frame is 
muted and does not extend far beyond references in BA material and values based on 
(regional) nationalism. The Islamic frame successfully constructs a non-contentious 
capitalist Islamic value system that informs all aspects of that frame and is amplified 
throughout. Islamic resonant frames raise topics that are relevant to participants and 
all SMOs, and utilise familiar cultural narratives grounded in Islam. I illustrated how 
such differences in resonance influence the public legitimacy and internal solidarity 
of movement actors, and thereby influence their political power. 
Chapter VI analysed the kinds of activities and tactics though which Islamic 
vs secular BAs have gained political influence.  Economic activities provided 
through Gülen community ties (export and trade promotion through international 
branches; Islamic bank and insurance, human capital) and AKP ties (legitimisation, 
export promotion, access to public banks), further facilitated by flexible 
organisational structures, have together combined to create new powerful 
organisations, and a new, legitimate pious middle class in the former periphery of 
Anatolian industrial districts. Islamic BAs’ organisational structures are 
 250 
characterised by hybrid structures, which are strong, resource-rich and flexible at the 
same time. Combining Müsiad’s centralisation and Tuskon’s sensitivity to local 
interests across organisations has facilitated the integration of political, civic and 
business interests across the network of SMOs. This resource exchange is 
collaborative in that Islamic BAs provide financial resources and political support for 
these SMOs in return. However, there are important costs for members of Islamic 
BAs who have to adjust, if not so inclined, their private behaviour, political opinions 
and business practices in line with the movement’s understanding of capitalist Islam. 
This is partly achieved through social pressure, and is required of members in order 
to access essential resources. This involves a set of practices and behaviour 
encompassing the private realm (praying, abstaining from alcohol, headscarves, 
cemaat newspaper etc.), and the business realm (e.g. paying ‘zekat’, interest-free 
banking, choice of business partners), including stakeholder relations (organising 
pilgrimages, providing prayer rooms, time for prayers).  
I argue that Islamic BAs gained political influence because they combined a 
broad range of resources and actors by applying typical social movement tactics that 
are grounded in the cultural-ideological environment and adapted to the political 
context. Conditions of high politico-religious contention and threats, combined with 
gradual globalisation, have encouraged businesspeople in the periphery to 
collaborate with other vulnerable Islamic actors in informal networks. They also 
encouraged them to build up resources in these networks through alternative market- 
and civic- based means complemented by resonant framing and flexible 
organisational structures, tactics that have escaped state control and threats. This 
non-contentious, market-based collaboration grounded in Islam, is coherently applied 
in Islamic BAs’ tactics that reinforce each other – in their networks, frames and 
resource exchanges. By building strong, informal networks with civic and political 
elites, Islamic businessmen have gained access to economic resources and legitimacy 
not provided by the central state. Resonant frames grounded in a capitalist, non-
contentious Islam and flexible organisational structures, complement such economic 
activities and informal networks. Tactics grounded in religion have increased Islamic 
BAs’ political influence by providing a source of solidarity and the public legitimacy 
necessary to support the growth of a new business elite through resource-exchange 
among diverse actors in the periphery. This exchange is contentious insofar as it is 
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supports wider movement interests and organisations, and paves the way for 
disruption and institutional change. 
More specifically, my argument has four parts devoted to the four different 
movement aspects essential for political influence: grasping political opportunity 
structures; developing embedded networks; developing collective action frames; and 
supporting such collaboration with rich resources and suitable organisational 
structures. Based on these findings, I argue that the political influence of Islamic 
BAs is due to their grasping POS at the right time and adapting their tactics to the 
political and cultural environments. State threats have played a key role in giving 
Islamic actors an incentive to develop a non-contentious, market- and CSR- based 
repertoire that is grounded in a capitalist Islam. Gradual decentralisation and 
globalisation act as important boundary conditions for the development of these 
successful tactics. 
Tapping into embedded networks is another condition of successful social 
movements. Islamic BAs have built informal venues for collaboration and political 
mobilisation where alternatives were closed off. They have managed to attract 
important political elites and powerful civic actors, while also to diversifying their 
ties to secular organisations. I hold that it is not the network structure per se that has 
provided advantages, but rather the inventive adjustment to the political and cultural 
context. The political context had forbidden cooperation between political elites and 
civil society, and thus conditioned a ‘structural hole’ that Islamic BAs have gradually 
captured. Threats from the state increased the incentives for, and advantages of, 
building strong collaborative grassroots networks among Islamic actors in the 
political, civic and business realms that serve as alternative platforms for the building 
of solidarity, political mobilisation and resource exchange.  
The completeness and amplification of Islam within Islamic BAs’ increases 
their internal solidarity and public legitimacy, thereby facilitating collective action. 
Frames interact with other social movement tactics in these processes, with the 
potential to reinforce or undermine them. Resonant framing can facilitate collective 
action by increasing solidarity to hold together networks among SMOs, and by 
giving meaning and legitimacy to BA activities and tactics. Islamic BA’s framing 
complements the grassroots networks of business, civic and political actors by 
creating internal solidarity through shared goals and identities. By constructing a 
non-contentious, capitalist Islam, Islamic BAs have incorporated the interests of all 
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SMOs involved. Additionally, by building frames based on Islam and public issues, 
Islamic BAs build up legitimacy. The amplification of Islam complements Islamic 
BAs’ economic activities aimed at creating a new, legitimate pious business elite to 
displace existing secular elites. Frames have to create appropriate, worthy 
‘repertoires of contention’ to gain support. The non-contentious aspect of the Islamic 
frame, focusing on creating a new, pious business elite, is highly adaptive to a 
threatening Kemalist state, while the incorporation of religion is attractive to the 
conservative constituency. The combination of exclusion with a non-contentious 
Islam is particularly powerful in the face of violent military and state threats, and is 
well adapted to the cultural-ideological environment.  
The analysis of the resource exchange and activities of Islamic BAs shows 
how Islamic BAs’ tactics reinforce one another by being based on a coherent and 
non-contentious type of capitalist Islam and collaboration among SMOs. Islamic 
BAs’ activities and resource exchanges are in line with framing by adhering to the 
defined goals and tactics, and facilitated by networks across SMOs.  Islamic BAs 
receive resources of legitimacy and economic resources through their networks with 
political and civic elites, to build a new pious business elite with public legitimacy – 
a key goal of Islamic BAs. Yet Islamic businessmen also return financial and 
political support. The Islamic movement’s resource exchange is indirectly 
contentious, promoting movement organisations and goals. First, this mutual 
resource exchange creates interlocking dependencies and continued support. Second, 
it creates parallel Islamic organisations and institutions that are aimed to supplant 
existing institutions. Thereby such seemingly non-political services in the civic and 
economic realm provide sources of political power for the whole Islamic movement. 
Third, the provision of such resources is largely limited toward co-religionists and 
requires compliance with certain Islamic civic, business and private codes of 
behaviour and institutions. These were previously illegitimate and aim to restructure 
Kemalist state institutions. 
In contrast, the secular BA’s elitism is reflected in its network, activities and 
frames, which qualify it as a ‘club’ rather than movement. I find that the association 
does not focus on economic activities, but on CSR and socialisation activities to 
create friendship and solidarity among large business-owners internally, and public 
legitimacy externally. Similarly, the network analysis showed that the secular BA 
has not cooperated with a popular civil society organisation, but have forged ties 
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with elitist secular clubs and the semi-public Chambers of Industry and Trade. 
Political elites of the secular coalition were more likely to be members of such elite 
clubs, rather than of the BA, showing the reduced focus on political integration via 
the secular BA. This is reflected in the fact that Islamic BAs overtook the secular BA 
in political integration during the formative years of the new moderately Islamic and 
capitalist AKP. This has reduced members’ access to economic resources today, 
unless they become strategic and join Islamic BAs. Combined with their incoherent 
collective identity and the focus on nationalism and elitism in their collective action 
frame, this has resulted in a gradual loss of political ties, economic power and public 
legitimacy compared to Islamic BAs. 
2. Literature contribution 
I established that in the BA literature little is known about how BAs engage in broad 
political struggles: Under what conditions do they become part of broader intra-state 
conflicts and how do they build up political power over competing business 
organisations? The role of ideology and religious groups in the processes of 
generating political power has been particularly neglected, although it is key for 
many transition economies with broad cleavages that bring ideology to the fore in 
political mobilisation. I propose that this inadequacy can be addressed by combining 
political-entrepreneurship with social movement approaches. 
Both the political-entrepreneurship and social movement literatures share a 
concern with collective action that is directed to achieve political influence for a 
constituency. Both political approaches to BAs, and the political process models of 
social movements, give primacy to political contexts and state actors in shaping the 
mobilisation tactics of civil society organisations. The former focuses on strategic 
political, state and BA elites, and tactics based on strong organisational structures 
and formal policy-exchanges. In return for access to state information and resources, 
rational businesspeople are assumed to organise and exchange resources in formal 
channels. A social movement approach extends the conventional boundaries of BAs 
by studying them as embedded organisations. Schmitter and Streeck’s (1999) 
framework mentions the category of BAs as movements. These are BAs that 
predominantly formulate goals and seek to have influence by exerting pressure on 
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public authorities for public goods.80 In order to become political actors, such BAs 
are required to build a sense of solidarity, and organisational structures to impose 
discipline. Additionally, to exercise influence, collective actors have to be able to 
formulate goals in terms of commonly accepted values in the public interest to gain 
legitimacy. Some of these processes are similar to collective action frames in social 
movements and relate to further discussions of what effective social movement 
organisations are. However, this category is not developed without explanation for 
how and why such BAs with movement characteristics might emerge and without 
mentioning ideological variables. I aim to develop such a category further.  
First, my framework adds ideological institutions to the study of contexts 
through the concept of POS, which condition the relevant range of actors, power 
resources and tactics. Secondly, it extends the range of relevant actors in BAs’ 
organisational fields, and the tactics and resources of power to include ideology and 
religion. This suggestion is based on my findings that show that Islamic BAs 
political influence originates from their alignment with, and exchanges with, the 
broader moderately Islamic movement beyond the organisational limits of BAs. I 
find that conditions of politico-religious contention have given incentives for Islam 
to enter Islamic BAs’ tactics in a complementary fashion; in their frames (through 
the use of Islam); through networks (cooperation with Islamic civil society 
organisations); and by means of activities and tactics (promoting a new pious 
business elite and Islamic norms and behaviours). Ideology and religion can increase 
BAs’ political influence by supporting members’ economic growth, by 
complementing business-related activities in BAs’ embedded networks with sources 
of public legitimacy and facilitating collective action through building solidarity. 
Religious groups, and not just political or state elites, can be important providers of 
economic resources and legitimacy for BAs.  
With regard to my first point, concerning the institutional context, 
conventional BA theory has neglected the role of the ideological context and how it 
affects BAs’ political mobilisation. Existing literature has focused on vulnerable 
political and state elites and their need for support from powerful business interests 
                                                
 
80 Activities like encouraging participation of their membership, providing services to them 
or developing control of membership, are less important in BAs that act as social movements 
(Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). 
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against either internal or external competitors. This vulnerability is profound in a 
number of transition countries that have been struggling to transform from military 
dictatorships and closed authoritarian regimes to democratic and neoliberal systems. 
In Turkey state threats from the centre have similarly created vulnerable political 
actors and complex intra-state struggles. However, these threats additionally overlap 
with ideological cleavages between Kemalist state structures as well as elites, and the 
conservative civil society in the periphery, including civic, political and business 
actors. The centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin, 1969, 1973) that overlaps with the 
secular-Islamist and left-right continuum, is the key institutional change that has 
shaped BAs’ mobilisation tactics. I refer to the collection of those changes as 
politico-religious contention.  It has given incentives for collaborative business 
mobilisation and brought ideology and religion to the fore in political mobilisation at 
large. Islamic BAs have developed an effective set of tactics adapted to the 
threatening political, and conservative cultural environments. This is a non-
contentious, market- and CSR- based repertoire in the periphery, which is grounded 
in a capitalist Islam, and in collaboration with other Islamic actors. This is in line 
with Tarrow’s (2011) assertion that cultural and ideological symbols become 
important where struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society.  
The proposed social movement framework extends not only the types of 
institutional incentives and intra-state conflicts that encourage businesspeople to 
engage in contentious politics, but also the range of tactics and actors that BAs apply 
to include ideological and political factors. The analysis shows that economic 
resources and legitimacy cannot only be provided by state elites at the national level, 
but also in collaboration with religiously motivated civil society organisations at the 
local level. While the incentive for the creation of flexible, yet strong BA 
organisations do originate from political elites as some BA literature has it, essential 
power resources can also be created at the grassroots level and feed up. Especially 
when traditional means of political mobilisation are cut off, BAs can adopt 
alternative informal movement tactics in collaboration with civil society 
organisations in the peripheries of power. Other important work in the area of 
networks and industrial districts argues that the local and organisational levels are 
crucial arenas for political and economic change (Sabel, 1999; Safford, 2009; 
Saxenian, 1994). For example, Safford’s (2009) historical institutional analysis 
argues that the locus of economic or political change is not only located in national-
 256 
level institutions, even in state-dominated varieties of capitalism, but feed down to 
the organisational level in regional industrial districts. The author argues that the 
sources of regional economic growth lie in the micro-level networks of state and 
non-state actors at the local level, shaping the availability of leadership and unifying 
platforms of political engagement.  
My second point in this context is that these tactics go beyond those 
developed in the political entrepreneurship literature that focus on providing 
information and policy support to rational political elites, through strong 
organisational structures that aggregate and control business interests. When BAs get 
embroiled in political-ideological struggles, this dynamic can feed down to the 
grassroots level to civic actors. Islamic BAs have ‘tapped into embedded networks’ 
(Tarrow, 2011), by building strong and informal coalitions with civil society 
organisations and political elites at the local level, and built up important resources 
through such collaboration. Common political goals and identities based on Islam 
and feelings of exclusion, built up in collective action frames have played a key role 
in supporting this resource exchange. This shows that the political access of BAs is 
not just based on narrow and strategic interests, but on broader shared politico-
religious struggles, which can take place in informal networks at the local level. 
Islamic BAs have gained political influence by receiving rich economic 
resources and legitimacy through their networks with the AKP and the Gülen 
community at the local level. Providing legitimacy to activities and solidarity in 
networks are two important ways through which ideology or religion can improve 
the power-generation tactics of BAs; and civil society organisations can be key 
providers of these. I find that worthy and relevant shared identities and goals have 
united actors in diverse networks, by providing a source of solidarity, and motivated 
them to act in the name of legitimate, pure and religious aims. Accordingly, the 
boundaries of BAs have to be extended to include relevant organisations in their 
organisational fields and context-specific tactics grounded in ideology and religion. 
This is especially relevant in environments where ideology plays a large role in 
political mobilisation and party systems. 
These tactics are successful because they are adapted to the cultural-
ideological and political contexts and based on a goal-oriented collaboration and 
shared identities. 
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The established non-contentious tactics do not only escape state control and 
threats as they are based in the market economy, private and civic spheres, but also 
because they are based in the periphery – the previously poor regions of central and 
south-eastern Anatolia. Above all, these tactics are grounded in the cultural 
environment, developing a socio-economic type of Islam throughout all tactics. This 
is in line with a specific model of the political process framework. Political 
mediation models of social movements argue that ‘challengers need to alter 
strategies and forms to address specific political contexts’, such as the partisan 
regime in power (Amenta, 2006; Amenta et al., 2010, p. 299, 2002, 1992). The more 
tactics fit the political circumstances or POS and the interests of institutional political 
actors, the more likely are they to be successful. Asserting an interaction between 
POS and successful tactics is a useful addition to the BA literature where dominant 
approaches argue that political interests are mainly served by organisationally strong 
BAs and their participation in formal policy channels at the national level. A political 
mediation model rather argues that the effectiveness of BA tactics for political 
support can go beyond such mechanisms, depending on the context. 
On the basis of such findings, I suggest the inclusion of a larger variety of 
relevant actors in BAs’ organisational fields, and of a wider range of power tactics, 
depending on different institutional incentives and constraints. Different contexts 
condition different types of tactics to successfully provide political support. Such an 
economic sociology approach regards BAs as embedded and shaped by social ties, 
ideological institutions and political contexts at both the regional and national levels 
– Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) termed these structural, cultural and political 
embeddedness. All of these social structures powerfully shape the types of 
opportunities, constraints, and organisational patterns that businesspeople and BAs 
face as they seek political and economic advancement (Granovetter, 1973, 1985). 
Through such a study I aim to make a contribution to the BA literature by showing 
how religion and contention can enter the activities and tactics of power-building 
efforts of BAs.  
Social movement theory focuses particularly on collective action outside of 
established institutional channels, as long as it is goal-oriented, aiming to challenge 
or defend authority. Social movements are defined as ‘collectivities acting with some 
degree of organization and continuity, outside of institutional or organizational 
channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is 
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institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or 
world order of which they are a part’ (Snow et al., 2004). Traditionally, interest 
groups and established organisations such as political parties are not regarded as 
movements, although they can be part of movements. In the Turkish case Islamic 
BAs collaborate with political parties and a specific religious movement.  
Focusing on how resource-poor groups mobilise and gain power, social 
movement research has developed a rich account of how groups who lack political 
power can generate resources at the periphery. I hold that this literature can apply to 
interest groups such as BAs where they collaborate with other resource-poor 
organisations, lack political influence and resources, and aim to achieve contentious 
goals. Islamic BAs’ activities encompass inter-organisational collaboration, a 
collective goal and identity based on Islam, and indirect contention that qualify them 
as movement tactics, rather than as economic services to members or political 
services for rational politicians. 
The fact that not only state institutions, but also religious institutions can 
serve as important sources of legitimacy and economic power has been established in 
social movement theory. Religious groups and organisations have been dubbed 
‘crucibles of social movements’ (Zald & McCarthy, 1998, p. 24). For example, 
Proffitt and Spicer’s (2006) study of shareholder activism over 35 years reveals that 
religious organisations were behind around 60% of the more than 2000 shareholder 
proposals in the US on topics relating to international human rights and labour 
standards. The tactics for gaining political influence go beyond providing policy 
support to rational political elites at the national level, as described in political-
entrepreneurship literatures, and/or economic services to members, as described in 
collective action literatures. The observed tactics in Turkey also go beyond 
contentious and directly disruptive tactics identified in the traditional political 
process framework of social movements. These are non-traditional movements 
insofar as they do not directly attack the state through contentious tactics, but rather 
apply non-contentious tactics in the economic and civic spheres through 
collaboration (Bakker et al., 2013). Due to multiple threats by the Kemalist 
establishment, Islamic movements in Turkey have transformed to apply economic 
and civic tactics to gradually transform the society from the bottom up. Islamic BAs 
have gained political influence by fostering a pious, legitimate business elite. The 
seemingly non-contentious activities of increasing the business exporter base of 
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Anatolian SMEs in the periphery by providing a trust-base, contacts, financial 
resources and information, is part of the moderately Islamic movement’s goal of 
creating a new pious business elite.  
But how does a new, legitimate, pious business elite increase political 
influence and how is that contentious, even indirectly? I argue that the grassroots 
level inter-organisational exchange through movement tactics, has paved the way for 
institutional change, by providing the legitimacy, resources and normalisation of 
Islamic practices essential to attack powerful actors in the centre. Firstly, this 
collaborative resource exchange has created a new, confident, compliant business 
elite that serves as a powerful support base, providing both financial and political 
support to the AKP and the Gülen community. This increases the economic power 
and legitimacy of all parties involved. In the business realm, a parallel pious elite has 
been created that can compete with existing elites in the centre, together with a new 
set of private and public institutions. Above all, this exchange normalises types of 
behaviour that were previously illegitimate. Islamic BAs and businessmen have 
gradually normalised a new set of Islamic codes of behaviours, norms and 
institutions to facilitate institutional change in the long run. 
In the early political process and resource mobilisation approaches, social 
movement actors were assumed to make strategic use of contingent opportunities 
provided by the political structure to mobilise constituencies, and to target the state 
in order to reform institutions. Identities and frames were viewed as resources that 
rational and strategic actors make use of and that may be transformed as a result of 
mobilisation (McAdam et al., 2001). The focus of mobilisation was on state actors 
and contentious, non-institutionalised tactics, which ‘excludes collective claims-
making focused on affirmation of identity from his definition of repertoires of 
contention’ (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004, p. 266). More recent political process 
approaches assert a more dynamic process of tactics. Claimants contend not only 
through known repertoires but can ‘expand them by creating innovations at their 
margins’ (Tarrow, 2011, p.11), creating a mix of tactics. Tarrow (2011) differentiates 
between conventional or contained (e.g. lobbying, press conferences, elections, but 
also established forms such as strikes and demonstrations), and disruptive and violent 
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protest actions.81 These continue to exclude, however, collaborative and indirect 
forms of contention that go beyond ‘symbolic and peaceful forms of disruption’ 
(Tarrow, 2011, p.102). The  ‘new social movement’ literature (Cohen, 1985; 
Melucci, 1985, 1989; Touraine, 1981), by contrast, highlights the importance of 
transforming everyday life and identities for social movements and the generation of 
power. Melucci (1989), and Touraine (1981) argue that the set of beliefs, symbols 
and values, with the goals of restructuring everyday life practices, should be the 
focus of analysis as they are not only tools towards, but also the goals of some 
movements.  
The modern Islamic movement in Turkey, however, has combined indirect 
socio-economic and private forms of contention with disruptive aims. In connecting 
these two approaches to movements, more recent literature suggests that tactics can 
range from contentious to non-contentious, and from attacking state or cultural 
authority through collaboration and/or confrontation (Bakker et al., 2013). Especially 
when it comes to studying the political influence of BAs it can be expected that with 
their increasing institutionalisation that a larger range of non-contentious and market-
based activities are employed (e.g. lobbying, campaign financing). My study 
therefore also contributes to social movement theory by providing an empirical 
example of how indirect contention in the market- and civic realms can achieve 
social movement goals. The political process approach of social movements would 
not regard such market- and -identity based, collaborative tactics as a form of 
contention. 
Such a combination of contentious and non-contentious, rational and 
ideological accounts is particularly relevant under conditions of threat, where direct 
contentious activities may be impossible, and where religion enters contention. 
Under such circumstances, ideological power is required to challenge authorities and 
to build up legitimacy, and the collective affirmation of new values, practices, and 
                                                
 
81 ‘Disruption is the common coin of contentious politics and is the source of the innovations 
that make social movements creative and sometimes dangerous’. The most dramatic forms, 
violent ones, are the easiest to initiate, but under normal circumstances, they are limited to 
small groups with few resources who are willing to exact damage and risk repression. The 
opposite forms, contained ones, offer the advantage of building on routines that people 
understand and that elites will accept or even facilitate. This is the source of its numeric pre- 
dominance in the repertoire, but also of its institutionalization and lack of excitement. The 
third set of forms, disruptive ones, break with routine, startle bystanders, and leave elites 
disoriented, at least for a time.’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 99) 
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identities can become an important goal of movement activity. Ideology and religion 
enter tactics ‘especially when struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society’, 
as ‘bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols’ becomes even more 
important (Tarrow, 2011, p.29).  
Some students of Islamic movements in Turkey similarly argue that the 
Turkish case provides a curious combination of ideological and rational resources, 
and of contentious and non-contentious tactics (Tuğal, 2009; Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 
2003). Yavuz (2003) finds that Turkey’s modern Islamic movement can be 
categorised as a new social movement as it seeks to reconstitute identities, 
institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through 
participating, influencing, or controlling cultural, education and economic spheres. 
Tuğal (2002, 2009), relying on a Gramscian approach, also argues that the early 
Islamic social movement in Turkey did not directly challenge the state. However, the 
author regards these tactics as ultimately disruptive as they aim at a long-term 
transformation through the creation of new ‘counter-hegemony’ in the cultural realm, 
in collective identities, habits and everyday life practices that pave the way for direct 
state challenges. Tuğal’s study relies on ethnography of the Islamist movement in 
Istanbul, but does not analyse Islamic BAs. I apply the author’s framework to argue 
that Islamic BAs have gained political influence by applying seemingly non-
contentious Islamic tactics in the economic and CSR spheres in collaboration with 
the Gülen community and AKP elites. I argue that the creation of a new pious 
business elite through Islamic BAs is part of this set of non-contentious tactics in the 
economic realm. Such an argument is also supported by two other in-depth studies 
that find that the Gülen community has ‘two faces’ in that it displays tolerance and 
pluralism and the public sphere, but promotes ‘pious uniformity and rigid morality in 
domestic and communial sites’, for example, gender segregation, punishment of 
adultery, traditional gender roles and inequality, and other restrictions in individual 
liberties (Turam, 2007). The community’s public image may present a progressive, 
tolerant and pluralist image by focusing on knowledge, education, science and 
international commerce, which however, under-represents its Islamic face and faith-
based activities (Turam, 2007; Agai, 2004).  
The study of Turkey’s BAs may have implications for the study of BAs in 
other transition economies, in which economic development has been driven by 
strong states cut off from civil society, that at the same time suffer from a low 
 262 
capacity (Buğra, 1994; Evans, 1996; Woolcock, 1998). Civil society and business in 
particular can become an active part in such intra-state conflicts where state and/or 
political elites are particularly vulnerable. This is often the case in countries, which 
are in the process of transformation from strong authoritarian and military regimes, 
creating conflicts between old and new political institutions and elites. Especially 
where such conflicts additionally overlap with ideological, ethnic or other social 
cleavages, cultural and ideological symbols form an important part of political 
mobilisation and business politics.  
This is for example the case in some countries that share an Ottoman heritage 
of a strong centre-periphery cleavage that additionally overlaps with the cleavage 
between Islamists and Secularists. A new middle class that is blending ‘Islamic piety 
and capitalist fervor’ (Nasr, 2010, p. 11) has been developing in the Middle East over 
the last few decades. This has led Islamism to partly turn into ‘a bourgeois 
movement consisting mostly of middle-class professionals, businessmen, 
shopkeepers, petty merchants and traders’ (Gerges, 2013, p. 407). The growth of an 
Islamic finance and banking sector worldwide is testimony to this process. The 
politicisation of religious identity is not unique to Turkey and the ‘Turkish 
experience is regarded as prototypical in the process of modernisation’ as the 
‘Kemalist ideology of modernization and nation-building was imitated in the 
experiences of other developing Muslim countries like Tunisia (Bourgubaism), Iran 
(Pahlavism), Egypt (Nasserism) and Indonesia (Pancasila)’ (Yavuz, 2003, p. 7). The 
Turkish experience may have implications for these countries in the future if they 
progress on their gradual democratisation and liberalisation processes. Turkey’s 
experiences have so far remained unique in comparison with the violent struggles of 
most Middle Eastern countries such as Algeria, Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Turkey’s 
diversified and competitive business environment, and its comparatively early 
transition to multi-party politics since the 1950, which has offered different, 
business-focused venues of political mobilisation to Turkish Islamists, in a way that 
is very different from the violent struggles of the Middle East. In Egypt, even before 
the Arab Spring, economic liberalisation had been limited compared to the Turkish 
experience (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009). Religious states such as the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (Westerlund & Hallencreutz, 1996) cannot usefully be compared to Turkey’s de 
jure parliamentary democracy. However, the Turkish experience may have 
implications for their future development. Currently, Indonesia has undergone a 
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similar process of moderating Islam with an increasing growth of a Muslim middle 
class (Hefner, 2011). Ideology and mass mobilisation among businessmen is also 
prevalent in some Latin American countries such as Argentina’s Peronism (cf. 
Chapter I).  
3. Potential limitations  
There are several potential limitations to this study. Sparse network data and the 
highly polarised environment made a study of the role of religion very difficult, both 
in interviews as well as in data access. This also applies to political affiliations, but 
to a lesser extent, as such data are more readily available. The first limitation of the 
network coding is therefore that for earlier time periods, especially civil society, but 
also political affiliation data were more limited than for the 2004–2012 period, which 
may underestimate civic integration, and to a lesser extent political integration in the 
1990s. Because affiliation with the Gülen or any other religious movement is a 
highly contentious issue, the present data may especially underestimate civic-Islamic 
memberships in the early 1990s. Additionally, movement-level actor-by-actor 
networks are sparse. That is mainly due to the strict coding excluding companies 
with fewer affiliations that cannot be clearly categorised; it is also an effect of the 
sparse data for early time periods. However, a strict coding system gives the findings 
more validity. The fact that political and civic integration may be underestimated 
only means that the patterns found may be even stronger in reality. The weaker civic 
Islamic integration of the early time periods might be a result of lacking data. That 
does not change the fact that civic integration remains strong in the secular coalition. 
It’s unlikely that additional data would change the differential between the two 
subgroups to a large extent.  
I aimed to increase the validity of my findings through the following 
strategies. First, all my findings are interpreted in relation to each other rather than in 
absolute terms. Findings about the Islamic movement only make sense in relation to 
the secular coalition, which serves almost as a ‘control group’. Second, in the 
network analysis the combination of visualisation and descriptive data allows 
identifying patterns between groups and across time, giving the emerging hypotheses 
validity. Third, the integration of archival and interview data with network data 
provides further validity through a triangulation of data sources. In spite of sparse 
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and hard-to-access data, a consistent and valid pattern has emerged across various 
data sources and movement tactics. 
The present research focuses on generating hypotheses of a new phenomenon 
that is hard to access. Most importantly, a qualitative network approach relies on 
refining datasets and hypotheses until a clearer picture emerges to extend existing 
theory, rather than to test theory. In a future study, the hypotheses from this PhD may 
be tested or expanded on another sample of holding groups, for which more public 
data are available (e.g. limiting the datasets to companies registered at the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange). Accordingly, I transform and refine my initial network data to 
generate more in-depth hypotheses about Anatolian capital based on business’ 
affiliations. In order to make sure that differences in subgroups are not a result of 
differences in re-coding, transformation rules were applied consistently to both 
subgroups. Critics may argue that there is circularity in transforming networks based 
on affiliations (which is done to arrive at subgroup-level networks), and then 
studying the resultant affiliations. An alternative approach to such network 
transformations could have been to use an external criterion to categorise business 
groups as either Islamic, Secular or Mixed. For example, a survey could be used to 
determine attitudes toward contentious issues to categorise members as belonging to 
either subgroup rather than relying on membership data for such categorisations. In 
the highly polarised political environment of the present study, this was not, 
however, possible, as it was hardly possible to raise such issues in interviews, let 
alone in a survey. 
In spite of the increasing competition and gradual displacement in Gaziantep, 
it appears that the polarisation between the secular and Islamic subgroups in 
Gaziantep is not as extreme as in other cities. BA representatives were not keen on 
criticising the other BAs in the city and largely remained respectful. This is probably 
the case because of the presence of the Konukoğlu family, the head of the large 
Sanko holding group, who plays an integrating leadership role in the city through its 
large presence in the Chambers and other local and national institutions. This has 
also been observed by Buğra and Savaşkan (2012), who regard the polarisation, 
especially in Kayseri, to be more extreme because of the absence of such integrative 
leadership. The Chambers in Antep, albeit contested, still serve as unifying forums 
and the leadership of a few companies that remain above politics, keep large 
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hostilities at bay. As a result, the differences between the two movements might be 
stronger and more clearly differentiated in more polarised city cases.  
Finally, the selection of textile cluster companies may cause a limitation to 
the generalisation of results to other industries. Although there might be differences 
between industries, the mobilisation of Islamic BAs takes place across all sectors, 
and I would argue that Gaziantep’s textile industry reflects a valid company sample 
of these tactics. The focus on one industry was chosen to rule out industry-specific 
effects of task- and production-requirements. If at all, the textile sector may 
underestimate the extent of political mobilisation, because textiles is generally not 
considered to be an industry where political connections are as important as in 
telecommunications or construction (e.g. less permits required). 
In spite of such potential limitations, we can still conclude that Islamic BAs’ 
political influence originates from their application of typical social movement 
tactics, combining political and civic elites at the grassroots level, and their economic 
activities with resonant framing grounded in Islam. These non-contentious tactics 
have generated a new pious business elite with the necessary resources, legitimacy 
and support base to compete with, and gradually displace secular elites.  
4. Further research and outlook for Turkey 
The above research could be complemented by a comparative case study of 
companies, tracking the growing and declining political influence of secular and 
Islamic businessmen across time. Further information on company economic 
performance and background would be required for such an analysis. These more 
easily available for large holding companies registered at the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange and thus findings could be assessed studying the effect of affiliation on 
this new sample. The current fallout between the Gülen community and the AKP 
also provides the opportunity to study how the change from cooperation to 
competition affects the business community. Are there changing alliances and tactics 
of Islamic BAs and what is the reaction of secular BAs? Furthermore, a comparative 
case study could further develop the conditions under which BAs with social 
movement characteristics emerge, and why some rise to political influence while 
others don’t. Useful comparative cases would be transition economies with 
vulnerable political systems and a history of military interventions, varying the 
extent of ideological/religious cleavages in society. Latin American cases such as 
 266 
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, Indonesia and/or Malaysia, India and South Korea are 
possible comparative cases.   
This thesis on Turkey’s state-business relations and their power generation 
has implications for Turkey’s democratic consolidation. The adequate representation 
of business is a core concern of several major theories of democratic consolidation. 
Some even argued that in Latin America democracy could only be consolidated 
where elites’ interests were effectively protected either through electorally strong 
political parties or through direct influence of elite groups (Rueschemeyer, Huber 
Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). In Chile, Colombia and Mexico, strong and 
encompassing BAs contributed in some instances to macroeconomic stabilisation, 
coordinated policy reform, trade negotiations and other aspects of economic 
governance (Schneider, 2004). Throughout Turkey’s modern history, narrow 
patronage-based elite networks have dominated the business environment. A more 
encompassing input of the collective interests of businessmen irrespective of 
partisanship would mean a significant improvement in the democratic consolidation 
and economic development of the country. The question then is, will the current 
state-business relations repeat past patterns of corrupt business cycles (Zürcher, 
2004) in a different guise? Or will they be are a force for economic development and 
democracy? 
On the positive side, the AKP administration has overseen a decade of 
economic growth and promoted development in previously neglected regions. A new 
middle class has emerged. This trajectory is evident in GDP growth rates, the 
increasing rates of construction and improvements to infrastructure, local services, 
healthcare, and a larger number of universities. Greater religious freedoms and the 
increased civilian control of the military were also reforms welcomed by the pious 
middle class. In spite of all these positive economic developments, it appears that the 
Islamic movement has continued Turkey’s fate of ‘corruption cycles’, in addition to 
increasing polarisation and authoritarianism. With the Gezi Park protests and the 
graft probes, numerous examples of corruption involving the AKP and Gülen 
community have resurfaced. This Çalık Group, a holding run by Erdoğan’s son-in-
law, is a perfect example of this. This Group ‘made much of its initial money in the 
notoriously impenetrable and repressive state of Turkmenistan in the 1990s, as the 
country emerged from Soviet collapse, and the country’s first dictatorial president, 
Turkmenbashi, began to be courted by Gülen elites, who curried his favor by 
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translating Ruhama, his “sacred writings,” into Turkish.’ In turn, Çalık Group is a 
major stakeholder of the Gülen-affiliated Bank Asya, which has been booming until 
recently thanks to AKP support for Islamic banking (Rodeheffer, 2013).  
I have argued that the social movement tactics of the Islamic movement have 
paved the ground for real institutional changes. Indeed there have been several 
‘reforms’ of Kemalist institutions to promote greater ‘religious freedoms’. For 
example, in the educational realm, religious ‘imam hatip’82 schools have recently 
been put to the same status as public state schools (Dombey, 2012; Yinanç, 2014). 
This has also led to a boom in building or transforming regular schools into imam 
hatip schools.83 Additionally, wearing a headscarf is now permitted in public schools 
and most public institutions (outside of the military and judiciary). Education and the 
headscarf issues have been two important areas of contention for the moderately 
Islamic movement. In the economic realm, Islamic banking has grown. ‘Bank Asya, 
the Islamic bank formed by Gülenists with less than $1 million in start-up capital in 
1996, is now one of Turkey’s ten largest banks, reaching $14 billion in assets by 
2012 while benefiting from the support that the AKP has given to Islamic banking 
(and a bank in which the founder [Prime Minister Erdoğan’s son-in-law’s] of Çalık 
group is a major stakeholder).’ Until the recent falling-out between the AKP and 
Gülen community, the latter has arguably had a large impact on Turkey’s foreign 
policy, which promoted friendlier relations with Middle Eastern neighbours (Kirişci, 
2011; Öniş, 2011, p. 56; Özvarış, 2013). The Islamic movement has also decreased 
the power of traditional secular strongholds, such as the military, and increased its 
own presence in the judiciary, police and the office of the Presidency. Gülen 
                                                
 
82 Several reforms to the educational system have been enacted. The so-called ‘4+4+4’ 
school system replaced the current eight uninterrupted years of primary school education. 
The change allows children aged 10-14 to attend specialist religious schools, known as imam 
hatip schools’ (Dombey, 2012), and allow their graduates universal access to all universities. 
Originally imam hatip schools served to train the Islamic clergy, but they now teach the 
national curriculum, albeit with a heavier focus on religious education.  
 
83 Imam hatip schools have increased in number by 73% between 2010 and 2011, showing 
the AKP’s political and bureaucratic support, whereas a large number of general high 
schools were shut down or transformed. It is provincial directors at the local level 
responsible for making such opening/transformation decisions, showing once more the local 
roots of the moderately Islamic movement (Yinanç, 2014). And while there is no gender 
segregation in public schools, increasingly new vocational schools and imam hatip schools 
practice some form of gender segregation (e.g. separate floors/buildings in imam hatip 
schools; separate dorms in vocational schools) (Özgür, 2012, pp. 90–91). 
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community followers have gradually taken key positions within the police and 
judiciary (Corke, Finkel, Kramer, Robbins, & Schenkkan, 2014; Dombey, 2013), and 
the military has been brought under greater civilian control. With the current AKP-
Gülen falling-out, the government has removed prosecutors and police officials it 
deemed too close to the Islamic cleric and replaced it with its own sympathisers, 
besides increasingly bringing the judiciary under control of the executive in general. 
I suggest that the direction this Islamisation will take depends to a large 
extent on external forces, and the interests of foreign powers in the continuing Arab 
uprising, which has once again put Turkey in a key geopolitically strategic position 
for ‘Western’ powers. Internally, although business is not expected to be a force for 
greater democratisation, the new pious middle classes would not support a departure 
from liberal market economies toward a state-controlled Islamist state and economy. 
Anatolian capital’s political preferences and support for the AKP crucially depend on 
continued economic growth and political stability, and so does the AKP’s continued 
electoral success. Although they may continue to support a greater Islamisation of 
the country with increasingly conservative and authoritarian reforms, the group 
studied is mainly interested in upward economic and social mobility rather than 
creating an Islamic state. In a sense the the proposed changes to secular institutions 
have been more in the direction of promoting a passive type of secularism, removing 
state control of the religious sphere and allowing for its greater public visibility 
(Kuran, 2008). This type of Islamism appears closer to an US American version of 
religion and conservatism, where schools with religious curricula flourish, and 
certain Catholic groups promote the downplaying of evolutionary theory in textbooks 
and to make illegal abortion (Tuğal, 2013). The real obstacles are not full-fledged 
Islamisation but the increasingly authoritarian stance of the AKP under Erdoğan, 
although restrictions on personal freedoms and religious minorities are troubling.   
As long as economic and political stability prevails and the opposition 
remains weak, further polarisation and authoritarianism is to be expected. Business 
preferences might shift if a credible opposition could arise that would be perceived to 
support economic growth. Indeed there are ample opportunities for the opposition 
with the increasing graft and corruption allegations of the Islamic camp, as well as 
the Gezi Protests. Internal division between the AKP and Gülen community also 
provide an opportunity that could be exploited, and so is the slowing down of 
Turkey’s economic growth. Additionally, in spite of many positive reports of 
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Turkey’s economic growth during the global recession, Turkey has an urgent current 
account deficit problem (Röhn, 2012), and has struggled to to climb up the ladder to 
higher value-added production. Large inflows of ‘hot money’, increased corruption, 
and political instability have added to an uncertain economic future. The term 
Anatolian ‘tigers’ that the Islamic movement likes to use is thus clearly a euphemism 
(Arslanhan & Kurtsal, 2010; Öniş & Bayram, 2008). However, the framing analysis 
has shown that the secular opposition lacks a charismatic leader that could counteract 
dominant Islamic frames and build on society’s parochial values in a secular way. 
Due to the CHP’s association with the military, this would almost require a new 
political party, in the same way the AKP arose from within the political Islamist 
movement. Most importantly, the solving of the Kurdish issue stands in the way of a 
unified secular-liberal opposition.  
It remains to be seen what the consequence of the Gülen-AKP break-up will 
mean for state-business relations. ‘The strongest indication that the fight was 
approaching a point of no return came when the government announced its decision 
to close down dershanes, special evening and weekend schools that prepare students 
for college entrance exams. These schools constitute one of the Gülen community’s 
major sources of influence and recruitment’ (Tuğal, 2013). So far it appears that the 
AKP is strengthening its political Islamist wing in response to this. There has been a 
revival of Islamist forces, especially since the AKP-Gülen fallout, with Erdoğan 
more recently reviving ‘anti-imperialist, pro-Iran, and puritan tendencies in Turkish 
Islamism’ (Tuğal, 2013). Either way, as long as this state-business exchange is based 
on peer and neighbourhood pressure and excludes non co-religionists, it also 
promotes further polarisation, and it is Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies that 
consitute the major obstacle to further democratisation. Recent reforms by PM 
Erdoğan to bring the judiciary under the executive’s control and the intention to 
reform Turkey to a Presidential system have removed checks and balances and the 
separation of powers. The costs associated with exit mean that business is unlikely to 
be a force for greater democratisation.  
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Appendix 
 
1. NACE Rev. 2 Industry Codes for Textile Cluster Sample 
The following industries were included in the textile cluster sample, following 
NACE Rev. 2 codes (Eurostat, 2008): 
- 01.6.3.02 Preparation of cotton fibres from Section A: Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 
- Divison 13: Manufacture of Textiles from Section C: Manufacturing; 
includes, for example, the preparation of fibres, weaving of textiles, finishing 
of textiles; other textiles like knitted fabrics, carpets and rugs, non-wovens 
and technical textiles 
- Division 14: Manufacture of wearing apparel (e.g. underwear, workwear) 
- Division 15: Manufacture of leather and related products, especially the 
manufacture of footwear footwear 
- Division 22: Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products, especially plastic 
products and plastic packing-goods (similar production process to synthetic 
yarns and several firms involved in plastic and yarns) 
 
2. Bonacich values 
Table 11:1993–1998 normalised Bonacich overlap measures; shared firm numbers (brackets) 
Bonacich  
measure 
(firm 
numbers) 
Gagiad Tuskon Musiad Civic 
Secular 
Civic 
Islamic 
Political 
Centre-
Left 
Political 
Centre-
Right 
Political 
Islamist 
Antep 
Cham
ber 
Turkey 
Chambers 
Gagiad (57)  0.607 
(8)  
0.393 
(1)  
0.944 
(26) 
0.516 
(3)  
0.000  
(0) 
0.811 
(14) 
0.000  
(0) 
0.846  
(37) 
1.000  
(10) 
Tuskon 0.607 
(8)   
(30) 0.788 
(7)  
0.604 
(4)  
0.693 
(5)  
0.000  
(0) 
0.000  
(0)  
1.000  
(1) 
0.669 
 (11) 
0.000  
(0) 
Musiad 0.393 
(1)   
0.788 
(7)  
(15) 0.499 
(1)  
0.750 
(4)  
0.000  
(0) 
0.639  
(2)  
0.000  
(0) 
0.677  
(6)  
0.000 
(0) 
Civic 
Secular 
0.944 
(26)  
0.604 
(4)  
0.499 
(1)  
(27) 0.466 
(1)  
0.791  
(1) 
0.858 
(12) 
0.000  
(0) 
0.944  
(26) 
0.766  
(4) 
Civic 
Islamic 
0.516 
(3)   
0.693 
(5)  
0.750 
(4)  
0.466 
(1)  
(19) 0.000  
(0) 
0.607  
(2)  
0.000  
(0) 
0.634  
(6)  
0.000  
(0) 
Political 
Centre-Left 
0.000 
(0)   
0.000 
(0)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.791 
(1)  
0.000 
(0)  
(2) 0.000  
(0)  
0.000  
(0) 
0.712  
(1)  
0.000  
(0) 
Political 
Centre-
Right 
0.811 
(14)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.639 
(2)  
0.858 
(12) 
0.607 
(2)  
0.000  
(0) 
(20) 0.000  
(0) 
0.790  
(13) 
0.000  
(0) 
Political 
Islamist 
0.000 
(0)   
1.000 
(1)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.000  
(0) 
0.000  
(0)  
(1) 0.000  
(0)  
0.000 
 (0) 
Antep 
Chamber 
0.846 
(37)  
0.669 
(11) 
0.677 
(6)  
0.944 
(26) 
0.634 
(6)  
0.712  
(1) 
0.790 
(13) 
0.000 
 (0) 
(57) 1.000 
(10) 
Turkey 
Chambers 
1.000 
(10)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.766 
(4)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.000  
(0) 
0.000 
(0)  
0.000  
(0) 
1.000  
(10) 
(10) 
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Table 12:1999–2003 normalised Bonacich overlap measures; shared firm numbers (brackets) 
Bonacich  
measure 
(firm 
numbers) 
Gagiad Tuskon Musiad Civic 
Secular 
Civic 
Islamic 
Political 
Centre-
Left 
Political 
Centre-
Right 
Political 
Islamist 
Antep 
Cham
ber 
Turkey 
Chambers 
Gagiad (88) 0.697 
(25) 
0.618 
(9) 
0.925 
(33) 
0.657 
(10) 
0.000 (0) 0.618 (4) 0.000 
(0) 
0.803 
(36) 
0.930 
(23) 
Tuskon 0.697 
(25) 
(60) 0.743 
(13) 
0.581 
(6) 
0.777 
(14) 
0.000 (0) 0.828 (9) 0.750 
(1) 
0.624 
(12) 
0.640 
(6) 
Musiad 0.618 
(9) 
0.743 
(13) 
(30) 0.000 
(0) 
0.845 
(13) 
0.000 (0) 0.788 (5) 0.000 
(0) 
0.586 
(5) 
0.000 
(0) 
Civic 
Secular 
0.925 
(33) 
0.581 
(6) 
0.000 
(0) 
(35) 0.000 
(0) 
0.801 (1) 0.000 (0) 0.000 
(0) 
0.907 
(29) 
0.943 
(21) 
Civic 
Islamic 
0.657 
(10) 
0.777 
(14) 
0.845 
(13) 
0.000 
(0) 
(27) 0.000 (0) 0.000 (0) 0.000 
(0) 
0.523 
(3) 
0.000 
(0) 
Pol-Left 0.000 
(0) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.801 
(1) 
0.000 
(0) 
(2) 0.000 (0) 0.000 
(0) 
0.757 
(1) 
0.000 
(0) 
Pol-Right 0.618 
(4) 
0.828 
(9) 
0.788 
(5) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.000 (0) (13) 0.874 
(1) 
0.633 
(3) 
0.000 
(0) 
Political 
Islamist 
0.000 
(0) 
0.750 
(1) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.000 (0) 0.874 (1) (2) 0.000 
(0) 
0.000 
(0) 
Antep 
Chamber 
0.803 
(36) 
0.624 
(12) 
0.586 
(5) 
0.907 
(29) 
0.523 
(3) 
0.757 (1) 0.633 (3) 0.000 
(0) 
(56) 0.929 
(22) 
Turkey 
Chambers 
0.930 
(23) 
0.640 
(6) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.943 
(21) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.000 (0) 0.000 (0) 0.000 
(0) 
0.929 
(22) 
(24) 
 
Table 13:2004–2012 normalised Bonacich overlap measures; shared firm numbers (brackets) 
Bonacich  
measure 
(firm 
numbers) 
Gagiad Tuskon Musiad Civic 
Secular 
Civic 
Islamic 
Political 
Centre-
Left 
Political 
Centre-
Right 
Political 
Islamist 
Antep 
Cham
ber 
Turkey 
Chambers 
Gagiad  (145) 0.715 
(68)  
0.738 
(60)  
0.897 
(45) 
0.773 
(49) 
0.742 
(24) 
0.720 
(46) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.829 
(75)  
0.896 
(44) 
Tuskon 0.715 
(68)  
(152) 0.825 
(82)  
0.708 
(26) 
0.824 
(59) 
0.725 
(23) 
0.802 
(63) 
0.680 
(3) 
0.775 
(65)  
0.732 
(28) 
Musiad 0.738 
(60)  
0.825 
(82)  
(116) 0.747 
(26) 
0.839 
(55) 
0.718 
(19) 
0.829 
(60) 
0.526 
(1) 
0.809 
(62)  
0.769 
(28) 
Civic 
Secular 
0.897 
(45)  
0.708 
(26)  
0.747 
(26)  
(49) 0.782 
(24) 
0.837 
(20) 
0.788 
(27) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.875 
(40)  
0.948 
(39) 
Civic 
Islamic 
0.773 
(49)  
0.824 
(59)  
0.839 
(55)  
0.782 
(24) 
(78) 0.810 
(23) 
0.780 
(38) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.826 
(50)  
0.786 
(24) 
Political 
Centre-
Left 
0.742 
(24)  
0.725 
(23)  
0.718 
(19)  
0.837 
(20) 
0.810 
(23) 
(40) 0.750 
(19) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.731 
(19)  
0.830 
(19) 
Political 
Centre-
Right 
0.720 
(46)  
0.802 
(63)  
0.829 
(60)  
0.788 
(27) 
0.780 
(38) 
0.750 
(19) 
(91) 0.743 
(3) 
0.801 
(51)  
0.800 
(28) 
Political 
Islamist 
0.000 
(0)   
0.680 
(3)   
0.526 
(1)   
0.000 
(0)  
0.000 
(0)  
0.000 (0)  0.743 (3)  (6) 0.000 
(0) 
0.000 
(0) 
Antep 
Chamber 
0.829 
(75)  
0.775 
(65)  
0.809 
(62)  
0.875 
(40) 
0.826 
(50) 
0.731 
(19) 
0.801 
(51) 
0.000 
(0) 
 (105) 0.909 
(43) 
Turkey 
Chambers 
0.896 
(44)  
0.732 
(28)  
0.769 
(28)  
0.948 
(39) 
0.786 
(24) 
0.830 
(19) 
0.800 
(28) 
0.000 
(0) 
0.909 
(43)  
(48) 
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Coding strategies 
 
3. Data sources for affiliation/membership data 
With respect to BA membership, the secular Gagiad representatives provided the 
most complete data with a list of members according to their joining date, which was 
used to group companies into the three time periods. For example, companies joining 
in the years between 1993 and 1998 were accumulated and all added to the 1993–
1998 time period. These members were then also carried over to the later time 
periods, unless later membership lists lacked the company names. For Tuskon 
affiliates and Müsiad, this information had to be compiled from various resources as 
the associations did not have such information ready at hand: for example, the 
association Hürsiad provides lists of previous board memberships since their 
foundation on their homepage (“Dünden bugüne Hürsiad yönetim kurulu-Hürsiad 
nostalji [Board membership from past to present - Hürsiad nostalgia],” 2012); these 
were used as a starting point for earlier time periods. The present (“e-Müsiad,” 2012, 
“Gapgiad üyeler [Gapgiad members],” 2012, “Hürsiad üyeler [Hürsiad Members],” 
2012), and past (board) membership information was then supplemented with 
secondary membership lists I found on earlier version of the associations’ websites.84 
For Tuskon affiliates, I was also given an earlier version of a membership booklet 
from 2006 (Güneydoğu Sanayici ve İşadamları Federasyonu, 2006), which was 
combined with their online list of membership accessed in 2012 to complete the 
2004–2012 period. Similar procedures were used for the second Tuskon affiliate – 
Gapgiad, and Müsiad membership. Where no information on timing was available, 
firms were sorted into three time periods according to the company’s founding date 
as a last resort.  
With respect to civic engagement, affiliation with the Islamic Gülen 
community was, first, coded code through information on school sponsorship to the 
community’s schools and educational institutions. This information was acquired by 
having a local teacher identify Gülen cemaat schools in Gaziantep, and by scanning 
local newspapers to confirm that information. The Ministry of Education, at the time, 
provided some information on school sponsorship on its official homepage (“Il Milli 
Eğitim Müdürlüğü Gaziantep - kurumlar rehberi [Ministry of Education of Gaziantep 
                                                
 
84 Accessed via waybackmachine, an internet archive that allows one to view earlier, 
publicly available versions of a homepage (“Wayback machine,” 2014). 
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Province - organisations’ list],” 2012), and especially schools with names of 
industrialists were checked in detail to find further information online (in local 
newspapers or company homepages). This affiliation was then assigned to the 
relevant time period based on the founding date of the school. These data were 
complemented by affiliation with local charities promoting ‘imam hatip schools’ and 
other Gülen community organisations. With respect to secular civil society 
organisations, leadership level data for Gaimder, Sunder, TEC (“Gaziantep Tenis ve 
Atcılık Kulübü [Gaziantep Tennis and Equestrian Club],” 2012), and Rotary85 were 
available since their foundation across several elections. Other than in BA coding, 
earlier civic involvements were not automatically included in the next time periods 
for Islamic civil society organisations. This is also true for political coding. For 
secular civil society organisations, earlier members were only included in later lists 
as long as their names still appeared on later membership lists.  
 
4. Cross-referencing of affiliation/membership information into one incidence 
matrix per time period  
First of all, these lists had to be cleaned up and standardised to a common format by 
removing Turkish characters. Secondly, a simple algorithm was written to compare 
the Gaziantep Chamber file with the other network membership files and combine all 
memberships into one file if a matching businessperson’s name was found. This 
matching mechanism brought together all memberships of a businessman if his full 
name (first and last name; only two words considered) is also listed in other 
documents. A second document was created that included potential hits through a 
mechanism that matched businessmen based on their last names only.86 This is 
because some membership lists did have full names, while others only provided 
initials for first names. This alternative matching file was created to not miss some 
crucial matches in the already sparse data. I sorted out the potential matches by hand 
by comparing further information on companies with membership information. I also 
                                                
 
85 This refers to a combination of several Rotary Clubs which provided online information 
(“Gaziantep - Alleben Rotary Kulübü,” 2012, “Kavaklik Rotary Kulübü,” 2012, “Yesemek 
Rotary,” 2012, “Zeugma Rotary Kulüp,” 2012) 
 
86 For example, if the prominent businessman Abdullah Nejat Kocer is listed as A. Nejat 
Kocer, Abdullah N. Kocer or Nejat Kocer in the Chamber leadership, this was coded as a 
definite match because two of the three words of the name match. If his name were listed as 
A.N. Kocer or N. Kocer only, then this would be included in the ‘maybes’ list.  
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re-checked the ‘definite’ matches to make sure there were no false hits. To sort out 
the potential cases where last names matched, for example, I relied on comparing 
company addresses (e.g. of Gaziantep Chamber and some BA lists), and if there was 
a match, the businessman’s membership was added as a definite match. Another 
secure way was to check the online Gaziantep Chamber information or company 
website which sometimes provided more board member names than were on the 
textile company list given to me by the GSO. For political entrepreneurs, election 
lists sometimes provided job information and if both last name and job description as 
businessman matched, that owner-manager’s political affiliation was added to the list 
of definite memberships. Again, this could be expected to under code memberships 
because I tended to exclude rather include many of these potential hits, especially 
where the last name was a very common name. This was initially done for 
companies before combining them into business groups. This combination into 
business groups was done through research. As outlined above most companies are 
family businesses and often information on bigger business groups could be found on 
the homepages of the companies, by comparing company addresses and through 
expert interviews (e.g. with the head of Gapgiad, who provided some information on 
their bigger member firms; several company owners provided information on their 
own firms’ ownership structures). Cross-membership is probably under-estimated 
and I remained cautious. In the network graphs business groups in textiles are spelled 
with a capital. There are cases where companies within the same family are 
independent, or even competitors, according to their owners’ statements (e.g. the Tat 
Group, which has two largely separate branches), in which case they were treated as 
separate. Other cases where cooperation or competition remains unclear were coded 
as separate but within the same family (e.g. in the network graph see the cases of the 
Kaplan family with multiple companies in the carpets and yarn sectors: Kaplan1, 
Kaplan 11 and so on). 
If a business group company is a member, this membership was extended to 
all the other business group companies by coding the whole business group as a 
member. The following table shows the final number of firms/companies coded as 
‘definites’ in each affiliation next to the number of holdings in parentheses. The 
figure in the second line shows the initial definite matches found through comparing 
two-word names. These numbers do not include the Islamic civic affiliations for time 
periods before 2004, which I added by hand after performing the matching 
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algorithms. These initial matches are most similar to the holdings in size because, as 
argued above, not that many potential hits could be added as definite matches. Also, 
the final company figures are much larger because affiliations were added to all 
companies of a business group.  
 
Table 14: Numbers of companies and business groups in each association after initial and 
final matching procedure 
Sample 
firms 
(groups) 
/ initial 
definites 
BA 
Musiad 
BA 
Tuskon 
BA 
Gagiad 
Civic 
Islamic 
Civic 
Secular 
Pol 
Right 
Pol 
Islamist  
Pol 
Left 
Antep 
Chamber 
National 
Chambers  
2004–
2012 
116 
(43)  
/ 42 
152 
(72) 
/ 91 
145 
(56) 
/ 68 
79  
(26) 
/ 29 
49 (14) 
/ 12 
91 
(35) 
/  46 
6  
(4) 
/ 4 
40 
(14) 
/ 18 
105  
(33) 
/ 65 
48  
(13) 
/ 26 
1999–
2003 
30  
(14) 
/ 15 
60  
(36) 
/ 36 
88  
(33) 
/ 45 
27  
(12) 
/ na* 
35 (8) 
/ 18 
13 
(9) 
/ 7 
2  
(2) 
/ 2 
2  
(2) 
/ 2 
56  
(17) 
/ 29 
24  
(4) 
/ 8  
1993–
1998 
14  
(9) 
/ 7 
30  
(20) 
/ 15 
57  
(23) 
/ 29 
19  
(11) 
/ na* 
27 (8) 
/ 16 
20 
(7) 
/ 11 
1  
(1) 
/ 1 
2  
(2) 
/ 1 
57  
(24) 
/ 31 
10  
(2) 
/ 4 
 
Initial datasets are binary (before further transformations in UCINET):87 ‘1’ 
was coded for a company, if one or more company board member directly, or a close 
family member indirectly, is affiliated with an association (BAs/political parties/civil 
society organisations); and ‘0’ otherwise. If there were more than one 
businesspersons of a business group who were members of the same association, this 
was still coded as ‘one’ network affiliation.88 The coding was then extended to all 
firms of a family group as the whole family or business group is expected to profit 
from a leader’s affiliation, which makes sense due to the highly paternalistic and 
authoritarian business culture in Turkey in general (Soylu, 2011), and in the 
                                                
 
87 For network data analysis, the program UCINET has been used for data entry, data 
transformation and for calculating indicators, such as Bonacich’s subgroup overlap 
measures, whereas the open-source program NodeXL has been used for network 
visualisations as it has more functions to analyse graphs and subgraphs than the quantitative 
program UCINET.  
 
88 There are such cases, especially for larger business where several board members might be 
members of the same BA. However, as the data structure is complicated enough 
encompassing 9 levels, this information was ignored as it does not add much additional 
information. This procedure was applied to all companies, therefore consistently applied and 
cannot be said to bias the results in either camp. Tie strength, instead was captured by 
summing up memberships across political, business and civic layers.  
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conservative Gaziantep, in particular. Also, as most of the analysis is conducted on 
the basis of the business group anyway, there is no overestimation of membership.  
 
5. Subgroup-level adjacency matrix transformations 
5.1.a. Further details on rules for assigning Islamic, Secular, Mixed and None codes 
to business groups 
 
For centre-right parties, different types of combinations were taken into account. 
Therefore, a company with a director of a centre-right party is not automatically 
coded as centre-right/Islamic, but can be coded as Mixed/both or secular depending 
on further business and civic affiliations, or as none if there is no additional 
information. To be categorised as Islamic, a further Müsiad/Tuskon or civic 
affiliation was necessary. I found that these rules apply well to the judgements made 
by interviewees, bar two exceptions: centre-right plus one civic affiliations are 
counted as either Islamic (if plus civic_Islamic) or secular (if plus civic_secular), 
although according to the rule they should be categorised as none (only 0.5 
differential). According to the rules, centre-right and Gagiad membership also results 
in a secular categorisations. These rules result in an overcoding of secular political 
ties in 2004, where there are multiple AKP members, who are additionally Gagiad 
members in the secular network. The goal was to err on the side of caution in 
categorising companies as Islamic. Also, Gagiad plus both civic affiliations should 
be coded as secular according to the rules, but fieldwork shows that mixed makes 
more sense and therefore I coded these cases as mixed.  
A political membership is regarded as the strongest type of membership 
because entering political parties is a risky choice for businesses that openly shows 
their political ideology, and might endanger their competitiveness whenever 
government changes (cf. Siegel, 2007). In general, political membership requires a 
strong ideological affiliation and a larger time investment. BAs are the second 
strongest type of membership because joining also requires ideological closeness (cf. 
discussion of the accession process in Chapter VI). However, Gagiad appears as the 
least coherent of the BAs, increasingly accepting all types of large businesses as 
members (cf. supported in framing analysis), and therefore its signalling quality 
decreases if it is combined with Islamic BA memberships (only 0.5 points in those 
cases).  
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Political Islamist parties were only included, if an additional, moderately 
Islamic membership was present in order to include only members of the moderately 
Islamic movement. Overall, there were only a few such cases among Gaziantep’s 
industrial elite. Six such business groups were found, three of which were excluded 
because across the three time periods they included no other memberships.89 The 
other three companies are additional Tuskon and/or Müsiad members and /or later 
switched to a centre-right party.  
 
5.1.b. Creating Islamic, Secular and Mixed actor-by-actor networks in UCINET 
More specifically, after developing and applying rules to code companies as either 
Islamic/Secular /Mixed or None (codes 1, 2, 3, or 0; see 2.3.2.b and 5.1.a of the 
Appendix), this information was added as a column in the original incidence  
(affiliation) matrix. Then I counted and added the number of BA, political and civic 
affiliations for each company coded as I/S or M, in order to be able to differentiate 
the business, civic and political ties of each subgroup. This resulted in nine extra 
valued attributes or columns per business group: 
Secular_BA/Secular_Pol/Secular_Civic; Islamic_BA/Islamic_Pol/I_Civic; and 
Mixed_BA/Mixed_Pol/Mixed_Civic. The column Secular_BA, for example, counts 
the number of BA memberships of a company coded as secular. The maximum value 
in the BA column would be three (member of all three BAs), in the political column 
two (member of both a political_right and political_left party), and in the civic 
columns two as well (member of both an Islamic and secular civil society 
organisations). In the secular coalition, the memberships are largely binary, and as 
there are two Islamic BAs (rather than one secular BA), Islamic companies have 
more valued data. The procedure of creating a one-mode adjacency matrix in 
UCINET involves the command that turns attributes into ties by the cross-products 
                                                
 
89 In the 2004–2012 time period, there are four political Islamist party members: ‘yeni 
yasam’ (no other affiliations) and ‘kamil tekstil’ (no other affiliations) were excluded; but 
‘Mustafa Kilic’ (also in Islamic BA) and ‘ozturk_orolluoglu’ were kept (also in AKP and 
Islamic BA). In the 1999–2003 time period, there were two company groups, one of which 
was kept (uzer tekstil, also in Müsiad and later AKP leadership) and the other removed 
(celikaslan tekstil with no other affiliation). In the 1993–1998 time period there was only one 
such case, namely, the same company as in 1999, ‘uzer tekstil’, which has an additional 
Islamic BA membership in addition to switching to the AKP in the 2004 period.   
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method (multiplication), where the diagonal (reflexive ties) was kept as valid as it 
contains information of the business group’s membership.  
 
5.2. Transformations of tie values following multiplication method of turning 
affiliations into ties between actors 
To analyse differences in the relationship layers between the Islamic and secular 
subgroups, one-mode adjacency matrices for each relationship layer were created. 
This was done according to the procedures described in section 2 of this chapter. For 
each of the 9 attributes a separate adjacency matrix was created (27 in total for 3 time 
periods), with businesses groups as rows and columns and the cells showing whether 
two Islamic businesses, for example, are connected by a common BA affiliation. The 
values of the multiplication method were then transformed again to produce a 
meaningful interval-level data to range between 0 and 3. The values of the 
multiplication method were then transformed again to produce a meaningful interval-
level data to range between 0 and 3; for example, a value of 1 indicates that both 
business groups share 1 affiliation, where one of the business groups may have one 
or two additional affiliations, not shared by the other business group: 
- 0: if each pair of two business groups, none is a member (match), or one is a 
member while the other is not (mismatch) (0-0; 0-1; 1-0) – recoded to remain 
0 (relevant for BA, c, pol) 
- 1: match where both companies of a pair are members of one organisation (1-
1) – recoded to remain 1 (relevant for BA, c, pol) 
- 2: match where both companies of a pair share membership of one 
organisation, while one of the two companies has an additional membership 
(1-2; 2-1) – recoded to 1, to reflect match in one organisation (relevant for 
Ba, c, pol) 
- 3: match where both companies of a pair share membership of one 
organisation, while one of the two companies has two additional 
memberships, (1-3; 3-1) – recoded to 1 to reflect match in one shared 
organisation membership (relevant for BA) 
- 4: match where both companies of a pair share membership in two 
organisations – recoded to 2 to reflect match in two shared organisation 
memberships (relevant for BA, pol, c) 
- 6: match where both companies of a pair share membership of two 
organisations, while one of the two companies has one additional 
memberships (2-3; 3-2) – recoded to 2, to reflect match in two organisations 
(relevant for BA) 
- 9: match where both companies of a pair share membership in three BAs – 
recoded to 3 (BA) 
 
To calculate densities by group of the Islamic and secular subgroups, business 
groups with mixed affiliations, i.e. with connections to both subgroups, were added 
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to both matrices. To arrive at one matrix per subgroup, ties across the BA, political 
and civic relationship layers were summed up to create a valued multiplex adjacency 
matrix (min is 1; max value is 7). Additions (of affiliations) make sense if we assume 
that each relationship type carries a similar weight. Then, to transform these 
affiliations into actor-by-actor ties, the cross-products method was again used and 
resulted in different values to the previous transformation (because of the sums and 
additions of mixed/ambivalent ties). Then, densities by group were calculated for 
both valued and dichotomised matrices at different levels. I dichotomised the 
matrices at different tie strengths or membership levels and interpreted densities by 
group at different tie strengths (densities would decrease at stronger ties because ties 
smaller than a certain level would be excluded, e.g. <= 2). As with all indicators the 
interpretation is relative rather than absolute and based on a comparison. (These 
dichotomisations are arrived at through the command ‘Transform – Graph-theoretic 
– Multigraph’ which automatically dichotomises valued matrices at various levels).  
 
6. Frequencies of relationship layers and strengths after assigning categories of 
Islamic (I; 1) / Secular (S; 2) / Mixed (M; 3) / None (N; 0) 
After this recoding, the numbers of business groups for each category are 
summarised in the following tables. The tables below show the numbers for each 
relationship layer by tie strength (i.e. number of affiliations) 
Table 15: Number of business groups in the 1993–1998 subgroup-level graph  
1993–1998: 
N=334  I_BA I_C I_Pol S_BA S_C S_Pol 
Mix_B
A Mix_C Mix_Pol 
None 0 20 21 1 11 15 0 2 3 
1 affiliation 19 2 2 16 6 2 1 2 1 
2 affiliations 3 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
3 affiliations 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
Business 
Groups I/S/M 
23 17 4 
 
Table 16: Number of business groups in the 1999–2003 subgroup-level graph 
1999–2003: 
N= 470 
I_BA I_C I_Pol S_BA S_C S_Pol Mix_BA Mix_C Mix_Pol 
None 0 33 37 1 18 22 0 4 4 
1 affiliation 33 8 3 22 5 1 0 1 1 
2 affiliations 6 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 
3 affiliations 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
Business 
Groups I/S/M 
41 23 5 
Table 17: Number of business groups in the 2004–2012 subgroup-level graph 
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2004–2012: 
N=646  I_BA I_C I_Pol S_BA S_C S_Pol 
Mix_B
A Mix_C Mix_Pol 
None 0 67 72 1 26 25 0 8 11 
1 affiliation 65 17 11 34 9 10 4 3 2 
2 affiliations 11 0 1 0 0 0 8 3 1 
3 affiliations 8 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Total 
Business 
Groups I/S/M 
84 35 14 
 
7. Organisational overlaps: visualisation information and details on exclusion of 
weakest overlaps in graphs 
In the full graphs, not all organisational overlaps are shown, and instead only the 
strongest were selected to reduce clutter. In 1993, seven overlaps were excluded; six 
were between approximately 0.5 and 0.6, signifying a weak positive relationship. In 
1999 only three overlaps were excluded ranging again between 0.5 and 0.6, i.e. weak 
positive relationships. In 2004 this method led to an exclusion of approximately 14 
overlaps, all of which range between 0.5 and 0.75. The exclusions for the 2004 
period are:  
- Gagiad-Tuskon; Gagiad-Musiad; Gagiad-left; Gagiad- pol right – all in the 0.7 
range; 
- Tuskon-civic secular; Tuskon-left, Tuskon-pol Islamist, Tuskon-TOBB – all above 
.68;  
- Musiad-civic secular; Musiad-left, Musiad-pol Islamist all larger than .53; 
- left-right ; left-Gaziantep Chamber; right-Islamist – all above 0.7. 
 
Different shades of grey were added to make subgroups clearer. However, I 
refrained from a stronger colour differentiation because the interest here is in 
organisational overlaps and not movements. Social movement organisations usually 
share the strongest overlaps so that there is a good overlap between the strongest 
overlaps of each organisation and its affiliated movement. Lighter grey reflects the 
strongest overlaps of secular organisations, darker grey of Islamic organisations and 
medium grey of neutral organisations. In 1993, light grey lines for the secular 
organisations were chosen for the strongest overlaps larger than 0.79. Islamic 
organisations have a slightly lower threshold due to weaker overlaps, so that dark 
grey lines were chosen for the strongest overlaps larger than 0.69. In this time period, 
the strongest overlap of each organisation is in line with its respective subgroup (e.g. 
Müsiad has strongest links to other Islamic organisations). In 1999, the threshold for 
the strongest overlaps is similar for the secular and Islamic subgroups, and is set to 
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overlaps larger than 0.74. Again these are largely in line with each subgroup. In 2004 
the threshold chosen for colouring the strongest overlaps was set at larger than 0.8. 
But in this time period, the strongest overlaps of each organisation are not 
completely in line with its subgroup. There are, for example, unexpectedly strong 
overlaps between civic secular with political left (0.84; coloured silver) and civic 
Islamic at 0.78. 
 
8. Growth in Business Association Membership Categories of Textile Cluster 
Sample Companies Across Time 
This table is based on membership data at the company/firm level and incorporates 
the study sample companies only. It shows the growth of each BA and BA 
combinations as well as the total number of firms; first in total numbers, then in 
percentage, expressed as a ratio relative to the previous time period. A percentage 
smaller than 100 means a decrease in membership, but percentages are interpreted 
relative to firm growth in the cluster. Categories with larger (bold) or smaller than 
firm growth changes are of most interest although BA membership increases overall 
across all time periods. 
 
Table 18: Firm-level membership data across three time periods by BA category 
 
1993–1998 1999–2003 2004–2012 
GAGIAD only 49 61 72 
TUSKON only 16 29 57 
MUSIAD only 8 15 29 
GAGIAD+TUSKON 7 18 13 
GAGIAD+MUSIAD 0 2 5 
TUSKON+MUSIAD 6 6 27 
GAGIAD+TUSKON+MU
SIAD 1 7 55 
GAGIAD total 57 88 145 
TUSKON total 30 60 152 
MUSIAD total 15 30 116 
None 314 452 572 
n (number of firms) 401 590 830 
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Table 19: Firm-level membership growth across three time periods by BA category 
Growth % relative to 
previous time period 1999–2003 2004–2012 
GAGIAD only 124% 118% 
TUSKON only 181% 197% 
MUSIAD only 188% 193% 
GAGIAD+TUSKON 257% 72% 
GAGIAD+MUSIAD 200% 250% 
TUSKON+MUSIAD 100% 450% 
GAGIAD+TUSKON+MU
SIAD 700% 786% 
GAGIAD total 154% 165% 
TUSKON total 200% 253% 
MUSIAD total 200% 387% 
None 144% 127% 
n (number of firms) 147% 141% 
 
9. Interview Guides 
Overview: Businesspeople interview topics 
- Company Background: Firm info, History, and Performance (profits, exports) 
- Production Process in textile industry cluster (specific assets):  ! Financial Capital (e.g. for start-up capital; which banks),  ! Exports (major markets; support from organisations; trust),  ! Innovation (uni-business relations, etc.) and Expansion (growth strategy) ! Flexible specialisation: Subcontracting, Input material and sales (where buy 
what from/sell what to; key materials); cooperation with other 
companies/evaluation in Gaziantep 
- Corporate Social Responsibility: examples of projects by companies and in 
cooperation with BA/political/ civil society organisations; aims and motivations 
- Organisations: Role of connections and examples of cooperation of firms with 
organisations ! BAs, Political parties, public institutions (Chambers and Kosgeb; local and 
national-level politicians); e.g. ever received stimuli from institutions?  ! Civil society groups: CSR projects and activities and their functions 
- Trust and Morality: meaning and role in economy; role of associations in process 
- Contentious/Political: state-business relations; role of religious community 
 
Overview: Business Association interview topics ! Organisational structures: membership figures/growth; personnel; budget; 
board of members (size, election procedure); membership selection process; 
relations with headquarters; internal committees  ! Activities: key activities for members; support activities for economic 
production/trade; relations among members and with political elites – how 
facilitated and why; specific BA questions (e.g. at TUSKON on their 
international trade conferences) ! Network: relations with civil society organisations, public institutions, 
political parties, other BAs; effectiveness at creating ties with political elites 
(compared to personal networks) ! Civil social responsibility: activities; aims and motivations; budgets and 
outcomes 
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! History, identity of association and vision: evaluate political parties, own 
association in relation to each other 
 
Overview: Public institutions interview topics ! Public areas where businessmen are involved individually/collectively, e.g. 
school donation and mosque-building processes ! Rents that can be extracted; resources offered to business community ! Evaluate state-business relations ! Evaluate textile cluster: influential companies; other background data  
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